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ABSTRACT
Woodrow Wilson, upon becoming President of the United 
States in March, 1913, refused diplomatic recognition to 
Mexico's provisional president, Victoriano Huerta, because 
he had seized power by military coup d'etat. Wilson then 
sent an executive agent, William Bayard Hale, to Mexico 
City to investigate the nature of Huerta's regime and the 
role of American Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson in the 
usurper's rise to power. Another agent, Reginald Del 
Valle, appraised the merits of the Constitutionalists—  
revolutionaries in Northern Mexico led by Venustiano 
Carranza. Hale found both Huerta and Ambassador Wilson 
guilty of gross wrongdoing, while Del Valle adjudged the 
Constitutionalists unworthy of support from the United 
States. Ambassador Wilson was recalled and, for the next 
three years, executive agents carried on diplomatic re­
lations with Mexican leaders.
Some of the diplomatic agents were personal repre­
sentatives of the President. In August and November, 1913, 
John Lind attempted to persuade Huerta to remove himself 
from office and was twice rebuffed. Meanwhile, Hale 
offered Carranza guidance from Washington in establishing 
a constitutionally legitimate government in Mexico City
Vand was also rebuffed. In August, 1915, David Lawrence 
failed to persuade Carranza to accept mediation of six 
Pan-American nations in ending the Mexican civil war.
Other presidential agents served primarily as fact­
finders. Lind scrutinized the Huerta government and the 
intensifying revolution between August, 1913, and April, 
1914. After the fall of Huerta in July, 1914, Paul 
Fuller attempted to determine which revolutionary leaders 
were most capable of establishing a new constitutional 
government. When the revolutionaries were unable to do 
so peacefully, Duval West attempted in the Spring of 1915 
to determine whether they were capable of ever establish­
ing a stable government.
Some of the executive agents represented the State 
Department. In order to minimize the danger to foreign 
lives and property that resulted from the continuing civil 
war, the Department assigned agents to accompany revo­
lutionary leaders. George C. Carothers travelled with 
General Pancho Villa from December, 1914, to October, 1915, 
and John R. Silliman joined Carranza in July, 1914.
Assisted by John W. Belt, Silliman remained in this 
capacity until March, 1916. Leon J. Canova served on 
roving mission between June, 1914, and January, 1915. 
Although never officially accredited as an agent, H. L.
Hall accompanied Emiliano Zapata, the revolutionary leader 
of the South, and, between October, 1914, and August,
1916, informed the Department of developments in that part 
of Mexico.
Fact-finders Hale and Lind, together with State De­
partment Agent Carothers, succeeded by Spring, 1914, in 
persuading President Wilson that the Constitutionalists’ 
program deserved the support of the United States.
Because Villa continually responded more favorably to 
Wilson's urgings than did Carranza, the American President^ 
acting through Agents Carothers and Canova, sought to 
promote V i l l a ’s ascendency in Mexican politics. In the 
process, Carothers and Canova became as much the agents 
of Pancho Villa as of the State Department. Silliman 
became similarly involved with Carranza’s faction.
Carothers exercised considerable influence over Villa's 
actions and attitudes, but Silliman did not likewise 
influence Carranza.
By mid-October, 1915, Carranza, having overcome the 
influences of Carothers and Canova, the unfavorable re­
ports of Del Valle, Fuller, and West, and the ineffectu­
ality of Silliman, triumphed by force of arms and re­
ceived d_e facto recognition from President Wilson. The 
interference of Wilson and his agents doubtless left an 
enduring legacy of animosity in Mexico. Yet their 
activities helped promote a revolutionary victory, which 
ultimately benefitted the Mexican people.
vii
This dissertation was researched primarily from 
government archives and manuscript and newspaper col­
lections in the United States and Mexico.
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PREFACE
From the earliest days of the Republic, Presidents 
of the United States have utilized the services of special 
executive agents in the conduct of diplomatic relations. 
George Washington set the precedent in designating 
Gouverneur Morris as his "private agent" to carry on some 
secret negotiations with agents of the King of Great 
Britain. Subsequent administrations found the services 
of such agents invaluable, especially in the conduct of 
secret diplomacy.
His use of executive agents allows the President to 
conduct foreign relations without consulting the Senate 
in any way. Their salaries and expenses are usually 
drawn from the President’s secret contingent fund, for the 
expenditure of which he is not required to make an account­
ing. They are not, strictly speaking, public ministers or 
foreign service officers, but they are usually accorded 
the same privileges and immunities by foreign governments 
as are officially accredited representatives of the United 
States Government.
Few, if any, Presidents have utilized executive agents 
as extensively as did Woodrow Wilson. For example, he 
sent Colonel Edward M. House on missions to England and
Europe during World War I; he approved Elihu Root's good­
will mission to Russia following the revolution of March, 
1917; and he named a board of experts, called the 
Inquiry, to advise him on post-war problems and had many 
of these men accompany him to the Versailles Conference. 
But his very implementation of this policy occurred even 
before World War I, when, beginning in 1913, he sent 
executive agents scurrying all over Mexico.
Some of his agents Wilson sent to Mexico on fact­
finding missions, and, although their reports were often 
routed through the State Department, they were directly 
responsible to the President. This group included William 
Bayard Hale, Reginaldo Del Valle, Paul Fuller, and Duval 
West. Others were sent to carry on diplomatic relations 
with the government in Mexico City or with leaders of the 
revolutionary factions. One, John Lind, was responsible 
directly to the President. For a time, he also served as 
a fact-finding agent. Another, David Lawrence, went of 
his own volition but with the President's blessing, and 
had only the most tenuous ties to the White House.
Others, including George C. Carothers, John Silliman, Leon 
J. Canova, John W. Belt, and H. L. Hall, were State De­
partment agents. Carothers and Silliman served simul­
taneously as consuls, Belt as a consular secretary, and 
their salaries were paid by the Consular Service.
XWhat follows is an account of the activities and the 
diplomacy of these eleven men and the influence they 
exerted on Wilson's foreign policy and on the course of 
the Mexican Revolution.
CHAPTER I
A NEED FOR INFORMATION
Mexico provided Woodrow Wilson with the first stern 
test of his skill as a diplomatist. When he began his 
presidency, he had no experience or training in the conduct 
of foreign relations. During his notable academic career 
as a professor of political science and history and as 
president of Princeton University, Wilson devoted himself 
mainly to the study of domestic politics and legislative 
processes. He scarcely mentioned foreign affairs in the 
presidential campaign of 1912, and his inaugural address 
dealt exclusively with domestic probl e m s .^
Wilson did not consider himself handicapped by these 
apparent deficiencies in his training. The orthodox tenets 
of foreign policy, such as expediency, protection of 
material interests, and national self-interest, were rela­
tively unimportant to him. He insisted that morality 
should be the principal consideration in international 
conduct, and he envisioned a new era in which the foreign 
policy of the United States would be determined by moral 
purposes and guided by idealism. Wilson's own idealism
iRay Stannard Baker, Woodrow W i l s o n ; Life and Letters 
(8 v o l s . ; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc.,
1931), IV, 55-56; Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), 3-11.
1
2grew out of the beliefs and values of Christianity, more
particularly the Presbyterian theology inculcated in him 
2
by his father.
In selecting William Jennings Bryan as his first 
Secretary of State, Wilson chose a man equally ignorant of 
foreign affairs, but one who shared his president's Presby­
terian background and faith in Christian ethics as the 
proper guideposts in relations between men and nations. 
Incorporated in Wilson and Bryan's idealism was a mission­
ary zeal to do good works and a concept of America's unique 
mission in world affairs. Because democratic institutions, 
which to them were the most Christian and ideal, had 
flourished in the United States, they believed that their 
country was divinely commissioned to promote the establish­
ment of such institutions in nations that did not possess 
them. This often led them to believe that they knew, 
better than did the leaders of those countries themselves, 
what was best for countries that seemed less fortunate than 
the United States. Their determination to render service 
caused Wilson and Bryan to interfere in the internal 
affairs of other nations on a scale greater than any
2
Link, Wilson The Diplomatis t , 16-18; Harley Notter, 
The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1937), 269; Arthur S.
Link, W i l s o n : The New Freedom (Princeton, N . J . : Princeton
University Press, 1956), 277-78; John Morton Blum, Woodrow 
Wilson and the Politics of Morality (Boston and Toronto: 
Little, Brown and Co., 1956), 84-85.
3
previous administration had contemplated.
Wilson never bore criticism well, and, more often than
not, he believed that those who attacked his policies were
inadequately informed. More likely to follow his own
intuition than to accept expert advice, he particularly
suspected any adverse opinions that might come from State
Department staff members and Foreign Service officers, most
of whom were Republican holdovers. Despite the fact that
most of them had received their appointments on a merit
basis, Wilson and Bryan looked upon them as pseudo-experts,
representatives of an aristocratic clique, who would be
more inclined to promote the material interests of
4
Americans abroad than to pursue altruistic goals.
^Link, New F r e e d o m , 278; Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson 
and the Progressive Era (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers,
1954), 81-82 ; Paolo E. Coletta, William Jennings B r yan, Vol. 
II: Progressive Politician and Moral Statesman, 1909- 1915
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1969), 92-95, 182-
183; Richard Challener, "William Jennings Bryan," An Un­
certain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the
Twentieth Century (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. , Inc. ,
1961), 81-84.
^Link, New F r eedom, 67-70; Link, Wilson The Diploma- 
tist , 24-25. Beginning with the Theodore Roosevelt Ad­
ministration, the State Department increasingly made ap­
pointments on a merit basis. By executive order, Roosevelt 
placed all diplomatic and consular posts, except for the 
rank of ambassador and minister, on a civil-service system, 
requiring competitive examinations. In 1906 Congress gave 
legislative sanction to his moves in regard to the consular 
service. William Howard Taft continued this policy, and, 
during his administration, created a Bureau of Appointments 
to review applications and administer examinations for 
diplomatic and consular posts. See Graham H. Stuart, The 
Department of S t a t e : A Hist ory of its Organiz at i o n ,
Procedure and Personnel (New York: The MacMillan C o . ,
1949), 205-206, 219.
4Desiring a house-cleaning, Bryan argued that the merit 
system should be scrapped: Republican incumbents should be
removed and replaced by "deserving Democrats." Wilson re­
jected this appeal for an outright return to the spoils 
system, but when foreign affairs grew critical, he con­
tinued to show his distaste for the professionals of the 
State Department by taking personal command of the situ­
ation and relying upon special executive agents to carry 
out his diplomatic missions."* His reliance upon special 
agents rather than professionals to help solve a particular 
diplomatic problem, along with his frequent simultaneous 
employment of men who sometimes held conflicting opinions, 
partly explains why his conduct of foreign affairs seemed 
erratic, even impulsive, at times. Perhaps there is no 
better example of this than in his relations with Mexico.
On February 18, 1913, just weeks before Wilson's 
inauguration, Mexican President Francisco I. Madero was 
toppled from power by a military coup d'etat. Madero
Baker, Woodrow WiIs o n , IV, 217-18; Link, New Freedom, 
105-107; Link, Wilson The Diplomatist, 22-25; Coletta, 
Progress ive Polit ician and Moral Statesman, 100-102 ;
Stuart, The Department of S t a t e , 225-30. Because of the
civil-service system established by Roosevelt and Taft, 
Bryan was able to make relatively few changes in the 
personnel of the consular service. Since there were no 
such restrictions preventing him from making changes in 
the diplomatic corps, Bryan, whenever Wilson permitted it, 
replaced Republicans with Democratic office-seekers. He 
was particularly prone to reward political confederates
who had remained loyal to him since 1896.
5himself had been elevated to power by leading a revolution 
which overthrew the thirty-five year old dictatorship of 
Profirio Diaz. Madero, however, was no radical, but a 
nineteenth-century liberal, and he failed to gauge accu­
rately the urgency of the revolutionary demands of many who 
had rallied to his side in fighting the dictator. He 
placed too much faith in the ability of free elections and 
democratic institutions to right the social and economic 
inequities that plagued his nation. Once elected presi­
dent, he proved incapable of leading what proved to be one 
of the great social revolutions of the twentieth century.^
Whatever the limits of his own reformism, even 
Madero's modest efforts to challenge the status quo were 
hampered by a hostile Senate held over from the Diaz 
regime and a Chamber of Deputies which was hopelessly split 
by factional disputes. The influential Catholic Party and 
conservative press vociferously opposed liberal reform. 
Adding to M a d e r o ’s woes, Emiliano Zapata and Pascual 
Orozco, two of his former military chieftains, became dis­
enchanted with their president and took their grievances
g
Anita Brenner and George R. Leighton, The Wind That 
Swept Mexico (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1943), 25-29;
Charles Curtis Cumberland, The Mexican Revolut i o n : Genes is 
Under Madero (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1952), 30,
208-28 , 256-58 ; Stanley R. Ross, Francisco 1^. Madero (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1955), 218-49; Manuel
Gonzalez Ramirez, _La Revolucion Social de M e x i c o , Vol. I:
Las Ideas - J^a. Violencia (Mexico, D.F. : Fondo de Cultura
Economica, 1960), 175-80, 312-18, 325-34.
6into the field in the form of armed rebellion. Such up­
risings, in turn, made Madero's government increasingly 
dependent upon the federal army, the Achilles heel of many 
a Latin-American constitutional regime.^
Compounding Madero's difficulties with the hostile 
attitude of the ambassador from the United States, Henry 
Lane Wilson. Because he was the only ambassador ac­
credited to Mexico City, the diplomatic representative of 
the other powers holding the rank of minister, Wilson 
assumed the role of dean of the diplomatic corps. In this 
capacity, and as the official representative of what he 
considered to be a superior people, Ambassador Wilson 
assumed that President Madero would seek his advice.
Wilson's personal attitudes, however, made this impossible. 
An admirer of former dictator Porfirio Diaz, the ambassador 
did not think the Mexican people capable of self-government. 
Such an attitude made his counsels incompatible with 
Madero's expressed desires to promote political democracy 
in his country. His advice spurned, Wilson grew increasing­
ly antagonistic toward the new government and vocally 
critical of President Madero.
^Cumberland, The Mexican Revolution, 184-99; Ross, 
Francis co JE. Ma d e r o , 226-32 ; Gonzales Ramirez, Las Ideas - 
La Violencia, 304-306; Michael C. Meyer, Mexican Rebel;
Pascual Orozco and the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1915 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967), 55-62;
John Womack, Jr. , Zapata and the Mexican Revolut ion (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), 124-28.
7Madero's refusal to follow the advice of the American 
diplomat was not the only source of antagonism between the 
two. An appointee of the William Howard Taft Adminis­
tration, Henry Lane Wilson naturally believed that his 
major responsibility in Mexico was to promote American 
business interests and ensure the protection of Americans 
and their property. The rebellions in Mexico, which took 
a toll in American lives and property, and Madero's in­
ability to quell them, were a constant source of irri­
tation to the ambassador. It was no secret that he yearned 
for a more authoritarian regime in Mexico and repeatedly 
prophesied that Madero's ineffective government could not 
last. Knowing well that the Democratic Party in the 
United States had adopted an anti-imperialist stance since 
1898, Madero looked forward to the inauguration of Woodrow 
Wilson, anticipating that the Republican ambassador would 
be recalled.^
Madero's wish was ultimately fulfilled, but not in 
time to do him any good. On February 9, 1913, Felix D^az, 
a nephew of Porfirio Diaz, led several army units in
3
Ross, Francisco I. M a d e r o , 236-40; Howard F. Cline, 
The United States and Mexico (Cambridge, M a s s . : Harvard
University Press, 1953), 128-30; Lowell L. Blaisdell,
"Henry Lane Wilson and the Overthrow of Madero," South- 
wes tern Social Science Q u arterly, XVIII (September, 1962), 
128-29; Eugene F. Massingill, "The Diplomatic Career of 
Henry Lane Wilson in Latin-America," Unpublished Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1957, pp. 87- 
93.
8revolt against the government in Mexico City. Madero had 
no other recourse but to call in additional federal army 
units to defend himself, placing them under the command 
of General Victoriano Huerta. Although there had been 
considerable antagonism between President Madero and the 
general, Huerta had an outstanding record of loyal service 
to the government and had proved on more than one occasion 
that he was one of the better commanders in the federal 
army. What Madero did not take into account was the fact 
that Huerta, an admirer of the Porfirian regime, had no 
faith in the workability of democratic institutions in 
Mexico. As an army officer, he was a stern exponent of 
order and was annoyed by the recurrent disorders that 
followed the downfall of the dictatorship.
At age fifty-nine, Huerta was bald, stocky in build, 
and had an oval-shaped high cheek-boned face that re­
vealed his Indian ancestry. A consumer of legendary 
quantities of brandy, he was plagued by cataracts and 
usually wore smoked glasses. When he appeared without 
them, he squinted, and this gave him a sinister counte­
nance. Although he was not a party to the original Felix 
Diaz revolt, Huerta did not seriously attempt to put it 
down. Instead, while his troops mounted feeble attacks 
on the rebel stronghold, he negotiated with the insur­
rectionists and ultimately conspired with Diaz to oust 
Madero. On February 18, Huerta ordered the arrest of
9Madero and Vice President Jose M. Pino Suarez and assumed
9
control of the government.
During the ten days of mock battle (February 9-18, 
Decena Tragica) , Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson took an 
active part in efforts to terminate the military action. 
Instead of blaming the insurrectionists, he insisted that 
M a d e r o ’s faltering leadership was responsible for the 
protracted violence which threatened the lives and 
property of innocents, including foreigners. He had long 
since concluded that the little president's ineffectual 
regime would be toppled sooner or later; therefore, he 
believed his responsibility was to hasten its fall in 
order to put an end to the carnage and destruction. He 
applied pressure through government officials and members 
of the diplomatic corps, seeking Madero's resignation, but 
the beleaguered president refused to capitulate. The 
ambassador then approached General Huerta, who reported 
that the conflict would soon be terminated. Although he 
was not a party to the D^az-Huerta conspiracy before the 
arrest of Madero, Ambassador Wilson was made aware that the 
president's ouster was imminent. Indeed, Wilson was
^Cumberland, The Mexican Revolution, 233-38; Ross, 
Francis co _I_. Ma d e r o , 191-202, 263-67, 284-309 ; George Jay 
Rausch, Jr., "Victoriano Huerta: A Political Biography,"
Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Illinois, 
1960, pp. 1-69; William L. Sherman and Richard E. Green- 
leaf, Victoriano H u e r t a : A Reappraisal (Mexico, D.F.:
Mexico City College Press, 1960), 63-71.
10
informed of the success of the coup well before it became 
a matter of public knowledge.
With Madero removed from power, Ambassador Wilson 
set about insuring that the successor would be strong 
enough to maintain order. The day of Madero's arrest, 
Wilson arranged a conference at the American Embassy be­
tween Diaz and Huerta. Under the aegis of the American 
Ambassador, an agreement, known as the Pact of the 
Embassy, was hammered out, whereby Huerta was to become 
provisional president. Huerta, in turn, agreed to 
operate with a cabinet chosen by Diaz. Since the consti­
tution precluded a provisional president from succeeding 
himself as elective president, Huerta agreed to support 
Diaz in the next election. At the ambassador's urging, 
both Huerta and D^az on February 18 promised to do all 
in their power to restore order in Mexico. Confident 
that he had played a key role in saving a prostrate 
nation from further chaos, Wilson then triumphantly 
presented Huerta and Ddiaz to a gathering of the diplo­
matic corps, heralding them as the guarantors of sta­
bility in M e x i c o . ^
^ C u m b e r l a n d ,  The Mexi can Revolut i o n , 238; Ross, 
Francis co 1^. M a d e r o , 297-311 ; Cline, The Uni ted States 
and M e x i c o , 131-32; Massingill, "The Diplomatic Career 
of Henry Lane Wilson in Latin America," 137-71; Blaisdell, 
"Henry Lane Wilson and the Overthrow of Madero," South­
west ern Social Science Quarterly , XVIII, 130-33 ; Alberto 
M. Carreiio, _La Diplomacia Extraordinaria entre Mexico 
Es t ados Unidos (2 v o1s . ; M e x i c o , D .F . : Editorial Jus,
1951), II, 265-66; Isidro Fabela, Historia Diplomitica
11
The next day President Madero and Vice President 
Pino Suarez were forced to resign, making Foreign 
Minister Pedro S. Lascurain the constitutional successor.
As soon as the Chamber of Deputies ratified these changes, 
Lascurain appointed General Huerta Minister of Gobernacidn, 
thus making Huerta the legal heir to the presidency. With­
in minutes, Lascurefin, too, resigned, and the Chamber 
ratified Huerta's succession to the provisional presi­
dency. At least technically, therefore, Huerta's 
accession to power was carried out in accordance with 
constitutional processes.
The manner in which the cynical old general had 
usurped the power of state was entirely in keeping with the 
precedents of Mexican history. The one incident in the 
whole episode that shocked the world was the murder of 
Madero and Pino Suarez on February 22. Although the 
government's report of the incident indicated that they had 
been shot during an attempt to prevent them from being in­
carcerated in the federal penitentiary, few accepted this 
official explanation. It is difficult to assess absolute 
responsibility for the murders. Both the Huertistas and
de la Revolucion Mexicana (2 v o l s .; M e x i c o , D . F .: Fondo
de Cultura EconJmica, 1958-1959), I, 69-118; Kenneth J. 
Grieb, The United States and Huerta (Lincoln, N e b . : Uni­
versity of Nebraska Press, 1969), 15-21.
12
the Felicis tas (Felix Diaz faction) had discussed the
advisability of their being eliminated; but, whether it
was Huerta, Diaz, or one or more of their subalterns who
ordered the assassinations, the records do not reveal.
Neither faction can be absolved of partial blame, since
11no one made adequate precautions for their safety.
Nor was Henry Lane Wilson innocent of responsibility. 
Because of his involvement in the events of the Decena 
Tragica, the American Embassy naturally became the focal 
point of those who wished to save the deposed president's 
life. Secretary of State Philander C. Knox, members of 
the diplomatic corps, and friends and relatives of Madero 
all beseeched Wilson to use his obvious influence with the 
new government to insure the safety of Madero and Pino 
Suarez. Wilson did reluctantly accompany the German 
Minister to ask Huerta for such guarantees, and the old 
general responded favorably. On another occasion, however, 
Huerta asked the ambassador's advice on the advisability 
of exiling Madero or confining him to a lunatic asylum. 
Wilson revealed his indifference to Madero's welfare by 
replying that the general should do what was "best for the 
peace of Mexico." To others who approached him concerning
^ C u m b e r l a n d ,  The Mexican Revolution, 240-41; Ross, 
Francisco JE. M a d e r o , 326-31 ; Rausch, "Victoriano Huerta," 
82-88; Sherman and Greenleaf, Victoriano Hue r t a , 79-84 ; 
Ramon Prida, From Despotism to Anarchy (El Paso: El Paso
Publishing Co., 1914), 196-201.
13
the safety of the fallen president, the Ambassador re­
sponded that he could not interfere in the internal
12
affairs of Mexico.
By Huerta's own admission, the most critical problem
facing tis provisional government was securing diplomatic
recognition from the world powers, particularly from the
United States. Recognition meant a renewal of old loans
and possibly new ones that would be needed to make his
13regime a stable one. At a meeting of the diplomatic
corps on February 21, Henry Lane Wilson urged the envoys 
of the foreign powers to impress upon their governments, 
as a means of promoting stable conditions in Mexico, the 
necessity of according diplomatic recognition to the new 
government. Thus, he implied without justification that 
United States would soon extend recognition. All of the 
European powers and most of the Latin American govern­
ments accorded Huerta's regime diplomatic recognition in 
March and April. Despite Wilson's urging, the Taft Ad­
ministration refused to follow suit. The Ambassador 
emphasized that Huerta was pro-American and would give
^ C u m b e r l a n d , The Mexican Revolut i o n , 239-40 ; Ross, 
Francis co _I. M a d e r o , 321-26 ; Massingill, "The Diplomatic 
Career of Henry Lane Wilson in Latin America," 180-90; 
Fabela, Historia Diplomatica de la Revolucii^n Mexicana,
I, 154-58; Grieb, The United States and H u e r t a , 24-28.
1 ^ Victoriano Huerta, Memorias de Victoriano Huerta 
(Mexico, D.F.: Edicirfnes "Vertice", 1957), 93.
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prompt attention to his requests, but Secretary of State
Knox wanted several matters, including damage claims, the
Chamizal controversy, and the distribution of Colorado
River waters, settled before extending recognition.
These disputes had not been settled when Woodrow Wilson
became President on March 4, and the matter of recognition
14
passed into his hands.
President Wilson had little knowledge of Latin Ameri­
can history and politics, and he looked at the Mexican 
situation from a frame of reference based on Anglo-Ameri­
can history and theory. He seemed unaware that the 
succession of Latin American governments was more likely 
to result from violence than from fair and free elections. 
Because Madero had championed political democracy while 
being elected president in the freest elections ever held 
in Mexico, Wilson assumed that the maintenance of demo­
cratic institutions was as important to Mexicans as to 
Anglo-Americans. Failing to perceive that, among Mexican 
reformers, social and economic adjustments were considered 
vastly more important than political democracy, Wilson 
believed that a government established by force must be
■^Cline, The Uni ted States and M e x i c o , 133-34 ; Massin- 
gill, "The Diplomatic Career of Henry Lane Wilson in Latin 
America," 202-209 ; Grieb, The United States and H u e r t a , 
36-37. The "Chamizal" is a six-hundred acre tract of land 
near El Paso claimed by both the United States and Mexico 
because of change in course of the Rio Grande.
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oppressive. He ignored the fact that most of Huerta's
cabinet members were considered to be reformers, and he
judged the provisional government to be a reactionary 
15regime.
Seeking for himself and his nation continued 
favorable relations with the Huerta government, Ambassador 
Henry Lane Wilson bombarded the new Democratic Adminis­
tration in Washington with requests for recognition of 
the Mexico City regime. He pointed out that it was the 
de facto government of the republic and had been es-
16tablished "in accordance with constitutional precedents." 
President Wilson, however, arrived at his own conclusion: 
the constitutional government of Mexico had been usurped, 
and he could not recognize a government of murderers. In
l^Grieb, The United States and H u e r t a , 42-43 ; Samuel 
Flagg B e m i s , "Woodrow Wilson and Latin America," Edward 
H. Buehrig (ed.), W i l s o n 's Foreign Policy in Perspective 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), 113-16;
Jorge Vera Estafiol, La_ Revoluci<5n Mexi c a n a : O n g e n e s  £
Resultados (Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Porrua, S.A., 1957),
277-84. Vera Estanol, who was Huerta's first Minister of 
Public Instruction, describes the background of each 
cabinet member and points out that only the Minister of 
War, General Manuel Mondrag<4n, was not considered a 
reformer. Vera Estanol argues that revolutionary propa­
ganda, which branded the group as reactionaries, throw- 
backs to the Porfirian regime, gave a false and un­
justified impression of the group.
X 6Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson to Department of 
State, March 8, 12, and April 9, 1913, Department of 
State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relat ions of the 
United States, 1913 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1920), 760, 772, 776.
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order to make his position clear to the world and to 
discourage future military coups in Latin America, on 
March 11, just a week after taking office, the President 
issued a statement of foreign policy making himself the 
judge of the constitutional legitimacy of Latin American 
governments:
We hold . . . that just government rests always
upon the consent of the governed . . . We can
have no sympathy with those who seek to seize 
the power of government to advance their own 
personal interests or ambitions . . .  As friends, 
therefore, we shall prefer those who act in the 
interests of peace and honor, who protect private 
rights and respect the restraints of consti­
tutional provision.17
T h u s , Wilson announced his intention of breaking the 
tradition of recognizing c[e facto regimes if they did not 
meet his standards of constitutional legitimacy.
If Wilson had needed a more practical reason for 
denying Huerta d_e facto recognition, it was readily 
available. It was by no means certain that the old 
general would be able to control his country. Although 
all but four state governors had immediately acknowledged 
allegiance to the new regime, and the federal army was 
devotedly loyal to Huerta, the dissidents were growing in 
number. Emiliano Zapata refused to come to terms with 
the new government, and his bands controlled the mountains 
that ringed Mexico City to the south and west. At this 
stage in his long revolutionary career, the agrarian 
17New York Times. March 12, 1913, p. 1.
17
reformer from the State of Morelos had already surrounded 
himself with ardent revolutionaries, some of Marxian 
persuasion, who made his faction the most radical in 
Mexico. Just thirty-four, Zapata, a small man with dart­
ing black eyes and an enormous drooping mustache, was 
suspicious of any government that established itself in 
the capital city. Each one that he had confronted had 
attempted to persuade him to compromise his reform 
program as outlined in the Plan of Ayala, a document that 
amounted to a holy writ to the rebels who rallied to his 
side. In accordance with the plan, Zapata fully intended 
to return lands that had been despoiled from the peasants 
during the Porfirian regime and to expropriate and re­
distribute one-third of the hacienda (large plantation or 
ranch) lands of his district. Not concerned with reform­
ing all of Mexico, his was a local peasant revolution,
and he was prepared to fight until his demands were un-
18
conditionally accepted.
In the northeastern state of Coahuila, Venustiano 
Carranza, the constitutionally elected governor, refused 
to acknowledge allegiance to the Huerta regime. Tall and
18 / /Womack, Z a p a t a , 159-77 ; Gonzalez Ramirez, Las
Ideas - La Violencia, 259, 278-83; Manuel Gonzalez 
Ramirez , La Revolucicfn Social de Mexico , Vol. Ill: El
Problema Agrario (Mexico, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura
Econrfmica, 1966), 202-205; Robert P. Dillon, Zapata: The
Ideology o f A Peas ant Revolutionary (New York: Inter­
national Publishers, 1969), 39-41; "Plan de Ayala," Manuel 
Gonzalez Ramirez (ed.) , Fuentes para la Historia de la
18
taciturn, with a flowing white beard, Carranza, at age 
fifty-five, was a patriarchal figure. No radical, he was, 
as Madero had been, the heir to Mexico's nineteenth- 
century liberal tradition. A lawyer, he represented the 
urban middle-class. He surrounded himself with lawyers 
and other middle-class professionals and was approachable 
only through these intermediaries. He was too insufferably 
certain of his own rectitude to be popular, and he did not 
have the charisma to be a beloved leader of the masses.
Yet, he was to dominate the Mexican Revolution until 1919.
Always properly legalistic, Carranza followed the 
hallowed Mexican practice of stating at the outset the 
purposes of a revolt. On March 26, 1913, he promulgated 
his Plan of Guadalupe. Claiming that Huerta had assumed 
power by unconstitutional means, Carranza dedicated his 
revolution to restoring constitutional government; hence, 
the name of his followers became the "Constitutionalists." 
Refusing to take the title of "provisional president," 
since by doing so he would be ineligible to become elective 
president, Carranza assumed the title of "First Chief of 
the Constitutionalist Army in Charge of Executive Power." 
Although he cited the assassination of Madero as justifi­
cation for rebelling, other considerations were probably
Revolucitfn Mexicana, Vol. I: Planes Politicos otros
documentos (Md’xico, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Econrfmica,
1954), 73-85.
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more important to him. Without making an issue of the 
death of Madero, Carranza, who had been a leading Maderista 
in the fight against Porfirio Diaz, entered into negoti­
ations with Huerta officials to discuss his possible recog­
nition of the provisional government. As conditions, he 
demanded a high degree of state sovereignty for Coahuila 
and extensive power for himself. Huerta refused the terms. 
Only then did Carranza secure a resolution from the Coa­
huila legislature condemning the general as a usurper. 
Carranza's rebellion, therefore, was prompted as much by 
personal ambition and a determination to maintain absolute 
control over his state as by idealistic considerations. 
Temporarily forced to flee from the federal armies,
Carranza and his "cabinet" established their headquarters 
in Piedras Negras, across the Rio Grande from Eagle Pass, 
T e x a s . ^
l^Gonzalez Ramirez, Las Ideas - Lai Violencia, 375-81; 
"Decreto de la Legislatura del Estado de Coahuila por el 
que se desconoce Victoriano Huerta, February 19, 1913," and 
"Plan de Guadalupe, 26 de Marzo 1913," Gonzalez Ramirez, 
Planes Politicos y otros documentos, 134 , 137-40 ; Juan 
Barrag^n Rodriguez , His tor ia del E j 4.x cito cle la_ Revo- 
lucidn Constitucionalista (2 v o l s . ; Mexico, D . F . : Talleres 
de la Editorial Stylo, 1946), I, 63-100; Robert E. Quirk, 
The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915 (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, I960), 8-11; Kenneth J. Grieb, "The 
Causes of the Carranza Rebellion: A Re-interpretation,"
The Americas, XXV (July, 1968), 28-32. The main object of 
contention between Huerta and Carranza was the disposition 
of irregular state troops. These troops, the remnants of 
Madero's revolutionary armies, were kept under control of 
the state governor, but Carranza wanted the federal govern­
ment to pay their expenses. Huerta refused unless they 
were brought under direct control of the government in 
Mexico City. Carranza had also quarreled over this matter
20
In the northwestern state of Sonora, Governor Jose M. 
Maytorena also refused to recognize the Huerta government. 
As in the case of Coahuila, the paramount issue was state 
sovereignty, and, again, Huerta refused to make concessions. 
Maytorena, however, was reluctant to declare himself in 
open rebellion, and, when he hedged, the state legislature 
pressured him into taking a leave-of-absence. On March 5, 
after he had crossed the border into Arizona in temporary 
exile, the Sonoran Legislature named Ignacio L. Pesquiera 
governor and declared the state to be in rebellion against 
the Huerta regime. The Sonorans quickly linked their 
fortunes to the Constitutionalist cause and acknowledged 
Carranza as their First Chief.
The Sonoran revolt, however, was soon dominated by 
Alvaro Obregrfn, the commander of the state's military 
forces. In 1913, Obregdn was still a relatively obscure 
figure, but he was to become the ablest military leader of 
the revolution and one of the dominant political figures of 
the 1920's. At age thirty-three, he was a slender, 
strikingly handsome man. Like Pesquiera and the other 
leaders of the Sonoran revolt, Obreg^n came from a ranchero 
(middle-class farmer) background. More than any other 
revolutionary leader, he was a pragmatist. Although he was
with President Madero before he was deposed. See Miguel 
Alessio Robles, Historia Politica de la Revoluci^n (3d. ed.; 
Mexico, D.F.: Edicidnes Botas, 1946), 24-25.
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no radical, when circumstances dictated he did not shrink 
from using the language of a radical demagogue in enticing 
the lower classes into the revolutionary armies. Within 
weeks of the outset of the Sonoran revolt, his forces
20controlled the border towns and the capital, Hermosillo.
In the north-central state of Chihuahua, the revo­
lution coalesced around Francisco (Pancho) Villa. Possibly 
the most colorful and controversial of all the revolution­
ary leaders, he was born Doroteo Arango and adopted the 
name Pancho Villa after becoming an outlaw. The origin of 
his outlawry is uncertain; the most popular legend of the 
day claimed that he had slain the son of an hacendado 
(owner of a large plantation or ranch) who had ravished 
his sister. Joining the Maderistas in 1910, he proved his 
worth in battle and was commissioned a colonel in the 
revolutionary army. Given an opportunity to live a re­
spectable life by Madero, he was probably the only
20Gonz^lez Ramirez , Las Ideas - L_a Violencia, 247 , 
381-87 ; Barrag^n Rodriguez, His toria . . . ^e _la Revolucion
Constitucionalista, I, 131-51; "Decreto del Congresso del 
Estado de Sonora por el que se desconoce a Victoriano 
Huerta," and "Acta de la Conferencia, 18 de Abril 1913," 
Planes Politicos £  otros documentos, 135-36 , 145-47 ;
Alberto Morales Jiminez, "Alvaro Obregcfn," Hombres de 1 a 
Revolucion Mexi cana (Mexico, D.F.: Instituto Nacional de
Estudios de la RevoluciOn Mexicans, 1960), 183-84; Ernest 
Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage (New York and London:
The Century Co., 1928), 97; Lesley Byrd Simpson, Many 
Mexicos (3d. ed . , rev.; Berkley, Calif: University of 
California Press, 1964), 271-72; John W. F. Dulles, Yester­
day In M e x i c o : A Chronicle of the Revolut i o n , 1919-1936
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), "4-6.
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revolutionary leader who truly revered the memory of the 
fallen president. To Villa everything was personal and 
concrete; therefore, his revolt was prompted by hatred of 
Huerta and a desire to avenge the death of Madero. -No 
ideologue, he reveled in the camaraderie of the army camp 
and in leading men in battle. Stocky in build, he was an 
earthy, passionate, and robust man. He inspired fear and 
loyalty among his followers. In return, he was fiercely 
loyal to his men. He was Mexican machismo (virility or 
manliness) incarnate. He also declared his allegiance to 
Carranza but, for all practical purposes, remained an inde­
pendent f o r c e . ^
Victoriano Huerta had to contend with all of these 
revolutionary forces, and, ultimately, so did Woodrow 
Wilson, as his non-recognition policy drew him into the
2lGonzilez Ramirez, Las Ideas - La Violencia, 387-88; 
Barragin Rodriguez , Historia . . . cle l_a Revolucid'n
Constitucionalista, I, 229-40; Haldeen Braddy, Cock of the 
W a l k : The Legend of Pancho Villa (Albuquerque: Uni­
versity of New Mexico Press, 1955), 1-31, 90-101; Martin 
Luis Guzman, Memoirs of Pancho V i l l a , trans. Virginia H. 
Taylor (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1965), 3-4,
90-103; Francisco R. Alamada, Ija. Revolucicfn en el Es tado 
de Chihuahua (2 v o l s . ; Mexico, D.F.: Instituto Nacional
de Estudios Historicos de la Revolucic^n Mexicana, 1965),
II, 25-32. Pancho Villa had a personal reason to dislike 
Huerta. In April and May, 1912, Villa and his irregulars 
had served under the general in a campaign designed to 
crush the Orozco rebellion. When the two quarreled over 
the ownership of an expropriated horse, Huerta charged 
Villa with insubordination and ordered him summarily shot. 
Already standing before the firing squad, Villa's life was 
spared by order of President Madero, and he was trans­
ferred to Mexico City for trial. He escaped from prison 
and made his way to El Paso, Texas. Although an exile, he 
remained grateful to Madero for having saved his life,
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the Mexican imbroglio. Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson, mean­
while, continued to push for recognition, insisting that 
Huerta was the only man who could pacify Mexico. He also 
pointed up the possible consequences of a delay in recog­
nition: the rebels would be encouraged, the civil war pro­
longed, and the toll of American lives and damage to their
22property much greater. Such arguments were hardly well
calculated to impress the president. As he told one of his 
advisors: "I am President of the whole United States and
not merely of a few property holders in the Republic of - 
M exico.
The President would gladly have recalled Ambassador 
Wilson, but sending a replacement to Mexico City would have 
constituted diplomatic recognition of the Huerta regime.
The ambassador, therefore, was studiously ignored in Wash­
ington; but the Administration could not ignore charges 
leveled against him by Robert H. Murray, Mexican corre­
spondent for the New York Wo r i d . Beginning on March 7, the 
WorId printed a series of Murray's articles, presenting a
while he kindled a personal hatred for Huerta. See Ross, 
Francisco I_. M a d e r o , 266-67.
^^Wilson to State Department, April 9, 25, and May 15, 
1913, General Records of the Department of State, National 
Archives, RG 59, 812.00/7066, 7273, 7652; hereinafter 
documents from the State Department 812.00 (Internal 
Affairs of Mexico) file will be cited only by the specific 
document number preceded by a slash.
23Rear Admiral Gary T. Grayson, Woodrow W i l s o n : An 
Intimate Memoir (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1960), 30.
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somewhat distorted expose of Ambassador Wilson's role in 
the Decena T r a g i c a . President Wilson already disagreed 
fundamentally with the views of his official representative 
in Mexico; now, Murray charged that the ambassador had 
helped instigate the Huerta coup and was largely responsi­
ble for the downfall of M a d e r o . ^
For weeks thereafter, President Wilson pondered the 
situation, his inexperience in foreign affairs denying him 
satisfactory answers. He discussed the problem with his 
cabinet and came to the conclusion that they all lacked 
trustworthy information upon which to base a policy.
During the course of the cabinet meeting of April 18, the 
advisability of sending "a confidential man" to Mexico to
"study the situation and get at the exact facts" was one
2 5
of the topics of discussion. Having previously utilized
the services of a special agent to gather information in
Philippine Islands, Wilson decided to follow the same
2 6
course in Mexico. On April 19, the day after the cabinet
24
New York Wo r i d , March 7-13, 1913. Later Murray ex­
panded his original expos^ into a series of magazine arti­
cles. See "Huerta and the Two Wilsons," Ha r p e r 's We e k l y , 
LXII (March 25-April 29, 1916), 301-303, 341-42, 364-65, 
402-404, 434-36, 466-69.
2 5E. David Cronon (ed.) , The Cabinet Diaries of 
Josephus Daniels , 1913-19 21 (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1963), 43.
26j}aker, Woodrow Wils o n , IV, 455; Roy Watson Curry, 
"Woodrow Wilson and Philippine Policy," Mississippi Valley 
Historical R e v i e w , XLI (December, 1954), 436. Even before 
taking office, Wilson despatched Professor Henry J. Ford, 
a former Princeton colleague, on a fact-finding mission to
25
discussed the matter, the President pecked out a letter 
on his portable typewriter, requesting the services of 
his first special agent to Mexico.
the Phillipines. Ford began reporting his findings in 
April, 1913.
CHAPTER II
SUSPICIONS CONFIRMED
Wilson chose a friend, journalist William Bayard Hale, 
to be his first fact-finding agent to Mexico. Forty-four 
years old in 1913, Hale was tall, slender, and dark, with 
thick black eyebrows that met above't'he bridge of his nose 
and gave him a devilish appearance. A native of Indiana, 
he had been educated for the ministry at Episcopal Theo­
logical Seminary in Cambridge, Massachusetts, after first 
studying at Boston University and Harvard. On ordination 
in 1893, he became rector of a church in Middleboro, 
Massachusetts, but his influence soon extended beyond his 
parish. Urging all Christians to be as revolutionary as 
Christ, he reflected the outlook of the Social Gospel 
movement in his articles in Arena magazine and in his book, 
The New Obedience.'*'
Victor Rosewater, "William Bayard Hale," Pictionary 
of American Biography, e d . Allen Johnson, e t . a l . (22
v o l s . ; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928-1958),
VIII, 112; "William Bayard Hale," National Cyclopedia of 
American Biography (50 v o l s . ; New York: James T. White &
Co., 1898-1968), XV, 182; "William Bayard Hale," W h o 1s 
Who In A m e r i c a , 1916-1917, Vol. IX, 1036; New York T i m e s , 
August 25, 1895, March 22, 1897. Hale's reform ideas 
resembled those of Henry George. He believed that the 
land-holding system of the United States promoted an 
inequitable distribution of wealth and should be revised.
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After building a new church for his congregation, Hale 
left the parish to engage in university extension work in 
Europe, and in 1895 lectured at Oxford University. Upon 
his return to the United States, he took a parish in 
Ardmore, Pennsylvania. Dissatisfied with the confinements 
of parish preaching, he again took to the road in 1900 and 
stumped the West for Democratic presidential hopeful 
William Jennings Bryan. Although he retained his clerical 
orders for another eight years, Hale abandoned the active 
ministry in 1901 for a career in journalism.
During the first few years in his new profession, Hale 
served on the editorial staffs of Cosmopolitan and Cur rent 
Literature, then as special correspondent for the New York 
Wo r i d , before becoming managing editor of the Philadelphia 
Public Ledger. Moving to the New York Times in 1907, he 
took an assignment that gained him national recognition.
He spent a week in the White House with President Theodore 
Roosevelt and wrote a series of articles depicting the 
everyday life of the chief executive. The articles were 
assembled in book form in 1908 under the title, A Week in 
the White House With Theodore Roosevelt. Even before the 
book was published, Hale went abroad for a second time as 
the Times * Paris correspondent. Returning to the United
A Photograph of Hale as he appeared in 1913 may be found 
in "Mediation As A Remedy for Mexico," Literary Digest , 
XLVII (August 9, 1913), 194.
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States after a year's service in Europe, he took a position 
as associate editor and feature writer for The W o r l d 's 
W o r k .^
The W o r l d 1s W o r k , which owner-editor Walter Hines
3
Page, had dedicated to promoting democratic ideals, gave
Hale an opportunity to promote social and political reforms.
Between 1910 and 1913, he contributed thirty-four articles
to The Wo r i d 's W o r k , making him one of the most prolific
4
journalists of the Progressive Era. Muckraker Ray 
Stannard Baker characterized Hale as a "brilliant journal­
ist. Through his association with Page, who was
championing Woodrow Wilson for the Presidency, Hale was
Rosewater, "William Bayard Hale," D .A .B ., VIII, 112; 
"William Bayard Hale," National Cyclopedia of American 
Biography, XV, 182; "William Bayard Hale," W h o 's Who in 
Ameri c a , 1916- 1 9 1 7 , IX, 103 6 .
3
Burton J. Hendricks, The Life and Letters of Walter 
Hines Page (3 v o l s . ; Garden City, N . Y . : Doubleday, Page
& Co., 1922-1925), I, 69-72.
4
Notable among Hale's articles were "The Speaker or 
the People," XIX (April, 1910), 12805-12, in which he 
defended the House "insurgents" in their attempt to check 
the power of conservative Speaker Joseph G. (Uncle Joe) 
Cannon; "A Dramatic Decade of History," XXI (January, 
1911), 3855-68, in which he catalogued the progressive 
reforms of the first decade of the 20th century; and his 
favorable characterizations of progressive governors 
Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin, Woodrow Wilson of New 
Jersey, and Judson Harmon of Ohio in successive issues, 
XXII (May, June, July, 1911), 14339-52, 14446-59, 14591- 
99.
^Baker, Woodrow W i l s o n , IV, 243. Baker also indi­
cated that he thought Hale "tempermentally unfitted" for 
the mission to Mexico.
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called upon to write a biography of the New Jersey gover­
nor. The flattering account, which ran serially for six 
issues beginning in October, 1911, was so well received by
Wilson that it was adopted in book form as the official
6
campaign biography in the 1912 presidential race. After 
the election victory, moreover, Hale edited some of 
Wilson's speeches which were published and. widely read 
under the title, The New Freedom.^
Being eminently Christian, and having given ample 
evidence that his views were in tune with Wilson's New 
Freedom, Hale was a logical choice to serve the Adminis­
tration in some capacity. Adding to his otherwise meager 
qualifications for a mission to Mexico— he did not even 
speak Spanish— was the fact that he had seen much of Latin 
America first hand. In the summer of 1912, as a member of 
the journalist entourage, Hale accompanied Secretary of 
State Philander C. Knox on a tour of the Caribbean and
^"Woodrow Wilson: A Biography," XXII, 14940-53;
XXIII, 64-76, 229-34, 297-310, 466-71, 522-23. The cam­
paign biography was published under the title, Woodrow 
Wils o n : The S tory of His Life (Garden City, N.Y.: Double­
day, Page & Co., 1912). Thereafter, Hale often referred 
to himself as Wilson's biographer.
^In the introduction to the book, which is accepted as 
an epitome of Wilson's political philosophy, Wilson stated: 
"I did not write this book at all. It is the result of the 
editorial literary skill of Mr. William Bayard Hale, who 
put together here in their right sequences the more sug­
gestive portions of my campaign speeches." See Woodrow 
Wilson, The New Freedom (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
Page & Co., 1913), vii.
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Central America. On the eve of the opening of the Panama 
Canal, Knox had undertaken the tour as a means of re­
establishing good relations with all the Caribbean and 
Central American republics and to offer them assistance in 
putting their fiscal affairs in order.
A deep sense of Anglo-Saxon superiority and responsi­
bility pervaded Hale's accounts of the tour. He found 
particularly repulsive the culture of the Negro population 
in Haiti, and thought the racially mixed population of 
Central America incapable of maintaining stable political 
conditions without outside assistance. He suggested that 
nations outside the Western Hemisphere, especially Germany, 
would be willing to perform the service, but the Monroe 
Doctrine restrained them. The United States, therefore, 
should take the responsibility. Never explicit about how 
his country should pursue the task, he did, however, laud 
the results of the American customs receivership in Santo 
Domingo; on the other hand, he suggested that mere loans
would only encourage revolutions by perpetuating unpopular
„ 8 government s .
Such attitudes were clearly in keeping with the goals 
of Wilsonian diplomacy and must have been a source of
g
William Bayard Hale, "With the Knox Mission to 
Central America," The W o r l d 's W o r k , XXIV (June, July, 1912), 
179-93 , 323-36; "Our Danger in Central America," ibid. ,
XXIV (August, 1912), 443-51.
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comfort to the President as he typed out the letter re­
questing Hale to undertake a tour of Central and South
America, "ostensibly on your own hook," in order "to find
9
out just what is going on down there." With possible 
military coups brewing in other Central American republics, 
Wilson obviously meant for Hale's inspection to cover 
several nations. As it turned out, he visited only Mexico. 
He apparently was given no written instructions, but an 
examination of his reports from Mexico reveals the purpose 
of his mission: to investigate fully the activities and
attitudes of Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson— especially to 
determine the validity of the rumors that the ambassador 
had been involved in the overthrow of Madero— and to judge 
the legality and stability of Huerta's provisional govern­
ment and its ability to restore peace in Mexico. Accept­
ing the mission, Hale put his personal affairs in order, 
drew $2500 from the President's secret contingent fund, and 
sailed for Mexico by steamer on May 1 5 . ^
That Hale's mission was meant to be confidential was 
evidenced by the manner in which he reported his findings 
to the President. The special agent sent telegrams and
9
Woodrow Wilson to William Bayard Hale, April 19, 1913, 
Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Division of Manuscripts, Library 
of Congress, Series III, Letterbook 2.
^ H a l e  to Wilson, May 3, 1913, Wilson Papers, Series 
II, Box 93; William Bayard Hale's expense account and 
itinerary, ibid. , Series II, Box 101.
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letters to one F. A. Muschenheim, a resident (whether real 
or fictitious the records do not reveal) of the Hotel Astor 
in New York City. The messages were forwarded to the Wash­
ington residence of Ben G. Davis, Chief Clerk of the State 
Department. Notes to Hale were also routed through the 
New York i n t e r m e d i a r y . ^  As a cover, also, the State De­
partment issued a press release, coincident with Hale's 
departure for Mexico, to the effect that the President did 
not take seriously the charges being leveled at Ambassador
Wilson and that no investigation of his activities was 
12neces s ary.
Despite these precautions, the persistent rumors of 
an investigation of Ambassador Wilson's activities, plus 
the arrival in the Mexican capital of a known friend of 
President Wilson, caused considerable speculation concern­
ing the purpose of Hale's visit. Being a distinguished 
journalist, he was called to speak at a dinner honoring 
him at the exclusive Jockey Club. In the course of his 
address, he attempted to squelch the rumors, assuring the
^^The Hotel Astor was Hale's residence before leaving 
for Mexico. He probably sent ciphered messages to the 
Hotel Astor. Neither the Wilson Papers nor the State De­
partment records contain a receipt indicating that Hale 
definitely was provided with a copy of the State De­
partment code book. Other agents signed receipts upon re­
ceiving a copy, but Henry Lane Wilson later insisted that 
Hale did possess a copy. See New York W o r l d , July 27, 1913.
^New Yo rk Times , May 18, 1913; Mexican Herald 
(Mexico City), May 19, 1913.
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gathering that he was merely collecting data for a series 
of magazine articles. But the special agent fanned the 
flames of rumor when he called upon Francisco de la Barra, 
the Minister of Foreign Relations. De la Barra eased the 
speculation by announcing that he and Hale were just renew­
ing an old friendship. Although de la Barra did not say so, 
it is quite possible that the two had met earlier in Wash­
ington, while de la Barra served there as ambassador from 
Mexic o .^
As Hale went about gathering information, the nature 
of his inquiries was bound to stimulate curiosity. Robert 
H. Murray, Ambassador Wilson's nemesis, noted in his column 
in the New York World "that everyone, especially the Govern­
ment officials and the friends of the American Ambassador, 
are deeply interested in finding out what brought Hale to 
Mexico." Commenting on the secrecy that shrouded Hale's 
activities, the reporter added that "compared to the dis­
creet three-ply silence he [Hale] has maintained, . . .
the proverbial reticence of the clam is verbal fire­
w o r k s . " ^  Because of his reticence, Hale was able to come
^ Mexican H e r a l d , June 3, 6 , 1913; "The Week:
Mexico," Independent, LXXIV (June 5, 1913), 1310. One his­
torian suggests that Hale revealed his presence in Mexico 
City, hence the nature of his mission, by speaking at the 
Jockey Club. Quite the contrary, his speech at the club 
was designed to cover his real purpose for being in Mexico. 
See George J. Rausch, Jr., "Poison-pen Diplomacy: Mexico, 
1913," The Amer i c a s , XXIV (January, 1968), 274.
14New York W o r l d , June 23, 1913.
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and go from his residence in the Hotel Iturbide with little 
notice being paid to his actions.
In carrying out his confidential inquiries, Hale es­
tablished numerous contacts in Mexico City. Speaking no 
Spanish, he naturally sought out Americans who were w i l l ­
ing to provide him with information. E. N. Brown, presi­
dent of the Mexican National Railway, who maintained inti­
mate relations with the Huerta government, provided Hale 
with details of the government’s fiscal transactions and 
the activities of foreign concessionaires. The special 
agent also found a confidant in the American Consul- 
General, Arnold Shanklin, who, for some time, had been at 
odds with Ambassador Wilson. From the embassy staff it­
self, Hale enlisted a willing informer in Luis D'Antin, a
clerk-interpreter. Another of the ambassador's enemies, 
reporter Robert H. Murray, also provided information.
From among American business interests, Hale befriended 
J. N. Galbraith, the agent of oilman Henry Clay Pierce, 
and C. A. Hamilton, a mine operator. His despatches also 
reveal that he made acquaintances of numerous middle-class 
Americans, who operated small businesses in Mexico City.^^
■^Hale did not reveal the sources of information for
each report, but in scattered passages of his numerous
despatches he identified the above informants. See Hale 
to State Department, June 3, 18, July 12, 24, August 5, 
1913/7798-1/2, 23616, 23626, 23632, 23639; Hale to State 
Department, June 12, 1913, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 
94; Memorandum (by Hale), September 28, 1913, ibid. , Box 
97. Except for document no. 7798-1/2, Hale's despatches 
were withheld from the regular State Department files.
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The fact that so many of H a l e ’s Informants were known 
enemies of Ambassador Wilson ultimately caused Boaz Long, 
the Chief of the State Department’s Division of Latin 
American Affairs, to question the reliability of the 
agent’s information. Bryan and Wilson, however, had com­
plete confidence in their agent, and when Long brought the
16matter to their attention, he was ignored. They were
not entirely unjustified, because Hale did solicit a va­
riety of viewpoints. He maintained confidential relations 
with Foreign Minister de la Barra, and, although he never 
mentioned them by name, he indicated that he communicated 
regularly with other members of Huerta's cabinet. Two 
notable politicians, conservative Manuel Calero and 
liberal Jesus Flores Magrfn, who collaborated with the pro­
visional government, also provided information. Hale also 
interviewed Felix Diaz's private secretary. Last, but not 
least, he conferred with Henry Lane Wilson, who, despite 
his veiled suspicion of Hale, was candid and openly
discussed his relations with both the Madero and Huerta
„ 17governments.
They were kept in the private possession of Secretary of 
State Bryan until they were released to the Index Bureau 
in March, 1920. Therefore, they do not appear in the 
proper chronological sequence with other documents that 
arrived at the State Department at the same time, but may 
be found mixed with documents dated March, 1920.
"^Long to Bryan, August 22, 1913/17669.
17
Hale to State Department, June 3, July 12, 24, 
August 5, 1913/23616, 23626, 23632, 23639; Hale to State
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One June 3, after nine days of investigation, Hale
18began reporting his findings to the President. He noted
that the prevailing opinion in Mexico City was that Huerta's
Department, June 12, 1913, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 
94; Alberto Noel to Felix Diaz, June 30, 1913, enclosed in 
Henry Lane Wilson to Woodrow Wilson, July 1, 1913, ibid. ; 
Memorandum (by Hale), September 28, 1913, ibid. , Box 97; 
Henry Lane Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes in M e x i c o , Belgium, 
and Chile (Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday, Page & Co. ,
1927), 305-306. Alberto Noel, Felix Diaz's private secre­
tary, reported his interview with Hale to his employer, 
who passed the letter on to Ambassador Wilson. Noel's 
letter contained a highly critical characterization of 
Hale, which the ambassador sought to use to discredit the 
special agent. By the time the letter was placed in his 
hands, Ambassador Wilson suspected Hale of being the 
President's representative.
For the nature of the political affiliations of Manuel 
Calero and Jesus Flores Magcfn, see Cumberland, The Mexican 
Revolution, 10-11, 153-154 , 196; James D. Cockroft, Intel­
lectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1913 
("Institute of Latin American Studies, The University of 
Texas: Latin American Monographs," No. 14; Austin: Uni­
versity of Texas Press, 1968), 91-98, 179, 185, 212, 220. 
Calero had served as Madero's Minister of Foreign Relations 
and Flores Magc(n had served as Minister of Gobernacion.
Both supported the Huerta regime.
18
In a recently published article, Kenneth Grieb 
charges that Hale went to Mexico determined to find Huerta 
and Henry Lane Wilson guilty of the charges that had been 
brought against them, and that he "commenced reporting 
immediately after his arrival indicating that he failed to 
conduct an investigation before formulating his recom­
mendations." See "Reginald Del Valle: A California Diplo­
mat's Sojourn in Mexico," California Historical Society 
Quarterly, XLVII' (December, 1968), 321. An itinerary of 
Hale's movements (which the above author did not cite) 
located in the Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 101, reveals 
that Hale reached Mexico City on May 24 and did not file 
his first report until June 3, nine days after his 
arrival. See Hale to State Department, June 3, 1913/23616. 
Although this report does not reveal the sources of Hale's 
information (the only informant mentioned was Foreign 
Minister de la B a r r a ) , Hale had ample time to conduct an 
investigation before filing his report. The note itself 
was not a definitive statement of his findings but merely 
a brief telegraphic message relating his first impressions.
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government was stable and that his triumph over the rebels 
was inevitable. The American colony, he added, was 
virtually unanimous in its recommendations for recognition 
of the provisional government. Hale did not think the 
confidence in the Huerta regime was justified. He noted 
that the Associated Press reports and the government's 
"official" versions of the campaigns against the rebels 
differed considerably. A study of the map and wire service 
reports convinced Hale that Huerta's grip on the nation was 
slipping. By July 9, he had investigated fully enough to 
report on the condition of the country, state by state. He 
concluded that Huerta controlled and was able to maintain 
order in no more than one-third of the national terri-
Hale had been briefed by Wilson and Bryan, and he doubtless 
had some preconceived notions about the Mexican situation; 
but there seems to be little reason to suppose that he 
went to Mexico with his mind already made up. In his 
recently published book, The United States and H u e r t a , 80, 
Grieb also charges that Hale "avoided diplomats and govern­
ment officials, seeking only individuals who could pro­
vide information that corroborated his own convictions."
As pointed out above, there seems to be little basis for 
this charge.
19
Hale to State Department, June 3, 6 , 16, 25, 1913/ 
23616, 23618, 23621; Memorandum on Affairs in Mexico (by 
Hale), July 9, 1913/8203; Hale to State Department, June 
12, 1913, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 94. Hale's esti­
mates of Huerta's control of the national territory were 
essentially correct. See Vera Estahol, La Revolucidn 
Mexicana, 326-27; Gonzalez Ramirez, Las Ideas - La 
Violencia, 403-405.
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More importantly, Hale also reported that Huerta's 
dominance of his own government and control of the capital 
city were rather tenuous. He cited numerous turnovers in 
Huerta's cabinet as evidence of dissension in the govern­
ment. Influential men, he discovered, were openly discuss-
20ing the propriety of asking Huerta to resign.
The most impressive evidence the American agent 
marshalled against the usurper concerned the financial 
condition of the provisional government. Huerta had in­
herited a near empty treasury and a tremendous national 
debt. Because the nation was in turmoil and the means of 
securing revenue was intermittently interrupted, Huerta 
needed large foreign loans to sustain the government until 
the nation was pacified. In the early days of June, the 
government had announced the negotiation of a substantial 
loan from an international banking syndicate, and it was
widely assumed that this loan would enable Huerta to mount
21a decisive military campaign against the rebels. Hale,
however, pointed out the fact that less than half of the 
loan had been subscribed immediately, the syndicate merely 
taking an option to supply the remainder six months later.
20
Hale to State Department, June 14, 22, 25, July 8 , 
1913/23617, 23620, 23621, 23625; Memorandum on Affairs in 
Mexico (by Hale), July 9, 1913/8203. For the nature of 
Huerta's intragovernmental conflicts, see Rausch, 
"Victoriano Huerta," 96-109; Sherman and Greenleaf,
Victoriano H u e r t a , 101-106.
21
New York T i mes, June 2, 3, 1913, p. 1.
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Most of what Huerta did receive, Hale explained, went to 
pay off already matured bonds, while only a fraction re­
mained for government operating expenses. Hale added, 
moreover, that E. N. Brown of the Mexican National Railway 
had confided that the remaining options would never be 
filled. Within six months, Brown feared, the Huerta govern­
ment would be bankrupt. The crowd of politicians around 
Huerta, the American railroad man told Hale, had not yet 
abandoned the government only because they were intent
22upon looting it of as much as possible before it fell.
Hale was alarmed by the anti-American sentiment in 
Mexico City. Particularly ominous, he believed, was the 
attempt of government officials to blame the United States 
for Me x i c o ’s declining economic fortunes. W i l s o n ’s 
refusal to grant diplomatic recognition to the provisional 
government, the charges ran, encouraged the revolutionaries 
and discouraged foreign investors from coming to Mexico's 
aid. While there was much truth in such allegations,
Hale also noted that the Huertis tas falsely charged that
22
Hale to State Department, June 22, 1913/23620; 
Memorandum on Affairs in Mexico (by Hale), July 9-, 1913/ 
8203. Hale's estimates on the true nature of the loan 
were essentially correct. He did not state exact figures, 
but the total amount of the loan was £16,000,000, of which 
only £ 6 ,000,000 was contracted immediately, with options 
being given to supply the remainder later. See Edgar 
Turlingon, Mexico and Her Foreign Creditors (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1930), 248-51; Jan Baz^nt, 
Historia de la deuda exterior de M e x i c o , 1823-1946 
(Mexico, D.F.: El Colegio de Mdxico, 1968), 175.
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the ultimate design of American foreign policy was to
reduce Mexico to anarchy in order to justify military
intervention and possible annexation. This anti-American
propaganda, the special agent believed, was designed to
divert the public’s attention from the government's poorly
23managed military effort against the rebels.
From Hale's point of view, the most disturbing aspect 
of this anti-American propaganda was its effect on the 
approximately three thousand American middle-class business­
men who lived in Mexico City. This element of the American 
colony, which, according to Hale, constituted "a strong 
force making for order and decency," had stayed with their 
businesses through the bad times of the Revolution of 1910 
and the Decena Tragica, but now felt their presence 
threatened by the wave of anti-Americanism. The special 
agent pointed out that these people were not great capi­
talists "of the Standard Oil or Guggenheim type, with 
employees who could readily leave the country," but were 
"Americans of our own type with our own sentiments and 
ideals. They live in American houses; they practice and 
hold American standards of morality and rectitude . . .
23Hale to State Department, July 12, 17, 1913/23626, 
23629. Anti-Americanism did indeed run high in Mexico 
City. The Huerta press was full of charges such as the 
ones Hale had reported. See Mexican He r a l d , July 7-11,
1913. A champion of American business interests in Mexico 
and a supporter of the Huerta regime, the He r a l d , an 
English language newspaper, almost daily printed trans­
lations of Huertista editorials condemning the Wilson 
Adminis t rat io n .
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To ask these people to withdraw from Mexico," Hale con-
2 4eluded, "would be to push civilization backwards." It
was just such people that Wi l s o n ’s New Freedom was designed
to protect and aid at home. Reading Hale's despatches, the
President must have wondered if he could do less for such
Americans abroad, especially when they were apparently
being intimidated by the likes of Victoriano Huerta.
Huerta himself Hale characterized as "an ape-like old
man, of almost pure Indian blood. He may almost be said to
subsist on alcohol. Drunk or only half-drunk (he is never
2 5sober), he never loses a certain shrewdness." The
shrewdness that Hale went on to describe was the cunning 
of a Machiavellian. The American agent painted a sinister 
picture of Huerta coming to President Madero on the first 
day of the Decena Tragica and offering his services in the 
defense of legal authority. Once in the President's trust, 
the old general had cynically allowed Felix Diaz and the 
other leaders of the cuartelado (military revolt) to make 
overtures. Once he had extracted favorable terms, includ­
ing the office of provisional president for himself, Huerta 
joined the conspirators in overthrowing the constitutional
24
Hale to State Department, July 2, 1913/23623; 
Memornadum on Affairs in Mexico (by Hale), July 9, 1913/ 
8203.
25
Memorandum on Affairs in Mexico (by Hale), July 9, 
1913/8203.
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government and murdering M a d e r o . ^
Just as fond of moralizing as his president, Hale con­
cluded that extending diplomatic recognition to a govern-
--
ment thus established would, in effect, be an endorsement
of "treason and assassination" and an "abandonment of all
the principles by which social order is maintained in a
civilized country. European powers, with their own clouded
histories," he added:
can afford perhaps to connive at the overthrow­
ing [of] lawful authority by murder, but surely 
the United States, especially if it would wield 
any moral influence in Latin America, can afford 
anything sooner than give its countenance to 
savage contempt for constitutional government.
(author’s punctuation).27
Although Wilson himself had articulated similar senti­
ments earlier, Hale's despatches, arriving in Washington 
when they did, served to bolster the President at a time 
when his resolve not to recognize Huerta was wavering. He 
was under pressure from several sources to at least grant 
conditional recognition. Several members of his cabinet, 
along with his close personal friend Colonel Edward House 
and the eminent Chief Counselor of the State Department, 
John Bassett Moore, insisted that de^  facto recognition 
would carry with it no moral acceptance of Huerta and his 
methods.  ^^
^ H a l e  to State Department, June 18, 1913/7798-1/2. 
^ H a l e  to State Department, June 3, 1913/23616.
O Q
House to Wilson, May 6 , 1913, Wilson Papers, Series 
II, Box 93; John Bassett Moore (enclosing Memorandum for
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Businessmen, such as James Speyer of the Wall Street bank­
ing firm of Speyer and Company, which held $10,000,000 in 
Mexican bonds, beseeched the President to clarify his 
Mexican policy. Wilson gave one proposal from the business 
world close scrutiny, mainly because it was endorsed by an 
old friend, former Princeton classmate Cleveland H. Dodge. 
Early in May, Julius Kruttschnit, chairman of the board of 
directors of the Southern Pacific Railroad, approached 
Wilson through Colonel House with a plan of conditional 
recognition. The plan had already been approved by several 
other large firms with interests in Mexico, including 
Phelps Dodge & Company, the Greene Cananea Copper Company, 
and Edward L. Doheny's Mexican Petroleum Company. The 
brainchild of Judge J. D. Haff of Kansas City, the plan 
called for Wilson to accord Huerta diplomatic recognition, 
with the provisos that the old general should call free 
•and impartial elections as soon as possible in the states 
he controlled and that the Constitutionalists should sus­
pend hostilities and hold impartial elections in the 
states they controlled. Both sides would then support the 
president thus elected. That Wilson gave this proposal 
serious consideration is evidenced by the fact that he 
drafted instructions to Ambassador Wilson embodying the
the President) to Bryan, May 14, 1913/8378; Cronon, The 
Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 42-44; David F. 
Houston, Eight Years With W i l s o n 's Cab inet (2 vols. ;
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1926), I, 69.
29
Haff plan.
These plans, as they matured in May, gave promise of 
a more positive Mexican policy. Apparently awaiting news 
from his special agent in Mexico City, Wilson hesitated 
before sending the instructions to his ambassador. Then 
in early June, when Hale's despatches began pouring in, 
painting such a dismal future for Huerta's government, 
Wilson dropped the plan of conditional recognition. In­
stead he adopted an alternate proposal, also presented 
by Julius Kruttschnitt, which omitted conditional recog­
nition and asked only that the Administration use its 
good offices to arrange elections in Mexico and mediate 
the differences between the provisional government and 
the Constitutionalists. President Wilson, in fact, sent 
a note to Henry Lane Wilson embodying this proposal as a
guide for the Ambassador to follow in his relations with
30
the Huerta government.
Wilson and Bryan never doubted the accuracy of Hale's 
reports. Such unqualified acceptance was not justified. 
Hale was a man of unquestionable integrity, and he was 
diligent in his efforts to make a full investigation.
29
Baker, Woodrow W i l s o n , IV, 245-53; Link, The New 
Freedom, 351-52.
30
lb id. ; State Department to H. L. Wilson, June 15, 
1913/7743. President Wilson went further than the 
Kruttschnitt proposal, insisting that Huerta pledge him­
self not to be a candidate for president in the arranged 
elections.
45
But his superficial knowledge of Mexican politics and his 
sense of Anglo-Saxon superiority betrayed him into making 
some false assumptions. True enough, there was consider­
able conflict within the provisional government, but this 
was hardly evidence of weakness on Huerta's part. The 
numerous changes in the cabinet resulted from Huerta's de­
termination to eliminate the Felicistas, whom he had been 
forced by the Pact of the Embassy to include in his 
original government. In fact, Huerta was strengthening 
his hand by replacing the deposed Felicistas with his own 
loyal followers. His campaigns against the rebels were, 
indeed, languishing, and he did not control most of the 
national territory; but Huerta did hold the important rail 
centers— the keys to military dominance of the nation— as 
well as most of the centers of dense population. Nor was 
the old general entirely unhappy over the course of the 
civil war. Prolonging the war for the time being provided 
him with a pretext for remaining in power. Although the 
international loan had netted the government very little, 
it had relieved the immediate financial crisis. Thus, at 
the time when Hale was prophesying doom for the pro-
31visional government, Huerta's strength was on the rise.
Maintenance of this strength, even Huerta realized, 
was dependent upon the stabilizing influence that diplomatic
3lRausch, "Victoriano Huerta," 96-98; Sherman and 
Greenleaf, H u e r t a , 105-106; Vera Estafiol, Lja Revolucitfn 
Mexicana, 318-29.
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32recognition from the United States would provide. The
importance of Hale's early despatches, regardless of how 
accurate, was that they re-enforced Wilson's original 
image of Huerta, hardened his Puritan will, and eliminated 
any possibility of diplomatic recognition for the usurper. 
This, in turn, prolonged Huerta's difficulties.
Hale's revelations on the activities of Ambassador 
Henry Lane Wilson were equally influential. Hale wasted no 
time in confirming President Wilson's worst fears concern­
ing his official representative in the Mexican capital.
In his first despatch to Washington, Hale revealed that 
the ambassador was a "vain busybody [of] highly nervous 
temperament increased by indulgence not scandalous, which 
slight frame is not equal to." Even more revealing, the
special agent insisted that "it is no secret that [the]
3 3fall [of] Madero was hastened by Ambassador Wilson."
Two weeks later, the President received Hale's elabo­
rately detailed thirty-three page account of the Decena 
Tragica. For the most part, his narrative of the facts 
was accurate, but he overemphasized Ambassador Wilson's 
involvement. He correctly pointed out that Wilson looked 
upon Madero with open contempt and had been discourteous 
to the Mexican President on more than one occasion. Hale 
was accurate in his charges that the ambassador harried
^ H u e r t a ,  Meim^rias de Victoriano H u e r t a , 93-94.
^^Hale to State Department, June 3, 1913/23616.
4 7
Madero throughout the Decena, blaming him for the violence
and trying to force his resignation. The agent also noted
correctly that, on more than one occasion, Wilson claimed
to be speaking for the entire diplomatic corps, when only
34two or three ministers agreed with him.
In reporting Wilson's involvement, however, Hale often
allowed his own righteous indignation and loathing for the
ambassador to cloud his judgment. Without justification
he concluded that "without the countenance of the American
Ambassador given to Huerta's proposal to betray the Presi-
3 5dent, the revolt would have failed." Such a supposition 
did not do justice to the conspiratorial talents of Felix 
Difaz and Victoriano Huerta. Although Wilson was forewarned, 
the two generals carried off their coup without the active 
involvement of the ambassador. Even had Wilson disapproved
-^Hale to State Department, June 18, 1913/7798-1/2;
John P. Harrison, "Henry Lane Wilson, El Tr^gico de la 
Decena," Historia Mexicana, VI (January-March, 1957), 374- 
405. The latter citation is a Spanish translation of the 
first, with notes and editorial comments. Harrison sug­
gests that this document, which was as much an indictment 
of Huerta as expos^ of Henry Lane Wilson's activities, was 
the decisive factor in preventing the recognition of the 
Huerta regime. Mexican historian Isidro Fabela, who served 
as Carranza's Minister of Foreign Relations, accepted Hale's 
report as prima face evidence of Ambassador Wilson's guilt. 
See "La Participacicfn de Henry Lane Wilson: Fragmento del 
informe confidential Enviado al President Woodrow Wilson por 
su Emisario William Bayard Hale, 18 de Junio 1913," Isidro 
Fabela y Josefina E. de Fabela (eds.), Documentos 
Historicos de la Revolucicfn Mexi c a n a , Vol. IX: Revoluci^n
£  Regimen Maderista (Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Jus, 1965),
187-205.
3 5
Hale to State Department, June 18, 1913/7 79 8-1/2.
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of their plans, there is no reason to suppose that they 
would have scrapped them or would have failed to oust 
Madero.
Hale also contended that "the plan for the immediate
settling of a military dictatorship would never have been
3 6formed except in the American Embassy." Again, he
assumed too much. The provisional government was not as
37
yet a dictatorship, nor was Wilson responsible for 
creating the Huerta regime. Huerta and Diaz agreed upon 
the bare bones of the provisional government before they 
consulted with the ambassador. Wilson's involvement in the 
coup took place after the arrest of Madero and was confined 
to the negotiation of the Pact of the Embassy, which merely 
designated the individuals who would serve in the cabinet 
and provided for a permanent government to be elected in 
the future.
Finally, Hale charged that Ambassador Wilson was re­
sponsible for the assassination of Madero and Pino Suarez. 
By his refusal to accept responsibility for their safety,
36Ibid.
3 7Huerta had used the veiled threat of force to keep 
some of the state governments in line and placed military 
men in power wherever possible, but the national congress, 
which had been elected with Madero in 1911, was still 
functioning and was by no means amenable to all of the 
provisional president's proposals. His pretensions were 
also challenged by the Felicistas who remained in the cabi­
net. See Rausch, "Victoriano Huerta," 97-102; Sherman and 
Greenleaf, Hu e r t a , 101-102, 105-106, 116-19; Vera Estafiol, 
La Revolucidin Mexi c a n a , 321-33.
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Hale reasoned, the ambassador "might be said to have de-
3 8livered the men to death." At best Wilson had looked 
upon Ma d e r o ’s safety with calculated indifference, but to 
accuse the ambassador of total responsibility for the de­
posed president's death was a grossly irresponsible 
statement on the part of Hale.
Grudgingly, Hale admitted that Ambassador Wilson 
talked freely and candidly of his part in the drama and 
gave "evidence in every sentence that he believed it to 
have been the only part humanity and patriotism (alike from 
the standpoint of Mexico and the United States) allowed him 
to play." The special agent conceded— and in doing so, 
largely contradicted his earlier characterization— that it 
would be "absurd to picture Mr. Wilson as a malicious 
plotter." Despite such admissions, Hale could not close 
his report without driving his point home. Again, he 
exaggerated:
It cannot but be a course of grief that what 
is probably the most dramatic story in which an 
American diplomatic officer has "ver been in­
volved, should be a story of s pathy with treason, 
perfidy and assassination in an assault on consti­
tutional government.
Then, in language calculated to have the greatest effect
upon President Wilson, he added:
. . . it is particularly unfortunate that this
should have taken place in a leading country of 
Latin America, where, if we have moral work to
O Q
Hale to State Department, June 18, 1913/7798-1/2.
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do, it is to discourage violence and uphold 
law .
Trifling, perhaps, in the sum of miseries 
that have flowed from it, yet not without im­
portance in a way, is the fact that thousands 
of Mexicans believe that the Ambassador acted 
on instructions from Washington and look upon 
his retention under the new President as a 
mark of approval and blame the United States 
for the chaos into which the country has 
fallen.39
Clearly this was a call for the President to clarify 
his Mexican policy, at least by recalling Henry Lane 
Wilson. President Wilson was indeed moved by the report. 
Just before departing for a short holiday in New Hampshire, 
he pecked out a short note to Bryan on his portable type­
writer :
The document from Hale is indeed extra­
ordinary. I should like, upon my return from 
my little outing, to discuss with you very 
seriously the necessity of recalling Henry 
Lane Wilson in one way or another, perhaps 
merely "for consultation" until we can talk 
with the man himself.
40The Secretary of State fully agreed. Actually they had
been moving toward this decision for days. On June 25, 
approximately a week before Bryan and Wilson received 
Hale's lengthy letter condemning Ambassador Wilson, Bryan 
received a telegram from the special agent revealing that
40 Wilson to Bryan, July 1, 1913, The Correspondence of 
Secretary of State -Bryan with President Wilson, General Re­
cords of the Department of State, National Archives, RG 59; 
hereinafter cited as Bryan-Wilson Correspondence; Bryan to 
Wilson, July 3, 1913, ibid. ; copies of both in Wilson 
Papers, Series IV, Box 275.
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the ambassador had invited Huerta to dine at the embassy.
In transmitting a copy to the White House, Bryan scrawled
a pencil message across the bottom of the telegram: "What
do you think of Huerta dining with Wilson?" The President
replied, adding his own pencil note beneath Bryan's:
"Think it most seriously unwise. Probably make it worse
to interfere." Then, as if in anger and as an afterthought,
he scribbled a second note on another part of the page:
41
"I think Wilson should be recalled."
Wilson and Bryan's response to Hale's revelations 
indicated that their indignation had mounted sufficiently 
to cause them to take more positive steps against Ambassador 
Wilson and the Huerta government. But, on July 4, ex­
hausted from his efforts to influence Congress on the
tariff and currency questions, President Wilson departed
42
on a ten-day vacation. During his absence no new moves
were made. The Administration still did not have a clear-
cut Mexican policy. Wilson's temporary reluctance to move
more forcefully in Mexican affairs was due to his lack of
information concerning the nature of the Constitutionalist
revolution in Northern Mexico. Hale's trusted opinions
had given him ample reason to believe that Huerta would
never establish a regime that he could accept. But, could
^ H a l e  to State Department, June 25, 1913/23621. The 
pencil notes were scribbled on the White House copy. See 
Hale to State Department [n.d.], Wilson Papers, Series XI, 
Box 94.
^ N e w  York T i mes, July 4, 1913, p. 1.
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he expect any better from the rebels? Already another 
special agent was in the field, attempting to provide 
the answer to this question.
CHAPTER III
NO ONE WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION
Reginaldo (often anglicized as Reginald) F. Del Valle 
of Los Angeles was Wilson's second fact-finding agent to 
Mexico. A long-time political confederate of Bryan, Del 
Valle was a member of a prestigious old Southern California 
family, his grandfather having come to the area in 1819 as 
an officer in the Spanish Army. Remaining in California 
after Mexico won her independence from Spain, the Del Valle 
family secured land grants and became substantial ranchers 
and vintners. Reginaldo, therefore, was reared in comfort­
able circumstances. He was graduated from Santa Clara Uni­
versity in 1873 and was admitted to the bar four years 
later. Using his legal career as a stepping-stone to 
politics, in 1880, at age twenty-five, he was elected to 
the lower house of the state legislature and, two years 
later, ran a successful race for the state senate. A life­
time Democrat, he was later unsuccessful in election bids 
for Congress and lieutenant governor. In 1893 Cleveland 
offered him the post of ambassador to Chile, but he de­
clined the honor. He supported Bryan in all his presi­
dential bids and backed Wilson's nomination in 1912. At
53
54
the time Wilson called him to serve in Mexico, he was a 
member of the Los Angeles Public Service Commission.^
In 1913, at age fifty-eight, Del Valle was grey-haired 
and mustached. Short and portly, he spoke fluent Spanish 
and, by appearance and cultural background, was hardly dis­
tinguishable from the Mexican leaders he was being sent to 
2
observe. But, other than his Spanish-Mexican heritage and 
his old acquaintance with Bryan, he had no particular 
qualifications to commend him for the mission. He was not 
an acknowledged expert on Mexican affairs, and, unlike most 
of the other agents Wilson and Bryan sent to Mexico, Del 
Valle did not share their view of the situation south of 
the border. He had a Spanish patrician's disdain for lower- 
class Mexicans, particularly those of Indian blood, and his 
despatches revealed that he had little faith in the
Nat ional Union Catalog o f Manus cript Collect ions, 
1959- 1961 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: J. W. Edwards, Pub., 1962),
588 ; New York T i m e s , July 19, 27, 1913, II, 2; Los Ange1es 
T i m e s , September 22, 23, 25, 1938. Biographical data on 
Del Valle is very sketchy and, for the most part, must be 
gleaned from newspaper reports. His family background is 
described in the National Union Catalog and his obituary in 
the Los Angeles T i m e s . The Del Valle Family Manuscripts 
are located in the Los Angeles Museum of Natural History, 
but they contain only a few items relating to Reginaldo, 
none of which refer to his mission to Mexico. The Henry E. 
Huntington Library of San Marino, California, contains some 
of Reginald's papers, but they deal almost entirely with 
his business ventures in the 1920's.
2
A photograph of Del Valle as he appeared in 1913 may 
be found in "Mediation As A Remedy for Mexico," Literary 
Digest, XLVII (August 9, 1913), 194.
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workability of democracy among the Mexican people. Wilson 
and Bryan obviously did not know this at the outset. Only 
as his mission drew to a close did it become apparent that 
his sympathies were at variance with those of the President 
and Secretary of State.
The purpose of Del Valle's mission was supposed to be 
a secret. He was supplied with a copy of the State De­
partment code book for enciphering his telegraphic messages. 
As in the case of Hale, his reports were to be addressed to 
the private address of the Chief Clerk of the State De­
partment instead of going through official channels. A 
memorandum jotted down by Bryan provided Del Valle with 
guidelines to follow in making his inquiries:
1. It is desirable to know the character, stand­
ing and popularity of those who have influence in 
any community.
2. Where is the dissatisfaction with the Govern­
ment, it is important to know the cause of dis­
satisfaction, and to what extent there is a 
concentration of opinion as to cause and agreement 
as to remedy?
3. Are conditions improving or growing worse?
This can be determined somewhat by the spirit of 
hopefulness or feeling of depression?
4. What was the real cause of the first revo­
lution, and does the sentiment upon which it was 
founded still exist?
5. What is the situation in respect to land owner­
ship and tenure? Are the conditions satisfactory, 
and what changes, if any, are contemplated?
Del Valle drew three-thousand dollars from the President's
contingent fund, and the Secretary of State provided him
with a letter identifying him only as a personal friend
traveling in Mexico on professional business and
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instructing all American diplomatic and consular officials
3
to accord him every courtesy.
Del Valle's itinerary called for him to go first to 
the Constitutionalist stronghold in the northwestern state 
of Sonora, then to make his way eastward across Northern 
Mexico. In order to gather information from the anti­
revolutionary elements, as well as from the revolutionaries, 
he went first to Tucson, Arizona, where a sizeable com­
munity of refugees from Northern Mexico had gathered. Ac­
companied by his wife and daughter, he arrived in Tucson 
4on June 7. Thus, he began his investigations at about the 
same time that Hale began reporting his impressions from 
Mexico City.
From the outset, Del Valle's mission took on a carni­
val atmosphere. He apparently revealed either to reporters 
from Los Angeles or to members of the refugee colony the 
fact that he represented President Wilson, because little 
secrecy shrouded his activities. The Los Angeles Times 
anticipated his movements, reporting his presence in Tucson 
on the very day of his arrival.^ Refugees, pouring out
O
“'Memorandum, [n.d.]; receipts for code book and $3000; 
letter, To the Diplomatic and Consular Officers of the 
United States of America, May 31, 1913, enclosed in Bryan 
to Del Valle, May 31, 1913/20446.
^Los Angeles T i m e s , June 7, 1913; Tucson Daily 
Citizen, June 10, 1913.
~*Los Angeles Times, June 7, 1913.
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their tales of suffering and privation and beseeching the 
aid of the Wilson Administration, swarmed around him as 
soon as he debarked from the train. The border newspapers, 
moreover, identified him without qualification as the
g
special agent of President Wilson.
Garbled versions of Del Valle's purposes began to 
circulate immediately upon his arrival on the border. The 
two major Los Angeles dailies— the Times and the Examiner—  
first created, and the border papers spread, the impression 
that the Californian had been sent to arrange a truce b e ­
tween the Constitutionalists and the Huerta government.^
The Los Angeles Times in particular presented Del Valle as 
a prospective peacemaker. The front page of the June 17 
issue bore his photograph, which was encircled by elaborate 
artwork. Embossed in the lower right corner of the picture 
was a toga draped Grecian-like female figure— apparently 
symbolizing liberty— holding a Mexican flag and an olive 
branch in one hand, while the other released a dove of 
peace which flew upward toward Del Valle's photograph. The 
obvious implication to be drawn from the picture was that
^Tucson Daily Citizen, June 10, 1913; Tucson Daily 
S t a r , June 10, 1913; Border Vedette (Nogales, Arizona),
June 14, 1913; El Paso (Texas) Morning Times, June 10,
1913.
^Los Angeles Tim e s , June 10, 1913; Los Angeles Ex­
aminer , June 10, 1913; Tucson Daily Citizen, June 11,
1913; Border Vedette, June 14, 1913; EJL Paso Morning T i m e s , 
June 20, 1913.
58
g
Mexico implored his aid in restoring peace.
Both Los Angeles newspapers were also responsible for
originating a rumor that Del Valle would succeed Henry Lane
9
Wilson as Ambassador to Mexico. There may have been a 
measure of validity to this report. In the early weeks of 
the Wilson Administration, Del Valle had gone to Washington 
seeking the ambassadorship.'*'^* That Bryan may have con­
sidered the Californian for the post is evidenced by his 
remarks to Huerta's Charge d'Affaires in Washington. When 
the charge discovered that an American was in Northern 
Mexico interviewing revolutionary leaders, he naturally 
questioned Bryan concerning the nature of the intruder's 
activities. Although Bryan denied that Del Valle had any 
official status at the time, he did reveal that the Cali­
fornian was "one of the probable candidates for Ambassador 
to Mexico."’*’’*' Whatever Bryan's intentions, the border 
press picked up and spread the story until it ultimately
g
Los Angeles T i mes, June 17, 1913.
9
lb i d . , June 7, 1913; Los An g e1e s Examiner, June 7,
1913.
^ U p o n  his return from Mexico in late July, Del Valle 
revealed to Eastern reporters that he had earlier come to 
Washington seeking the post of Ambassador to Mexico. See 
New York T i m e s , July 27, 1913, II, 2.
^ E n c a r g a d o  de Negocios ad-:£nterin a Secretario de 
Relaciones Exteriores, June 12, 1913, Archivo General de 
la Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Ramo de la 
Revolucion (hereinafter cited as A G R E ) , L-E-786, Leg. 28, 
f. 1-2.
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made news in Mexico City.
Del Valle was not as discreet in his public comments 
as one would expect from a "secret agent." When queried 
concerning the nature of his visit to Northern Mexico, he 
did not deny outright that he was an agent of the Presi­
dent, but gave equivocal answers that only served to in­
crease the specualtion. For example, to the reporter of 
the Los Angeles T i mes, he commented: "While I am acting in
a personal capacity, the fact is that I am simply an
13instrument of President Wilson and Secretary Bryan." The 
El Paso Times reported him as saying: "I am not represent­
ing the United States government as an official, but as an
envoy for the purpose of submitting reports of conditions
14in Mexico to President Wilson and Secretary Bryan." By
involving his wife and daughter— who were invited to a
round of parties by the ladies of Tucson and Nogales— in
his interviews, Del Valle allowed his mission to take on
. 1 5the air of a social outing.
12
Tucs on Daily Citizen, June 10, 11, 1913; Border 
Ve d ette, June 14, 1913; ELI Paso Morning T i m e s , June 20, 
1913; E_1 Imparcial (Mexico City), June 18, 1913.
13 Los Angeles T i m e s , June 10, 1913.
14
El Paso Morning T i m e s , June 20, 1913.
15 Los Angeles T i m e s , June 14, 1913. The society page 
of the Times lauded the conduct of the Del Valle women, 
indicating that their activities had been a smashing social 
success. The Times also suggested that they had made an 
excellent impression upon the refugees.
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However indiscreet he may have been, Del Valle took 
his mission quite seriously and, in his own fashion, was a 
diligent investigator. Between June 7 and 13, he divided 
his time between Tucson and Nogales, interviewing refugees. 
Most notable among them were Jose M. Maytorena, self­
exiled governor of the State of Sonora; Felipe Rivera, de­
posed governor of the State of Sinaloa; and Martin 
Espinoza, who was still governor of the District of Tep/c. 
All three professed sympathy for the Constitutionalist 
cause. Most of the other exiles were middle-to-upper- 
class property owners, professionals, and merchants. Del 
Valle referred to them as the "reputable citizens" of 
Sonora. This group immediately won the Californian's 
sympathy. They had endured great suffering, Del Valle re­
vealed, and longed for peace, even under Huerta's rule, if 
that was the surest way to end the chaos in Northern 
Mexico. They charged that the Constitutionalist armies 
were composed of the "worst elements" in their state. The 
refugees grieved that in their absence the rebels were 
systematically despoiling their property. Should they 
return to protect their interests, their lives would be 
endangered. The sale of their confiscated cattle and other 
moveable property, they further lamented, was providing the 
revenue to finance the revolutionary war e f f o r t . ^
•^Del Valle to State Department, June 8, 19, 12, 1913/ 
23641, 23642 , 23643; Tucson Daily Citizen, June 10, 11, 
1913; Border Vedette, June 14, 1913. Governor Rivera
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To judge these matters first-hand, Del Valle entered 
Mexico on June 13, bound for the Sonoran capital, 
Hermosillo. The Constitutionalist leaders eagerly antici­
pated his arrival and attempted to make a good impression. 
Well aware that he represented President Wilson, the rebel 
leaders had the Californian investigated before he entered 
their bailiwick. The revolucionaries' Hermosillo news­
paper, La Voz de S o n o r a , sent a reporter to interview Del 
Valle in Nogales. Overly impressed by the fact that the 
special agent was of Mexican descent and spoke Spanish
fluently, the newspaperman pronounced Del Valle completely
17
sympathetic to the rebel cause. Not surprisingly, there­
fore, Del Valle was cordially received in Hermosillo. The 
rebel leaders granted him interviews and allowed him to 
wander about the city, observing conditions and conversing 
with the local inhabitants. Encountering no obstacles, he
completed his investigation in two days and returned to
18Tucson on the 16th.
revealed that Huerta had used police state terrorism in an 
attempt to extract a profession of loyalty to the pro­
visional government. When he refused to submit, Rivera 
claimed, he was arrested, but escaped and made his way to 
Tucson. Governor Espinoza apparently came to the border 
in order to be beyond Huerta's reach while he made up his 
mind about his loyalties.
17 La Voz de Sonora, June 14, 1913, enclosed in Del 
Valle to State Department, June 17, 1913/23644.
1 O
Louis Hostetter (American Consul, Hermosillo) to 
State Department, June 17, 1913/7862; Del Valle to State 
Department, June 17, 1913/23644.
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After resting a day in Tucson, Del Valle sent his wife 
and daughter home to Los Angeles, while he proceeded to El 
Paso, Texas. Arriving there on June 18, he spent two days 
in conferences with Constitutionalist agents and sympa­
thizers and civic leaders in El Paso and with Huerta's 
officials across the Rio Grande in government-held Ciudad 
Juarez. Since the Constitutionalists had destroyed a
length of the railroad tracks south of Jud'rez , Del Valle
19was unable to travel into the state of Chihuahua.
Denied access to the interior of North-Central Mexico, 
the special envoy continued his journey along the border 
until he reached, perhaps, his most important destination, 
Venustiano Carranza's headquarters in Piedras N e g r a s , 
Coahuila. Arriving across the border in Eagle Pass, Texas, 
on June 21, Del Valle crossed the Rio Grande the next day 
and, with the aid of the American Consul, arranged an 
interview with Carranza and his staff. With portent of 
his future relations with the Wilson Administration, 
Carranza was truculent and uncooperative in his meeting 
with Del Valle. Extremely nationalistic, the First Chief 
was hypersensitive to any encroachment upon his inde­
pendence in directing the course of the Revolution. From 
the press reports that preceded Del Valle's arrival in
19
Del Valle to State Department, June 27, 1913/
23648; K1 Paso Morning T i m e s , June 20, 1913.
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Piedras Negras, Carranza could have inferred that the 
agent's purpose was to infringe upon that independence by 
attempting to arrange a truce between the Constitution­
alists and Huerta's provisional government. So as to 
accentuate his own official character, the First Chief 
refused even to speak to the special agent except in the 
presence of an official of the United States government—  
in this case, Consul Luther T. Ellsworth. The bearded 
revolutionary leader absolutely refused to discuss the 
Mexican political situation and terminated the interview 
abruptly, with little more than social amenities having 
been e x c h a n g e d . ^
In his report of the incident, Del Valle was at a 
loss to explain why Carranza was so suspicious. Ignoring 
the obvious impression the press reports and his own mis­
guided comments might have made, the Californian could not 
understand how the First Chief got the misinformation that 
the United States was trying to bind the rebels to a con­
ciliatory arrangement with the provisional government in 
Mexico City. The special agent conjectured that Carranza 
was so cautious because he had recently received a repre­
sentative of General Felix Diaz, who attempted to bind
20
Ellsworth to State Department, June 21, 23, 1913/ 
7845 (no document number for June 23); Del Valle to State 
Department, June 23, 27, 1913/23646, 23648; R. S. Bravo, 
Consul, Mexico (Eagle Pass) a Secretario de Relaciones 
Exteriores, June 24, 1913, A G R E , L-E-846, Leg. 1.
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him to an unsatisfactory peace arrangement. Actually,
Del Valle's earlier indiscreet behavior was just beginning 
to haunt him.
Del Valle had intended to make his way to Mexico City
by railway, observing conditions as he went; but again
rebel destruction of the rail lines denied him access to
the interior. With this route closed, he journeyed to
New Orleans, in order to take a steamer to Vera Cruz. At
this juncture, Secretary Bryan, apparently unaware of the
publicity his agent had received on the border, was pleased
with the progress of the mission and decided that Del Valle
should continue his investigations beyond Mexico City.
President Wilson fully agreed, and Del Valle, therefore,
found new instructions awaiting him in Havana when he
arrived there on June 28. He was directed to visit Zapata's
stronghold, then investigate conditions in all the states
surrounding the Mexican capital. This note also informed
Del Valle of the presence of William Bayard Hale in Mexico
City and directed the Californian to confer confidentially
2 2with the President's other agent.
Meanwhile enough of Del Valle's despatches had reached 
Washington to give Wilson and Bryan an evaluation of the
21
Del Valle to State Department, June 27, 1913/23648.
22 Bryan to W i l s o n 5 June 25, 1913, Bryan-Wilson Corre­
spondence; Wilson to Bryan, June 27, 1913, Wilson Papers, 
Series IV, Box 125; Bryan to AmLegation (Havana), June 28, 
1913/23649a.
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Constitutionalists and what they represented. Of all the 
Mexican leaders who professed sympathy for the Revolution, 
Del Valle, strangely enough, seemed most favorably im­
pressed with Jos^ M. Maytorena, who had gone into self­
exile rather than declare himself in rebellion against 
Huerta. The Californian, however, accepted the former 
Sonoran governor's excuse for his absence from his state—  
he claimed that illness had forced him into exile— and 
believed that the refugee was sincere in his devotion to 
the Constitutionalist cause. The special agent was, how­
ever, skeptical of the revolutionary ardor of the other
2 3two refugee governors he interviewed in Tucson.
Del Valle was also favorably impressed with Sonora's
interim governor, Ignacio L. Pesquiera, picturing him as
being "greatly liked and respected," a man of "deep
convictions," but of only "fair ability." Despite the
fact that he interviewed Alvaro Obregdn, who was currently
winning important military victories over Huerta's armies,
the special agent gave the Sonoran military chieftain only 
24
scant notice. Nor did the other rebel leaders in
Northern Mexico fare very well under Del Valle's critical 
eye. He characterized Pancho Villa, who controlled most
2 3
Del Valle to State Department, June 8, 9, 1913/ 
23641, 23642.
24
Del Valle to State Department, June 17, 19, 1913/ 
23644, 23645.
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of the Chihuahua countryside, as "a man of very bad 
25
repute." But more importantly, he pictured Venustiano
Carranza, the titular leader of the Constitutionalists, as
having "personally a good appearance, little ability,
narrow, inordinate stubbornness," and as being "inclined
to severity, not liked." He added, furthermore, that
Carranza was "a detriment to his cause on account of his
2 6
injudicious leadership." Secretary of State Bryan took 
special notice of Del Valle's unfavorable impression of the 
First Chief and, in reporting it to the President, queried 
if the rebel leader's belligerent attitude might not have 
resulted from the refusal of the United States to allow
2 7the revolutionaries to purchase arms across the border.
If, according to Del Valle, the rebel leaders were 
not of the highest quality, he did, nevertheless, ac­
knowledge that they held common principles. All professed 
a filial devotion to the memory of the martyred Madero and
^ D e l  Valle to State Department, June 27, 1913/23648.
^ Ibid. ; Del Valle to State Department, June 23, 1913/ 
23646.
o 7
'Bryan to Wilson, June 25, 1913, Wilson Papers,
Series IV, Box 125; copy in William Jennings Bryan Papers, 
Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Box 43.
Since March 14, 1912, the export of arms and munitions from 
the United States to Mexico had been forbidden by executive 
order of President Taft and continued by President Wilson. 
See "Proclamation prohibiting the exportation of arms and 
munitions of war to Mexico," March 14, 1912, U.S. De­
partment of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations 
o f the Uni ted States, 1912 (Washington: Government Print­
ing Office, 1919), 745.
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a determination never to acknowledge the legality of the 
Huerta government. Accepting these professions at face
value, the special agent also noted that the rebels in­
sisted that Huerta had gained power by fraud and murder
and, for that reason, they had revolted in an attempt to 
restore constitutional government. Only the resignation 
of the usurper and his cabinet and the naming of a Consti­
tutionalist as president ad-interim would satisfy the 
rebels, he added. When he asked if they would agree to an 
armistice, during which time impartial elections could be 
held, the Constitutionalist leaders all responded that they 
would never agree to such an arrangement unless Huerta 
first resigned. To the American agent, moreover, they as­
serted their determination to fight to the last man and,
if necessary, to sacrifice all their worldy possessions for
^  28 the cause.
Although Del Valle unhesitatingly endorsed the sin­
cerity of purpose of the Constitutionalist leaders, he had 
great reservations about the designs of the rank-and-file 
of the revolutionary armies. Many of the secondary 
officials, particularly the guerilla chieftains, he
^®Del Valle to State Department, June 9, 17, 27, 1913/ 
23642, 23644, 23648. Exiled Governor Maytorena was the 
first to state the purposes of the Constitutionalist re­
volt, and Del Valle, instead of repeating those principles 
as they were enunciated by each rebel leader, referred to 
the statement of Maytorena as being representative of the 
sentiments of all of the Constitutionalist leaders.
6 8
insisted, were more eager to despoil the substantial 
property holders than defeat Huerta. They seemed to take 
great pleasure in levying forced loans and confiscating 
private property. What was worse from Del Valle's middle- 
class point of view, the propertyless were being swayed 
into joining the revolutionary armies by promises of a 
general confiscation and redistribution of property. Such 
promises, plus numerous "incindiary and socialist publi­
cations" which circulated in Northern Mexico, had incited 
many who had little understanding of the Constitutionalist 
cause to form into roving guerilla bands. Equally dis­
tressing, Del Valle added, Constitutionalist leaders, in­
cluding Pesquiera and Carranza, justified the depredations 
as the only means of financing the rebel war effort. The 
end result, Del Valle lamented, would be the economic deso­
lation of Mexico. In Sonora, Chihuahua, and Coahuila, 
where the rebels were most active, he had already found 
that most of the banks and commercial houses were closed. 
Industry was at a standstill and even the land was not 
being cultivated. He found conditions in Nuevo Lec^n and 
Tamaulipas slightly better, mainly because the revo­
lutionaries were relatively inactive in those states. The
agent also thankfully acknowledged that, for the most part,
29
American owned property had been spared. Overall it was
^ Ibid. ; Del Valle to State Department, June 12, 19, 
1913/23643, 23646.
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a grim picture that the special agent painted.
Del Valle's impressions of Zapata and the other revo- 
luctionaries in Central Mexico would doubtless have added 
to the gloomy view of the Revolution, but he never got the 
opportunity to form them first hand. By the time he 
reached Mexico City, his mission had become a fiasco. 
Despite the supposed secret nature of his activities , the 
Huerta government and representatives of the press antici­
pated his arrival. Huerta’s charge d'affaires in Wash­
ington, after speaking to Bryan, had reported the nature 
of the Californian's activities along the border, and the 
Mexican Consul in Eagle Pass, Texas, had reported the 
a g ent’s conference with Carranza. The context, if not the 
details, of his conferences in Hermosillo, El Paso, and 
Piedras Negras were reported in the Mexico City newspapers , 
along with the agent’s itinerary and all the rumors that 
accompanied his movements. Even before his arrival in the 
capital city, officials of the provisional government 
branded the activities of the special agent as "not only 
officious but injurious to the interests of peace."
Since the Constitutionalists were interpreting his visit 
as a practical recognition of their belligerency, Huerta
prophesied that the end result of Del Valle’s mission would
30be the prolonging of the civil war.
30 /Encargado de Negocios ad-interin a Secretario de
Relaciones Exteriores, June 12, 1913, A G R E , L-E-786, Leg.
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With such advance publicity, it is not surprising that 
Del Valle was besieged by reporters when he arrived in 
Mexico City on July 6. He then compounded his earlier 
indiscretions by submitting to more interviews, in the 
course of which he revealed the full nature of his mission. 
To the reporter of Mexico City's pro-Huerta English 
language newspaper, The Mexican He r a l d , for example, Del 
Valle stated that his purpose was "to obtain all the infor­
mation possible bearing upon the actual political con­
ditions of the country to lay before President Wilson and
31
Secretary of State Bryan." Other papers repeated this
or similar statements, along with the persistent rumor that
Del Valle would replace Henry Lane Wilson as ambassador.
Not surprisingly, then, the special agent was constantly
hounded by reporters during his stay in the Mexican 
32capital.
28; R. S. Bravo a Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, June 
24, 1913, ibid. , L-E-846, Leg. 1; ELL Imparcial, June 18, 
July 7, 1913; Mexican H e r a l d , June 20, 1913.
31
Mexican He r a l d , June 8, 1913.
32
El Diario (Mexico City), July 7, 1913, enclosed in 
Henry Lane Wilson to State Department, July 15, 1913/8165; 
El Imparcial, July 8, 1913; Diario del Hogar (Mexico City), 
July 9, 1913; Mexican He r a l d , July 9, 10, 1913. Kenneth 
Grieb maintains that Del Valle "destroyed the secrecy of 
his mission" by his indiscreet handling of the press in 
Mexico City. See "A California Diplomat's Sojourn in 
Mexico," California Historical Society Quarterly, XLVII, 
321. But, as pointed out above, the Huerta government 
and the Mexico City press had been fully apprised of the 
nature of Del Valle's mission long before his arrival in 
the capital city.
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Fearing that the publicity might impair his own
mission, William Bayard Hale was annoyed by the excitement
that surrounded Del Valle's arrival in Mexico City. The
"atmosphere is electric," he wrote to Bryan of conditions
in the Mexican capital, and "the possibility of grave
3 3indiscretion is distressing." In fact, Bryan, himself, 
learned of Del Valle's arrival in Mexico City from the 
sensational press reports, and was greatly distressed by 
his agent's bungling behavior. In an attempt to muzzle the 
Californian, Bryan wired Del Valle on July 8 "to avoid 
newspapers and take care not to permit yourself to be con­
sidered an official." Closing with stern words of caution, 
Bryan added that "the success of your mission depends upon 
this." Even more concerned the next day when he received 
no reply, Bryan wired Hale to direct Del Valle to call at 
the telegraph office for a message. A week passed before 
the Californian replied. Even then, he insisted that he 
had "emphatically assured" all the Mexicans he had inter­
viewed that he was doing so in a "private capacity." He 
also suggested that the news releases were purely specu­
lative, probably originating from the provisional govern­
ment for propaganda p u r p o s e s . ^
3 3
Hale to State Department, July 8, 1913/23624.
34
State Department to Del Valle, July 8, 1913/23650a; 
State Department to Hale, July 9, 1913/23625; Del Valle to 
State Department, July 16, 1913/23651.
72
The arrival of a second special agent in Mexico City 
drove Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson to adopt extreme
measures for his personal defense. Earlier he had at­
tempted to discredit Hale. Bypassing normal State De­
partment channels, he penned a letter directly to the 
Pres ide n t :
I have assumed that Dr. Hale has no official 
mission in Mexico and that he is not charged 
with the making of any report to you concerning 
conditions in Mexico, but in the event that
information should be offered you from this
source I deem it my duty, as your personal repre­
sentative here, to say that this person is by 
temperament and habit entirely unfit to form a 
just and clear idea of the situation here.
Hale, the ambassador continued, failed completely "to grasp
the underlying causes of the unrest in Mexico." In closing,
Wilson added that he felt it his duty to make sure that the
President was not misled by "the reports of sentimental
idealists."
After the arrival of Del Valle, the ambassador's 
official despatches grew increasingly caustic. He claimed 
that he could not protect the interests of Americans be­
cause "the presence in Mexico of persons claiming to be 
representatives of the President are lowering the dignity 
of the Embassy and detracting from the respect the Mexican 
people have been taught to regard it during the last three
35 Ambassador Wilson to President Wilson, July 1, 1913, 
Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 94.
3 6years." The belligerent ambassador did get to the heart
of the matter, however, when he wrote that "the President
should understand that . . . he is now face to face with
grave responsibilities which cannot be avoided by a halt-
3 7ing or uncertain policy." Such was the tone of the 
messages that President Wilson found on his desk when he 
returned to Washington from his holiday in New Hampshire 
on July 14.
He also found fresh despatches from Hale, adding new 
justification for Ambassador Wilson's recall. The special 
agent reported that Wilson, in collusion with Huerta, was 
rounding up all possible support in Mexico City in favor 
of diplomatic recognition of the provisional government.
At the same time, Hale insisted, the ambassador was in­
gratiating himself and blackening the reputation of the 
Wilson Administration in the eyes of American businessmen. 
Rumor had it, the agent added, that, in speaking to members 
of the American colony, Ambassador Wilson had referred to 
the administration in Washington as a "vicious pack of 
fools." In defending himself, the ambassador had even
released to the press a letter of commendation from former
3 8President William Howard Taft. Clearly the time for a
38Wilson to State Department, July 9, 1913/7999*
■^Wilson to State Department, July 11, 1913/8027.
3 8Hale to Davis, July 12, 17 , 1913/23626 , 23692 ; Hale 
to State Department, July 15, 1913, Wilson Papers, Series 
II, Box 94.
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change had come.
By this time, however, Hale was pleading for more 
than the mere recall of Henry Lane Wilson. Like the am­
bassador himself, Hale wanted the Administration to adopt
a more positive Mexican policy. "We [Americans] are, in 
spite of ourselves, the guardians of order and justice and 
decency on this Continent," he wrote to the President;
. . . we are providentially, naturally and in­
escapably (sic) , charged with the maintenance 
of humanity's interests here. Civilization and 
humanity look to u s , and have a right to look
to us, for protection on this Continent. . . .
To ensure that he was not misunderstood, Hale added:
This is no argument for intervention in Mexico. 
Intervention is not necessary. Firm representation, 
politely made, as by a perfectly friendly, yet 
fully determined and powerful neighbor, would, I 
believe, save Mexico. To frame the exact plan, to 
hit upon just the fashion and manner in which the 
necessary influence can be brought to bear, w i t h ­
out involving us too deeply, may take long and 
hard thought. Then, let the Government of the 
United States give it that thought. But let it not 
abandon Mexico. . . .39
Indeed, the President had been giving a great deal of 
thought to a course of action in dealing with the Huerta 
Government. Acting quickly upon his return to Washington, 
President Wilson recalled Ambassador Wilson to Washington 
for "consultation." Making a clean sweep of his worrisome 
diplomats, he also recalled Special Agent Del Valle. The 
Californian was ordered to cease his interviews, slip out
^ H a l e ,  Memorandum of Affairs in Mexico, July 9, 1913/
8203.
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of Mexico City quietly, and inform no one of^h'is desti- 
4°nation.
Ironically, Wilson and Del Valle returned to the 
United States aboard the same steamer. Actually Del Valle 
had called upon the ambassador and interviewed him before 
their departure. At that time or during the cruise home, 
the special agent revealed to Ambassador Wilson that he 
held both the deposed Madero regime and the Consti­
tutionalists in low esteem. Finding themselves in basic 
agreement, the two deposed diplomats developed a cordial 
relationship by the time of their arrival in New York. Del 
Valle, Wilson wrote in his memoirs, had "refused to be used 
by any particular faction" in Mexico and had made a serious 
effort "to ascertain the t r u t h . S u c h  comments were a
^ S t a t e  Department to Wilson, July 15, 1913/7743; 
State Department to Del Valle, June 15, 1913/23650b.
^ Mexican H e r a l d , July 18, 1913; New York Times, July 
19, 1913, p. 2; Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes, 307-308. Upon 
their return to the United States, rumor also leaked from 
the State Department that Wilson and Del Valle were in 
basic agreement concerning conditions in Mexico and what 
policy the United States should follow. See New York 
Times, July 27, 1913, II, 2; New York W o r l d , July 27, 1913. 
On April 16, 1920, in testimony given before Senator 
Albert B. Fall's sub-committee of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Henry Lane Wilson again praised Del Valle as an 
unbiased investigator whose opinions resembled his own.
See Investigation of Mexican Affairs, U.S. Senate, Sen.
Doc. 285, 66 Cong., 2 Sess. , 2289-91 ; hereinafter cited as 
Inves t igat ion o f Mexican Affairs. In the course of his 
testimony, Wilson also charged that Secretary of State 
Bryan had not trusted the reports of William Bayard Hale 
and had sent Del Valle to Mexico City for the purpose of 
keeping an eye on Hale. All available evidence indicates 
that this charge is false, but at least one historical 
account has perpetuated this view by citing Wilson's
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far cry from the ambassador's response to Del Valle's ar­
rival in Mexico. His attitude toward Hale, with whom he 
disagreed, remained implacably hostile.
On July 26 Del Valle called at the Department of 
State and, after a personal conference with Secretary 
Bryan, dictated his final report. His summation of con­
ditions in Northern Mexico was substantially the same as 
he had reported earlier. He again acknowledged that the 
rebel leaders of Sonora and perhaps a thousand men sur­
rounding Carranza were sincere revolutionaries. They were 
attempting to overthrow a government which they considered 
to have been established by unconstitutional means. The 
other rebels in the field, he added, followed "dangerous 
leaders" who were "pursuing neither the justification of 
ideals nor . . . any honest motives." Having made only a
brief study of conditions in the center of Mexico, Del 
Valle noted that this type of irresponsible guerrilla 
activity was present in virtually every state. He
testimony. See James Morton Callahan, American Foreign 
Policy in Mexican Relations (New York: The MacMillan Co. ,
1932), 535. The scholar must use considerable caution in 
utilizing the testimony contained in the Fall Committee 
report. The sub-committee conducted its investigations 
in 1919 and 1920, as a means of embarrassing President 
Wilson during his fight for the ratification of the 
Treaty of Versailles. Most of the witnesses were hostile 
to the Wilson Administration, and the committee's final 
report condemned the President for his handling of 
Mexican affairs.
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acknowledged that the most formidable uprising in the
center was that of Emiliano Zapata in the states of
Morelos, Guerrero, and Puebla. But Del Valle made the
mistake, as other special agents in the future would, of
associating Zapata with rebel leaders who had no legiti-
42
mate aims m  view.
Del Valle also noted that while Huerta was unable to
put an end to the guerilla activities in the countryside,
wherever possible he was entrenching himself in power by
installing generals as state governors. Huerta and other
officials of the provisional government justified their
arbitrary rule, Del Valle noted, on the ground that the
populace was illiterate and without understanding of the
responsibilities of citizenship. What was needed, these
officials insisted, was a man like Huerta, who possessed
"the iron hand to bring into submission the people who
cannot be controlled by any other methods." Then Del
Valle allowed his own bourgeois prejudices to creep in,
concluding that forceful methods were partially justified,
because Mexico did not possess "that powerful middle class
4 3which is the backbone of free government."
Although Del Valle obviously had little sympathy for
42New York Times, July 27, 1913, II, 2; Del Valle to 
Bryan, July [n.d.], 1913, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 95.
43
Del Valle to Bryan, July [n.d.], 1913, Wilson 
Papers, Series II, Box 95.
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the Mexican revolutionaries, he noted with considerable in­
sight what he considered to be the two basic causes of the 
current upheaval in Mexico. One was the personal ambitions 
of politicians, stultified by thirty-five years of Porfirio 
Diaz's despotic rule, but given free reign by his ouster. 
More importantly, once elevated to power, these poli­
ticians, especially M a d e r o , had made more promises than 
they could immediately redeem. As a result, they found
that they could not control the passions they had helped 
44to arouse.
The purpose of Del Valle's mission had been to present 
the Administration with accurate information on conditions 
in Mexico. Wilson and Bryan solicited no policy recom­
mendations from their agent, nor did he offer any outright. 
Implied recommendations inevitably crept into his reports. 
The member of a substantial Spanish-Mexican-American 
family, Del Valle's sympathies went out to those in Mexico 
whose status paralleled his own. Thus, the impression 
emerged that the rebels, with their uncertain leadership 
and confiscatory methods, were not worthy of support from 
the United States. If Del Valle's reports implied that 
the rebels were unworthy of support, they also hinted at 
the advisability of supporting the Huerta government as a 
means of promoting order in Mexico. Such tacit recom­
mendations, plus the opinion offered by Hale to the effect
44Ibid.
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that Del Valle should not "be taken seriously as a re­
porter," placed the Californian in an increasingly un-
45favorable light with the Administration. Del Valle, 
moreover, continued to exhibit a complete lack of judgement 
in meeting the press. Even after his return to Washington, 
Wilson and Bryan repeatedly denied that Del Valle had been 
serving the Administration in any official capacity. When 
reporters cornered him as he was leaving the State De­
partment building and questioned him personally on the 
matter, he blurted out the following comment, correcting 
himself in mid-statement: "I cannot talk at this time
about my mission to Mexico— that is, as to the purpose of
,|46my going there.
His patience worn thin by Del Valle's repeated errors 
of judgment, the President received even more distressing 
news concerning his special agent from another Californian, 
progressive Republican Congressman William Kent. Kent re­
vealed that Del Valle was considered a reactionary by 
progressives in Los Angeles and was said to be a political 
associate of newspapermen William Randolph Hearst and 
Harrison Gray Otis, both of whom had extensive property
45 Hale, Memorandum on Affairs in Mexico, July 9, 1913/
8203.
46
New York Times, July 27, 1913, II, 2; New York 
W o r l d , June 27, 1913.
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interests in Mexico. Their Los Angeles newspapers—
Hearst's Examiner and Otis's Times— had, of course, been
booming Del Valle for the position of Ambassador to Mexico
from the outset of his special mission, and they continued
48to do so upon his return to the United States.
If Bryan had ever seriously entertained thoughts of 
appointing Del Valle to the ambassadorship, those notions 
were now completely dashed. In view of his apparent re­
lationship with Hearst and Otis, the outcome of such an 
appointment could have proved as disastrous as that of 
James M. Sullivan— another deserving Democrat with big-
business connections— whom Bryan rewarded with an ap-
49pointment as Minister to the Dominican Republic.
47
Edwin T. Earl to William Kent, August 1, 1913,
Wilson Papers, Series IV, Box 123. Kent, gravely concerned 
over American economic exploitation of Latin America, from 
time to time passed on to Wilson correspondence from his 
constituents and friends that touched upon the subject, 
especially when one of the President's agents was involved. 
He remained one of the few congressional Republicans who 
sympathized with Wilson's Mexican policy.
^ Los Angeles Examiner, June 10, 11, July 31, 1913;
Los Angeles T i m e s , June 7, 10, 11, 1913, July 27, 1913.
Both Hearst and Otis owned more than a million acres of 
Mexican agricultural property, while Hearst was also in­
volved in oil and railroad enterprises. For the nature 
of their holdings, see John Kenneth Turner, Barborous 
Mexico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969), 216-17.
49
Ignoring Sullivan's affiliation with New York 
bankers, Bryan naively trusted the New Yorker because of 
his past record of loyalty to the party. Once in Santo 
Domingo, Sullivan used his post for the benefit of his 
banker friends by transferring into their hands the 
deposits of the American Receiver-General of Dominican 
Customs. Through his close association with Dominican
81
Whatever Del Valle's affiliations may have been, Wilson and 
Bryan now suspected him and terminated his services shortly 
after his return to the United States. There is no record 
of any formal dismissal or evidence that Del Valle left 
Washington under a cloud of disgrace. By August 4, he was 
back in Los Angeles singing the praises of the Wilson Ad­
ministration's Mexican policy; but no longer did the local 
press hint at ambassadorial possibilities, nor is there any 
evidence that Wilson or Bryan ever again solicitied his
A • 50advice.
What was the effect of Del Valle's impressions? 
President Wilson assuredly ignored the agent's implied ap­
proval of the Huerta regime. Still, despite the Cali­
fornian's blundering behavior, the President may not have 
ignored his negative expressions concerning the revo­
lutionaries. One thing is certain: for three months, 
while the Administration applied moral pressure on the 
Huerta regime in an attempt to effect a change of
President Josd" Bordas Valdes, Sullivan also contrived to 
line his own pockets in what proved to be one of the most 
sordid episodes of American diplomacy. See Link, New 
Freedom, 107-10; Coletta, William Jennings B r y a n , II, 116- 
19 , 196-99; Wilfrid Hardy Callcott, The Caribbean Policy 
o f the Uni ted States, 1890-19 20 (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1942), 397-98.
^ N e w  York T i m e s , August 5, 1913, p. 3; Los Angeles 
T im e s , August 6, 1913. Upon his return to Los Angeles,
Del Valle resumed his position on the Los Angeles Public 
Service Commission and was elected its president.
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government that would affect all Mexicans, the Zapatistas 
and Constitutionalists were completely ignored. Wilson 
made no attempt to secure either their approval of his 
policy or their cooperation in carrying it out. Perhaps 
he had temporarily discounted the revolutionaries as an 
insignificant force in Mexican national affairs. If so,
Del Valle's reports may have created that impression.
Meanwhile, both Del Valle and Ambassador Wilson had 
been summoned to testify before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations. Del Valle was sent packing off to 
California and did not appear before the committee; but 
Wilson did, and he used the opportunity to defend his 
diplomacy and at the same time to lash out at the Presi­
dent's use of special agents, who, he insisted, provided 
misleading information. This inference, that the execu­
tive was relying upon the advice of diplomats who had not 
been sanctioned by senatorial confirmation, led members 
of the Foreign Relations Committee, ever sensitive to 
encroachments upon their foreign policy-making preroga­
tives, to insist that the agent's reports be made available 
for their perusal. Determined to save himself further 
embarrassment at the hands of the recalcitrant ambassador,
the President asked for his resignation, which was duly
51delivered to the State Department on August 4.
5lNew York T i m e s , July 31, August 5, 1913, p. 1; New 
York W o r l d , July 31, 1913.
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While President Wilson was dispensing with the 
services of two of his representatives to Mexico, the one 
remaining in Mexico City, William Bayard Hale, continued 
his barrage of pessimistic reports. Economic conditions 
continued to decline, he reported. France had announced 
that he would provide no more loans, the Minister of 
Finance had been dismissed, and the president of the 
Mexican National Railway had resigned in despair. The 
complete financial collapse of the Huerta government, Hale 
believed, was inevitable. Huerta, nonetheless, was de­
termined to remain in power and threatened anyone who
5 2hinted at the advisability of his resigning. The time,
Hale insisted, was "auspicious for the inauguration of a
positive policy in Mexico." "Would you," he inquired of
5 3the President, "consider a suggestion?" When no reply 
was forthcoming from Washington, the special agent pro­
ceeded with his own unsolicited recommendations. The 
responsible American in Mexico, he believed, no longer 
desired recognition for the Huerta government. The rebels, 
he added, had done nothing to justify special consideration 
from the United States. Therefore, any plans for im­
mediate recognition, conditional or otherwise, should be 
scrapped. Instead, he suggested that the Administration
52
Hale to State Department, July 15, 17, 18, 28,
August 5, 1913/23627, 23628, 23629, 23633, 23639.
53
Hale to State Department, July 15, 1913/23627.
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state categorically what conditions Mexico must meet for 
future recognition. These should include free elections 
and Huerta's self-elimination as a candidate for presi­
dent. Hale was aware that Henry Lane Wilson had earlier 
been directed to make such conditions the basis of his 
negotiations with the provisional government, but he was 
certain that the ambassador had offered them to Huerta 
rather "apologetically." Hale then insisted that the Ad­
ministration must make it clear to Huerta that it was 
prepared to compel such a settlement, but added that he
was "inclined to the opinion that only moral determined
54compulsion would be necessary to carry these points."
A week passed with no response to his suggestions. 
Meanwhile Huerta took the initiative to secure an accommo­
dation with the Wilson Administration. Certain that Hale 
was secretly reporting to President Wilson, Huerta sent 
Hale's friend and recently resigned Minister of Foreign 
Relations, Francisco de la Barra, to the special agent 
with a proposition. De la Barra was being sent on a 
mission to Europe and, en route, was to stop in the 
United States. Huerta was hopeful of arranging a personal 
conference for de la Barra with President Wilson, at which 
the Mexican diplomat could hopefully present a persuasive 
case for recognition. Hale earnestly recommended that the 
President meet with de la Barra, but not for the reasons 
54
Hale to State Department, July 17, 1913/23629.
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Huerta envisioned. Hale believed that the conference 
would afford Wilson an excellent opportunity to person­
ally apply his moral suasion and impress upon the 
usurper's representative the necessity of accepting the 
previously recommended prerequisites for future recog­
nition. Wilson declined to meet with de la Barra, because 
he had already decided to send another special agent to 
Mexico City to carry out Hale's r e c o m m e ndations.^
55
Hale to State Department, July 24, 29, 1913/23632, 
23634; State Department to Hale, August 1, 1913/23634.
CHAPTER IV
THE FIRST REBUFF
By the end of July, 1913, President Wilson had decided
to follow William Bayard Hale's advice— to eliminate Huerta
and aid in establishing a new government in Mexico City by
applying "moral determined compulsion." The procedure that
he had decided upon, one which was endorsed by several
business firms with interests in Mexico, was based on a
plan proposed earlier by Judge J. D. Haff of Kansas City.^
Wilson must have been aware that adoption of the Haff plan
might place him in a compromising position. Months before,
on March 11, he had declared that his administration would
2
not support special interests in Latin America. There 
was, moreover, a growing conviction among his advisors that 
economic support by industrial concessionaires, especially 
British oil interests, was all that sustained Huerta's
3
power. Adoption of the Haff plan, therefore, might later
ljudge Haff's plan, which was endorsed by the Southern 
Pacific Railroad, Phelps Dodge and Company, the Greene 
Cananea Copper Company, and the Mexican Petroleum Company, 
is outlined above in Chapter II, 43-44.
^New York T i m e s , March 12, 1913, p. 1; Baker, Woodrow 
W i l s o n , IV, 64-67.
^Houston, Eight Years With W i l s o n 's Cabinet, 69, 73-74; 
Cronon, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 43-44; Hale
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be construed as a move by the President to support one 
group of special interests against another.
Determined that his policy should not smack of "dollar 
diplomacy," Wilson resolved that his plan be carried out in 
a disinterested manner, by a special agent who sympathized 
with New Freedom ideals and had absolutely no connection 
with business concessionaires. John Lind of Minnesota was 
such a man. In fact, Lind insisted that he was chosen for 
the mission for no other reason than the fact that he had 
never been associated with concessionaires or any other 
kind of interest in Mexico. Other than this, he had no 
obvious qualifications as an emissary to the republic south 
of the border. He did not speak Spanish, he knew nothing 
of Mexican affairs, and he had no previous diplomatic ex­
perience; but he offered what Wilson and Bryan considered 
a most important qualification: he was a loyal progressive
Democrat.^
to State Department, June 3, 1913/23616; Haff to Wilson, 
May 12, 1913/7576. Although he noted that foreign loans 
had netted the Huerta government very little, Hale did 
acknowledge that the loans had allowed the usurper to 
survive a financial crisis and sustain his government 
temporarily. Judge Haff, in submitting his plan to the 
President, had insisted that British oil interests were 
primarily responsible for propping up the Huerta regime.
^Testimony of William F. Buckley, December 6, 1919, 
and John Lind, April 27 , 1920 , Investigation of Mexican 
Af f a i r s , 767-814, 2318; Interview with Lind, November 12, 
1919, William F. Buckley Manuscripts, Latin American Col­
lection, University of Texas Library, File No. 233; "John 
Lind as a Strong Personality," American Review of Reviews, 
XLVIII (September, 1913), 281. Buckley, a lawyer and 
speculator in Mexican real estate and oil leases, served
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A politician most of his adult life, Lind shared many 
of the beliefs, anxieties, and other characteristics common 
to reformers of the Progressive Era. Only the fact that he 
was a Swedish immigrant prevented him from completely 
fitting the urban middle-class, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, 
Progressive stereotype.^ Arriving in the United States in 
1868, Lind was reared on a Minnesota farm. But like so
as counsel for the Huerta delegation at the Niagara Falls 
Conference, arranged by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to 
settle disputes growing out of the American military inter­
vention at Vera Cruz in April, 1914. He was openly hostile 
to Wi l s o n ’s Mexican policy, and he acknowledged that Lind 
was chosen as the President's agent because of his complete 
lack of association with any interests in Mexico. He 
believed that an appointment based on such considerations 
was naive and ill-considered.
^George M. Stephenson, John Lind of Minnesota (Minne­
apolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1935), 3-27, 191.
Basic studies of the Progressive Era characterize "pro­
gressives" as being well-educated, urban middle-class 
businessmen and professionals from the n a t i o n ’s older 
families of Anglo-Saxon stock. For basic statements of this 
stereotype, see George E. Mowry, The California Pro­
gressives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952),
86-104; Richard Hofstadter, The Age of R e f o r m : From Bryan
to F .D .R. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. , 1955) , 133-
73; George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt (New 
York: Harper & Row, Pub., 1958), 85-105. More recently
historians have suggested that the base of the progressive 
stereotype needs broadening. Two recent articles indicate 
that the WASP background of progressive reformers may be 
overdrawn and that the role of the immigrant in the Pro­
gressive Movement has been largely overlooked. See J. 
Joseph Huthmacher, "Urban Liberalism and the Age of Reform," 
Mississippi Valley Historical R e v i e w , XLIX (September,
1962), 231-41; John D. Buenker, "Edward F. Dunne: The
Urban New Stock Democrat as Progressive," Mid-America, L 
(January, 1968), 3-21. Another recent article suggests 
that earlier studies failed to note the importance of the 
rural background of progressive reformers, especially those 
of the Midwest. It argues that a majority of progressives 
came from the farms and small towns of rural America and 
moved to the city after reaching adulthood. See Wayne E.
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many other midwestern progressives, he spent much of his 
adult life in the city, practicing law and engaging in 
public affairs. Seeking to emulate his childhood hero, 
Abraham Lincoln, Lind began his political career as a 
Republican. Beginning with moderately conservative views, 
he served three successive terms in Congress between 1887 
and 1893. During this time, however, he became increasing­
ly dissatisfied with his party's failure to check the 
domineering and corruptive tendencies of big business, and 
before he retired from Congress he had earned the repu­
tation of a reformer of unimpeachable honesty. Supporting 
such measures as pure food laws , forfeiture of unused lands 
by the railroads, a more effective Interstate Commerce Com­
mission, and the Sherman Antitrust Act, he won repeated 
endorsements from Minnesota's Farmers' Alliance and was 
wooed by the People's Party. Although he was alienated by 
the Populists' jeremiads and by their reliance on panaceas, 
he, nonetheless, endorsed William Jennings Bryan for Presi­
dent in 1896 and became an undying supporter of the Great 
Commoner for the remainder of his political life.^
Fuller, "The Rural Roots of the Progressive Leaders," 
Agricultural His t o r y , XLII (January, 1968), 1-13.
^Stephenson, L i n d , 15-117; John D. Hicks, "The 
People's Party in Minnesota," Minnesota H i story, V 
(November, 1924), 555-59; Carl H. Chrislock, "A Cycle of 
the History of Minnesota Republicanism," Minnesota History, 
XXXIX (Fall, 1964), 102-103.
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Having bolted the Republican Party, Lind accepted 
support of reform Democrats and Populists, while unsuc­
cessfully contesting for the Minnesota governorship in 
1896. But in 1898 he embellished his domestic reform ap­
peal with ardent support for America's righteous war 
against Spain and with his equally outspoken criticism of 
the Republicans' postwar imperialism. With fusion support, 
and now calling himself a Democrat, he was elected gover­
nor. At the beginning of his term, he called for a 
thoroughgoing reform program, including tax reform, ex­
pansion of the activities of the state correctional and 
charitable institutions; stricter antitrust laws; reser­
vation for the state of mineral rights on lands disposed 
of in the future; and direct democracy devices, such as 
the direct primary, initiative, and referendum. The noted 
reformer-economist, Richard T. Ely, was moved to charac­
terize Lind's proposed program as "the epitome of the 
drift of opinion of those who truly had the public welfare 
at heart." Like Wilson's later New Freedom, Lind dedi­
cated his program to freeing politics and business from 
the grip of special interests; but he faced an obstruction­
ist legislature throughout his term and secured few re­
forms. His administration, nonetheless, served as a 
harbinger of Progressivism in Minnesota.^
^Stephenson, L i n d , 133-78; Russel B. Nye, Midwestern 
Progressive Politics (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State
University Press, 1959), 214-15.
Swept out of office by the Republican landslide of 
1900, Lind remained a powerful force in Minnesota politics. 
He was again elected to Congress in 1902 but retired volun­
tarily after one term. Thereafter he served actively in 
Minneapolis civic affairs and as a member of the Board of 
Regents of the University of Minnesota. He campaigned 
actively for Bryan in all his presidential bids. Although 
he was wooed by the Bull Moose Party in 1912, he remained 
a loyal Democrat and was instrumental in securing a Minne­
sota delegation that supported Woodrow Wilson at the 
Democratic National Convention. Following the election, 
he was called to Washington to discuss policy and patron­
age with his old friend, Secretary of State designate 
Bryan, and with Wilson's personal advisor', Colonel Edward 
House.®
Lind, himself, was an obvious candidate for ap­
pointment. Indeed, he declined the ambassadorship to 
Sweden because he did not think it ethical for a Swedish 
immigrant to serve in that post. Being the most popular 
Democrat in Minnesota, he also declined to serve as 
Assistant Secretary of Interior, because neither he nor
his friends thought the position adequate for one of his
g
political status. Thus, politics and personal scruples
^Stephenson, L i n d , 180-206, 348-50.
^Wilson to Lind, June 11, 1913, and Lind to Wilson, 
June 12, 1913, Wilson Papers, Series IV, Box 285; Congress­
man W. S. Hammond (Minnesota) to Lind, June 23, 1913, John
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combined to make the Minnesota progressive available for 
the more publicly noteworthy mission to Mexico.
Lind's Scandanavian ancestry was reflected in his blue 
eyes and grey-flecked sandy hair. Tall and slender, his 
tousled, unkempt appearance and gaunt features prompted a 
contemporary journalist to characterize him as "lincoln- 
esque." His earlier reputation for unimpeachable honesty 
persisted in 1913, and he was considered an impatient man 
of action. Although he had a nervous habit of tapping on 
the stump of his left wrist— his hand was amputated after 
a boyhood hunting accident— to emphasize a point, he was 
noted for his cool, forthright manner of meeting problems 
under pressure. As President Wilson, himself, noted in a 
letter to his wife: "Lind . . .  is just the well balanced
sort not to be disquieted by what goes on about h i m . " ^
Lind Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, 
Minnesota, Box 3. The Wilson Papers do not reveal an 
official record of a presidential offer of the post of 
Assistant Secretary of Interior; but the letter from 
Congressman Hammond to Lind, cited above, indicates that 
the offer was tendered. The Congressman also congratulates 
Lind for having declined the position because it lacked 
dignity, and even suggests that the offer would never had 
been made if he had known about it in advance.
3-0"John Lind As A Strong Personality," American Re­
view of Reviews, XLVIII, 281; "The Week: Mexico," The
Nat i o n , XCVII (August 7, 1913), 112; "Mexico: What Does
Mediation Mean?," Outlook, CIV (August 16 , 1913), 833; New 
York T i m e s , August 5, 1913, p. 3; Eleanor Wilson McAdoo 
(ed.), The Priceless G i f t : The Love Letters of Woodrow 
Wilson and Ellen Axson Wilson (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., Inc., 1962), 295.
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With no forewarning, on July 28, Lind received a tele­
gram from Bryan, asking him to come to Washington for 
"consultation" on a confidential matter of great importance. 
When Lind replied that he would be delayed a few days, Bryan 
revealed only that when he was available, he should come 
prepared to remain for several weeks. Thus, Lind was com­
pletely unaware of the purpose of his call to service until 
he arrived in Washington on August 1. He apparently agreed 
with the objective of his mission, because, after only two 
days of discussion with Bryan and Wilson, he set out for 
Mexico.^
Only a naive man, or one who had great faith in his
President and the righteousness of the task set before him,
would have undertaken the mission that Wilson laid out for
Lind. Wilson apparently assumed that Huerta and the
Mexican people would submerge their nationalism temporarily
and accept a change of government dictated by the United
States, because that is precisely what Wilson's personally
prepared instructions to Lind called for. The special
agent was to inform Huerta t h a t :
the Government of the United States does not feel 
at liberty any longer to stand inactively by while 
it becomes daily more and more evident that no 
real progress is being made towards the establish­
ment of a government at the City of Mexico which 
the country will obey and respect.
11-Bryan to Lind, July 28, 29 , 1913 , Lind Papers, Box 
3; Bryan to Wilson, July 31, 1913, Bryan-Wilson Corres­
pondence; Testimony of Lind, Investigation of Mexican 
Af fairs, 2317-18.
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He was then to dictate terms which Mexico should follow in 
establishing an acceptable government:
(a) An immediate cessation of fighting through­
out Mexico— a definite armistice solemnly entered 
into and scrupulously observed;
(b) Security given for an early and free election 
in which all will agree to take part;
(c) The consent of General Huerta to bind himself 
not to be a candidate for election as President of 
the Republic at this election;
(d) The agreement of all parties to abide by the 
results of the election and cooperate in the most 
loyal way in organizing and supporting the new ad­
ministration .
Lind was then to offer American aid in arranging such a 
settlement and to promise diplomatic recognition for the 
regime thus established. Perhaps Wilson's naivete was 
most evident in the last paragraph of L i n d ’s instructions, 
a closing statement that Huerta would use in order to 
ignore Wilson's tacit ultimatum and offer a counter 
solution:
If Mexico can suggest any better way in which 
to show our friendship, serve the people of 
Mexico, and meet our international obligations, 
we are more than willing to consider the sug­
gestion.
John Lind was an ambassador in every respect except 
name. He was invested with full power to negotiate with 
the head-of-state in Mexico City and was granted an am­
bassador's salary, but he could not bear the title, since 
that would constitute diplomatic recognition of the Huerta
12 Instructions (Mexico), Lind Papers, Box 3; draft of 
instructions prepared on President Wilson's portable type­
writer in Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 95.
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government. Instead, he bore a letter designating him
as the "personal representative" of the President and 
"advisor to the E m b a s s y . I n  dispatching their third 
agent, Wilson and Bryan consulted no one— neither Huerta, 
the Constitutionalists, nor the Senate of the United 
States. On the day of L i n d ’s departure from Washington, 
the Embassy in Mexico City was notified simultaneously of 
Ambassador Wilson's resignation and of the special agent's 
impending arrival. Everyone else, Huerta included, was 
informed by a State Department press release of the same
j 15day.
Not the slightest hint of the mission's purpose was 
included in the Department's message to Mexico City or in 
the press release, but a security leak from within the Ad­
ministration resulted in the publication of garbled 
versions of Lind's instructions. From these press 
comments, the impression invariably emerged that Lind had 
been sent to force the immediate resignation of Huerta and 
that he would then direct the formation of a new
13 Bryan to Lind, August 5, 1913, Lind Papers, Box 14. 
In this note, Bryan informs Lind that he will receive an 
ambassador's salary— $17 ,500— while serving in Mexico.
14 Letter, To Whom It May Concern, August 4, 1913,
Lind Papers, Box 3.
15 State Department to American Charge' d'Affaires, 
Mexico City, August 4, 1913, Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 3 , 
817-18; New York T i mes, August 5, 1913, p. 1.
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provisional government in which the Constitutionalists 
would p a r t i c i p a t e . ^
Sensing that defiance of the United States would add 
stature to his faltering regime, Huerta quickly exploited 
the rumor-clouded situation by launching a series of verbal 
blasts at the policy of the Wilson Administration. He 
whipped the people of the capital city into a patriotic 
frenzy by announcing that he would refuse any mediation 
offers by the United States, declaring that "national 
dignity and decorum will not brook interference by outside 
parties. Besieged by reporters, and knowing no more 
than they about the true nature of Lind's mission, American 
Charge d'Affaires Nelson 0 1Shaughnessy frantically cabled 
Washington for authority to deny the rumors. Denial was 
necessary, he reported, since the populace of the capital 
city was so aroused by Huerta's comments that the Governor 
of the Federal District had come to the Embassy, warning 
that Lind might be mobbed at the railway station when he 
arrived. The only explanation Bryan allowed 0'Shaughnessy 
to give was that Lind came on a "mission of peace" and that 
no weight should be given to "misrepresentations of
■I £
New York T i m e s , August 5, 10, 1913, p. 1; New York 
W o r I d , August 5, 1913. Similar versions of Lind's in­
structions also appeared in the Mexico City press. See 
Mexican Herald , August 6, 1913; ^1 Imparcial, August 6,
1913.
^ Mexican He r a l d , August 6, 1913; ^1 Imparcial,
August 6, 1913.
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18
sensational newspapers." With this reply, the Charge' 
could not quell the excitement that Huerta had provoked.
His prestige on the rise, Huerta ignored the concili­
atory tone of Bryan's note and directed his Foreign 
Minister to reply that if "Mr. Lind . . . does not properly
establish his official character or if he is not the bearer 
of recognition of this government by yours, his sojourn in 
this Republic will not be pleasing." When the text of this 
note was splashed across the headlines in Mexico City, 
anti-Americanism intensified. In their exuberance to 
support Huerta's nationalism, representatives of the press 
condemned the sending of a special agent instead of an 
ambassador, insisting that this action was designed by 
Wilson to make the Mexican nation appear inferior. The 
most vehement columnists insisted that Lind be expelled as 
persona non grata. Special Agent Hale, who was still in 
Mexico City, noted that informed Mexicans were comparing
the Lind Mission to the indignities suffered by the United
19States in the Citizen Genet and Sackville-West incidents.
Retaining his righteous plane, Wilson retorted that he 
180'Shaughnessy to State Department, August 5, 1913, 
and State Department to 0'Shaughnessy, August 6, 1913, 
Foreign Affairs, 1913 , 818.
19 0 'Shaughnessy to State Department, August 7, 1913/ 
10637; Hale to State Department, August 7, 1913/23636; 
Mexican Herald, August 7, 1913; E^ l Impar c i a l , August 7, 
1913; E^ l Independiente (Mexico City), August 7, 1913.
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was fully within his rights in sending an "advisor to the
Embassy" and was certain that the provisional government
would not regard the nature of Lind's mission as un- 
20friendly. Huerta, having defended the dignity of the
nation, could now magnanimously offer guarantees for Lind's
safety. His Minister of Gobernacion issued a directive
outlawing violent demonstrations, while the Minister of
Foreign Affairs issued a statement to the effect that Lind,
like any other foreigner, could travel freely in Mexico,
but that he would be treated as a private citizen and
21accorded no special consideration.
Lind's arrival in Vera Cruz on August 9 served to
perpetuate the tension. Although quite unintentional, the
fact that he journeyed to Mexico aboard a battleship lent
credence to the rumors that ascribed a punitive character
to his mission. Crowds gathered at the dock when he
debarked. They appeared more bewildered than hostile;
nonetheless, a troop of policemen greeted Lind and his
wife and accompanied them to the American Consulate, while
the citizens of Vera Cruz passively observed the pro- 
22
cession. After spending the night in the port city,
20gtate Department to 0'Shaughnessy, August 8, 1913/ 
10637.
2 1 o 'Shaughnessy to State Department, August 8, 9, 
1913/8274, 8276; EJL Imparcial, August 10, 1913.
^ E 1  Imparcial, August 10, 1913; K1 Pais (Mexico 
City), August 10, 1913; Washington T i m e s , August 11, 1913, 
in Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 95; William W. Canada 
(American Consul, Vera Cruz) to State Department, August
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the Linds travelled to Mexico City, arriving concurrently 
with a government staged demonstration in another part of 
town that was more pro-Huerta than anti-Lind. At the 
railway station, Lind revealed a talent for shirtsleeve 
diplomacy that would characterize the early phase of his 
mission. Addressing the reporters, he gave assurances 
that he had in no way been menaced and was gracious in his 
praise of Mexican hospitality. "All the Mexican authori­
ties with [whom] I have come in touch," he announced,
"have treated me with the courtesy which is characteristic 
of Latins .
Actually, Lind had been well coached. Bryan had 
ordered Hale to greet the new agent at Vera Cruz. The two 
met aboard ship and conferred for some time before going 
ashore. Since neither spoke Spanish, Bryan directed the 
American Consul at Vera Cruz, William W. Canada, to ac­
company the two agents to Mexico City and offer his advice. 
Thus, when Lind arrived in the capital, he was fully 
abreast of the situation and knew what behavior might have
14, 1913/8536. Actually Wilson had intended for his agent 
to catch a commercial steamer from New Orleans but, ap­
parently, failed to check sailing schedules before the 
Linds departed from Washington. No steamer was available 
at New Orleans. Wishing to avoid delay, Wilson wired Lind 
to proceed to Galveston, Texas, where the battleship New 
Hampshire awaited to take him to Vera Cruz. See Bryan to 
Lind, August 5, 1913, Lind Papers, Box 14; Lind to State 
Department, August 6, 7, 1913/8250, 8251.
23
Mexican Her a l d , August 11, 1913; Canada to State 
Department, August 14, 1913/8536.
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the best effect. He and Hale sensed that conditions in the
Mexican capital were potentially explosive, and they agreed
that if Wilson's demands were presented immediately,
aroused public opinion might force a negative reply. Lind,
therefore, requested that the nature of his instructions be
kept a secret temporarily. Meanwhile Lind remained close
to Hale, residing at the latter's hotel, the Las curain,
before moving to the Embassy on the 13th. Not surprisingly,
the two agents, finding that they held many views in
common, became fast friends and confidants, and each
24
praised the efforts of the other to Washington.
24
State Department to 0'Shaughnessy, August 8, 1913, 
and State Department to Lind, August 8, 1913/10637; State 
Department to Canada, August 8, 1913/8265a; Canada to 
State Department, August 14, 1913/8536; Lind to State De­
partment, August 28, 1913/10487; Bryan to Tumulty, August 
8 , 1913, Wilson Papers, Series IV, Box 48; Hale to State 
Department, August 20, 1913, ibid. , Series II, Box 96;
Lind to Bryan, [n.d.], Lind Papers, Box 14; E^ L Imparcial, 
August 10, 1913; III Pais , August 10, 1913; Washington 
Times, August 11, 1913, in Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 
95; New York T i m e s , August 10, 1913, p. 1. Wilson had 
intended for Lind to take up immediate residence in the 
Embassy, but the linens, dishes, and some of the furnish­
ings, having been the personal property of Henry Lane 
Wilson, had been removed. Meanwhile, Bryan ordered 
0 'Shaughnessy to procure new furnishings and prepare the 
Embassy for the Linds' occupancy. See State Department to 
0'Shaughnessy, August 10, 11, 1913/8277, 8300A;
0'Shaughnessy to State Department, August 10, 11, 1913/ 
8278, 8301; State Department to Lind, August 11, 1913/8278. 
One incident occurred at the time when the Linds moved into 
the Embassy that indicated how effective Hale's briefing 
had been. Mrs. Lind, when offered the bed once used by 
Mrs. Henry Lane Wilson, refused, exclaiming, "What! Sleep 
in the bed of a murderess?" The wife of Charge*
0'Shaughnessy, who greatly admired Mrs. Wilson, recorded 
the incident. See Edith 0'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat * s Wife 
in Mexico (New York: Harper and Bros., Pub., 1916), 14.
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Wilson accepted the advice of his agents and directed
Lind to withhold the proposals until he received further
instructions. Meanwhile Lind was to report on conditions
25
as he found them. Several factors may have caused the
President to pause. Wilson had not contemplated the possi­
bility of the Lind Mission's being so severely criticized. 
Not only had Lind's coming caused a furor in Mexico, but 
most of the governments which had recognized Huerta were 
also furiously critical. Their diplomats regarded the
mission with "merriment," prophesied failure, and were not
2 6the least bit inhibited from publicly saying so. Re­
publicans in the Senate also seized the opportunity to 
embarrass the President. Not critical of Lind personally, 
Clarence D. Clark of Wyoming introduced a resolution 
calling for an investigation of the Administration's 
Mexican policy, while William A. Smith of Michigan insisted 
that the Constitutionalist lobby in Washington was guiding 
Wilson's hand. While Albert B. Fall of New Mexico and 
Boies Penrose of Pennsylvania lent their voices to the 
criticism, Augustus Bacon of Georgia, Chairman of the Com­
mittee on Foreign Relations, defended the Administration 
and, after three days of debate, succeeded in having 
25
State Department to Lind, August 10, 1913/8274a.
2 6
New York T i m e s , August 6, 1913, p. 2.
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2 7Clark's resolution placed at the bottom of the calendar.
While President Wilson collected his thoughts, Lind 
busied himself by touring the city and meeting various 
members of the foreign colony and diplomatic corps. He had 
several callers at the Hotel Lascurain and received 
numerous telegrams, letters, and petitions from members of 
the diplomatic corps, well-wishers, and cranks, as well as 
from friends and enemies of Huerta. A model of discretion 
throughout these early days of his mission, he remained 
placid and cordial but refused to discuss the nature of 
his instructions with anyone except Hale. In his only 
public statement, all he would reveal was that President 
Wilson's policy was designed to restore peace to Mexico 
and that it was animated by an honest and sincere desire 
to render a s s i s t a n c e . ^
Huerta, despite his earlier bombastic statements, was 
anxious to reach some accord with the United States, and, 
therefore, looked forward to seeing Lind reveal the 
purpose of his mission. The old general now felt that in 
any negotiations he would be able to deal from a strong 
2 7Cong. R e c . , 63 Cong. , 1 Sess. (August 6, 7, 9,
1913), 3133-34, 3171-76, 3212-15; New York T i m e s , August 7, 
1913, p. 3; ib i d . , August 8, 9, 1913, p. 2.
2 8
Mexican H e r a l d , August 10-13, 1913; New York T i m e s , 
August 10-13, 1913, p. 1; New York W o r l d , August 13, 1913. 
The correspondence Lind received in his first days in 
Mexico is too voluminous to cite individually. It is 
contained in the Lind Papers, Boxes 3 and 14.
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position. No doubt he had strengthened his hand in the 
national capital as a result of his nationalistic pro­
nouncements against outside interference in Mexican in­
ternal affairs. Although the financial condition of his 
government was rapidly deteriorating, his armies were 
victorious in the field. In early August they captured 
Zapata's headquarters at Huautla, and the campaign in the 
South seemed to be gaining momentum. The Federal armies 
controlled the Northeast and had repulsed Carranza's army 
at Torredn in the Center and Obregdn's at Guaymos in the 
West. Despite Huerta's lack of religious fervor, the
Church and the powerful Catholic Party supported him,
2 9because his regime seemed to promise law and order.
Lind, therefore, met no resistance when he sought unof­
ficial tal k s .
Although Lind later had an interview with Huerta, the 
agent carried on actual negotiations with Foreign Minister 
Federico Gamboa. Gamboa had just been recalled from his 
post as Minister to Belgium and had arrived in Mexico 
almost simultaneously with Lind. The career diplomat's 
new appointment resulted primarily from Huerta's latest 
move to eliminate the Felicistas from his cabinet; but it 
may have also been conditioned by the fact that Gamboa was
^ B a r r a g d n  Rodriguez, Historia . . . Constitution-
alista, I, 150, 196-209 ; Gonzdlez Ramirez, Las Ideas - 
La Violencia, 404; Womack, Zapata, 173-76 ; Rausch, 
"Huerta," 136-37, 146.
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the scion of the Catholic Party, with which the old usurper
30wished to solidify his relationship. At any rate, the
choice was fortunate for the provisional government.
Gamboa proved a stubborn but skillful negotiator.
Calling at the Foreign Ministry, Lind first approached 
Gamboa for unofficial talks on August 12. After formal 
introductions by 0'Shaughnessy, the special agent and the 
foreign minister conversed for almost an hour. Gamboa 
was conciliatory. He assured the American agent that the 
provisional government would give "earnest consideration" 
to President Wilson's suggestions and urged Lind to reveal 
the exact nature of his mission as soon as possible, 
preferably the next day. But he also intimated that no 
suggestions would be considered that did not include pro­
visions for recognition. Lind, in reply, explained the 
"spirit" of his instructions, adding that he was certain
that President Wilson "did not contemplate recognition
31under existing circumstances."
The fact that Lind and Gamboa were able to conduct 
cordial conversations eased much of the tension surrounding 
30
Mexican H e r a l d , August 7, 1913; Peter Calvert, The 
Mexican Revolut i o n , 1910- 1 9 1 4 : The Diplomacy of Anglo-
American Conflict ("Cambridge Latin American Studies," No.
3; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 41-42,
204-205.
•^Lind to State Department, August 12, 1913/8314;
New York W o r l d , August 13, 1913; Mexican H e r a l d , August 
13, 1913; New York T i m e s , August 13, 1913, p. 1.
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the Minnesotan's mission, and Wilson was obviously relieved
by the Mexican Foreign Minister's conciliatory attitude.
The day after their talk, the President personally drafted
new instructions for Lind, directing him to present the
proposals to Gamboa. At the same time, he was to emphasize
that the United States, having "canvassed" the world
powers, was certain that she had "the sympathy and moral
support of the governments of Europe." Lind was also to
point up to Gamboa that the United States was "offering
Mexico the only possible plan by which she may find a way
out of her difficulties and avoid worse ones." Failure
to comply fully, Wilson added, would be interpreted as a
refusal by Huerta to abide by the agreements he made upon
assuming power, especially that one calling for early 
32elections.
Wilson persisted in interpreting the terms of the 
Pact of the Embassy, by which Huerta became provisional 
president, as he saw fit. He assumed that the portion 
calling for early elections meant that they should have 
been held in a matter of weeks after the pact was agreed 
upon. On May 31, 1913, the Mexican Congress had, indeed, 
passed a law calling for elections on October 26 that 
same year. Huerta, assuming that he would reach the peak
3 2
State Department to Lind, August 13, 1913/15335a.
The note, which was drafted by Wilson on his personal 
typewriter, was sent under Bryan's signature.
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of his power in July, had wanted the elections to be held
at that time, but his opponents in the Congress succeeded
in postponing them. Wilson seemed ignorant of the fact
33that elections had been called.
Wilson was bluffing when he claimed European support 
for his demands. On August 8, the Department of State 
had sent a circular note to the foreign representatives in 
Washington, urging their governments' cooperation in ob­
taining a favorable hearing for the President's proposals. 
Without knowing what Wilson's exact intentions were, all 
they could have done was what Great Britain did. Foreign 
Secretary Edward Grey directed his ambassador in Mexico 
City, Francis William Stronge, to "unofficially" indicate 
to the Mexican Government that a refusal to at least hear 
the proposals of Washington would be a "grave mistake."
No nation exerted pressure for the acceptance of Wilson's 
demands.^
Lind was struck by the international implications of 
his latest instructions. Unaware that Bryan had made 
representations to the foreign powers, the special agent
^ R a u s c h ,  "Huerta," 110-11; Vera Estahol, La. Revo- 
luc io'n Mexi c a n a , 325-26 ; copy of election law in 
0'Shaughnessy to State Department, September 3, 1913/
8779.
34
State Department to the representatives of certain 
foreign powers, August 8, 1913/8284a; Calvert, Diplomacy 
of Anglo-American Conflict, 2 04 ; Grieb, The United States 
and H u e r t a , 97-98.
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was reluctant to present Wilson's demands as representing
the will of other nations. From what information he had
gathered, he reported to Washington that it appeared to
him that his mission was "considered an unwarranted
attempt to dictate in the conduct of Mexican domestic
affairs." Gravely concerned over the impression that
would result from an outright refusal of his demands,
Lind inquired of the Secretary of State what course he
should pursue if this occurred. Paradoxically, Lind, with
his doubts, suggested also that if he was to present the
President's proposals, they should be delivered as an
ultimatum, with a four-day time limit sent for the
Mexican minister's final reply. Mistakenly assuming that
delay would give other nations time to exert pressure for
acceptance, Wilson and Bryan refused to fix a time limit
for the answer and offered Lind no advice on future moves
3 5until they received Huerta's response.
Without knowing how much, if any, foreign support 
Wilson's proposals would receive, Lind delivered them to 
Gamboa on August 15, and waited while the minister read 
the memorandum. His attention drawn to the last para­
graph, Gamboa quickly informed Lind that this passage 
offered Mexico complete justification for submitting a 
3 5Lind to State Department, August 13, 1913, and 
State Department to Lind, August 14, 1913/8334. Lind 
recommended that if delivered the President's proposals 
on Thursday, August 14, he should demand a reply by the 
following Monday.
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counterproposal. He also pointed out that nothing in the 
document justified the American agent's earlier insistence 
that recognition was out of the question. He then 
questioned the good will professed in the document, insist­
ing that the United States encouraged strife in Mexico by 
sympathizing with the revolutionaries and by not strictly 
enforcing the arms embargo. Noting the recent debate in 
the United States Senate, Gamboa also suggested that the 
proposals did not represent the will of the American 
people.
In reply, Lind evidenced none of the doubts he had 
earlier expressed to Washington. He dodged the matter of 
a counterproposal, but he emphasized that the President's 
memorandum "implied the impossibility of recognition."
He insisted, moreover, that the United States had not 
knowingly sympathized with the rebels and that the patrol 
of the border exceeded international requirements. But he 
was most determined in warning that Mexico should never 
interpret one Senate debate as evidence of division among 
the people of the United States. The American people 
would support their president, he asserted, even to the 
extent of armed intervention. Veiling his threat somewhat, 
Lind went on to explain that this frightening prospect had 
prompted his President to offer his proposed peace settle­
ment. Both diplomats then agreed that the content of the 
memorandum should remain an absolute secret, and Gamboa
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promised a reply the next day. Wilson was heartened by 
Lind's report of the conversation and congratulated his 
emissary for his conduct, especially for emphasizing the 
unity of the American people.
Wilson's optimism was short-lived. On the 16th, 
through Charge' 0'Shaughnessy, Gamboa delivered his 
lengthy formal reply in which he refused to accede to any 
of the President's conditions. The note was so polished—  
"suave," as Lind put it— and polite that the minister's 
veiled sarcasm was seldom offensive. Gamboa reiterated 
to Lind, whom he referred to as "Mr. Confidential Agent," 
all the earlier points he had made concerning recognition 
and, at the same time, declared as "unfounded" Wilson's 
charge that no progress was being made toward the es­
tablishment of a government in Mexico City which enjoyed 
the Mexican people's "respect and obedience." In answer, 
he proclaimed with some exaggeration that twenty-two of 
twenty-seven states, all three territories, and the 
Federal District were under the "absolute control of the 
present government." Wilson, he continued, "is laboring 
under a serious delusion when he declares that the present 
situation of Mexico is incompatible with the compliance of 
[s i c ] her international obligations." Other nations, he 
counseled, had seen fit to extend diplomatic recognition,
•^Lind to State Department, [n.d.] (received August 15, 
1913), and State Department to Lind, August 15, 1913/10639.
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tender loans, anftVeven continue investing in Mexican 
indus tr y .
After defending the legality and stability of the 
provisional government, Gamboa explained why none of 
W i l s o n ’s proposals could be accepted. As if counseling 
on a point of international law, he emphasized that 
"Bandits [the revolutionaries], Mr. Confidential Agent, 
are not admitted into armistice . . . Were we to agree
with them to the armistice suggested this would, ipso 
f a cto, recognize their belligerency." The request that 
General Huerta should agree not to appear as a candidate 
for the presidency, he insisted, "cannot be taken into 
consideration . . . This point can be decided only by
Mexican public opinion. . . ." The pledge that all parties 
agree beforehand to the results of the election and support 
the government thus established, he acknowledged, was 
something to be desired. But his government could not 
speak for the rebels. Having refused Wilson's propo­
sitions, Gamboa, referring to the last paragraph of Wilson's 
memorandum, offered Huerta's counterproposal: "One, that
our Ambassador be received in Washington; two, that the
United States of America send us a new ambassador without
3 7previous conditions." No compromise was suggested.
^ G a m b o a  to Lind, August 16, 1913, Foreign Relations, 
1 9 1 3 , 823-27 ; Spanish original in Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 
Poder Ejecutivo, Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores,
Diario Official, CXXVII (August 27, 1913), 2-4; Lind to 
Wilson, August 17, 1913, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 95.
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Rejection had never seriously entered Wilson's 
thoughts. His administration was totally unprepared for 
that eventuality. Lind was given no new instructions or 
guidance for his future relations with the provisional 
government. In the face of Washington's silence, Lind 
seized the initiative. On August 18, two days after 
Gamboa delivered his reply, the American agent again con­
fronted the Foreign Minister. He warned Gamboa that the 
rejection "was a grave and perilous step." For Mexico 
to "hope for a division among the American people along 
partisan lines . . . was utterly futile." When President
Wilson, he continued, is "compelled to communicate to the 
Congress and to the American people . . . all the inci­
dents accompanying the change of government, no American 
in or out of public life would dare to publicly defend the 
character of the present government." Rejection of the 
President's proposal, he further warned, left the United 
States with three options: one, to alter the neutrality
laws to allow Mexicans to purchase arms in the United 
States; two, to recognize the belligerency of the revo­
lutionaries; and three, armed intervention by the United 
States. Gamboa would only reply that he thought President
Wilson would modify his views after he had an opportunity
3 8
to read the full text of his rejection note.
3 8
Lind to State Department, August 18, 1913/24649; Lind 
to State Department, [n.d.], Lind Papers, Box 14. The 
latter citation is a draft of a telegraphic message sent
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Still having received no new directions from Wash­
ington, on August 19, Lind, with the aid of the British 
Minister, arranged a meeting with Huerta. The interview 
did nothing more than give the general an opportunity to 
boast of the imminent pacification of the country and to 
outline his plans for future reforms. Huerta also indi­
cated that he was anxious for the negotiations to con­
tinue. Of more significance, the day following the inter­
view, Minister Stronge, having just come from Huerta, 
called on Lind to relate the general’s impressions of the 
previous n i g h t ’s meeting. For days Stronge had been im­
pressing upon Lind that, in the interests of peace and 
stability in Mexico, the United States should extend 
diplomatic recognition to the Huerta regime. This day, in 
the course of their conversation, Stronge stated un­
officially that he believed that a "working agreement" 
could be arranged with Huerta if the State Department
between August 16 and 19. The original is not to be 
found in the State Department files. Several of the 
messages Lind sent between August 16 and 29 are missing. 
They apparently were received in Washington, because the 
Department's Index Bureau assigned them document numbers; 
but they are absent from the files. In cases where there 
is a draft in the Lind Papers and corresponding original 
in the Department files, they are identical in their 
wording. The drafts for which there is no Department 
copy, therefore, appear to be accurate and are in­
valuable in recreating what otherwise seems to be an 
inexplicable series of events.
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would urge American bankers to extend the provisional
government a loan. Lind thought the proposal worthy of
39consideration and reported it to Washington.
Bryan was intrigued by the loan proposal. Ignoring
the inconsistency of having denied State Department support
40for bankers' loans to China, the Secretary of State had 
recently come to the conclusion that such loans, by pro­
moting economic stability in Latin America, might further 
political stability. American loans were certainly 
preferable to loans from other foreign sources. He urged 
Wilson, therefore, to consider seriously Lind's suggestion. 
Only a loan "sufficient to meet the temporary requirements 
of the d_e facto government" would be necessary. After all, 
he pointed out, "some government is necessary— without it 
elections could not be held." In conclusion, he suggested 
that the offer should be conditioned on acceptance of the
39 Lind to State Department, [n.d.] (two), Lind Papers,
Box 14.
40 During the Taft Administration, the State De­
partment had secured American banker participation in an 
international consortium's attempt to finance the build­
ing of railroads in China. In the first days of the 
Wilson Administration, Bryan had opposed continued Ameri­
can participation in the consortium, insisting that it 
conferred monopolistic privileges on a few bankers. Wilson 
concurred, also maintaining that the conditions of the loan 
seemed an impingement on China's administrative inde­
pendence. Their decision in this case, however, was not 
intended to apply to all cases relating to international 
loans. See Link, New Freedom, 283-86; Roy Watson Curry, 
Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy, 1913-1921 (New York: 
Bookman Associates, 1957), 18-27.
114
President's original proposals.
While Wilson and Bryan pondered their next step,
Gamboa attempted to seize the initiative. On the 21st,
he called upon Lind and informed the special agent that
he desired to travel to Washington in order to meet
personally with President Wilson. He was positive that
he could alter the President's attitude. Lind's first
impulse was to believe that Gamboa was sincere, but he
42counseled that Huerta might be stalling for time. 
Although Lind only suspected it, stalling was precisely 
what Huerta had in mind. He was near to consummating a 
loan with Mexican bankers. The funds, he hoped, would 
enable him to crush the revolutionaries and leave Wilson
no alternative but to extend diplomatic recognition of
, . . 4 3his regime.
The ruse did not work. Wilson refused to budge an 
inch. In his first positive move in days, he instructed
41 Bryan to Wilson, [n.d.], Wilson Papers, Series II, 
Box 96. Actually, Bryan would have preferred a policy of 
having the United States Government extend loans to Latin 
American nations at 4-1/2 per cent interest, the money to 
be secured by selling 3 per cent bonds. Wilson did not 
believe the Congress or the American people would condone 
such a "novel and radical proposal" and rejected the 
scheme. As an alternative, Bryan looked to bankers' 
loans. See Link, New Freedom, 330-31; Paolo Coletta, 
"Bryan, Anti-Imperialism and Missionary Diplomacy," 
Nebraska H i s tory, XLIV (September, 1968), 179.
42
Lind to State Department, August 21, 1913/10642.
43
Calvert, Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict ,
213; Rausch, "Huerta," 146.
115
Lind to inform Gamboa that he would be received unof­
ficially in the United States only if his reply to the 
initial proposals was withdrawn and if he came with the 
understanding that the attitude of the United States with 
regard to recognition was unchanged. Wilson also revealed 
that he was accepting Lind's earlier advice. He notified 
his agent that he was preparing an address for Congress 
relating to his Mexican policy and that he intended to 
include a relation of the recent negotiations. He also 
noted that, since Gamboa's latest move seemed to indi­
cate that Huerta was softening, he would delay his message 
several days in order to give Gamboa an opportunity to
i • 44make concessions.
When on August 24, Gamboa had made no further ad­
vances, Bryan directed Lind to proceed with the loan pro­
posal. He also revealed that the President would, indeed,
address Congress in two days unless there was a change of
4 5attitude in Mexico City. Lind had lost his patience for
negotiating; he was ready for a final showdown. Hoping 
to cow Huerta into submission, he decided to offer the 
proposals and, if a satisfactory reply was not forth­
coming in one day, to depart for Vera Cruz. "I suggest 
this course," he explained to Bryan, "because I believe it 
dignified and also because I have become satisfied that
^ S t a t e  Department to Lind, August 22, 1913/10642.
45
State Department to Lind, August 24, 1913/8526.
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silence and action at the opportune time are the most
effective arguments. Let the ultimatum be action. They
46
discount words." Lind had hoped to use the British 
Ambassador as an intermediary in broaching the matter of a 
loan. When by August 25, Ambassador Stronge had not re­
ceived permission from his government, Lind submitted a 
new set of proposals that bore his own mark. He insisted 
that the elections be held as scheduled and that Huerta 
should not be a candidate for president. Somewhat more 
realistically, he also suggested that the other propo­
sitions in his original instructions— an immediate armi­
stice and all parties to support a newly elected govern­
ment— should "be taken up later, but speedily and re­
solved as circumstances permit." Then he promised that 
if Huerta would accede to this program, President Wilson 
would "express to American bankers and their associates 
assurances that the Government of the United States will 
look with favor upon the extension of an immediate loan 
sufficient in amount to meet the temporary requirements 
of the tie facto government of Mexico." At the same time, 
Lind also informed Gamboa that he would depart for Vera 
Cruz the next day. Early the next morning, as promised,
47the special agent boarded the morning train to the coast.
*6Lind to State Department, [n.d.], Lind Papers, Box 3.
^ L i n d  to State Department, August 25, 1913/24650; 
Mexican H e r a l d , August 26, 1913.
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Huerta was not the least intimidated by Lind's de­
parture, nor by the fact that Wilson planned to address 
Congress. He felt particularly secure, because negoti­
ations for a 18,000,000 peso domestic loan were drawing
to a close, and the old general expected these funds to
4 8sustain him until late November. Gamboa's formal reply,
which was sent to Vera Cruz aboard the night train of the 
26th, the same day as Lind's departure from Mexico City, 
revealed the confidence of the provisional government.
It fairly bristled with sarcasm and innuendo. After re­
fusing to accede to any one of the demands, Gamboa noted 
the inconsistency of the Wilson Administration: it
insisted that as a sovereign nation the United States had 
the right to withhold diplomatic recognition from certain 
nations, yet would deny Mexico her sovereignty by inter­
fering in her internal affairs. "If once we were to admit 
the counsels and advice (let us call them thus) of the 
United States of America," he remonstrated:
not only would we . . . forego our sovereignty,
but we would as well compromise for an indefinite 
future our destinies as a sovereign entity and all 
the future elections for President would be 
submitted to the veto of any President of the 
United States. And such an enormity, Mr. Confi­
dential Agent, no government will ever attempt 
to perpetuate. . . .
Gamboa suggested that the "disproportionate interest"
48
Rausch, "Huerta," 146; Turlington, Mexico and Her 
Foreign Creditors, 253-54; Ba z ^ n t , Lji deuda exterior de 
M e x i c o , 17 9.
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President Wilson had evidenced in Mexican internal affairs 
would lead one to believe that he "would know perfectly 
well the provisions of our Constitution in the matter of 
elections." Were this the case, chided Gamboa, the current 
impasse could have been avoided, since the Constitution 
prevented "an ad interim President of the Republic from 
being a candidate at the forthcoming elections." Nor had 
Huerta done anything, he added to indicate that he was 
seeking the elective presidency. In conclusion, the 
Foreign Minister intimated that the loan proposal consti­
tuted an attempted bribe. "When the dignity of the nation 
is at stake," he insisted, "I believe that there are not
loans enough to induce those charged by law to maintain it
4 9to permit it to be lessened."
At 1:00 p.m., August 27, well before Gamboa's note was 
completely translated and relayed to Washington, and with 
only scant knowledge of its contents, Wilson went before 
Congress and bared the facts— as he saw them— of the Lind 
Mission. Acknowledging that Huerta had spurned his pro­
posals, he lamented that the United States could not do no 
more than adopt a waiting policy— "watchful waiting," as 
the press dubbed it. "We can not thrust our good offices 
upon them," he concluded. "The steady pressure of moral 
force will before many days break the barriers of pride and
^ G a m b o a  to Lind, August 26, 1913, Foreign Relations, 
1913 , 832-35; also in Diario Official, CXXVII, 6- 8 .
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prejudice down, and we shall triumph as M e x i c o ’s friends 
sooner than we could triumph as her enemies." Since the 
violent civil war was bound to intensify south of the 
border, he urged all Americans to leave Mexico at once. At 
the same time, he promised to enforce strictly the arms em­
bargo against both sides of the conflict. ^
While Wilson was addressing Congress, Lind, Consul 
Canada, and Embassy interpreter, Louis D ’Antin, who had 
come to Vera Cruz, pored over Gamboa's note. Not until 
11:00 p.m., the 27th, had D'Antin completed the trans­
lation, and only then did Lind grasp the importance of the 
Mexican Foreign Minister's comments relating to Huerta's 
eligibility for the presidential election. "Every point 
contended for in the last note is accepted in fact, though 
not in form," he triumphantly, if inaccurately, proclaimed 
in a telegram to Bryan. In Washington, Bryan and Wilson 
had also grasped the implications of Gamboa's note. Two 
days before, in fact, David Lawrence of the Associated 
Press, a reporter close to Wilson, had presented the Presi­
dent with a memorandum, in which he revealed that the 
Mexican Constitution forbade an ad interim president from 
succeeding himself as elective president. Lawrence's 
memorandum and the translation of Gamboa's note, plus Lind's 
euphoric despatch, struck the President and the Secretary 
of State with the force of revelation. "Accept my hearty
"^New York T i mes, August 28, 1913, p. 1.
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51 '■*congratulations," Bryan wired his agent. Wilson must 
also have congratulated himself. By prompting Gamboa to 
admit this constitutional technicality publicly, the main 
object of the Lind Mission seemingly had been accomplished. 
Even the policy of "watchful waiting" which he had outlined 
to Congress seemed the most reasonable course to follow.
The success of his Mexican policy now seemed to hinge only 
on Huerta's good faith in allowing the elections to proceed 
as scheduled.
Mexico's impression of Gamboa's note was quite 
different. On August 28, the provisional government re­
leased the complete texts of the Lind-Gamboa exchange, and 
the press again indulged in an orgy of patriotism.
Huerta's popularity was definitely enhanced, but the main 
hero of the press commentaries was Federico Gamboa. An 
editorial in EJL Diario proclaimed that "John 'Lind thought 
to come, to see and to conquer, but Federico Gamboa was 
able to counter and dominate him." EJ^  Indepiendente 
insisted that the Foreign Minister had met the "Colossus 
of the North" in battle and had driven him from the field. 
As for Huerta, a writer for El_ P a / s , ignoring consti­
tutional technicalities, touched the truth when he 
commented that "President Wilson has not only launched 
51 Lind to State Department, August 27, 1913, Wilson 
Papers, Series II, Box 96; Lawrence to Wilson, August 25, 
1913, ibid. ; State Department to Lind, August 27, 1913/ 
8593.
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the candidacy of Huerta, but has advanced it, since should
he be proposed, he could find no better argument in his
52
favor than the odium of a Yankee President." Certainly 
his supporters did not think that Huerta had made any 
concessions to the United States.
Lind remained confident that W i l s o n ’s stand had been 
a proper one, but he was gravely concerned for the safety 
of Americans in Mexico City. Press attacks on the United 
States, plus Wilson's plea for all Americans to leave 
Mexico, had, indeed, caused a near panic in the American 
colony. The railway station was crowded with would-be 
refugees seeking passage to Vera Cruz. The American 
Consul-General was inundated with requests for financial
53assistance from those who could not pay their own passage.
Lind was particularly fearful for the safety of 
William Bayard Hale. Beginning as early as August 12, the 
Mexico City press had launched a series of attacks on Hale. 
His advice, it was said, had prejudiced President Wilson 
against the provisional government and, hence, he was 
responsible for the strained relations between his country 
and Mexico. In the United States, Senator Penrose, claim­
ing that he knew Hale personally and considered him a
^ Mexican Herald. August 28-31, September 1, 1913; El 
Imparcial, August 29-31, September 1, 1913; New York Wo r i d , 
August 28-31, 1913; JE1 D i a r i o , El Indepiendente, and El 
Pais quoted in New York T i m e s , August 30, 1913, p. 2.
^ N e w  York W o r l d , August 29, 30, 1913; Mexican H e r a l d , 
August 29, 30, 1913.
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dishonorable character, siezed upon the Mexican press 
comments and attempted to embarrass the Administration. 
When news of Penrose's remarks reached Mexico City, the 
press called for Huerta to enforce against Hale Article 33 
of the Constitution, which allowed the President to deport 
"pernicious aliens." Hale and Lind were certain that 
former Ambassador Wilson was behind the attacks, and 
0' Shaughnessy acknowledged that Wilson had earlier at­
tempted to have Hale arrested by Mexican authorities. 
Although Bryan directed 0'Shaughnessy to appeal to the 
provisional government for guarantees for this agent's 
safety, and Gamboa responded favorably, clearly Hale's 
usefulness as an informant was clearly at an end. On the
26th, he was directed to go to Vera Cruz, then to return
54to the United States with Lind.
Lind, in the meantime, had expected his precipitous 
departure from Mexico City to pose enough of a threat to 
induce Huerta to seek new parleys. When no overtures 
came from Mexico City, the special agent, on his own
54
Cong. R e c ., 63 Cong., 1 Sess. (August 15, 1913), 
3385-86; Hale to State Department, August 15, 1913/
20447; State Department to 0'Shaughnessy, August 16, 1913/ 
20447; Lind to State Department, August 16, 1913/8379;
Lind to State Department, August 26, 1913, Lind Papers,
Box 14; 0'Shaughnessy to State Department, August 18, 1913, 
Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 96; State Department to Hale, 
August 26, 1913/10643B; Bryan to Wilson, August 26, 1913, 
Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 96; New York T i m e s , August 
12, 1913, p. 5; ibid. , August 14, 1913, p. 4; ibid. ,
August 16, 1913, p. 3; ib i d . , August 17, 1913, II, p. 1; 
ibid.. August 18, 1913, p. 5; New York W o r l d . August 16,
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initiative, wired 0'Shaughnessy to approach Gamboa and 
assure the Foreign Minister that he was prepared to return 
to the capital and re-open the talks. In a disheartening 
reply, 0 1Shaughnessy reported that Gamboa could think of 
no reason for the special agent to come to Mexico City.
By this time, also, Bryan and Wilson were concerned that 
further advances by the United States might be construed 
as a willingness to make concessions. But they were not 
willing to give up hope that Lind might ultimately be 
summoned by Huerta. Instead of calling him home, there­
fore, Lind was ordered to remain in Vera Cruz and assume 
the role of an observer, to be available for negotiations 
only if they were requested by the M e x i c a n s . ^
Hale was now expendable. At Lind's behest, he agreed 
to return immediately to Washington, partly because of the 
antagonism that had developed toward him in Mexico City 
and partly because both men felt that their impressions of 
the Mexican situation could best be expressed verbally in 
a conference with the President and Secretary of State. 
Certainly Lind trusted Hale to convey his impressions 
accurately. Indeed, no two agents that Wilson sent to 
Mexico were more like-minded and compatible than these 
two. Expressing a need for another agent with whom to 
55
State Department to Lind, August 26, 27, 1913/ 
10634A, 8593; Lind to 0'Shaughnessy, August 28, 1913, and 
0 1Shaughnessy to Lind, August 28, 1913, Lind Papers, Box 
14.
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confide and consult, Lind urged that Hale be returned to 
Vera Cruz as soon as possible. Wilson, as will be
revealed, instead, sent Hale on a diplomatic mission to 
another part of Mexico. It is a paradox that Lind, the 
man of action, became a passive observer, while Hale, the 
more contemplative of the two, became an active diplomat. 
Thus, the diplomatic phase of Lind's mission was 
temporarily closed. Now he was left to swelter in the 
tropical heat of Vera Cruz and serve as Wilson's eyes and 
ears in Mexico, a task he did not relish, but one that he 
performed with characteristic conscientiousness.
c /:
Lind to State Department, August 28, 1913/10487; 
New York W o r l d , August 30, 1913.
CHAPTER V
MORE CONFRONTATIONS - MORE REBUFFS
John Lind's residence in Vera Cruz lengthened from an 
expected few weeks into almost eight months. During that 
time, "El^ Manco" (the one-handed one), as the natives 
called him became a familiar figure throughout the city 
and was cordially received everywhere. Walking about the 
city, along the docks, or through the railroad yards, his 
appearance— he wore dark grey suits and a felt hat —  con­
trasted sharply with the shorter, brown-skinned, cotton- 
clad, straw sombreroed Mexicans. Lind was regarded with 
s ome affection by the Vercruz anos , particularly after he 
and Mrs. Lind danced in the streets during the Fiesta de 
Covadonga, the city's biggest annual celebration. At 
first the Linds lived at the Hotel Terminal, but after Mrs. 
Lind returned to Minnesota in late October, Lind made a 
starkly furnished room in the American Consulate his head­
quarters. Probably to afford himself easier access to his 
sources of information, he declined an opportunity to live 
more comfortably aboard Admiral F. F. Fletcher's flagship 
which was anchored in the harbor.'*'
IStephenson, L i n d , 224-25 ; La Opinicfn (Vera Cruz), 
September 9, 1913; San Antonio (Texas) E x p r e s s , January 18, 
1914.
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Mexico's largest and busiest port, Vera Cruz was an 
advantageous location for gathering information. In the 
course of his daily afternoon walks, Lind often stopped to 
drink coffee or beer or smoke a cigar with a group of the 
local inhabitants. From such informal contacts, the agent 
drew many of the impressions that he forwarded to Wash­
ington. He solicited information from a wide variety of 
people— Mexicans, as well as Europeans and Americans; 
diplomats and officials, as well as interested private 
citizens; landowners and businessmen, as well as property- 
less laborers and peasants; conservatives as well as 
radicals. On occasion others sought him out. He received 
dozens of letters, petitions, and memorandums from anony­
mous or insignificant persons from all over Mexico. He
2
had numerous visitors at the consulate.
Some of his many conferences with well-known visitors 
drew considerable publicity. For example, in November, 
the Ministers of Germany, Norway, and Russia, disturbed by 
degenerating economic conditions in the Mexican capital, 
came to Lind and hinted at the advisability of American 
intervention as a means of restoring order in Mexico. 
Although they were ostensibly on a hunting trip, the Mexico 
City press reported the true purpose of their visit to
ry
Lind's contacts and interviews were too numerous to 
cite individually, but the Lind Papers, Boxes 3, 14, 15, 
and 16 and the State Department's 812.00 file reveal that 
Lind drew his information from numerous sources.
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Vera Cruz. Many were particularly intrigued by Lind's 
well publicized conversations with Jesus Flores Magc^n, 
whose revolutionary reputation predated the Madero upheaval 
of 1910-1911. Actually, Flores Magd’n came to Vera Cruz to 
plead for the recognition of Huerta as a means of ending 
Mexico's fraticidal strife.^
Lind also harbored numerous fugitives from Huerta's 
persecution, including several members of the Madero 
family, and helped some of them escape the country aboard 
U.S. Navy warships. In fact, Mrs. Lind, upon sailing for 
the United States, hid two refugees in her stateroom a- 
board the steamer Morro Ca s t l e , while she remained on deck 
all night during the voyage to Cuba.'* By mid-December 
Lind had established confidential relations with Consti­
tutionalist sympathizers in the Vera Cruz region and he 
brazenly allowed them to frequent the consulate. In March,
1914, he began communicating with agents of Emiliano 
£
Zapata. In maintaining such contacts, Lind became a
^Lind to State Department, November 3, 1913/9513; 
Mexican H e r a l d , November 1-3, 1913; E_1 Imparcial, November 
1-3, 1913.
^Lind to State Department, January 19, 1914/10600; 
Mexican Herald , January 20 , 27 , 1914; EJL Paj^s , January 20, 
24, 1914.
-’Lind to State Department, November 20 (two), 1913, 
January 23, 27, 1914/9841, 9850, 10652, 10703; Admiral F.
F. Fletcher to Navy Department, November 21, 1913, Janu­
ary 31, 1914/9889, 10907; New York T i m e s , October 28, 1913, 
p. 1; Raul Dehesa y Nufiez, "Yo Conoci a Mr. Lind,"
Excelsior (Mexico City), February 20 , 1954 , p. 6 .
^Lind to State Department, December 12, 13, 1913/
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constant source of irritation to officials of the pro­
visional government, and, not surprisingly, the very 
mention of Lind's name sent Huerta flying into a rage.^
Lind also had his regular confidants, men who were 
perfectly acceptable to Huerta. Charge' 0'Shaughnessy was 
a regular correspondent and Consul Canada was a constant 
companion while Lind was in Vera Cruz. Both were mildly 
pro-Huerta, but were loyal to the Administration. Two 
pro-Huerta businessmen also offered their views regularly: 
an American, J. J. Slade, and an Englishman, Fred Adams. 
Adams and Lind became close friends despite the fact that 
the former was a local agent for British oilman Weetman 
Pearson, First Viscount Cowdray, whom Lind suspected of 
providing financial support for the Huerta regime. Embassy 
counselor-interpreter Louis D'Antin, who was anti-Huerta, 
provided much information. For anti-government advice, 
however, Lind relied most heavily upon Loring Olmstead, an 
American who managed the exclusive British Club in Mexico
10152, 10170; Testimony of Lind and William W. Canada,
April 30, 1920 , Investigation of Mexican A f fairs, 2350-55, 
2435-39; Louis M. Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revo­
lution, 1913-1916 (New York: Exposition Press, 1967), 143-
47; Womack, Z a p a t a , 184. Because of Lind's clandestine 
activities, Mexican historian Alberto Maria Carreno has 
suggested that Huerta would have been justified in having 
him executed as a spy. See La. Diplomacia Extraordinaria 
entre Mexico £  Estados U n i d o s , II, 276.
^Huerta, Memorias , 95; 0'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's 
Wife in M e x i c o , 54.
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City. Thus, Lind suffered from no dearth of informants 
and received the widest range of opinion.
Lind's own advice to Washington was endless. Having 
proven himself a trustworthy servant, his impressions were 
eagerly received by the President and Secretary of State.
To a remarkable degree, Lind, Bryan, and Wilson responded 
to changing situations in Mexico in the same way, except 
that Lind's responses were usually more vehement. His 
voluminous despatches exuded an air of Teutonic superi­
ority— being Scandinavian, he preferred the term Teuton to 
Anglo-Saxon. Possessing a Midwestern progressive's yearn­
ing for honest men and fair play in politics and business, 
he was naturally outraged by the circumstances which 
elevated Huerta to power and sustained him there. Yet, 
his first inclination was to accept conditions as they were. 
On August 28, shortly after settling in Vera Cruz, he ad­
vised Bryan: "I have learned enough of conditions here and
learned enough of the Latin character to realize that we 
cannot expect to make them [Mexicans] conform in any very 
great degree to our standards in the matter of government 
. . . The sense of cooperation in government and in
business, which is a strong characteristic of the Teutonic 
race, is utterly wanting in them." Referring to the
Q
Again, Lind's correspondence with his informants is 
too voluminous to cite individually. It is contained in 
the Lind Papers, Boxes 3, 14, 15 and 16 and the State De­
partment's 812.00 file.
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upcoming elections of October 26, in which, supposedly,
Huerta’s successor would be chosen, Lind counseled that
"we simply cannot expect elections to be held in the sense
they are conducted in the United States. . . Judged by our
standards the elections here are a farce." Closing with a
note of opprobrium, but recommending no remedial action by
the United States, Lind added that "anyone who has had the
misfortune to deal with the Irish of our cities . . . has
his mind prepared in slight degree to appreciate conditions 
9
in Mexico." The special agent's tacit acquiescence did 
not last. Less than three months later, he was an avowed 
interventionist. "A worse pack of wolves never infested 
any community," he wrote of Huerta and the interests who 
supported him. "Nothing can be done in the way of re­
construction until they are all eliminated. . . . Lind,
nonetheless, began his vigil in Vera Cruz with an almost 
euphoric outlook.
Throughout the month of September, the Wilson Adminis­
tration remained optimistic about conditions in Mexico. 
Huerta, for a change, made an advance to promote better 
relations. He proposed to send Manuel Zamacona, a retired 
diplomat who had earlier served as ambassador to the United 
States, to Washington to serve in a capacity similar to
9
Lind to Bryan, August 28, 1913, Wilson Papers, Series 
IV, Box 120.
"^Lind to State Department, November 13, 1913/9704.
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Lind's. Forwarding the proposal to Washington, O'Shaugh- 
nessy reported his conviction that Huerta was "desirous of 
coining to an understanding with our government" and that 
the general was "convinced of the impossibility of recog­
nition by the United States ."11 Assuming that Huerta had 
made an iron-clad commitment to step down after the October 
elections, Wilson did not think further negotiations with 
the provisional government were necessary. He, therefore, 
refused to receive Zamacona. Lind, Wilson, and Bryan were 
further heartened when, on September 16, Huerta addressed 
the Mexican Congress and assured the legislators that he 
would not be a cnadidate for office and that the greatest 
triumph of his interim government would occur when he 
relinquished his power to an elected successor. A few days
later, in a press interview, the usurper also promised to
12
remain neutral and refrain from endorsing any candidate.
By mid-September several parties had nominated presi­
dential candidates, including the Felicistas, who put 
forward Felix Diaz. Wilson and Bryan were particularly
1 l o 'Shaughnessy to State Department, September 1, 
1913/8648.
1^0'Shaughnessy to State Department, September 7, 
1913/8735; Lind to State Department, September 4, 5, 1913/ 
8671, 10500; State Department to Lind, September 8 , 1913/ 
24260a; New York T i m e s , September 6 , 1913, p. 2; ib i d . , 
September 11, 1913, p. 3; ib i d . , September 12, 1913, p. 8 . 
Wilson remained undecided about receiving Zamacona until 
the Mexican diplomat arrived in New York, but then informed 
him that it would be useless for him to go to Washington.
132
encouraged when the Catholic Party nominated Federico
Gamboa. Despite the harsh words the nationalistic diplomat
had leveled at them, the President and Secretary of State
had been impressed by Lind's favorable characterization of
Gamboa and announced that they would recognize him if he 
13
was elected. So comforted was Bryan that he wrote to
Wilson: "It seems to me that things are going quite well 
at present and we have only to sit tight and await the
election." Again the Secretary of State congratulated
Lind on the success of his mission, suggesting that the 
whole turn of events was the result of the agent's di­
plomacy . ^
In the last days of September, this euphoria began to 
evaporate. Hale, who had returned to Washington and was
serving as a resident counselor on Mexican affairs, noted
that even if the elections were held as scheduled, the 
results might prove unsatisfactory for the United States. 
The liberals in the Mexican Congress, he insisted, would
F. D. Roosevelt (Assistant Secretary of the Navy) 
to Bryan, forwarding radiogram from Lind, September 15, 
1913/10502; Lind to State Department, September 16, 1913/ 
8880; 0'Shaughnessy to State Department, September 16, 
1913/8867; State Department to Lind, September 18, 22, 26, 
1913/8880, 10645A, 10645B; Bryan to Wilson, September 17, 
1913, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence; Mexican H e r a l d , 
September 17, 22, 1913; EJL Di a r i o , September 26, 1913;
New York T i m e s , September 17, 1913, p. 3; Rausch,
"Huerta," 144.
14 Bryan to Wilson, September 25, 1913, Bryan-Wilson 
Correspondence; State Department to Lind, September 26, 
1913/10645B.
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oppose Gamboa, because he represented the conservative 
Catholic Party. Hale also pointed out that the revo­
lutionaries had announced their refusal to either partici­
pate in the election or abide by the results. "It seems 
to me," he warned, "that to eliminate Huerta and yet leave 
Mexico in disorder is a small practical gain." There was 
no assurance,m o r e o v e r , that the usurper would be eliminated 
by the elections. Among the options available to the 
national Chamber of Deputies, should no candidate receive 
a majority, was nullification of the election results. If 
the elections were voided, Hale revealed, Huerta would re­
main in power. Hale suggested that one possible way to 
avoid these eventualities was to secure Constitutionalist 
participation in the elections. The Liberals in the 
Chamber of Deputies, he assured Wilson, desired Consti­
tutionalist participation and would likely support their 
candidate. "So far as I know," he quizzed the President, 
"our government has made no approached to the Revo­
lutionaries. Ought we not do s o ? " ^
Hale's revelations stirred the President into immedi­
ate action. Having ignored the Constitutionalists since 
June, he suddenly recognized their disruptive potential.
On October 1, Wilson personally drafted a telegram, which 
Bryan relayed to Lind, directing the special agent to
■^Hale to Wilson, [n.d.], Wilson Papers, Series II,
Box 9 7.
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contact leaders in the Mexican Congress and urge them to 
make an "earnest and sincere effort" to induce the rebels 
to participate in the coming elections. Within three days, 
Lind was able to report that certain legislators were, 
indeed, encouraging the revolutionaries to vote. Not 
satisfied with this indirect approach, Lind also suggested 
that the Administration appeal directly to the rebel 
leaders.^
Wilson was already moving in that direction. At the 
same time he instructed Lind to contact the Mexican legis­
lators, the President apparently directed Hale to establish 
communications with Constitutionalist agents in Washington. 
The records reveal no written instructions by Wilson, but 
the report of the conversations between Hale and the 
Constitutionalist agent, M. Perez Romero, which Romero sent 
to Carranza, reveals that the American agent was directed 
to take a hard line. President Wilson favored Gamboa to 
win the upcoming presidential election, Hale informed the 
Constitutionalists, and, if he won and the elections ap­
peared to be legally conducted, he would receive the moral 
support of the United States. Hale then indicated that 
Wilson believed that the Constitutionalists had been justi- 
fied in revolting against the Huerta regime, but he also
-I £
Wilson to Bryan, October 1, 1913/9583; State De­
partment to Lind, October 1, 1913/10645C; Lind to State 
Department, October 2, 4, 1913/10646, 9563.
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insisted that the elections of October 26 should eliminate
any justification for continued revolution. In conclusion,
Hale counseled that his president wanted Mexicans to learn
to use votes instead of bullets to win their political 
17battles.
The implications of Hale's comments was clear. Wilson 
had thrown down the gauntlet to the Constitutionalists: 
participate in the elections and accept the results, even 
if a conservative such as Gamboa was elected president, or 
suffer the odium of having their cause repudiated by the 
United States. But Wilson had misgauged Venustiano 
Carranza's nationalism and pertinacity of purpose. The 
First Chief was greatly incensed by the American presi­
dent's latest attempt to dictate the course of Mexican 
politics. Without once mentioning the elections, but ob­
viously declining to participate in them, he instructed 
his agent to inform Hale that, as the leader of the 
Constitutionalist revolution, he alone would decide what 
was best for his country and that his "line of conduct" 
would not c h a n g e . ^
17
S. Gil Herrera a Carranza [n.d.], A G R E , L-E-861,
Leg. 5; M. Perez Romero a Carranza, September 30, October 
3, 1914, ibid. ; Fabela, Historia Diplomatica de la Revo- 
lucion Mexic a n a , I, 243-244. S. Gil Herrera was an alias 
for Sherbourne G. Hopkins, an Anglo-American, who served 
as Constitutionalist commercial agent and legal counsel.
18
Carranza to Romero, October 6 , 1913, AGRE, L-E- 
861, Leg. 5.
136
Having mistakenly ignored the Constitutionalists for 
months, Wilson should now have known that the rebels were 
not only unwilling to compromise with their political ene­
mies but were determined to continue fighting until they 
were all eliminated. His future relations with the revo­
lutionaries, however, reveal that he had not learned this 
lesson. As yet he did not fully understand their lack of 
faith in the electoral process. Instead, he looked to 
those who seemingly respected democratic processes and 
hoped that they would elect a government which he could 
recognize.
Events in Mexico City during the month of October 
proved most disillusioning for Wilson. Constitutionalist 
sympathizers in the national Chamber of Deputies— mostly 
holdovers from the Madero regime— became increasingly de­
fiant of Huerta. Having recently blocked several of the 
usurper's appointments, they grew more brazen after Sena­
tor Belisario Domdfnguez , who had openly called for Huerta's 
removal, mysteriously disappeared. When he was found 
murdered several days later, the Chamber of Deputies 
launched an investigation. Already pressed by unrest in 
the national capital, the Huertistas were further stunned 
when, on October 8 , the rebel armies under General 
Francisco Villa overran Torrerfn, the key to the Federals' 
northern defenses. It was by far the most impressive rebel 
victory to date, and it encouraged the Constitutionalist
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sympathizers in the Chamber to circulate petitions calling 
for Huerta's ouster. They even threatened to completely 
disrupt the government by endorsing a resolution to dis­
band the Cahmber and reconvene elsewhere, presumably in
19rebel-held territory.
After lengthy discussions, Huerta and his cabinet 
agreed that only ruthless action could forestall an insur­
rection in the capital city. On October 10, therefore, 
Huerta packed the galleries of the Chamber with secret 
police and surrounded the hall with soldiers. When the 
Deputies refused even to reconsider their recent actions, 
110 of the legislators were arrested on the grounds that 
they were attempting to usurp executive power and were 
acting in collusion with the revolutionaries. The next 
day Huerta assumed dictatorial powers and announced that
2
a new Congress would be chosen in the upcoming elections.
By unfortunate coincidence, the day Huerta assumed 
dictatorial powers, Sir Lionel Carden, the new British
0'Shaughnessy to State Department, October 8 , 10, 
11, 1913, Fo reign Relations, 1913 , 835-36 ; Rausch, 
"Huerta," 148-53; Vera Estafiol, La Revolucicfn M e x i c a n a , 
337-39; Barragan Rodriguez, Historia . . . Consti-
tutionalista, I, 263-67.
20 0'Shaughnessy to State Department, October 10, 1913 
(three)/9166, 9167, 9168; 0 'Shaughnessy to State De­
partment, October 11, 1913 (two), Foreign R e lations, 1 9 1 3 , 
836-3 7; Mexican He r a l d , October 11, 1913; Vera Estafiol, La 
Revolucicfn Mexicana, 339-41; Sherman and G r eenleaf, 
Victoriano H u e r t a , 105-107; Jos^ Mancisidor, Historia de 
la Revolucidn Mexicana (Mexico, D.F.: Ediciones el Gusano
de L u z , 1958), 198-200.
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Minister, arrived in Mexico City and presented his cre­
dentials. Lind did not think it a coincidence. He saw the 
makings of a monstrous conspiracy. The American agent had 
been on hand to greet the new minister when he arrived in 
Vera Cruz. In the course of their conversations, Carden 
had revealed great admiration for Huerta and had even sug­
gested that the old general was the only man strong enough 
to restore order in Mexico. He had also been outspokenly 
critical of Wilson's nonrecognition policy, claiming that 
it encouraged revolution and was largely responsible for 
the heavy losses suffered by British investors in Mexico. 
Lind was aroused by the crass materialism implied in 
Carden's remarks. But even more incriminating in Lind's 
eyes was the fact that the minister had been greeted at 
Vera Cruz not by a legation official but by Fred Adams,
21
the local agent for Lord Cowdray's El Aguila Oil Company.
Incriminating, because weeks before Carden’s arrival, Lind
had reported his conviction that British oil interests
were angling for favorable treatment from Huerta and were
22urging him to be a candidate for president. Lind
21
Mexican He r a l d , October 12, 1913; Lind to State De­
partment, October 8 , 1913/9127; Calvert, Diplomacy of 
Anglo-American Conflict, 225-26, 233. Actually the British 
Charge' d'Affaires had gone to Vera Cruz to meet the new 
minister, but Carden disembarked aboard the pilot boat. 
Before the charge' could locate him, Carden had been 
greeted by Cowdray's agent and had conferred with Lind.
22
F. D. Roosevelt to Bryan, transmitting radiogram 
from Lind, September 15, 1913/10502. In this despatch,
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assumed, moreover, that Carden, by presenting his cre­
dentials when he did, signified England’s moral approval
23
of the dictatorship.
Lind quickly became obsessed by the specter of British 
duplicity. The arrival of Carden at the same time Huerta 
assumed dictatorial power, he wrote to Bryan, "was no
24
accident. I believe the whole was carefully planned."
Almost two weeks elapsed before Lind unraveled the threads
of what he thought to be an evil plot. But the day after
his conversations with Carden, he reported the bare bones
of his hypothesis: "Lord Cowday [si c ] through Adams con-
2 5
trols Huerta Administration absolutely." Basing his 
assumptions on rumors and reports from American oilmen, 
including J. N. Galbraith, a representative of Standard 
Oil, Lind "came to the conclusion that Lord Cowdray's money 
kept Huerta in power. In return for his support, Cowdray 
was demanding new concessions which would enable him to 
deliver oil to the Royal Navy under fifty to one hundred 
year contracts. Having recently converted to an oil burn­
ing navy, and being dependent upon Mexican oil, the British 
Cabinet, Lind believed, had readily acceded to Cowdray's
Lind refers to the "largest interest in Mexico not Ameri­
can," which was British.
23
Lind to State Department, October 15, 1913/9218.
24T,Ib i d .
25
Lind to State Department, October 8, 1913/9127.
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demand that their ineffective minister in Mexico City, 
Francis Stronge, be replaced with the oil m a n ’s hand- 
picked tool, Sir Lionel Carden. Fearing the disruptive 
potential of the rebel sympathizers in the Mexican legis­
lature, Cowdray and Carden had insisted upon the establish­
ment of a dictatorship. The ultimate end of the con­
spiracy, the American agent insisted, was the complete con­
trol and monopoly of the Mexican oil fields and oil 
business by the British. To insure the success of this
scheme, Carden would find some means of maintaining Huerta
2 6in power despite the upcoming elections.
The results of those elections served to confirm Lind's 
suspicions. As election day approached, Huerta's own in­
tentions, at least, did become apparent. Instructions were 
sent to state governors and local j ef es politicos, direct­
ing them to insure that the polling places were manned by 
loyal Huertistas. Although he was not an official candi­
date, leaflets urging the electorate to vote for Huerta 
appeared everywhere. Felix Diaz, who returned to Vera 
Cruz on October 23, in order to stand for election as 
prescribed in the Pact of the Embassy, passed this infor­
mation on to Lind and, in counseling the agent, prophesied 
that the elections would be so well managed that Huerta
2 6
Lind to State Department, October 15, 16, 23, 25,
1913/9218, 10647, 9355, 9401.
141
would receive an overwhelming majority. Apathy on the
part of the electorate and Huertista intimidation in some
areas did result in an exceedingly small voter turnout on
election day. Although Huerta received a majority of the
votes cast, the total did not meet constitutional minimums
and it was generally conceded that the election results
9 8
would be nullified.
Ignoring his earlier counsels to Wilson and Bryan that
they should not expect Mexican elections to conform to
Anglo-American standards, Lind condemned the fraud and
intimidation. More importantly, he insisted that the
election results were part of a conspiracy in which the
29British were deeply implicated. His analysis had little 
basis in fact. To be sure, Huerta had managed the 
elections and was determined to remain in power, but the 
supposed British determination to sustain him there, in
27
Lind to State Department, October 23, 26, 27, 28, 
1913/9355, 9406 (two), 9441; Rausch, "Huerta," 181-82; 
Sherman and Greenleaf, H u e r t a , 108-109. Diaz was closely 
watched by Huerta's police and was a virtual prisoner in 
his hotel. When the results of the election went against 
him, Diaz and an aid crawled across the hotel roof and 
gained asylum in the American Consulate, which was located 
immediately next door. Lind and Canada then escorted Diaz 
to an American warship, from which the general transferred 
to a commercial steamer and went into exile. See Canada 
to State Department, October 27, 1913/9418; Mexican H e r a l d , 
October 29, 30, November 2, 1913.
2 8
Mexican H e r a l d , October 27, 1913; New York T i m e s , 
October 27, 1913, p. 1.
29 Lind to State Department, October 26 (two), 27,
1913/9392, 9406, 9415.
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defiance of Wilson's wishes, and to monopolize the Mexican 
oil industry, was a fiction derived from rumors and false 
information provided by American competitors. Lord Cowdray 
did have influence in the majority Liberal Party in 
England, but he did not exert pressure on the cabinet in 
behalf of Carden's appointment. Minister Stronge's failing 
health, plus the need for a diplomat with abundant ex­
perience in Latin America, were the primary considerations 
behind the choice of Carden, who had served at various 
consular and diplomatic posts in Latin America since 1877. 
Nor was there valid evidence that Cowdray took advantage 
of Huerta's diplomatic difficulties with the United States 
to press for larger concessions. The opposite seems to 
have been the case. More likely, Huerta was exerting 
pressure on the British oil man by using his intersts in 
Mexico as a hostage to secure monetary support. Only in 
one respect was Lind correct. The British Cabinet,
Cowdray, and Carden were primarily concerned with the 
protection of English material interests in Mexico and 
believed Huerta the most capable of guaranteeing their 
safety.30
However faulty Lind's notions might have been, the 
important point is that Wilson and Bryan believed him,
30 Calvert, Diplomacy of Anglo-Ameri can Conflict , 216- 
84. Calvert utilizes recently available British Foreign 
Office records in revealing the true intentions of Cowdray 
and the Foreign Office.
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primarily because his suppositions were supported by 
others. As early as April, 1913, the possible connection 
between England's recognition of the Huerta government and 
her oil interests had been discussed at one of Wilson's 
Cabinet meetings. In August, Boaz Long, Chief of the Latin 
American Division of the State Department, after a secret 
conference with Henry Clay Pierce, had reported the Ameri­
can oil man's conviction that England had recognized 
Huerta at Cowdray's insistence. At almost the same time 
Lind began his tirades against the British, the New York 
World published an expos^ which charged that Cowdray had 
dictated the appointment of Carden as the man best
31qualified to protect and expand British oil intersts.
The upshot of all these faulty suppositions was that Wilson 
launched campaigns of diplomatic pressure designed to force 
the British Cabinet to give up its alleged Mexican policy 
and to unseat Huerta immediately.
Wilson's campaign against the British produced positive 
results. He began on an almost belligerent note. In an 
address delivered on October 27, to the Southern Commercial 
Congress at Mobile, Alabama, he attacked concessionaires as 
the instigators of most of the strife in Latin America. 
Obviously directing his comments at the British, he sug­
gested that the United States would aid the people of Latin
^ C r o n o n ,  Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 43-44; 
Long to Bryan, August 26, 1913/8693-1/2; New York W o r l d , 
October 21, 23, 24, 25, 1913.
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America in freeing themselves from the yoke of commercial 
oppression by foreign business interests. Through the 
press and official diplomatic channels, he let the British 
know in no uncertain terms that he believed them to be 
taking undue advantage of the chaos in Mexico to gain pre­
eminence in the oil business. Alarmed by these angry out­
bursts, the British Cabinet moved quickly to mollify the 
American President. Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey 
helped clear the air by dispatching his private secretary, 
Sir William Tyrell, to Washington for conferences with 
Wilson and Bryan. At the same time, Grey and Lord Cowdray 
made representations to the American Ambassador, Walter 
Hines Page. The Foreign Secretary even instructed Carden 
to attempt to mediate between the United States and Huerta; 
but the usurper refused the good offices of the British.
At any rate, Huerta now knew he would receive no support
32
from Great Britain in his conflict with President Wilson.
The British Government never withdrew diplomatic recog­
nition of the Huerta regime, but by early December, 1913, 
the Foreign Office had made it abundantly clear to Wilson 
that Lord Cowdray had little influence in formulating
32
Link, New F r eedom, 369-77 ; Calvert, Diplomacy of 
Anglo-American Conflict , 254-84 ; Walter V. Scholes and 
Marie V. Scholes, "Wilson, Grey and Huerta," Pacific His­
torical Re v i e w , XXXVII (May, 1968), 151-58; William S. 
Coker, "Mediacidn Britanica en el conflicto Wilson - 
Huerta," Historia Mexi c a n a , XVIII (October-December,
1968), 249-50.
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British foreign policy or in choosing His Majesty's diplo­
matic representatives, that British policy with regard to 
Mexico had never been designed to thwart his purposes, and
that Great Britain would never support Huerta against the 
33United States. Lind, nonetheless, persisted in seeing a
British plot to maintain Huerta in power and enhance their
material interests. When Lind continued to report that
Carden was hatching plots in Mexico City, Bryan asked for
concrete evidence of British wrongdoing. Lind could only
reply: "My evidence against Carden is not of a character
cognizable in a court of justice." He based his charges,
he revealed, on "the general sentiment that pervades the
atmosphere so to speak and little incidents that occur from
day to day." Falling back upon his reputation for personal
integrity, the Minnesotan pleaded for understanding:
"While I am not in a position to prove my assertions, I am
morally certain that I have in no instance overstated the 
3 Afacts." Certainly Wilson and Bryan did not doubt their 
agent's sincerity, but since he could not prove his as­
sertions, his anti-British tirades were thereafter ignored.
Other European nations soon followed England's 
example, especially after Wilson sent notes to the powers 
revealing that he was determined to deny Huerta all foreign
^ L i n d ,  New Freedom, 377 .
Q f
State Department to Lind, December 16, 1913/10185; 
Lind to State Department, December 17, 1913/10239.
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sympathy, material aid, and credit. Although none of them 
withdrew its recognition of the provisional government or 
evidenced any sympathy for Wilson's moralistic policy, 
they were careful to determine the attitude of the United 
States in formulating their own policies toward Mexico.
The result was the virtual diplomatic isolation of the
„ . 3 5Huerta regime.
Meanwhile, Wilson had also exerted pressure directly
on Huerta. In doing so, he inexplicably bypassed Lind
and, on November 1, sent an ultimatum to Huerta through
the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, demanding that the die-
3 6tator retire immediately or face possible intervention.
Only three days before, 0'Shaughnessy had conferred with 
Foreign Minister Querido M o h e n o , who revealed that, 
because of faltering finances, the provisional government's 
position was becoming increasingly untenable. 0'Shaughnessy 
also got the impression that the Mexican Cabinet thought 
the retirement of Huerta might serve the best interests of 
Mexico. "I am of the opinion," he wrote to Bryan, "that 
if you make suggestions to the administration in Mexico 
City in such a manner as to save their amour propre (for 
any man who listens to the dictation of the United States
35
Link, New F r eedom, 377, 386-87; Grieb, United States 
and H u e r t a , 113-17; Cline, United States and M e x i c o , 148- 
53.
3 6State Department to American Embassy, November 1,
1914/11443a.
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is ruined politically) such suggestions will be listened to
and substantially followed." That same day, he also spoke
with Huerta's private secretary and received the same 
3 7
impression. Wilson's ultimatum of November 1 was hardly
suited to allow the dictator to bow out with honor; the
charge', therefore, withheld the full impact of Wilson's
new demands and began secret parleys with the Minister of
3 8Foreign Relations.
With 0'Shaughnessy making so many visits to the 
Foreign Ministry, the rumor inevitably emerged that Wilson's 
Mexican policy had taken a new turn. Wishing to maintain 
the secrecy of his efforts, 0'Shaughnessy staunchly denied 
the rumors. Bryan, approving of the charge's course of 
action, also issued a denial. But when Lind was informed 
of the proceedings in Mexico City, he immediately wired 
for permission to participate in the negotiations. Upon 
receiving such permission from the Secretary of State,
Lind inadvertently sabotaged 0'Shaughnessy's efforts by 
revealing to a reporter of the Mexican Herald that the 
United States had, indeed, made new advances to the Huerta 
government. Secret parleys no longer possible, Foreign 
Minister Moheno notified the charge' that, since it would 
appear to be a surrender to Yankee pressure and thus a
3^0'Shaughnessy to State Department, October 30, 1913 
(two)/9469, 9474.
^® 0 'Shaughnessy to State Department, November 3, 1913/ 
9510; 0'Shaughnessy , A Diplomat's Wife in Mex i c o , 32.
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blow to Mexican sovereignty, no agreement could be made at
that time. The dejected American charge' naturally blamed
39Lind for the failure to secure Huerta's resignation.
Lind, still hopeful of a confrontation with Huerta, 
went to Mexico City anyway, arriving there on November 7. 
His conduct in November was decidedly different from what 
it had been at the outset of his mission in August. Then 
he had conducted himself as a man of peace and goodwill.
In November, however, he was brusque with everyone and no 
longer cared if his actions were considered an unwarranted 
breach of Mexican sovereignty. Noting that the members of 
the diplomatic corps and foreign colony feared, above all 
else, the destructive possibilities of a revolutionary 
victory, he delighted in taunting them with threats of a 
possible lifting of the twenty-month old embargo on Ameri­
can arms sales to Mexico. With access to weapons, Lind 
threatened, the Constitutionalists would make short work 
of Huerta and all his supporters, natives and foreigners 
ali k e .^
^ S t a t e  Department to 0'Shaughnessy, November 2, 1913/ 
9564E; Lind to State Department, November 2, 1913/9507; 
State Department to Lind, November 5, 1913/9568;
0'Shaughnessy to State Department, November 6, 1913/9598; 
Mexican H e r a l d , November 4-6, 1913; New York T i m e s , November 
6 , 1913, p. 1; 0'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's Wife in M e x i c o , 
33-34, 39.
^ N e w  York T i m e s , November 9-11, 1913, p. 1; ibid. , 
November 12, 1913, p. 2; Testimony of Nelson 0'Shaughnessy, 
May 3 , 1920, Investigation of Mexican A f f airs, 2710;
0 'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's Wife in M e x i c o , 40-46.
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Of course Lind's hostility for the British was bound­
less, especially after Huerta greeted his return to Mexico 
City with a defiant circular note addressed to all the 
powers, in which he denounced the latest American attempt 
to unseat him. The day before the dictator's outburst, 
Lind conferred with Carden and, during the course of their 
conversation, the minister told the American agent that it 
did not seem reasonable to expect Huerta to "efface him­
self" by resigning under pressure. Taking his cue from 
Carden's comments, Lind reported his conviction that the 
usurper's renewed defiance was British inspired. He 
insisted, also, that Carden's newest scheme was to have 
Huerta install the Congress chosen in the inconclusive 
October elections and allow it to validate British and 
other European concessions. These validations, supposedly,
would guarantee Huerta increased revenue and European
«. 41 support.
Lind's long sought direct confrontation with Huerta 
never took place. Harried by Wilson's new demands, 
rumblings in his own cabinet, and deteriorating national 
finances, Huerta, as he often did, escaped his miseries 
by taking to the bottle. With the old general hiding 
among the many cafes and bars of Mexico City, Lind had to 
be content in conferring with his private secretary,
41 Lind to State Department, October 30, November 5,
7, 8, 9, 1913/9491, 9565, 9619, 11440, 9523.
Jesus M. Rabago. At a meeting arranged by the German
Minister, the special agent insisted that both Huerta and
the recently elected congress must resign. Rabago replied
that Huerta's resignation could be accomplished only in a
manner that would allow him to bow out with dignity and
that it would be impractical to disband the new congress
and leave the nation without a legislature. Both the
Belgian and German Ministers, who were present, agreed
with Rabago, but Lind remained immovable. His judgment
increasingly affected by his personal hatred for Huerta,
the special agent complained to Washington that "were it
not for the fact that we are dealing with a man who is
little less than a madman much of the time an adjustment
42
could be arrived at."
Attempting once again to badger the provisional 
government into making concessions, on November 12, Lind 
delivered his own ultimatum. Huerta, he demanded, was to 
guarantee that the recently elected congress would not con­
vene, then he was to resign. Exceeding his instructions, 
Lind further demanded that the dictator agree to these 
terms by 6 p.m. that same day and carry them out com­
pletely by 12 midnight or face a complete rupture in 
diplomatic relations with the United States. When no reply 
was forthcoming, Lind packed his bags and returned to Vera 
Cruz. 0'Shaughnessy, on the other hand, refused to give
42
Lind to State Department, November 12, 1913/9677.
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up hope. He continued to negotiate with members of Huerta’s
cabinet. President Wilson, moreover, showed no inclination
43
to completely sever relations with the Huerta regime.
Wilson, however, was no longer willing to rely en­
tirely upon diplomatic pressure as a means of ousting the 
dictator. Even while 0'Shaughnessy and Lind were seeking 
H u e r t a ’s resignation, Wilson renewed his efforts to secure 
cooperation from the Constitutionalists. In September 
Carranza had moved his headquarters from the state of 
Coahuila to a safer location at Hermosillo, Sonora. There 
he established his own provisional government. Late in 
October, therefore, Wilson sent Hale to Tucson, Arizona, 
to secretly locate himself near the Constitutionalist head­
quarters. Should Huerta have resigned, the special agent 
would have conferred directly with Carranza and attempted
to persuade the rebels to participate in creating a new
44provisional government in Mexico City.
Adopting a fictitious name, Hale spent several days
4 3Lind to State Department, November 11, 12, 1913/ 
9675, 9677; 0'Shaughnessy to State Department, November 
12, 1913/9680; New York T i m e s , November 13, 1913, p. 2;
El P a i s , November 15, 1913; 0'Shaughnessy , A Diplomat * s 
Wife in M e x i c o , 47-48.
44 Bryan to Wilson and Wilson to Bryan, October 24, 
1913, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 98; Bryan to Wilson, 
[n.d.], ibid. ; Hale's intinerary, ibjLd. , Box 101; William 
Jennings Bryan, Jr., to State Department, October 30, 
1913/9745. The son of the Secretary of State, who lived 
near Tucson, served as Hale's intermediary while the 
special agent temporarily hid his identity.
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quietly inquiring of the strength and character of the 
Constitutionalist movement. He added these impressions to 
those he had received from inquiries in El Paso, Texas, 
and reported his conviction that the revolutionaries were 
much stronger and more unified than was generally believed 
in Washington. Support from the United States, he noted 
in his first despatch to Wilson, might provide them with 
an added incentive to step up their military effort. On 
November 5, his investigations were interrupted when he 
was recognized by a newspaper reporter. In order to 
maintain the secrecy of his mission, he fled Tucson for the 
seclusion of a nearby ranch owned by the father-in-law of 
William Jennings Bryan, Jr. But once it became apparent 
in Washington that Huerta would not accede to Wilson's 
latest demands, and since Hale had been discovered on the 
border, the Secretary of State abandoned any pretense of
secrecy and ordered the agent to await new instructions
• ™ 45m  Tucson.
When the new instructions came, they marked a definite 
change of attitude on Wilson's part. The recent series of 
events in Mexico City had hardened his Puritan will and 
made him more determined than ever to eliminate Huerta.
45 Bryan to Wilson, [n.d.], Wilson Papers, Series II, 
Box 98; Hale to State Department, November 5, 9, 1913/ 
10195; Wilson to Bryan, November 7, 1913, Wilson-Bryan 
Correspondence; Bryan to William Jennings Bryan, Jr., 
November 8, 1913/10648C; Tucson Daily Citizen, November 
7, 11, 1913; New York T i m e s , November 7, 1913, p. 1.
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After the u s u r p e r ’s latest rebuff, for a time he con­
sidered armed intervention, at least to the extent of 
blockading Mexican ports. Secretary of War Lindley M. 
Garrison supported intervention, but Secretary of the 
Treasury William G. McAdoo and Attorney General James C. 
McReynolds were reluctant to use military force. They sug­
gested, as an alternative, recognition of the belligerency 
of the Constitutionalists and a lifting of the arms 
embargo. From Vera Cruz, Lind graphically spelled out the 
advantages of such a policy. He insisted that only a 
military victory by the rebels would completely eliminate 
all the elements supporting the Huerta regime. The mili­
tary forces of the United States, he concluded:
. . could defeat but . . . could neither humble
nor humiliate them. This can only be done by 
their own people, their own blood, the people of 
the North. They can do it to perfection if given 
a fair chance. To make a dog feel that he really 
is a cur he must be whipped by another dog 
preferably by a cur. Consequently let this house- 
cleaning be done by home talent.46
Even before Lind submitted his colorful comments, 
Wilson had decided to offer aid to the Constitutionalists. 
On about November 11, he directed Bryan to instruct Hale, 
who was still in Tucson, to inform the Constitutionalist 
leaders that the Administration in Washington was contem­
plating lifting the embargo on the sale of arms to Mexico. 
46 Link, New F r e e d o m , 380 ; Cronon, Cabinet Diaries _af 
Josephus Daniels , 83; Lind to State Department, November 
15, 1913/9760.
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But at the same time, Hale was to issue this stern warning:
We desire above all else to avoid intervention.
If the lives and interests of Americans and all 
other foreigners are safeguarded we believe 
intervention may be avoided. If not we anticipate 
that we will be obliged to intervene. We are 
confident that the leaders of the North will give 
us no motive to intervene in their territory.47
By issuing this warning, Wilson doubtless was attempting to
forestall the growth of interventionist sentiment among
foreigners with investments in Mexico. But he may also
have wanted the Constitutionalists to make some limited
commitment to abide by his wishes.
With rumors of a possible lifting of the embargo
circulating in Washington and on the border, Carranza’s
earlier demonstrated reluctance to treat with the Wilson
Administration diminished. The road toward more cordial
relations had also been paved by Dr. Henry Aller Tupper,
Director of the International Peace Forum. An old friend
of Bryan, Tupper, in early November, was completing his
47 El Secretario del Estado a William Bayard Hale, 
[n.d.], A G R E , L-E-861, Leg. 5 (English translation by 
author). W i l s o n ’s biographer Arthur S. Link cites a 
pencil draft of the above instructions, dated November 11, 
1913. See New Freedom, 382. This author was unable to 
locate the draft in the Wilson Papers. The note cited 
above apparently was translated into Spanish and presented 
to the Constitutionalists by Hale.
Bryan wanted former Democratic governor of Missouri, 
Joseph W. Folk, who was currently Solicitor of the State 
Department, to join Hale for the negotiations with the 
Constitutionalists, but Wilson vetoed this move. The 
President did not want anyone officially connected with 
the State Department to be involved. See Bryan to Wilson 
[n.d.], Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 98; Wilson to Bryan, 
November 7, 1913, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence.
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third junket into Northern Mexico. Although his avowed 
purpose was to mediate between the revolutionaries and the 
provisional government, he established a very close re­
lationship with Carranza— indeed, in time, he became com­
pletely enamored of the Constitutionalist cause. Before 
entering Mexico the second time in June, he had asked Bryan 
for a letter of introduction. There is no record of such a 
letter being issued; nonetheless, the self-styled peace 
commissioner reported his findings to the Secretary of 
State by periodically issuing an open letter to the press. 
On November 1, he wired Bryan from Nogales that the Consti­
tutionalists had authorized him to offer a proposition in 
their name. In reply, Bryan refused to receive the offer 
as being official, but stated that he would be pleased to 
have any information that the peace commissioner cared to 
report. On November 2, therefore, Tupper directed one of 
his statements to the press, proclaiming Carranza's eager­
ness to buy arms in the United States, along with the 
rebels' promise to respect the lives and property of 
foreigners. This declaration clearly anticipated the 
purpose of Hale's instructions. Carranza, meanwhile, know­
ing that Wilson's agent was in Tucson, underlined his will­
ingness to negotiate by moving his headquarters to the
48border at Nogales, Sonora.
48]jryan to Wilson, June 16, 1913, Bryan Papers, Box 43;
Tupper to Bryan, November 1, 1913, and Bryan to Tupper,
November 2, 1913/9499; William Jennings Bryan, Jr., to
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After holding preliminary conferences with Consti­
tutionalist agents in Tucson, Hale motored to Nogales on 
November 11, where he was cordially greeted by Carranza's 
Sub-Minister of Fomento (Public Works), Ignacio Bonillas, 
a graduate of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who 
served as an intermediary between Hale and Carranza.
Later that same day, the American agent crossed the border 
in the company of the American Consul, Frederick R.
Simpich, and held a preliminary conference with Carranza 
and Bonillas. As if to clear the air before entering into 
official parleys, the ever cautious First Chief reiterated 
his earlier stated determination never to accept Huerta or 
any remnant of his regime. He then acknowledged that the
next day he and the members of his cabinet would be willing
49
to discuss other matters.
State Department, November 2, 1913/9506; E^ l Paso Morning 
T i m e s , November 1, 8, 1913; Tucson Daily Citizen, November 
4, 6, 9, 1913; New York T i m e s , November 3, 1913, p. 3. In 
August, 1914, after Huerta had been eliminated, Bryan sug­
gested to Wilson that Tupper make official representations 
to Carranza in behalf of the State Department. At that 
time, however, the President was reluctant to engage any 
more special agents and declined the Secretary's propo­
sition. As Wilson put it, Tupper was likely to go to 
Mexico "on his own hook" anyway and, despite his lack of 
official character, would probably report his findings to 
Washington. See Bryan to Wilson, August 22, 1914, and 
Wilson to Bryan, August 26, 1914, Bryan-Wilson Corre­
spondence. For the nature of his visits to Mexico, see 
testimony of Henry Allen Tupper, September 19, 1919,
Investigation of Mexican A f f a i r s , 497-528.
49
Hale to State Department, November 11, 12, 14, 1913/
9668, 9674, 9735; El^  Paso Morning T i m e s , November 12, 1913;
Tucs on Daily C i t izen, November 12, 1913.
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The conference of November 12 was held in a sparsely 
decorated, drab little room in the Mexican border customs 
house. Sensing that the future conduct of the Consti­
tutionalist revolution was the matter at issue, crowds of 
curious observers gathered on both sides of the border, 
hoping to hear or, at least, see the proceedings. A 
cordon of Constitutionalist troops kept the spectators out 
of hearing range, but through the open windows they could 
see the patriarchal figure of Carranza as he expounded, 
gesturing with his hands for emphasis, while Simpich and 
Bonillas huddled near Hale, quietly interpreting the First 
C h i e f ’s comments. The impression that reporters received
from their observations was that the meeting proceeded
• u  5 0  quite amicably.
Certainly Hale felt that Wilson's proposals had been 
cordially received. Carranza and his lieutenants im­
mediately expressed their eagerness to receive arms from 
the United States and seemed most sincere in promising 
to protect foreign lives and property. They were tempo­
rarily disconcerted by Wilson's threat of intervention, 
but after they had fully digested the prospects offered
~^E1 Paso Morning T i m e s , November 12, 1913; Tucson 
Daily Citizen, November 13, 15, 1913; New York T i m e s , 
November 13, 1913, p. 1. Isidro Fabela locates this 
first meeting at the Hotel Escobosa in Hermosillo. State 
Department records and newspapers locate the meeting at 
Nogales. See Fabela, Historia Diplom^tica de 1a 
Revolucirfn M e x i c a n a , I, 246.
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by the special agent, they seemed quite gratified and 
Carranza personally expressed his satisfaction. Careful 
to accurately represent the Constitutionalists' attitude, 
Hale agreed to submit his report of the meeting to 
Carranza for editing before forwarding it to Washington.'*'*' 
While awaiting the First Chief's revisions, the 
special envoy began reporting his impressions of the revo­
lutionary leaders. His characterizations were more 
favorable than those offered a few months before by 
Reginald Del Valle. Hale was struck by what he called 
their "moral enthusiasm." "With few exceptions," he re­
vealed, "the leaders are plain men, their speech is re­
markable for Quaker-like conscientiousness and precision 
. . . There is no mistaking the settled determination of
these men and their complete confidence in ultimate com­
plete success." Noting that they were determined to make 
the current upheaval Mexico's last, Hale concluded that 
"these men are plainly bent on complete political and 
social revolution. . . ." The special agent offered the
following characterization of the First Chief:
Carranza is positive character, huge slow-moving 
body and mind. He is deferred to absolutely.
Carranza might be somewhat more refined Oom Paul.
His capacity for silent deliberation is re­
markable, though when he speaks it with fluency
"^Hale to State Department, November 12, 1913/9685.
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and appositeness. . . The Government is, so to 
speak, in Carranza's hat.52
Hale's vignette was quite accurate. At this stage of the
Constitutionalist Revolution, the First Chief had
surrounded himself with a group of advisors— he called
them his cabinet— who were entirely subservient. He made
almost all the decisions and, as a result, the movement
53enjoyed a greater unity than at any other time.
After waiting two days for the rebel chieftain's
formal reply to Wilson's arms proposal, Hale reported some
disturbing news: "Urgent. I have just learned that
Carranza believes Washington is not sincere in its de-
54clared intention of allowing importation of arms." When, 
later tha same day, Carranza delivered his formal response, 
it reflected the rebels' suspicions. The special agent 
reported that the formal reply differed greatly from the 
verbal response Carranza had given at the conference two 
days before. Now the First Chief dwelt at length on
52 Hale to State Department, November 14, 1913 (two)/ 
9733, 9737. In comparing Carranza to Oom Paul, Hale was
probably referring to Paul Kruger, the intensely nation­
alistic late-nineteenth century leader of the South 
African B o ers.
5 3 /Barrag^n Rodriguez, Historia . . .Constitucionalista,
I, 219-20; Martin Luis Guzmin, The Eagle and the Serpent,
trans. Harriet de Onis (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday &
Company, Inc., 1965), 51-57. Although the latter citation
is a historical novel, in many ways it is a memoir,
because Guzman was a revolutionary who served in the camps
of both Carranza and Villa.
■^Hale to State Department, November 14, 1913/9736.
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Wilson's threat of intervention. Acknowledging that he
still wished to receive arms from the United States, he
also warned that any foreign interference in Mexico's
domestic affairs was "inadmissable upon any grounds or
5 5upon any pretext." Presumably he extended this exclusion 
to the arranging of a peaceful transfer of power to a new 
provisional government in Mexico City.
Carranza must have been struck by the incongruity of 
Wilson's actions: while negotiating through Lind and
0'Shaughnessy for the peaceful ouster of Huerta, the 
president was also offering the Constitutionalists weapons 
so that they could eliminate the dictator by force. Hale 
suspected that this prompted the First Chief's change of 
attitude. The rebel leaders, he reported, feared that 
Washington was "using the threat of lifting the arms em­
bargo merely to unseat Huerta and to set up another Presi­
dent in Mexico City." "This," he insisted, "they would
5 6never forgive." But Carranza's suspicions probably went 
deeper. He wished to avoid making any commitment to 
Wilson for fear that the American President would use it 
as a means of attempting to influence the course of the 
Constitutionalist Revolution.
After contemplating the First Chief's response, Hale
^ H a l e  to State Department, November 14, 15, 1913/ 
9738, 9759.
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himself made a plea for a change of attitude in Washington.
"The Constitutionalists," he again emphasized, "are totally
irreconcilable towards the capitalistic and military
elements, which they hold would still be in power in the
capital even with Huerta out of the Presidency." The rebel
leaders had told him that M a d e r o , by allowing these
elements representation in the interim regime that preceded
his election to the presidency, had subverted his own
chances of success. Hale noted that the Constitutionalists
were determined that the same situation should not be
allowed to happen again. They "know their own minds
perfectly," he insisted, "their programme is definite,
their pertinacity is intense and their prospects bright."
Then he inquired: "Do they not thus constitute the most
powerful, single factor in the whole problem and is not any
attempted solution which ignores [this] fact certain to
5 7fail to give Mexico peace?" What he was suggesting as 
subtly yet forcefully as possible was that President 
Wilson should forget about his efforts to negotiate a 
peaceful change of governments in Mexico City, because the
^ H a l e  to State Department, November 15, 16, 1913/ 
9759, 9769. One of the provisions of the Treaty of Ciudad 
Juarez, by which Porfirio Diaz capitualated to Madero's 
triumphant revolutionary armies, was that an ad interim 
government, headed by Francisco de la Barra, Diaz's 
Minister of Foreign Relations, should serve until elections 
could be held. The de la Barra government did much to 
disillusion many of the revolutionaries and helped produce 
the chaos that Madero inherited. See Cumberland, The 
Mexican Revolution, 150-71.
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Constitutionalists would neither acknowledge it nor lay 
down their arms until they were completely triumphant.
Wilson was perplexed by Carranza's attitude. He 
seemed transfixed by the very name Constitutionalists, a 
name that carried with it a pledge to restore consti­
tutional government to Mexico. It seemed incomprehensible 
to him that those who made this pledge should use other 
than constitutional means to purge those who had tra­
ditionally subverted constitutional processes. Not 
surprisingly he sought clarification of several matters 
before making any more proposals to the rebels. Hale was 
to make the following inquiries :
Are the Constitutionalists willing to have 
Constitutional Government restored by peaceable 
means or do they prefer force? If assured of 
free and fair elections would they submit their 
cause to the ballot or do they still insist on 
the sword as the only weapon? Are there any 
men outside of their army in whose wisdom and 
patriotism they have confidence[? If] so secure 
as many names as possible[.] If the Consti­
tutionalists succeed in setting up a govern­
ment by force do they intend to give the people 
an early opportunity to elect a president and 
congress at a free and fair election? If so 
would they be willing to surrender the govern­
ment into the hands of those selected by the 
people at such an election even though the 
persons selected were not the ones preferred by 
those in power?
In providing the special agent with new instructions, Bryan 
revealed the extent of Wilson's distress:
He is deeply disturbed by the impression he 
gets from your last telegram that the leaders 
of the Constitutionalists would trust no one but 
themselves. He would not be willing, even
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indirectly, to assist them if they took so 
narrow and selfish a view. It would show 
that they do not understand Constitutional
C Q
processes.JO
Hale must have been disappointed that his previous ex­
planations had gone for naught; nonetheless, he sought 
another conference with Carranza and attempted to present 
his President's point of view. As forcefully as possible 
he argued for the acceptance of a constitutional transfer 
of power, but the rebel leaders were just as stubborn as 
Wilson. They did not even honor Wilson's inquiries with 
specific answers to his questions, but once again stated 
their determination never to compromise on their revo­
lutionary goals. Carranza, moreover, continued to issue 
public statements to the effect that the would brook no 
foreign interference in Mexico's internal affairs and that 
all he wanted from the United States was the right to 
purchase a r m s . ^
Hale soon grew impatient with the First Chief's out­
bursts. The American agent felt that the public statements 
were meant for domestic consumption, an attempt on 
Carranza's part to pose as a super-nationalist and to 
counter Huerta's patriotic pronouncements. The rebel 
5 8
State Department to Hale, November 16, 1913/9759.
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Hale to State Department, November 17, 1913/9812; 
Tucs on Daily Citizen. November 15-18, 1913; j^ l Paso 
Morning T i m e s , November 15-18, 1913; New York T i m e s , 
November 15, 1913; p. 1; ib id. , November 16, 1913, p. 2.
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chieftain further chagrined Hale on November 17 by launch­
ing a war of nerves. Claiming that he had more pressing 
problems to occupy his time, Carranza refused to meet 
again with the American agent and insisted that all 
communications should be submitted in writing to Francisco 
Escudero, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. When Escudero, 
and then the previsouly congenial Bonillas, refused to 
comment on Wilson's recent inquiries, Hale insisted upon 
a personal meeting with Carranza. Again the First Chief 
excused himself, whereupon Escudero demanded that Hale 
present formal credentials before the Constitutionalists 
would agree to any more c o n f e r e n c e s . ^
Faced with such evasive tactics, Hale's attitude 
toward the rebels began to change. He came to the opinion 
that they were to enamored with their own power because of 
their recent military victories: Obregdn's at Culiacan,
the capital of the state of Sinaloa, on November 14, and 
Villa's at Ciudad Juarez, across the Rio Grande from El 
Paso, Texas, two days later. No doubt both victories 
bolstered the confidence of the Constitutionalist leaders, 
some of whom intimated that they did not need arms from 
the United States. Hale also believed, and he was probably 
correct, that Escudero's demand for formal credentials was 
a ploy to secure diplomatic recognition of the 
6 0Hale to State Department, November 17, 18 (two), 
1913/9768, 9807, 9814.
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Constitutionalists’ belligerency. The special agent was 
further annoyed when the Minister of Foreign Relations 
told reporters that he had asked for Hale's credentials as 
a preliminary step to starting formal negotiations. All 
previous talks, he insisted, had been held out of friend­
ship for Hale and had been "extra-official." When queried 
on the matter by correspondents, the American agent 
clearly evidenced his pique, charging that Escudero's 
comments were a "complete misrepresentation.
Feigning indifference to American support, on 
November 19, Carranza announced that he would return to 
Hermosillo. Later that same day, he departed by rail. By 
this time, also, Wilson was tiring of the Constitution­
ali sts’ evasiveness and he ordered Hale to return to 
Tucson. Before departing from Nogales, the harried 
special agent, his words loaded with sarcasm, revealed to 
reporters his unhappiness over the rebels' attitude:
You know, the world is full of all kinds of 
people. Some are not only impossible, but 
highly improbable. Please understand that I am 
not speaking of the gentlemen across the border 
who are with such admirable skill preventing 
their friends from helping t h e m . ^
1
I bid. ; Tucson Daily Citizen, November 19, 20, 1913; 
El Paso Morning T i m e s , November 19, 20, 1913; New York 
T i m e s , November 19, 1913, p. 2.
62 -Hale to State Department, November 19, 1913 (two)/
9819, 9820; State Department to Hale, November 19, 1913/
9825; New York T i m e s , November 20, 1913, p. 2.
166
If by evasions and harassing tactics Carranza hoped 
to induce Wilson into offering arms without attached 
strings, he overplayed his hand. That he did, indeed, 
want American arms was evidenced by the fact that he left 
Escudero and Bonillas behind in Nogales to arrange another 
conference with Hale, while he paused at Magdalena, a short 
distance from Nogales, to await the outcome. When Consul 
Simpich notified Escudero and Bonillas that Hale had left 
Nogales, rebel agents were sent to Tucson to invite him to 
continue the negotiations at Hermosillo. Wilson, however, 
believed that further contacts with the Constitutionalists 
would be fruitless. On November 24, he recalled Hale to 
Washington.^
Although Hale probably understood the reasons for 
Carranza's obstinacy better than did Wilson, both were 
disappointed at their inability to promote a rapprochement 
with the Constitutionalists. Making matters worse, the 
failure of Hale's negotiations had the effect of bolstering 
Huerta's confidence. The old general was definitely 
shaken by the news of Hale's visit to Nogales and the 
prospect of American aid to the revolutionaries. For a 
time he seemed on the verge of succumbing to Wilson's 
pressure. On November 15, his Minister of Gobernaci^n,
Hale to State Department, [n.d.]/9902; Simpich to 
State Department, November 20, 1913/9843; State De­
partment to Hale, November 24, 1913/9825; Tucson Daily 
C i tizen, November 22, 1913.
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Manuel Garza Aldape, promised to provide 0 1Shaughnessy with
a list of names from which Huerta's successor might be
chosen. But when news of Carranza's response to Wilson's
propositions reached Mexico City, the usurper again became
defiant. He absolutely refused to step down. Not wanting
to seem less nationalistic than the rebel chieftain, he
renewed his pronouncements against foreign interference in
64Mexican internal affairs. If, as Carranza suspected,
Wilson was using the conferences with the Constitution­
alists as a double-edged sword, the results did more to 
hinder than help his efforts to unseat Huerta.
The Constitutionalists, themselves, were anything but 
pleased with the results of the conference at Nogales. 
Disappointed at not securing a lifting of the arms em­
bargo, they also feared that Hale had returned to Wash­
ington with the wrong image of the revolutionaries and 
that he would prejudice the Wilson Administration against 
them. Throughout the month of December, therefore, the 
Constitutionalist agents in Washington maintained contact 
with Hale and sought to cultivate a more favorable im­
pression. To their surprise, they found that the American 
agent held the Constitutionalist leaders in high regard 
and that he was sympathetic to their cause. He warned 
them, nonetheless, that their attitude prevented a formal
6^0'Shaughnessy to State Department, November 13 
(two), 15 (three), 1913/9705, 9720, 9755, 9756, 9757;
New York T i m e s , November 15, 1913, p. 2.
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lifting of the arms embargo. He did suggest, probably
without the knowledge of President Wilson, that it would
be easy for the rebels to smuggle arms across the border
6 5at carefully selected isolated spots.
Although there is no evidence that Hale attempted to
influence the President in favor of the Constitutionalists,
the rebel agents temproarily lost their liaison with the
Administration when, in January, Hale fell ill and was
indisposed for months. Because of his illness, he asked
to be relieved of his duties. Wilson was saddened by the
loss of so loyal and sympathetic a servant and, in
acceding to the resignation, noted that he and Bryan would
"be at a loss where to turn for similar service in the
6 6
time ahead of us." His services as an executive agent at 
an end, Hale ratified his faith in Wilson by publishing an 
article in the May, 1914, issue of W o r l d 1s Work which, as 
the title, "Our Moral Empire In America," suggests, was a
6 5
Hale to Wilson, December 31, 1913, Wilson Papers, 
Series II, Box 101; Francisco Urquidi (Constitutionalist 
agent, New York) a Antonio J. Villarreal, November 24, 
1913, Buckley Papers, File No. 233; Robert V. Pesqueira 
(Constitutionalist agent, Washington) a Carranza,
December 24, 30, 1913, Isidro Fabela (ed.), Documentos 
His tor icos de la Revolucicfn Mexi c a n a , Vol. I: Revolucio'n
Y_ Rdgimen Constitucionalista (Mdxico, D . F . : Fondo de
Cultura Econcfmica, 1960), 180-81 , 184-85.
6 6
Hale to Wilson, December 31, 1913, January 13, 1914, 
Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 101; Wilson to Hale,
January 14, 1914, i b i d . , Series III, vol. 9, pp. 327-28.
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defense of the President's righteous stand against the 
Huerta style of politics in Latin A m e r i c a . ^
The mutual admiration and common political philoso­
phies which had marked the relationship between Wilson and 
Hale did not survive World War I. As the war in Europe 
progressed in 1914-1915, the ex-special agent, a staunch 
Germanophile, became convinced that America's neutrality 
policies favoed the Allies. Wilson's attitude, es­
pecially, disturbed him. He believed that the President's
mind was "warped by the fact that he had never studied
6 8anything but British history." Hale's dissatisfaction, 
plus the offer of a $15,000 annual salary, led him, early 
in 1915, to accept a position with the German Information 
Service, a cover agency for Germany's propaganda effort in 
the United States. Ironically, it was Hale's letter to 
the editor of the New York T i m e s , which was published 
December 2, 1914, defending the Administration against 
the interventionist tirades of Theodore Roosevelt, that 
caught the attention of the propagandists. Assuming that 
Hale, an old friend of the President, might "hold the 
keys" to the back door of the White House, German 
propagandist George Sylvester Viereck, at the urging of 
German Ambassador Johann von Bernstorff, contacted the
^ W i l l i a m  Bayard Hale, "Our Moral Empire in America," 
World's W o r k , XXVIII (May, 1914), 52-58.
^ N e w  York T i m e s , July 27, 1918, p. 1.
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ex-special agent and engaged his services. Although there
is no evidence that Hale ever attempted to influence
Wilson directly, for almost a year and a half, he was a
member of the propagandists' "Inner Council." In May,
1916, he quit the German Information Service to accept the
6 9post of Berlin correspondent for the Hearst newspapers.
In October, 1917, Hale's role in the German propa­
ganda effort was bared when the State Department released 
the texts of several of Bernstorff's telegrams which, ac­
cording to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, proved that 
German agents had engaged in "acts of war" against the 
United States even before she entered the war. By 
implication Hale was branded as a German agent. In 
January, 1918, the former publishers of Century Magazine 
revealed that in 1908 Hale had offered them an article 
relating the details of a recent personal interview with 
the Kaiser. The German Foreign Office, however, thought 
the article too revealing of Germany's military plans and 
purchased all of the already printed copies in order to 
suppress it. Although there was nothing particularly 
condemnatory about the journalist's role in the incident, 
even the New York Tim e s ' version of the episode referred
6^I b i d . , December 2, 1914, p. 12; ibid. , December 7, 
1918, p. 1; ibid. , April 11 , 1924 , p. 21; George Sylvester 
Viereck, Spreading Germs of Hate (New York: H. Liverlight ,
1930), 53-54, 58, 113-14; Rosewater, "William Bayard Hale," 
D .A . B ♦, VIII, 113.
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to Hale as the "Kaiser's friend." Later that year, his 
reputation was further damaged when investigations by the 
Attorney General of New York and the Chief of the Bureau 
of Investigation of the United States Department of Justice 
produced testimony that Hale had written a propaganda 
speech defending the sinking of the Lusitania and that, 
while he claimed to be a Hearst correspondent in 1916-1917, 
he was actually serving as a German agent in Europe. An 
Army intelligence officer, moreover, charged that the news 
despatches Hale sent from Europe to the New York American 
were definitely "pro-German, anti-British, and anti- 
American." The overall impression that emerged from these 
exposes was that Hale was a traitor to his c o u n t r y . ^
Hale denied every charge, and the fact that he was 
never prosecuted would seem to indicate that the Justice 
Department had no concrete evidence of wrongdoing. Hale 
maintained that the sinking of the Lusitania sickened him 
and that afterwards his enthusiasm for the German propa­
ganda effort waned until he became completely disenchanted 
and resigned to accept the post with the Hearst c h a i n . ^
^ N e w  York T i m e s , October 11, 1917, p. 1; ibid. , Oc­
tober 12, 1917, p. 3; ibid. , January 11, 1918, p. 5; ibid., 
July 16, 1918, p. 1; ibid.. July 26, 1918, p. 20; ibid., 
July 27, 1918, p. 1; ibid. , August 2, 1918, p. 10; ibid. , 
August 9, 1918, p. 20; ib i d . , August 12, 1918, p. 9; ib i d . , 
December 7, 1918, p. 1; ibid. , December 8 , 1918, p. 4; 
ibid. , December 14, 1918, p. 3; ibid. , December 15, 1918,
p . 1 0 .
^1Ibid. , July 18, 1918, p. 10; ibid. , August 1, 1918, 
p. 11; ib i d . , August 25, 1918, I, p. 2; ib i d . , December 8 ,
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Despite all his professions of loyalty to the United States, 
Hale was still the subject of numerous persecutions. He 
was expelled from social clubs and literary societies. His 
name was expunged from biographical directories— including 
W h o 's Who In America— and he was proscribed by his pro­
fession. During his travails, neither the President nor 
anyone else in the Administration came to his defense.
After the war he retreated to Europe, an embittered man. 
Venting his venom on Wilson, he produced one book, The 
Story of a_ Style (1920), in which he ridiculed his former 
master's rhetoric, literary ability, and idealism. In the
more friendly environs of Munich, Bavaria, he died on
7 2
April 10, 1924, a relatively obscure figure.
For almost seven months, from June to December, 1913, 
Hale was Wilson's most trusted adviser on Mexican affairs. 
He had forcefully, if not with entire accuracy, brought to 
the President's attention the sordid details of Huerta's 
rise to power. He was the first to impress upon Wilson and 
Bryan the strength of the revolutionaries. The recall of 
Henry Lane Wilson, the sending of John Lind, and the first 
attempts to promote cooperation with the Constitutionalists
1918, p. 4.
72
New York T i m e s . April 11, 1924, p. 21; Rosewater, 
"William Bayard Hale," D . A . B . , VIII, 113. The last edition 
of W h o 's Who In America to contain a biography of Hale was 
the 1916-1917 edition, vol. IX, p. 1036.
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all resulted, in part, from his counsels. He left Wilson's 
service with a better understanding of what motivated the 
revolutionaries than any other member of the Administration. 
But other agents would soon go beyond Hale's mere under­
standing and develop an emotional attachment to the rebels. 
It was their pleadings that would have the greatest effect 
on Wilson's attitude toward the Mexican Revolution.
CHAPTER VI
A BUDDING FRIENDSHIP
All of Wilson's diplomatic efforts in Mexico in the 
fall of 1913 had met with failure. Having been rebuffed 
by both Huerta and Carranza, uncertain that either would 
ever establish a government in Mexico City that he could 
recognize, and fearful that military intervention would 
provoke war with both, Wilson announced on November 20 
that he would again revert to a policy of "watchful wait­
ing."'*' In what was, perhaps, the clearest statement of his 
Mexican policy to date, the President directed a circular 
note to the world powers, announcing his determination "to 
isolate General Huerta entirely; to cut him off from 
foreign sympathy and aid and from domestic credit, whether 
moral or material, and so to force him out." He insisted, 
moreoever, that he was willing to "await the results without 
irritation or impatience." Presumably he meant that he 
was willing to allow the civil war in Mexico to remain a
*”New York T i m e s , November 21, 1913, p. 1.
2
State Department to all Embassies except Turkey and 
Mexico, and to European Legations, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and Denmark and Portugal, November 24, 
1913/11443b.
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war of attrition until, hopefully, the revolutionaries, 
whom he assumed had the best interests of the masses of 
Mexican people at heart, were victorious.
The siege-like operation implicit in the Adminis­
tration's Mexican policy was not to John Lind's liking.
He believed that the Constitutionalists deserved the 
active support of the United States. Lind's sympathy for 
the rebels resulted from his personal hatred of Huerta 
and, more importantly, from his growing awareness of what 
he considered to be the true causes of the Mexican Revo­
lution. As early as September 19, he wrote to Bryan that 
a purely political settlement, a mere transition in govern­
ment, would solve none of Mexico's problems permanently. 
"There can be no lasting peace," he insisted, "without
3
judicious and substantial social and economic reforms."
Lind drew this conclusion from the information he 
gathered in his many interviews and voluminous corre­
spondence. The initial spark likely came from William
3
Lind to Bryan, September 19, 1913, Bryan-Wilson 
Correspondence; John P. Harrison, "Un Andlisis Norte- 
americano de la Revolucidn Mexicana," Historia Mexic a n a ,
V (April-June, 1956), 598-618. The latter citation is a 
Spanish translation of the first, with an introduction 
and notes. Harrison contends that, despite being an 
amateur diplomatist, Lind understood Mexico's needs better 
than did the professionals in the State Department. 
President Wilson was greatly impressed by the letter. In 
returning it to Bryan he noted: "It is a splendid letter
and most instructive from every point of view. It will 
furnish us much food for thought and conference." See 
Wilson to Bryan, October 6 , 1913, Bryan Papers, Box 43.
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Bayard Hale, who had described the Revolution as a struggle 
"between surviving medievalism, with its ideas of aris-
4
tocracy, exploit [and] peonage, and modern civilization."
It was in such terms that Lind attempted to describe the 
conflict. But it was his own personal observations of the 
hacienda system and peasant life that made the greatest 
impact on Lind's thinking. Early in September he and 
Admiral Fletcher visited a hacienda near Vera Cruz which 
was managed by a fellow Minnesotan, R. M. Emery. Lind was 
appalled by the squalor in which the pe^ns lived. He was 
outraged by the spectacle of peasants being worked 
mercilously under the supervision of armed overseers.
What astounded him most was that Mr. Emery, a well- 
educated man who was a former member of the University of 
Minnesota's board of regents, defended the system. "When 
Americans and 'Democrats' at that, in the course of a few 
years become so entranced with this method of appropri­
ating the toil and blood of human beings that they wantonly 
repudiate the noblest accomplishments of our people," he 
indignantly wrote to Bryan, it was no wonder that revo­
lution was ravaging Mexico. He intimated, moreover, that
virtually ever native and foreign-owned hacienda was
5
guilty of exploiting the Mexican people.
^Hale to State Department, June 3, 1913/23616.
~*Ibid. ; La Opinion (Vera Cruz) , September 5, 1913;
New York W o r l d , September 2, 1913.
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In reporting his analyses of the problems that beset 
Mexican society, Lind was often naive, his information 
faulty. For example, he blamed Spanish colonial policy 
entirely for Mexico's contemporary agrarian problems, in­
cluding the inequitable distribution of land. He seemed 
completely ignorant of the fact that many of the great 
aggregations of agricultural property had been secured 
within the past fifty years, during the Juarez and Diaz
g
regimes of the late nineteenth century. A man of 
definite anti-Catholic bias, Lind ignored any positive 
role the Church played in Mexican society, and insisted 
that the clergy, from the bishops to the curates, were 
little more than agents of repression. If a Mexican was to 
succeed in business or politics, Lind intimated to Wash­
ington, he must cooperate with the Church. "Saint Peter 
holds the keys [to success]," he wrote to Bryan; "the 
Padre has some 'puli' with him; appease the Padre, make him 
well disposed, and the chances of enjoying the goodwill of
g
Lind to Bryan, September 19, 1913, Bryan-Wilson 
Correspondence; John Lind, "The Mexican People," The Bell­
man , XVII (December 5, 12, 1914), 715-18, 749-54. This 
article, published after Lind's return to the United 
States, represents his comprehensive view of Mexico's 
problems. The article was originally delivered as an 
address to the Chicago Traffic Club in the fall of 1914.
For scholarly accounts of land acquisition and 
exploitation in the late 19th century and early 20th 
century, see George M. McBride, The Land Systems of Mexico 
(New York: American Geographical Society, 1923), 71-81;
Gonzalez Ramirez, El^  Problema agrario, 116-240.
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Saint Peter are fair."^ He suggested, also, that the Revo­
lution resulted largely because the Church had lost its 
control over the common people. That Lind believed they 
were losing their reverence for the Church was demonstrated 
in a remarkable despatch in which the agent suggested that 
the United States should secure an option on the National
g
Cathedral as a likely site for building a new embassy.
Lind mistakenly ignored all local influences and 
divided the Mexican people into two geographical group­
ings: Northerners and Southerners. Although he had never
been in the northern part of the republic, he developed the 
notion that, with the possible exception of the wealthy 
propertied and professional classes of the South, the 
Northern Mexicans were decidedly superior to their Southern 
counterparts in intellectual and economic potential. He 
suggested that the backwardness of the Southern Indians was
7
Lind to State Department, August 28, 1913/10487;
Lind, "The Mexican People," The B e l l m a n , XVII, 715-18, 749- 
54. This article was immediately branded as being anti- 
Catholic by Father Francis G. Kelley, an outspoken critic 
of the Wilson Administration's Mexican policy. Claiming 
that Lind encouraged the revolutionaries, hence the perse­
cution of the Catholic Church, Father Kelley used the 
article as anti-Wilson propaganda. Father Kelley also 
charged that Lind plagiarized most of his historical data 
from the Encyclopedia Britannica, which may explain Lind's 
superficial knowledge of Mexican history. See Testimony 
of Buckley, Lind, and Father Kelley, Investigation of 
Mexican Affairs, 774-79, 2336, 2682; Stephenson, L i n d , 
279-80.
g
Lind to State Department, December 18, 1913/10256; 
Lind to Wilson, January 10, 1914, Wilson Papers, Series II, 
Box 101.
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comparable to that of the Negroes in the Southern United
States, except he believed that the Indians' potential was
greater than the black mans'. In fact, he had greater
faith in the Indians than in the mestizos (mixed Indian
and European). The single most stultifying influence in
Southern Mexico, he insisted, was "the mongrel progency of
9
the early Moorish Spaniards." "it is absolutely futile to 
hope for orderly government at the hands of the Mexicans of 
the South," he wrote to Bryan, shortly after Huerta assumed 
dictatorial powers. Having concluded that a revolutionary 
settlement was necessary, Lind placed his faith in the 
rebels of the North and dismissed those of the South, the 
followers of Emiliano Zapata, as little more than 
brigands.^
But Lind believed that more than the racial compo­
sition of the populations of the two sections was re­
sponsible for the North's advancement. He contended that 
Northern Mexico's proximity to the United States was the 
single most important determinant. Northern Mexicans were 
afforded a greater opportunity to come into contact with 
Anglo-American ideas and institutions. The most fortunate
9
Lind to Bryan, September 19, 1913, Bryan-Wilson 
Correspondence.
^ L i n d  to State Department, October 11, 1913/14966; 
Testimony of Lind, Investigation of Mexican A f f a i r s , 2327- 
30; Lind, "The Mexican People," The B e l lman, XVII, 718-19, 
749, 752.
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among them, Lind noted, had even lived in the United States.
They had labored for American businessmen, and they or
their children had been educated in American schools. The
total result was that the Northerners had appropriated
11"progressive ideas" from the United States. Lind
naturally assumed, therefore, that the Constitutionalists
of the North drew their revolutionary fervor from their
association with American ideas and institutions. Their
revolution, he wrote to President Wilson, was an attempt
12"to keep step with the march of our people."
By the end of September, Lind felt that the United
States had a definite responsibility to give moral support
to the Constitutionalists; after his mid-November failure
to pressure Huerta into resigning, he advocated outright
13assistance to the revolutionaries. A revolutionary
settlement "will be a little rough," he noted:
[W]e must see to it that the walls are left 
intact, but I should not worry if some of the 
verandas and French windows are demolished . . .
As a good friend and as a true and unselfish 
one, only desirous of Mexico's good, we should
^ L i n d  to Bryan, September 19, 1913, Bryan-Wilson 
Correspondence; Lind to Bryan, December 5, 1913, Wilson 
Papers, Series II, Box 42; Testimony of Lind, Investi­
gation of Mexican A f f a i r s , 2327-30.
12
Lind to Wilson, January 10, 1914, Wilson Papers, 
Series II, Box 101.
13 Lind to Bryan, September 19, 1913, Bryan-Wilson 
Correspondence; Lind to State Department, November 13, 15, 
1913/9704, 9760.
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be near enough to prevent a neighborhood 
scandal, and as a good neighbor we shall be 
glad also when the house is ready for 
permanent repairs to lent [sic] a helping 
hand and see to it that the work is done 
fairly and that the required material is 
not w a s t e d .^
In these comments, Lind revealed his true feelings concern­
ing the Mexican Revolution. Despite his sincere sympathies 
for the Constitutionalists, he had an early twentieth- 
century American progressive politican's middle-class fear 
of social upheaval. In this note and those that followed, 
in which he discussed the advisability of a rebel victory, 
Lind insisted that the Wilson Administration be prepared 
to mitigate the extreme inclinations of the revolutionaries. 
The President read Lind's opinions with great interest.
His own actions and statements ultimately revealed that he 
agreed with his agent's point of view. But for the time 
being Carranza's refusal to cooperate offered him no 
avenue by which to influence the Revolution.
Lind even offered a solution to his problem. He sug­
gested that aid be extended, instead, to General Pancho 
Villa. By late November, Lind had come to the opinion that 
Villa was a "true, virulent type of the most promising 
element of the Mexican population." He admitted that the 
general had faults, that he was "avaricious" and "cruel," 
but insisted, nonetheless, that he had attained the highest 
1 a
Lind to State Department, November 15, 1913/9760.
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degree of "physical, moral and mental efficiency . . .
[the Mexican] environment could reasonably expect to 
produce." But again Lind counseled that if aid was ex­
tended to Villa, the Administration should attempt to 
restrain his extreme violent t e n d e n c i e s . ^
Restraining the Constitutionalists, especially when
their campaigns threatened the lives and property of
foreigners, was a matter of grave concern to Wilson in
December, 1913. Having pressured the European powers into
following his lead in formulating Mexican policy, Wilson,
in turn, was being pressured by those nations to accept
the responsibility for protecting the interests of all
foreigners in Mexico. Accordingly, as his part of the
bargain, the President, in his annual address to Congress
of December 2, promised that all efforts would be made to
16provide such protection. Even as Wilson made this
commitment, his resolve to stand by it was being tested 
by none other than Pancho Villa.
While Carranza was establishing his provisional 
government in the northwestern state of Sonora, General 
Villa was carving out a bailiwick of his own in north- 
central Mexico. After his smashing victory at Torreon, 
Coahuila, on October 8 , he moved northward, captured Ciudad
15
Lind to State Department, December 5, 1913/10077.
16
Cline, United States and M e x i c o , 152-53; New York 
T i m e s , December 3, 1913, p. 1-2.
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Juarez on November 16, then established dominion over the
entire state of Chihuahua with the exception of the
capital, Chihuahua. On December 3, this federal garrison
fell, making Villa the strongest military force among the
17Constitutionalists. Along with the news of Villa's
military triumphs, State Department officials in Washington
also received an increasing number of reports of Villista
18
depredations upon foreign property. These reports had
begun to trickle in following the rebel victory at Torredn, 
but at that time it was hard for Wilson to be too concerned 
about the maltreatment of foreigners in northern Mexico, 
when at the same time Huerta was rigging elections, 
arresting legislators, and establishing himself as dic­
tator. But when Villa captured Chihuahua, the crisis in 
Mexico City had passed and Wilson had made his commitment 
to protect foreign interests. He could no longer ignore 
the depredations, especially after Villa ordered every 
Spaniard to leave Mexico within ten days or face a firing
■^Quirk, The Mexican Revolut i o n , 17; Barragcin 
Rodriguez, His t oria . . . Constitutionalista, I, 263-87.
18 All American Consuls in Mexico had standing 
instructions from the State Department to make repre­
sentations in behalf of the lives and interests of all 
foreigners in their territory of jurisdiction. The in­
structions and representative complaints from American, 
French, Spanish, German, Japanese, and Chinese nationals 
concerning depredations by the revolutionaries may be 
found in Foreign Relations, 1913 , 898-956.
184
j 19 s quad.
Out of this new problem that confronted Wilson came 
one ray of hope. Villa obviously favored Americans over 
other foreigners and, because Wilson had not recognized 
Huerta, gave them preferential treatment. He clearly 
demonstrated this attitude at Torrecfn. Immediately after 
the capture of that city, the Villistas began an indis­
criminate looting of the business establishments. The 
American Consular Agent, George C. Carothers, quickly 
sent a note of protest to General Vil l a ’s headquarters, 
demanding the protection of American lives and property. 
Within an hour, an officer and a squad of twenty-five 
soldiers were placed at Carothers' disposal. Taking orders 
from him, the soldiers were posted before American-owned 
businesses. At the same time, Villa ordered the cessation 
of all looting and punished some of the perpetrators. 
Thereafter, Carothers reported, the Villistas were
 ^ i 20orderly.
What was also encouraging about the Torredn episode 
was that Consul Carothers was able to persuade Villa to
^ M a r i o n  Letcher (American Consul, Chihuahua) to State 
Department, December 11, 1913, and State Department to 
Letcher, December 12, 1913, Foreign Relations, 1913 , 903- 
904.
20xheodore C. Hamm (American Consul, Durango, forward­
ing Carothers' report of conditions in Torrerfn, September 
25-0ctober 11, 1913) to State Department, October 15, 1913/ 
9658; copy in Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 97; Testimony 
of George C. Carothers, February 28, 1920, Investigation 
of Mexican Affairs, 1766.
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mitigate his harsh attitude toward other foreigners.
Calling upon the general to personally thank him for pro­
tecting American interests, Carothers also protested the
21
persecution of the Spaniards in Torrerfn. Most of the 
Spaniards in question were not remnants of the colonial 
regime, but had immigrated to Mexico during the presi­
dency of Porfirio Diaz and had become some of his 
staunchest supporters. Many of them were pawnbrokers and 
loansharks. They also dominated the retail grocery 
business. Their credit policies had always been unpopular 
with the lower classes, and now Villa charged that they 
were all Huertistas and had aided the Federals in the 
defense of Torreon. Carothers argued that the general's 
charges were unfounded, and, whether a result of the
consul's persuasion or some other influence, Villa tempo-
4 ' 2 2 rarily halted his persecution of the Spaniards.
Before Villa left Torredn to begin his campaigns in 
Chihuahua, he called upon Carothers, wished him well, and 
promised to cooperate with other American officials in the
21Ib i d .
O O
Ib i d . The economic activities of the Spaniards were 
aptly described by Edith 0 1Shaughnessy: "The Spaniards are
the traders of Mexico. They keep countless pawn-shops 
(empegnos); they are usurers and money-lenders of all 
kinds; they are the overseers on the haciendas and, inci­
dentally, they keep all the grocery-shops; in fact, they 
control the sale of nearly everything in Mexico." See A 
Diplomat's Wife in M e x i c o , 94.
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future. But when Villa captured Chihuahua and renewed his
persecution of the Spaniards, the American Consul there,
Marion Letcher, was unable to change the general's 
23attitude. By this time the State Department had decided
that a special agent was needed in Constitutionalist- 
controlled territory to reinforce the efforts of the 
consuls. Not surprisingly, the man chosen for the delicate 
mission was George C. Carothers, the Consular Agent at 
Torrerfn.
Carothers was a long-time resident of Mexico. In
1889, aged fourteen, he emigrated with his parents from San
Antonio, Texas, to Saltillo, Coahuila. In 1902 he was made
the Consular Agent at Torrec^n. Since consular agents did
not receive a regular salary, but merely a percentage of
the fees collected for official services, Carothers
occupied himself mainly as a commission merchant, grocer,
and real estate speculator. Never a large operator, he
estimated in 1914 that his holdings were worth no more
24
than 25,000 pesos. Because of his penchant for gambling,
23Hamm to State Department, October 15, 1913/9658; 
Letcher to State Department, December 18, 1913, Foreign 
Relations, 1913 , 909.
^ Register of the Department of S t ate, 1917 (Wash­
ington: Government Printing Office, 1918), 81; Raymond G.
Carroll, "United States Special Agents Powerful in Mexico," 
New York S u n , August 15, 1915; copy in Buckley Papers,
File no. 233; National Archives, Record Group 59, File no. 
I l l .70C22/59 ; Carothers to State Department, October 8 , 
1914, i b i d . , 125.36582/111. All Department of State re­
cords cited herein, unless designated otherwise, are from 
Record Group 59; hereinafter such materials will be cited
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he was perpetually in debt. Indeed, in February, 1912,
State Department officials, after a special investigation,
had ordered Carothers1 dismissal from the consular service
because of his inability to meet his financial obligations.
Before the dismissal order was put into effect, Torrerfn
was swept up in the Orozco rebellion against the Madero
government. During those troubled days, Carothers worked
tirelessy to protect American lives and property and won
the admiration of his superiors and the citizens of
Torrecfn, including his creditors. The Director of the
Consular Service, Wilbur J. Carr, decided, therefore, that
25
Carothers deserved a second chance.
In his late thirties, George Carothers was a portly 
figure of a man; his belly hung over his belt, forming 
what his Mexican friends called the "curve of felicity."
He wore small-apertured metal-rimmed eyeglasses that 
accentuated the full moon shape of his face. Despite his 
bulk, he was fastidious in his dress and presented a
NA, plus file and document number. For the nature of the 
office of consular agent, see Graham H. Stuart, American 
Diplomatic and Consular Practice (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952), 343-44.
25
George H. Murphy (Consul General At Large) to State 
Department, January 20, 1912, NA 125.36582/40; State De­
partment to Hamm, February 5, 1912, ib i d ./4 0 a ; Hamm to 
State Department, March 30, 1912, ibid./ 4 2 ; State De­
partment to Hamm, April 10, 1912, ibid.
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26
pleasing appearance. His despatches reveal that he was
not excitable and that he was almost always in good
spirits. From his childhood days in San Antonio, he seemed
to prefer the companionship of Mexicans to that of Anglo-
Americans. In Torredn his business interests brought him
into contact with all strata of Mexican society. He knew
2 7their problems and understood their moods. As a
journalist who watched Carothers in action put it, "he
2 8knew latino psychology as a cow knows its calf." In the 
vernacular of the border, he was simpatico.
In the beginning, the nature of Carothers* service 
was different from that of previous agents. He was 
directly responsible to the Secretary of State rather than 
the President. His communications went through formal De­
partment channels. At first his observations and opinions 
were not solicited. He was instructed to perform specific 
tasks and report the results. Only after months of 
service was he encouraged to operate on his own initiative.
At the time of his appointment to the post of special 
agent, Carothers was on a leave-of-absence, attending to 
some personal affairs in the United States. On November 
2 6
Edward Larocue Tinker, Corridas and Calaveras 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), 6 . For a
photograph of Carothers, see E_1 Pueblo (Mexico City) ,
March 8 , 1915.
2 7
Carroll, "United States Special Agents," New York 
S u n , August 15, 1915.
2 8
Tinker, Corridas and Calaveras, 6 .
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17, he stopped in Washington long enough to have an inter­
view with Boaz Long, Chief of the State Department’s 
Division of Latin American Affairs. He again described his 
relations with Villa, picturing the general as not only
capable, well-meaning, and just, but as willing to co-
2 9
operate with American officials. Coincidentally, 
Carothers gave a verbal account of his cordial relations 
with Villa at the same time that the Department was re­
ceiving William Bayard Hale's reports of his own troubled 
relations with Carranza at the Nogales Conferences. The 
friendly attitude of the Chihuahua strong man constrasted 
dramatically with the bellicose pronouncements of the 
First Chief and offered tantalizing possibilities for in­
fluencing the course of the Mexican Revolution that Wilson 
could not ignore. Carothers' impressions, moreover, were 
strongly reinforced by those of Lind. The decision to 
send a State Department agent to northern Mexico, there­
fore, was prompted as much by a desire to establish cordial 
relations with at least one Constitutionalist leader as by 
a desire to protect foreign lives and property.
The probability of a new assignment must have been 
mentioned to Carothers while he was in Washington, because 
he sent Bryan an itinerary of his movements for the month
^^Hamm to State Department, October 27, 1913, NA 
125.36582/50; Long, Memorandum of conversation with G. C. 
Carothers, November 26, 1913/9836-1/2.
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of December. The Department's initial instructions, which
were directed to Carothers on December 9, while he was
aboard ship en route from New York to Galveston, Texas,
were very general. He was "to make a trip into the State
of Chihuahua with a view of conferring with General Villa
and other leaders, for the purpose of insuring, in so far
as may be possible, lives and property of Americans and
30other foreigners." Carothers never acknowledged receipt 
of the Department's note, but when he arrived by train at 
Texas City, Texas, more urgent instructions awaited him.
He was informed that Villa had ordered some 400 Spaniards 
at Chihuahua to abandon their property and leave Mexico 
within ten days or be shot. He was further informed that 
Consul Marion Letcher was unable to persuade the rebel 
general to reverse his decree. Carothers was directed to 
"proceed immediately to Chihuahua" and, if he saw Villa 
on the way, he was to "renew and reinforce Letcher's 
representations." If he reached Chihuahua without seeing 
Villa, he was to confer with Letcher and attempt to halt 
the persecution of the Spaniards. These instructions, as 
did the ones that followed, also hinted that Carothers' 
mission would entail more than merely looking to the 
protection of foreigners' lives and property. He was
30carothers to State Department, December 2, 1913, NA 
125.36582/134; Carothers to State Department, December 5, 
1913, ibid. , 312. 52/79 ; State Department to Carothers, 
December 9, 1913, Foreign Relations, 1913 , 902.
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directed to "represent to him [Villa] . . .  in the most
impressive manner . . . the horror that would be felt
throughout the civilized world by the infliction of such 
31
a penalty." If Wilson was ever to openly support the 
revolutionaries, he wanted them to be more respectable 
than Huerta.
On his way to El Paso, the port of entry into the 
state of Chihuahua, Carothers paused long enough in San 
Antonio, Texas, to meet with Dr. J. M. Rodriguez, the 
director of the local Constitutionalist junta. A former 
mayor of Torredn and long-time friend of Carothers, 
Rodriguez described the Constitutionalist hierarchy for 
the new special agent and informed him of the revo­
lutionary activity that had occurred while he was on 
leave in the United States. When Carothers arrived in El 
Paso on December 17, he found two of V i l l a ’s agents,
Lazaro de la Garza and Felizitos Villarreal, awaiting him. 
They placed a special train at his disposal but urged him 
to await the arrival of two Carrancista agents, Luis 
Cabrera and Eliseo Arredondo, who were also on their way 
to see Villa. Carothers knew both of them well and 
decided to delay his departure for Chihuahua until their 
arrival in El Paso, hoping he could enlist their support
31
State Department to Carothers, December 13, 1913,
Foreign Relations, 1913 , 906.
192
32in behalf of the Spaniards.
Arriving in Chihuahua on December 22, Carothers went
to the American Consulate as directed , but there he met
with a hostile reception. Letcher evidently viewed the
special agent's presence as evidence that the Secretary of
State was displeased with the Consulate's efforts. His
pride obviously wounded, Letcher told Carothers that he
could accomplish nothing in Chihuahua and haughtily
stalked from the room. Bewildered, the special agent set
out on his own to find Villa. The enmity that developed
in this first encounter between Letcher and Carothers was
going to plague their relationship throughout Carothers'
33tenure as special agent.
The special agent found Villa indisposed on the 
evening of the 22nd, but the next morning they breakfasted 
together. During the course of their meal, Carothers 
confronted Villa about the mistreatment of the Spaniards. 
In response, the rebel general poured out his bitter
32
Carothers to State Department, December 31, 1913,
NA 312.52/104; ^1 Paso Morning T i m e s , December 16, 1913; 
San Antonio Express , December 19, 1913.
33 Carothers to State Department, December 31, 1913,
NA 312.52/104. By February 1914, the antagonism between 
Carothers and Letcher intensified to such a degree that 
Carothers asked Secretary Bryan to intercede and order 
Letcher to cooperate. Shortly thereafter, Bryan ordered 
Letcher to afford the special agent "all assistance in 
your power." See Carothers to State Department, February 
10, 1914, and State Department to Letcher, February 18, 
1914/10903.
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hatred for the Spaniards, reviewing all of his earlier
charges against them. He also claimed that during the
battle for Chihuahua, he found arms and ammunition in the
hands of Spaniards and had positive knowledge that they
had aided the Federals in the defense of the city.
Carothers then insisted that no one should be executed
without a fair trial, and Villa agreed that none would be
molested unless a court proved them guilty of aiding the
Huertistas. He also promised that all who could establish
34their innocence could return to their property.
Having acceded to Carothers' requests, Villa in turn
urged that President Wilson lift the arms embargo. He
insisted that with access to arms from the United States,
he would be in Mexico City within sixty days. Having no
authority to discuss this matter, Carothers could offer
no encouragement. After the interview, the special agent
left Chihuahua, fully confident that in the future Villa
would be cooperative. Congratulating himself on the
success of his efforts, Carothers paused in El Paso long
enough to file a brief telegraphic report to Washington
before hastening to Fort Worth, Texas, to join his family 
35for Christmas. In his initial effort, Carothers
34carothers to State Department, December 26, 1913,
NA 312.52/94, 104; ^1 Paso Morning T i m e s , December 24, 
1913.
3^Ibid. ; Carothers to State Department, December 24,
1913, NA 312.52/88.
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seemingly had met with more success than any of the 
previous agents.
Meanwhile, John Lind was experiencing nothing but
frustration as he grew increasingly impatient with the
Constitutionalists' slow advance toward Mexico City.
Having accompanied Admiral Fletcher on a voyage to Tuxpam
and Tampico in late November and early December, Lind
returned to Vera Cruz convinced that the rebels could
easily capture those cities with the encouragement of the
United States. They were inhibited from doing so, the
special agent insisted, because they feared intervention
by American Marines if any American oil properties were
damaged. In a patently absurd reply, Bryan offered no
encouragement for the rebels, but advised Lind to suggest
to Admiral Fletcher and British naval authorities that
they urge the Federals to surrender the cities without a
fight and, thus, prevent the destruction of the oil
3 6production facilities.
Throughout the month of December, Lind repeatedly re­
ported that economic conditions in Mexico City were 
deteriorating, that Huerta and his henchmen were hanging 
on only to plunder the treasury and enrich themselves. If 
the rebels were not speeded to victory, he warned,
•^Lind to State Department, November 24, 27, 29, 
December 3 (two), 1913/9900, 9931, 9975, 10045, 10046; 
State Department to Lind, November 24, 30, 1913/9954a, 
9975.
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conditions in Mexico might become so bad that the outcry 
of European and American interests for protection would
become so intense that the United States might be forced
37to intervene militarily. When by mid-month the Ad­
ministration offered the rebels no encouragement, Lind
3 8asked for a personal conference with the President.
Pressured by Bryan and the Chief Counselor of the State
Department, John Bassett Moore, Wilson agreed to meet
Lind while on Christmas vacation at Pass Christian,
39
Mississippi.
On December 30, Admiral Fletcher placed the cruiser 
U. S . S . Chester at Lind's disposal, and he sailed for the 
Mississippi coast. Since his instructions did not specify 
that his departure be secret, the special agent, unable to 
contain his jubilation, told reporters that he welcomed 
the opportunity to speak directly with the President and 
hoped that the meeting would herald a change in the Ad­
ministration's policy. Wilson was visibly annoyed when 
reporters descended upon his holiday retreat and gave the 
37 Lind to State Department, December 5, 8 , 14, 15, 19, 
22, 1913/10077, 10098, 10185, 10196, 10269, 10291.
3 8
State Department to Lind, December 13, 1913/10152; 
Lind to State Department, December 19, 1913/10269.
39
Bryan to Wilson, December 25, 1913, Wilson Papers, 
Series II, Box 100; Moore to Wilson, December 29, 1913, 
i b i d ., Series IV, Box 285; Wilson to Moore, December 29, 
1913/10454.
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conference the fullest publicity. Lind's views being well
known, rumors spread that Constitutionalist officials were
aboard the Chester and that more active support of the
revolutionaries would follow the meeting. Another widely
circulated rumor had it that Lind was accompanied by
officers of Huerta's government, who were prepared to lead
40an American backed coup to oust the dictator.
Wilson, now fearful of his agent's discretion in
meeting the press, did not even allow him ashore. Instead,
the President steamed several miles into the Gulf of
Mexico aboard a revenue cutter to meet Lind aboard the
Chester. Although reporters chartered a tug and shadowed
the President, they were not allowed aboard ship to
witness the conference. The secrecy of the meeting, and
Wilson's refusal afterwards even to discuss it with the
41press, only served to multiply and amplify the rumors. 
Aboard ship Lind applied every argument in his repertoire 
in trying to persuade Wilson of the necessity of giving
40
Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, to Admiral 
Fletcher, December 29, 1913, Josephus Daniels Papers, 
Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Box 39;
Canada to State Department, December 30, 1913/10377; New 
York T i m e s , December 30, 1913, January 1, 2, 1914, p. 1; 
Mexican H e r a l d , December 31, 1913, January 1, 1914; Daily 
Picayune (New Orleans), January 1, 2, 1914.
41
New York T i m e s , January 2, 1914, p. 1; ibid. ,
January 4, 1914, p. 2; Daily Picayune, January 3-5, 1914.
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open and active support to the Constitutionalists. But 
as Wilson indicated in reporting the character of the 
meeting to Secretary Bryan, Lind offered "nothing new" to 
persuade the President to change his policy. Lind, none­
theless, returned to Vera Cruz confident that he had been
persuasive and certain that a lifting of the arms embargo
43and more active support of the rebels would soon follow.
A month passed without Wilson taking action on his
agent's suggestions. For one thing, Bryan opposed lifting
the arms embargo. To him it seemed inconsistent to make
representations to the rebels for the protection of foreign
lives and property, then to intensify the violence in
44Mexico by giving them easier access to weapons. His 
apprehension was eased somewhat by Luis Cabrera, Carranza’s 
new agent in Washington. Late in January, Cabrera held
y ^
A transcript of Wilson's shorthand notes taken at 
the Pass Christian Conference gives only hints of the 
topics of discussion but suggest that Lind urged vigorous 
action. See Notes from conversation with Lind (transcript 
made under direction of Ray Stannard Baker), [n.d.],
Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 101.
43
Wilson to Bryan, January 6 , 1913, Bryan Papers, Box 
29; Lind to Wilson, January 10, 1914, Wilson Papers,
Series II, Box 101; Lind to Mrs. Lind, January 22, 1914, 
Lind Papers, Box 15; Lind to Bryan, January 15, 1914/ 
1065-1/2. Lind left no record of his comments to the 
President at the Pass Christian conference, but from his 
correspondence to Wilson, Bryan, and Mrs. Lind, it is 
apparent that he believed Wilson was in complete 
agreement with his v i e w s .
Bryan to Wilson, [n.d.], Bryan Papers, Box 41.
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several secret conferences with Third Assistant Secretary
of State William Phillips. He offered assurances that the
Constitutionalists would respect foreign-owned property.
In a move that seemed to signal a greater willingness by
Carranza to cooperate with the Wilson Administration,
Cabrera also assured Phillips that the revolutionaries
intended to accomplish their program of social and economic
4 5reform by constitutional methods.
Wilson still had reservations about openly supporting
the rebels. Phillips noted that even after receiving
Cabrera's assurances, Wilson was determined to "do what he
believed right and not to be overinfluenced by the 
4 6Mexicans." A policy change which favored the Consti­
tutionalists did follow soon after the Phillips-Cabrera 
meetings. If the Mexican agent's reassuring words 
sparked this policy change, then, even more certainly, 
Lind's advices had earlier paved the way. In a letter to 
Ambassador Page on January 29, Wilson revealed a greater 
understanding of the Constitutionalists than ever before. 
Excluding the Zapatistas, as Lind would have, Wilson con­
cluded that the "men in the North" are "not mere rebels 
. . . They are conducting a revolution with a programme
which goes to the very root of the causes which have made
^ L i n k ,  New Freedom, 388-89; William Phillips,
Ventures In Diplomacy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952), 60-62.
46 Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, 61.
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4 7constitutional government in Mexico impossible."
By this time another factor may have influenced the 
President as much or more than the advice of his agent.
For months, Justice Department officials had been aware 
that the Constitutionalists were smuggling arms across 
the border. Although occasionally the smugglers were 
apprehended and prosecuted, the Wilson Administration had 
not launched an all out effort to enforce the arms em­
bargo, mainly because it was assumed that the rebels were 
the only ones receiving the illicit arms. In the early 
weeks of 1914, however, the Justice Department gained 
positive evidence that H u e r t a ’s agents had been purchasing 
large quantities of weapons and ammunition from American 
firms. Most of these arms reached his hands by way of
Havana, although some were smuggled out of New Orleans
48
aboard private yachts. Since Huerta, apparently re­
ceiving more illicit arms than the Constitutionalists, was 
benefitting from the embargo, Wilson finally decided that 
Lind's advice was sound. On January 31, he sent a 
circular note to his diplomatic corps directing them to 
inform the powers that he no longer felt "justified in 
maintaining an irregular position as regards the contend­
ing parties in the matter of neutrality" and that he
^ L i n k ,  New F r e e d o m , 389.
^ M i c h a e l  C. Meyer, "The Arms of the Ypiranga," 
Hispanic American Historical Review, L (August, 1970), 
544-50.
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intended to "remove the inhibition on the exportation of
arms and ammunition from the United States into Mexico."
49Three days later he took the fateful step.
Lind, meanwhile, had chafed at Wilson's delay in 
lifting the embargo. When the President finally made the 
move, the special agent interpreted it as an unqualified 
endorsement of the policies he had been advocating. Not 
satisfied with this triumph, he now demanded even more 
active support for the Constitutionalists. "The cause of 
the revolutionists is now our cause," he proclaimed in a 
note to Bryan, "we must see to it that they make the best 
of their opportunity and we must help them do s o . " ^
Even before the lifting of the embargo, he urged that the 
United States somehow take over the commissary operations 
of the revolutionary armies. He insisted that the rebels 
"should not be permitted to fritter away their time 
foraging in a country that must be well nigh exhausted. 
Later he suggested that the United States provide ad­
visors to organize the Constitutionalists' transportation, 
49
State Department to all diplomatic missions of the 
United States, January 31, 1914, and Proclamation revoking 
the proclamation of March 14, 1912, prohibiting the 
exportation of arms or munitions of war to Mexico,
February 3, 1914, Department of State, Papers Relating to 
the Foreign Relations of the Uni ted States, 1914 (Wash­
ington: Government Printing Office, 1922), 446-48.
^^Lind to State Department, January 30, 1914/10737.
51
Lind to State Department, January 12, 1914/10517.
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communications, and intelligence systems. "We must see to 
it that they get brains as well as bullets," he counseled. 
Urging rapid victory at any cost he offered a plan by which 
the revolutionaries might capture Mexico City without 
losing a man. He suggested means by which the city could 
be denied its fuel, food, and power supplies. The popu­
lation of the capital would be so alarmed, he insisted,
that, for their own self-interest, the people would rise
5 2up and drive Huerta from office.
Perhaps his most ambitious scheme for aiding the 
rebels called for the capture of Huerta's gunboats, which 
guarded the Gulf Coast. Trained by the U.S. Navy and 
commanded by a U.S. Marine officer— who would temporarily 
assume civilian status— a small band of Mexican guerrillas, 
Lind insisted, could easily capture the gunboats and use 
them to invade Tampico and Vera Cruz. With the gunboats 
in rebel hands, the agent believed that the revolution 
would be over in thirty days. When the gunboat Zaragoza 
sailed for New Orleans for repairs early in February, Lind 
urgently wired Washington that a naval officer friend at 
Vera Cruz had suggested that one Armin Hartrath, Annapolis 
class of eighty-eight and currently a resident of New York 
City, might be willing to lead a group of Mexican 
guerrillas in an attempt to capture the gunboat as it left 
the mouth of the Mississippi River on its return to
52Lind to State Department, January 30, 1914/10737.
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Tampico. Although the President vetoed this wild scheme, 
he congratulated Lind on the detailed information he had 
compiled.
The pace of the revolutionaries' offensive was never
fast enough for Lind, and the three-month period of January
through March, 1914, was a time of great anguish for him.
After victories— Villa's at Chihuahua and Ojinaga,
Obregcfn's at Culiac^n, and General Pablo Gonzalez's at
Ciudad Victoria— in December and January, the rebel ad- 
54
vance halted. Huerta's regime, having been at a low
point both militarily and financially in November and
December, showed signs of rejuvenation in January and
February. Even in December Huerta enjoyed a glimmer of
success; while his armies were losing in some sectors,
other federal forces recaptured the all-important rail
center of Torretfn. Shortly thereafter the Church,
hacendados, and bankers closed ranks behind the usurper
55as their best hope for survival. Lind viewed this
-^Lind to Wilson, January 10, 1914, Series II, Box 
101; Lind to State Department, February 5, 6 (two), 1914/ 
10792, 10818, 10819; State Department to Lind, February 
8 , 1914/10818.
"^Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 17-19; Barragan 
Rodriguez, Historia . . . Constitucionalista, I, 113, 271,
289-93 ; Gonzdlez Ramirez, Lja Ideas - Lii Violencia, 406-409.
■’■’Rauch, "Huerta," 189-200 ; Vera Estaffol, Lja Revo- 
lucirfn Mexicana, 350-57; Edwin Walter Kemmerer, Inflation 
and Revolution: M e x i c o 's Experience of 1912-1917
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940), 11-26.
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reactionary tendency with increasing alarm; but instead of 
seeing the turn of events as evidence of Huerta's growing 
strength, he insisted that the old general's stepped-up 
programs of military conscription, forced loans, and 
taxation were signs of impending anarchy. In the face of 
such conditions, on February 24, he suggested a new course 
of action, one that obviously had been on his mind for 
w e e k s :
I believe, and I say this after serious re­
flection, that if the revolutionists fail to 
take active and efficient action by the middle 
of March it will be incumbent on the United 
States to put an end to Huerta's saturnalia of 
crime and o p p r e s s i o n . ^
Thereafter he never relented in his demands for military
intervention.
Even though Bryan insisted that intervention was out 
of the question, Lind proceeded, on his own initiative, 
to plan a campaign for the capture of Mexico City. First, 
he sent a Marine officer to the capital to make a 
reconnaissance of Huerta's military installations. Then, 
he arranged with the American manager of the Mexican 
National Railway to transport secretly several hundred 
Marines to Mexico City by night. At dawn the Marines would 
seize strategic locations, arrest Huerta, and establish a 
military government, which would serve until the 
5 6Lind to State Department, January 7, 14, 24, 26, 
February 18, 24, 1914/10462, 10539, 10677, 10688, 10924, 
10956.
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Constitutionalists could take over the city. Huerta was 
to be given political asylum in the United States. Lind 
acknowledged that Carranza should be informed of the 
operation in advance but did not think the Constitution­
alist leader would have any reason to raise objections. 
"The taking of Mexico City," he eupherically assured the 
Secretary of State, "if limited to the purpose of putting 
a stop to Huerta's anarchical career and to afford the 
Mexican people an opportunity of resume orderly govern­
ment should not be regarded as intervention in the 
offensive sense it seems to m e . " ^  Significantly, Bryan
replied that "the President has received your recent
5 8reports and has them under consideration." Was this a 
hint that Wilson's patience was also wearing thin and 
that he considered intervention a likely prospect?
Sharing Lind's frustrations over Huerta's tenacity 
and the Constitutionalists' inability to rapidly unseat
"^State Department to Lind, March 3, 1914/11000; Lind 
to State Department, February 24, March 8 , 12, 23, 1914/ 
10965 , 11098 , 11227 , 27482 ; Captain W. A. Burnside (U.S.M.C.) 
to Lind (conveying summary of military strength and action, 
February 26-March 4, 1914), [n.d .]/16251 ; Stephenson, L i n d , 
259-60. Stephenson, using only the Lind Papers, and not 
having access to complete State Department files, sug­
gested that the "most cheritable" conclusion to be drawn 
from this scheme is that it was pressed upon Lind by 
Marine and Navy officers who were "itching for a scrap 
with the greasers." State Department records indicate that 
Lind was the instigator of the plan.
5 8
State Department to Lind, March 25, 1914/11265.
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the usurper, Wilson also had to cope with the problems re­
sulting from the predatory actions of the revolutionaries. 
Even after Carothers' apparently successful trip into 
Chihuahua in December, the State Department continued to 
receive news of depredations against the Spaniards. In 
addition to these complaints, came reports that Villa was 
confiscating coal from American-owned mining companies 
and making threatening gestures toward German and Japanese 
firms. Special Agent Carothers had no sooner arrived in 
Fort Worth, Texas, for a Christmas holiday when
despatches from Washington directed him to find Villa and
59
investigate the reports.
When Carothers arrived in El Paso on December 30, he 
discovered that Villa was due to arrive across the border 
in Juarez the next day. The agent, meanwhile, made an 
investigation of the complaints and reported his belief 
that they were exaggerated. When Carothers did confront 
Villa, the general became annoyed that the American agent 
should repeatedly involved himself in affairs that did 
not directly concern the United States. When Carothers 
refused to back down, explaining that he had been ordered 
by President Wilson to intercede for the Spaniards,
Villa's attitude softened. The next day he provided the 
agent with a written explanation of his actions, which
5 9State Department to Carothers, December 27, 1913,
Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 3 , 909-10.
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Carothers forwarded to Washington. In emotion-packed 
phrases (since Villa could barely write, he must have 
dictated the note to a stenographer or had one of his ad­
visors prepare it), the rebel general again poured out his 
bitter hatred for the Spaniards. He insisted that he had 
intended to keep his earlier promises but found it 
necessary to continue the deportations as a means of 
protecting the Spaniards from the wrath of his soldiers.
Any of them who could vindicate themselves, he promised, 
could return to their homes and property without fear of
reprisals. Again, Carothers was satisfied that Villa was
, r L 60 acting m  good faith.
It took Carothers longer to settle a dispute between 
Villa and the Guggenheim-owned American Smelting and 
Refining Company. The rebel general had demanded that the 
company purchase some $500,000 worth of confiscated ores, 
much of which had been taken from the company, itself, or 
from its preferred customers. On January 20, Carothers 
reported that Villa had agreed to return the ores he had 
confiscated from the company and promised that it would 
not be required to purchase any ores confiscated from 
other foreign-owned m i n e s . ^  Thereafter, Villa's
60carothers to State Department, December 30, 31, 1913, 
NA 312.11/3073, 312.52/104; Villa to Carothers, January 1, 
1914, NA 312.52/104; New York T i m e s , February 22, 1914, II,
p. 1.
^ S t a t e  Department to Carothers, January 19, 1914, NA 
312.115an3/84; Carothers to State Department, January 20, 
1914, ibid./85.
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relations with American Smelting and Refining were cordial.
He protected its shipments to the border and it provided
6 2him with coal for his railroads.
Carothers was far less successful in securing pro­
tection for IQ Desengaho Mine of Guanacevi, Durango, which 
was owned jointly by Spanish, Mexican and American 
citizens. Since the order to confiscate the mine 
alledgedly came from Villa, Carothers brought the matter 
to the general's attention. Villa denied having issued 
the decree. While Carothers was attempting to determine 
the source of the order, the State Department directed 
Consul Frederick Simpich at Nogales to take the matter up 
with Carranza. In response, the first Chief issued a 
directive that gave local rebel leaders a temporary 
respite from American diplomatic pressure. Asserting his 
prerogative as leader of the revolutionary forces,
Carranza demanded that all complaints of foreigners be 
directed to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Isidro Fabela,
only by diplomatic representatives of the country directly 
6 3concerned. At approximately the same time, Cabrera, in
62ciarence C. Clendenen, The United States and Pancho 
Villa (Ithaca, N.Y.: Published for the American Historical
Association, Cornell University Press, 1961), 73-74.
^ S p a n i s h  Ambassador to State Department, January 7, 
1914, Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 4 , 786; State Department to 
Carothers, January 10, 1914, ibid. , 787-88; Simpich to 
State Department, February 19, 1914, ib i d . , 793; Carothers 
to State Department, January 11, 12, 1914, NA 312.52/114, 
118.
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Washington, was giving assurances that the Constitution­
alists would respect foreign-owned property. Theoreti­
cally there was no contradiction between Carrenza's 
directive and Cabrera's promises, since each nation was 
given an opportunity to make representations in behalf of 
their own citizens. At any rate, Wilson and Bryan paid 
no heed to the First Chief's newest demand and continued 
to direct their appeals in behalf of all foreigners 
directly to Villa and other subordinate rebel leaders.
Further complicating Carothers' efforts, Bryan also
involved him in matters that concerned only Mexican
citizens. One of the initial issues that Washington had
directed him to take up with Villa was the arrest and
detention of Luis Terrazas, Jr., the son of a wealthy
Chihuahua hacendado and former governor of the state.
Villa despised the Terrazas family, as he despised all
hacendados, and, after capturing Chihuahua, he confiscated
the family's holdings, which amounted to millions of acres.
When Luis, Jr., took refuge in the British Consulate, he
6 4was forceably removed by Villa's men. The plight of this 
prominent Mexican family attracted considerable attention 
6 4
Secretary of War to Secretary of State (forwarding 
letter from General Hugh L. Scott, El Paso), December 13, 
1913, Foreign Relations, 1913 , 905; State Department to 
Carothers, December 15, 1913, ib i d . , 907 ; New York T i m e s , 
December 12, 1913, p. 1; EJL Paso Morning Times , December 
12, 17, 1913; Alamada, La Revolucidn en el Estado de 
Chihuahua, II, 68-70.
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in the United States. The New York Times condemned Villa's 
"act of brigandage," and numerous American friends, in­
cluding Senator Albert B. Fall of New Mexico, appealed to
6 5
the State Department to intercede.
The Terrazas matter was further confused when Senator 
Fall appeared in El Paso and began applying pressure on 
Villa's agents. Fall demanded that Luis, Jr., be re­
leased and the family's possessions be returned or he 
would use his influence in the United States Senate to dis­
credit the Constitutionalist cause. The Senator also 
spoke to Carothers. Besides his concern for the Terrazas 
family, Fall revealed that he had contracted for the 
purchase of some of the Terrazas cattle, and he wanted the 
special agent to use his influence with Villa to secure 
their release. The head of the family, Luis, Sr., who was 
then living in Fall's El Paso home, also sought Carothers' 
aid in securing the release of his son. Villa agreed that 
two female members of the family, who had remained in 
Chihuahua, were free to leave whenever they chose, but he 
remained indifferent to other appeals. He promised that 
Luis, Jr., would not be harmed, but insisted that he be 
held hostage to guarantee that his father would not finance
^ N e w  York Times, December 12, 1913, p. 1; Fall to 
State Department, December 16, 1913/10223. The State De­
partment 812.00 file contains numerous appeals in 
Terrazas' behalf from Americans and Mexicans.
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a counter-revolution in Chihuahua as he had against
M a d e r o . ^  As Villa put it to Carothers: "cuando se amara
el becerro la vaca no anda muy l e j o s . " ^
Despite only mixed success in his early relations with
General Villa, Carothers immediately formed a high opinion
of this bandit-turned-revolutionary. The special agent was
especially impressed by the quick, simply justice which
this caudillo (chieftain) meted out to his followers and
how they adored him. Carothers acknowledged that Villa
often committed unspeakable atrocities against the
H uertistas: but since the Federals murdered, even hanged,
prisoners, Villa felt that he was only fighting fire with 
6 8fire. The agent continued to be encouraged by the
general's pro-American attitude. Overjoyed by the lifting 
of the arms embargo, Villa had openly proclaimed that
6 6
Carothers to State Department, December 31, 1913, NA 
312.52/104; Carothers to State Department, January 28, 
February 3 (two), 1914/10706, 10780, 10820; Ronald Atkin, 
Revolution! Mex i c o , 1910- 1920 (New York: The John Day C o . ,
1970), 164-65. Villa could not always keep his promise. 
During one of his absences from Chihuahua, some of his 
underlings, hearing rumors that Terrazas knew the location 
of 500,000 pesos which had been hidden by the Banco de 
Minejco, hanged the unfortunate hostage but cut him down 
before he died. Ultimately Terrazas escaped and made his 
way to safety in El Paso.
In 1912 Luis, Sr., helped finance the Orozco re­
bellion against the Madero government. See Meyer, Pascual 
O rozco, 108-109.
^ C a r o t h e r s  to State Department, February 10, 1914/ 
10903.
6 8
Carothers to State Department, February 3, 10, 1914/ 
10820, 10903.
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President Wilson was "the most just man in the world. All
Mexicans will love him. . . . "  He also announced that,
thereafter, the Villistas would "look upon the United
6 9
States as our friend." In the enthusiasm of the moment,
he promised Carothers that, even if his actions seemed
"arbitrary and contrary to custom," he would reveal "the
real truth about everything" to President Wilson and would
"take the consequences of any of his acts.
Events soon proved that Villa would not always be
truthful in his relations with the United States. On
February 19, the Associated Press carried a story that
Villa had arrested Gustave Brouch, an American, and
William S. Benton, an Englishman, on a charge of fili-
71bustering against the revolution. The British Embassy 
in Washington, meanwhile, received a telegram from Mrs. 
Benton, a Mexican national, who was afraid that her 
husband, a Scotsman, was a victim of foul play. When the 
British Ambassador urged the State Department to investi­
gate, both Carothers and the American Consul at Juarez,
Thomas Edwards, were directed to see Villa immediately and
7 2
determine Benton's fate. Before Carothers received the
69"Letting The Guns Into Mexico," Literary D i g e s t , 
XLVIII (February 14, 1914), 303-304.
^ C a r o t h e r s  to State Department, February 3, 1914/ 
10820.
^ N e w  York T i m e s , February 19, 1914, p. 1.
7 2State Department to Carothers and Edwards, February
19, 1914, Foreign Relations, 1914 , 842-43.
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despatch, he was contacted by friends and relatives of 
Benton. At their request, he went to Villa and asked what 
had happened to the Scotsman. Uncharacteristically, the 
general asked Carothers if he was there in an official 
capacity. When the agent replied that he was only repre­
senting friends, Villa would offer nothing more than 
assurances that Benton was safe. Although puzzled by 
Villa's attitude, Carothers returned to El Paso where he 
found the despatch from the State Department awaited him. 
He immediately wired Washington his belief that Benton 
was merely being held until Villa left Juarez the follow­
ing day. Carothers was confident that Benton was un­
harmed . ^  ^
Carothers next decided that Consul Edwards should 
make an official inquiry, hopefully to insure Benton's 
safety. When the general was confronted by the consul, he
confessed that Benton was dead. He claimed that the
Scotsman had come to his headquarters armed with a pistol
and had attempted to kill him. Villa would give no
details of Benton's death but agreed that his wife might 
claim his property. Before Edwards could report his find­
ings to Washington, the Department, on the strength of 
Carothers' telegram, issued a press release giving
^ C a r o t h e r s  to State Department, February 19, 1914, 
ibid. , 843 ; Testimony of Carothers, Investigation of 
Mexican Affairs, 1784; El Paso Morning Times, February 21, 
1914.
213
assurances of Benton's safety. When the news in Consul 
Edwards' report was released, it caused an international 
incident.^
The revolutionaries had killed foreigners before and 
Washington had not been held responsible. But in this 
case, the State Department, by issuing a statement which 
it was quickly forced to repudiate, made it appear that 
the Wilson Administration had attempted to cover up Villa's 
transgressions. The impression had been growing at home 
and abroad for weeks that Wilson was on the verge of 
giving the rebels active support. The lifting of the arms 
embargo had been viewed as the first step in that di­
rection. If the Administration was going to persist in 
this policy, European critics demanded that it also make an 
even greater effort to protect foreign lives and property. 
This opinion was expressed most vehemently in the British 
press. Always critical of Wilson's anti-Huerta and non­
recognition policies, the British newspapers now placed
the blame for Benton's death squarely on the American
7 5President's shoulders. Villa had given the British
lion's tail a nasty twist; Carothers spent the next few 
days trying to bandage it.
7^Edwards to State Department, February 19, 1914, 
Foreign Relations, 1914 , 843 ; New York T i m e s , February 21, 
1914, p. 1.
75"Letting Guns Into Mexico," Literary D i g e s t ,
XLVIII, 303-304; "The British Press on Benton's Fate," 
ibid. (March 7, 1914), 481.
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The Benton killing, like the persecution of the
Spaniards, grew out of V i l l a ’s deep-seated hatred of the
privileged classes. Benton was a wealthy Chihuahua
h acendado. Antagonism between the two dated back to the
Madero Revolution but had intensified in the few months
7 6
preceding Benton's death. Claiming that Benton was a 
Huertista, Villa had confiscated many of the Scotsman’s 
cattle. Benton apparently went to Juirez on February 18 
to protest and seek the release of the remainder of his 
stock. The Associated Press reported that the rancher's 
friends and relatives insisted that he was unarmed when he 
crossed the Rio Grande. These same people revealed to 
Carothers that they had warned Benton not to go to Juarez 
and that he had gone anyway, looking for t r o u b l e . ^
In order to answer the critics, Bryan directed 
Carothers to see Villa immediately and determine exactly 
how Benton had met his fate. When the special agent re­
turned to Juarez, Villa was gone. He reportedly had de­
parted for Chihuahua in order to begin preparations for 
his next campaign. L^zaro de la Garza, one of V i lla’s 
advisors, assured Carothers that there had been a trial.
The next day the American agent was given a copy of the 
76ciendenen, United States and Pancho V i l l a , 6 6 .
7?New York T i m e s , February 21, 1914, p. 1-2; Carothers 
to State Department, February 20, 1914, Foreign Relations. 
1 9 1 4 , 844; Carothers to State Department, February 21,
1914, NA 312.41/127.
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trial proceedings. The legal transcript indicated that a
court martial had convicted Benton of attempted murder and
of actively assisting both Orozco and Huerta. The
unanimous death dentence had been carried out immediately
by firing squad. Too readily the American agent accepted
the trial records as fact and sent them to Washington
7 8without further investigation. He did not know that the
transcript was fraudulent, designed to placate the State
Department. In reality, Benton, after quarreling with
Villa, had been murdered, clubbed to death by Rudolfo
7 9Fierro, Villa's personal assassin.
At first, the British Cabinet was prepared to accept 
the report of the trial and requested nothing more than a 
thorough investigation. But the rumor persisted that 
Benton had committed no crime and was the victim of foul 
play. As a result, Foreign Secretary Grey was forced to 
endure a grilling by Parliament. In answering the 
questions, he acknowledged that he did not hold the United 
States responsible for Benton's death. With no adequate 
7 8Carothers to State Department, February 21 (three), 
1914, Fo reign Relat i o n s , 1 9 1 4 , 845-46; Testimony of 
Carothers, Investigation of Mexican A f f airs, 1784-85.
79 Testimony of Carothers, Inves t igat ion o f Mexican 
Af fairs, 1785 ; Guzman, Memoirs of Pancho V i l l a , 134-35. 
Months later Villa confessed to Carothers that Benton had 
been taken to Samalayuca, just South of Juarez, where he 
was killed while watching his own grave being dug.
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means of communicating directly with Villa, he explained, 
he had relied on the diplomatic representatives of the 
United States, who, out of good will, had made an investi­
gation. Having weathered the crisis in Parliament, the 
Cabinet now faced the wrath of the press, which heaped
vituperation upon the Foreign Secretary for not adequately
8 0insuring the safety of British citizens abroad. Under
pressure Grey notified the Wilson Administration that,
although "His Majesty’s Government . . . can take no
measures against Villa at the present time, . . . they will
take whatever steps are possible to secure justice being
81
done whenever the opportunity occurs." While G r e y ’s 
memorandum appeared to be a veiled threat to the Roosevelt 
Corallary to the Monroe Doctrine, it was probably more the 
case of a wounded lion trying to retain some pride.
Before the episode ended, it became still more 
complex. As soon as Carothers and Edwards found out that 
Benton was dead, they requested that the body be returned 
to the family. Villa, realizing that he would be caught 
in a lie, refused to release it. Otherwise he seemed quite 
cooperative. He agreed that Mrs. Benton could visit the 
8 0
The Times (London), February 24, 1914, p. 9; New 
York T i m e s , February 23, 1914, p. 2; i b i d . , February 24, 
1914, p. 1; "The British Press on Benton's Fate,"
Literary Di g e s t , XLVIII, 481.
81
British Embassy to State Department, March 3, 1914,
Foreign Relat i o n s , 1914 , 858-59.
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8 2
grave-site, which he promised would be well marked.
The British Government, meanwhile, requested an
inspection of the body to determine the exact cause of
death. Bryan, confident that a medical examination would
vindicate Villa and the United States, directed Carothers
to go to Chihuahua, see Villa, and request permission for
a commission of examiners, including a British subject,
to inspect the body. Consul Letcher was instructed to aid
the special agent, but he went to Villa on his own, before
Carothers departed from El Paso. Having quarreled often
with Letcher in the past, Villa communicated his answer
directly to Carothers. He agreed to the medical
examination and offered to arrange a special train to
8 3transport the commission to Chihuahua. Villa acceded to
the investigation because he had arranged a rather naive 
ruse. He sent a special train to bring Benton's body 
from Samalayuca to Chihuahua. Trying to hide the fact 
that Benton had been clubbed to death, Villa, thinking that 
bullet holes would fool the medical examiners, had a squad
8 2Carothers to State Department, February 21, 23,
1914, Fo reign Relations, 1914 , 846-49; Edwards to State De­
partment, February 22, 24, 1914, ibid., 847, 850.
8 3British Embassy to State Department, February 24, 
1914, ib i d . , 851-52 ; State Department to Letcher, February 
25, 1914, ib i d . , 852 ; Carothers to State Department, 
February 26, 1914, ib i d . , 853 ; State Department to 
Carothers, February 25, 1914, NA 312.41/130a; E^ Paso 
Morning T i m e s , February 26, 1914.
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84of men fire a volley into the decomposing cadaver.
Luckily for Villa, his medical knowledge was never tested
by the examining commission.
While Carothers, Edwards, and Letcher were dealing
with Villa, Wilson and Bryan decided to appeal to Carranza
as well. On February 24, before plans for the medical
examination of Benton's body were finalized, Consul
Simpich at Nogales was instructed to urge the First Chief
to order the cadaver released to the victim's family.
Indignant at not being consulted at the outset, Carranza
delayed his answer for four days. Then he reminded Wilson
and Bryan that he had earlier informed them that all
representations in behalf of foreigners should be made
directly to his headquarters only by representatives of
the nation concerned. It was improper, he insisted,
especially since Mrs. Benton was Mexican, for the United
States to involve itself in the Benton case. He announced,
also, that officials of his government would make a full
investigation. Accordingly, the investigating commission,
which had been organized by Carothers and Edwards, was
turned back by Carranza's officials as it attempted to
8 5
board the train in Juarez.
^ T e s t i m o n y  of Carothers, Inves t igat ion o f Mexican 
A f fairs, 1785; Guzman, Memoirs of Pancho V i l l a , 136-37. 
Months later Villa told Carothers of his plans to trick 
the medical examiners.
^ S t a t e  Department to Simpich, February 17, 24, 1914, 
Foreign Relations, 1914 , 849-50 , 855-56; Simpich to State 
Department, February 26 , 28, 1914 , ibid. , 853 , 856-57 ; EJL
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Again Carranza's pugnacity had prevented Wilson and
Bryan from exercising an influence in Mexican affairs. The
First Chief was motivated solely by a desire to have other
nations respect the right of Mexicans to conduct their own
investigations. He and his advisors definitely believed
that a blow had been struck for Mexican sovereignty and
against American interventionism under the auspices of the
8 6
Monroe Doctrine. In the process, much of the onus for
the Benton murder was transferred to Carranza. Quite un­
wittingly, he rescued Villa from a ticklish situation.
Since the true nature of the Benton killing was still not 
known in Washington, Wilson's image of Carranza was again 
darkened, while Villa's was hardly tarnished.
Paso Morning T i m e s , March 1-2, 1914. Carranza's agents in 
Washington were greatly disappointed at their chief's 
refusal to cooperate with the United States and Great 
Britain in investigating the Benton case. Ever since 
Cabrera's arrival in Washington, they had been attempting 
to cultivate a favorable impression of the revolution. All 
their efforts, they felt, were being sacrificed for the 
First Chief's narrow-minded nationalism. Their differences 
precipitated a short but intense conflict between the 
diplomatic agents in Washington and Carranza and his 
cabinet. See Kenneth J. G r i e b , "El Caso Benton y la 
diplomacia de la Revolucicfn," Historia Mexicana, XVIII 
(October-December, 1969), 299-301.
86 .
Fabela, Historia Diplomatica de la Revolucion
Mexicana, I, 277-84; Juan Barragdn, "From the Memoirs of 
Don Venustiano Carranza," translator not named, El 
Universal (Mexico City), April 27, 1930, in National 
Archives, Record Group 76, Records of the Special Claims 
Commission, United States and Mexico, created under the 
Claims Convention of September 10, 1923, File no. 148; 
hereinafter cited as NA, RG76/148.
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Until the Benton incident, Carothers had made El Paso 
his headquarters. Afterwards, Bryan deemed it advisable 
for the agent to remain constantly at Villa's side. But 
Carranza's recent declarations caused Carothers to pause.
"I can see that from now on conditions will be very 
different," he wrote to Bryan. "I can do more good by 
having the good will of both Carranza and Villa." He 
recommended, therefore, that he go first to Sonora and, 
hopefully, obtain the First Chief's permission before pro­
ceeding to Villa's headquarters. With the Secretary of 
State's approval, Carothers arranged for an interview with 
Carranza at Nogales. By this time, the First Chief had 
made a preliminary investigation of the Benton killing and 
could see the advisability of having the American agent 
accompany Villa. Having made his public pronouncements in 
defense of Mexican sovereignty, Carranza gave his 
permission. In fact, he gave Carothers a code book for 
facilitating communication with Constitutionalist 
officials. After the meeting, the special agent was
confident that American relations with both Villa and
8 7Carranza would be more cordial in the future.
Despite the furor caused by the Benton affair, it did 
8 7State Department to Carothers, February 25, March 1, 
1914, NA 312.41/130a, 152; Carothers to State Department, 
March 1, 3, 6 , 1914, ibid./152, 166, 175; Carothers to 
State Department, March 4, 7, 1914/11048, 11093; Ell Paso 
Morning T i m e s , March 3, 1914.
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not alter the Wilson Administration's policy. The nature 
of Carothers' mission, however, did change. Before the 
affair, he had merely carried out the Department's orders
and reported the results. During the course of the
incident, he began to exercise considerable initiative of 
his own. He, not Bryan, had seen the necessity of his 
establishing cordial relations with Carranza. At the same 
time, he wrote to Bryan, revealing his own conception of 
what his job should entail:
I wish you to know that my desire to do this 
work is prompted by my sincere affection for the 
Mexican people, acquired during twenty-five 
years residence among them, and I expect to live 
the balance of my life in Mexico. I have 
realized that there is still hope for them to 
settle their difficulties without intervention, 
and it has been my desire to contribute my
efforts to further that end.
He also acknowledged that incidents like the Benton murder 
were lamentable, but that the revolutionaries, most of 
whom were p e d n s , had so long been treated like savages 
that they responded in kind. He closed his letter by de­
claring his intention "to hold him [Villa] within bounds
8 8as far as possible." Bryan apparently agreed with 
Carothers' view, because he relieved the agent of the 
responsibility of further investigating the Benton affair. 
"Your influence with Villa," wrote the Secretary of State, 
"should not be jeopardized by [my] putting you in a 
8 8Carothers to State Department, February 23, 1914/
11454.
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89position where you might offend him."
Judging from their correspondence and actions, both 
of the agents in Mexico felt a responsibility for aiding 
the Constitutionalists. They differed significantly over 
means to that end: Lind, fearing revolutionary excesses
and looking to large-scale American direction of Mexican 
affairs, demanded military intervention; Carothers, 
understanding the violence of the revolution and willing 
to give the Mexicans a chance to settle their own affairs, 
hoped only to restrain the revolutionaries enough to 
prevent intervention. As events were to prove, Wilson 
was leaning toward Lind's position but as yet had no 
plausible pretext for adopting it. For the time being, 
Carothers' position had to suffice.
89 State Department to Carothers, February 27, 1914,
NA 312.41/138.
CHAPTER VII
A FRIEND INDEED
The months of March and April, 1914, were pregnant 
with events which determined the course of the Mexican 
Revolution and the course of relations between the United 
States and Mexico. Given the nature of Wilson's Mexican 
policy, his agents inevitably became involved in these 
events. While John Lind was sweltering and seething in 
Vera Cruz, George Carothers was constantly on the move, 
accompanying General Villa's Division of the North. Villa 
provided the American agent with a passport which gave him 
access to the battle lines and allowed the two to be in 
constant contact. All revolutionary civil and military 
authorities were directed to give the American every 
assistance. Villa allowed him to use the Constitution­
alists' telegraph lines and placed trains at his disposal, 
so that messages could be sent out by messenger. With 
Bryan's approval, Carothers established a communications 
system, using Zach L. Cobb, the Customs Collector at El 
Paso, as an intermediary. Cobb knew and maintained cordial 
relations with Constitutionalist officials on the border 
and was able to ascertain Villa's whereabouts at any time. 
With a minimum of delay, he was able to forward
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instructions from the Department to Carothers and relay 
the agent's responses to Washington.'*'
While Villa massed his forces and stockpiled munitions
for the upcoming Torreon campaign, Carothers sought to
arrange for the safety of foreigners who lived in the city.
As early as January 30, the agent reported that he doubted
if Villa would be too concerned for the safety of non-
combatants. Then on February 4, the Associated Press
quoted the general as declaring that the Spaniards in
Torreon could expect no mercy. Troubled as much by the
implied savagery in this pronouncement as by the possible
diplomatic repercussions, Bryan again directed Carothers
to remind Villa of the adverse world opinion that would
result from his failure to observe "the rules of war and
2
respect the person and property of foreigners." The 
special agent replied that the press quoted Villa accu­
rately but that the Secretary of State should understand 
the context within which the general had made such 
comments. Villa, being unsophisticated, Carothers ex­
plained, was flattered when representatives of the press 
paid him so much attention. As a means of impressing 
gatherings of reporters, the agent further explained, Villa
^Carothers to State Department, February 3, 10, 1914/ 
10820, 10903.
2
Carothers to State Department, January 30, 1914, NA 
312.11/3243; State Department to Carothers, February 6 , 
1914, Foreign Relations, 1914 , 790-91; New York Times , 
February 4, 1914, p. 2.
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was inclined to strut about and make bombastic pro­
nouncements. Carothers also noted that Villa, in confi­
dence, had revealed that he openly threatened the 
Spaniards in hopes of frightening them into withholding
support from the Huertistas. He would not harm them unless
3
they actually did support Huerta.
Still not satisfied, Carothers sought the aid of
General Hugh Lenox Scott, the commander at El Paso's Fort
Bliss, in promoting the safety of foreigners. The special
agent first attempted to arrange a meeting of the two
soldiers in Juarez, but War Department officials did not
4
think it "expedient" for Scott to cross the border. 
Carothers, therefore, arranged a rendezvous on the inter­
national bridge which linked El Paso and Juarez. For two 
hours, on the night of February 18, the two generals and 
the State Department agent sat in the back seat of an 
automobile and discussed the responsibilities of a 
civilized soldier. Scott impressed upon Villa that, for 
reasons of good politics and not merely for humanitarian 
ones, he should cease his harsh treatment of foreigners; 
otherwise, he would so prejudice foreign opinion that he 
would not be able to secure foreign support should he
need it in the future. The American general also pointed
^Carothers to State Department, February 8 , 1914, 
Foreign Relations, 1914/791; Carothers to State De­
partment, February 10, 1914/10903.
^Carothers to State Department, February 3, 1914, and 
State Department to Carothers, February 4, 1914/10775.
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up the favorable impression to be derived from humanitarian 
treatment of prisoners of war. At the conclusion of the 
conference, General Scott presented Villa with a copy of 
the Hague Convent ion Rules of Civilized W a r f a r e , which 
some of his officers had roughly translated into Spanish. 
Carothers was elated at the generals' cordial relations 
and optimistically predicted that the meeting would pro­
duce "excellent results.
Next the special agent attempted to establish a 
neutral zone for foreigners outside Torreon. Villa was 
amenable; so Carothers, choosing to remain constantly at 
the general's side, sent a trusted friend, E. F. Fletcher, 
to Torreon to speak with the leaders of the foreign 
colony. Fletcher quickly ascertained that most of the 
foreigners were unwilling to retire from the city. Al­
though they were relieved by Villa's promises to protect 
their interests, most preferred to remain near their 
property. At length, Fletcher and the Acting American 
Consular Agent, John Bonnet, designated several prominent 
buildings, in addition to the various consulates, as 
sanctuaries to which foreigners might retire when the 
battle began. All nationalities of the foreign colony
^Carothers to State Department, February 19, 1914/ 
10917; El^  Paso Morning T i m e s , February 20, 1914; Testimony 
of Carothers, Inves t igat ion o f Mexican A f fairs, 1766 ; M a j . 
Gen. Hugh Lenox Scott, Some Memories of a. Soldier (New 
York: The Century Co., 1928), 500-502.
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except the Spaniards were satisfied with this arrangement. 
The Spaniards refused to trust the United States to look 
after their best interests. A Spaniard, moreover, told 
General Jose R. Velasco, the Federal commander, that 
Fletcher was spying for the Constitutionalists, and, 
during his return trip to the border, Carothers1 messenger 
was arrested and returned to Torreon. Only after an 
intensive interrogation by General Velasco was he allowed 
to return to the border.^
Bryan, meanwhile, had directed Charge' 0'Shaughnessy 
to appeal to Huerta for aid in establishing a neutral zone 
in Torreon. Although the old general agreed to cooperate 
in the matter, 0 'Shaughnessy reported that he did not trust 
the usurper's word. As suspected, several days later the 
charge' informed Bryan that Huerta had never sent in­
structions to General Velasco. The dictator told 
0'Shaughnessy that he did not expect an attack on Torreon 
in the near future but agreed that, if he was informed 
when the attack was about to begin, he would instruct
g
Carothers to State Department, February 8 , 1914, 
Foreign R e lations, 1 9 1 4 , 791; Carothers to State De­
partment, February 9, 1914, NA 125.36582/58; Carothers to 
State Department, February 10, 13, 22, 23, 24, 1914/10903, 
10879, 10952, 10953, 10995; John R. Silliman, American 
Consul, Saltillo, to State Department, February 21, 1914/ 
11044; State Department to Carothers, February 8 , 1914/ 
10820. Since Villa's rail lines were tied up, Fletcher 
traveled to Torrecfn by way of Eagle Pass and Saltillo. 
Silliman, who was informed by an eye-witness, reported the 
details of Fletcher's arrest and detainment.
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Velasco to take every precaution for the safety of 
foreigners. Although such notification would give the 
Federals an advantage, the charge* suggested that Carothers 
contact him when the battle was about to begin, so that he 
could again appeal to Huerta. Evidencing more concern for 
the safety of noncombatants than for a Constitutionalist 
victory, Bryan instructed Carothers to notify O'Shaughnes sy 
on the eve of Villa's attack.^
Sensing the advisability of having Carranza's support 
for the protection of foreign interests, Carothers left 
Villa's side temporarily and again traveled to Sonora to 
confer with the First Chief at Agua Prieta, across the 
border from Douglas, Arizona. Surprisingly cooperative, 
Carranza promised to instruct Villa to give notice to 
foreigners before the battle began. In order to facilitate 
communications with Constitutionalist headquarters, the 
First Chief also gave the American agent an itinerary of 
his movements.^
On March 10, as Villa began his march, Carothers did, 
indeed notify 0 'Shaughnessy, who, in turn, informed 
Huerta. The usurper, thereupon, assured the charge' that
^State Department to 0'Shaughnessy, February 14, 1914/ 
10870; 0'Shaughnessy to State Department, February 17, 25, 
March 3, 1914/10913, 10983, 11040; State Department to 
Carothers, March 5, 1914/11040.
O
Carothers to State Department, March 9, 10, 1914/ 
11103, 11117.
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General Velasco would be ordered to "spare no efforts" to
9
Insure the safety of foreigners. Bryan, not satisfied 
with even these arrangements, again ordered Carothers to 
attempt to arrange a neutral zone outside the city. Having 
discovered from friends in Torreon that General Velasco 
would likely arrest him if he entered the city, Carothers 
asked for detailed written instructions, so that the 
Federals, if they took him into custody, would have no 
justifiable reason for detaining or prosecuting him. Armed 
with new instructions from Washington, Carothers again 
joined Villa on March 19, as the Division of the North 
launched a massive assault on the suburbs of T o r r e o n . ^
On March 27, after Villa captured Gomez Palacio and 
was preparing his attack on Torreon proper, Carothers again 
attempted to establish a neutral zone. Instead of entering 
Torreon himself, he prudently decided to send the British 
Vice Consul at Gc^mez Palacio, H. Cunard Cummings, whose 
relations with the Federals were very friendly. At the 
same time, Villa forced the British consul to carry an un­
conditional surrender demand to General Velasco. The 
rebel general also promised that food and shelter would be
Q
Carothers to State Department, conveying text of 
Carothers to 0'Shaughnessy, March 10, 1914/11121;
0'Shaughnessy to State Department, March 11, 1914/11150.
Instate Department to Carothers, February 18, March 
13, 16, 1914/10983, 10995, 11176; Carothers to State De­
partment, March 15, 17, 1914/11176, 11203.
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provided for foreigners at the nearby villages of Aviles 
and Lerdo. Neither proposal was accepted. Velasco 
refused to surrender unless he was allowed to evacuate 
his men, and the foreigners, fearful of running a gauntlet 
between the opposing armies, chose to remain in the city 
and take refuge in the cellars of a few well marked build­
ings. The following day, the final attack began. On 
April 2, the surviving Federals evacuated under the cover 
of a dust storm and the Villistas occupied the city. In
the course of some of the fiercest fighting of the entire
11revolution, not one foreigner was killed or wounded. 
Although no neutral zone was established, the American 
effort made both sides conscious of the welfare of non- 
combatants .
During the course of the Torredn campaign, Villa 
allowed Carothers to periodically send brief accounts of 
the rebels' progress to Washington. These reports did not 
give details of the relative fighting ability of the 
opposing armies or the number of casualties suffered by 
either. Usually he merely reported the capture of small 
towns, such as Bermejillo, Tlahualilo, and Gomez Palacio, 
and, finally, the fall of Torreon itself. Since these 
reports often provided the most advanced information from
^ C a r o t h e r s  to State Department, April 1, 1914/11366; 
I. M. Ulmer, Acting Consular Agent, Torrecfn, to Hamm,
April 8 , 1914/11706; Hamm to State Department, April 13, 
1914/11706; New York T i m e s , April 10, 1914, p. 2.
231
the front, the State Department released the news to the 
12press. Huerta, on the other hand, did not allow the
Mexico City press to reveal the magnitude of his defeats
during the Torreon campaign. Consequently, the reports that
appeared in the American press differed dramatically from
13those in Mexico City. Puzzled by the American news­
paper accounts, Huerta's consular inspector, who was in 
El Paso at the time of the Torreon campaign, began search­
ing for the source of the reports. On April 2, the day 
Torreon fell, he reported to Mexico City that one of his 
subordinates had intercepted a message from Carothers to 
Washington, imploring his superiors not to release any 
more news, since the outcome of the battle was still in the 
balance and any news might encourage the Federals to send 
in reinforcements.^
12Cobb (for Carothers) to State Department, March 23, 
27, 28, April 1, 3, 1914/11241, 11315, 11323, 11366,
11386; New York Tim e s , March 22, 1914, II, p. 2; ibid. , 
March 24, 25, 27, April 2, 3, 1914, p. 1.
13Mexican He r a l d , March 21-April 9, 1914; El 
Imparcial, March 22-April 9, 1914. During the seesaw of 
battle, Huerta reported minor reverses for the rebels as 
major victories for the Federals. Throughout the campaign 
he flatly denied that his forces were losing. As late as 
April 9, one week after the fall of Torreon, he had not 
admitted to the press that General Velasco had been de­
feated. He claimed, instead, that the Federal troops had 
evacuated the city only to take up more defensible 
positions in the highlands.
14lnspeccic(n General de Consulados de Mexico en Los 
Estados Unidos de America, El Paso, Texas, a Secretaria de 
Relaciones Exteriores, March 31, April 2, 1914, A G R E , 
L-E-795, Leg. 3, L-E-787, Leg. 8 .
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On April 5, Huerta released what he claimed to be a 
translation of Carothers1 despatch. He charged that, as a 
consular agent accredited to his government, Carothers was 
guilty of unethical conduct, that he was openly siding 
with the revolutionaries. The dictator also insisted that 
the agent's claims of victory for Villa had been premature 
and had caused the reinforcements, which might have come
to the aid of the Federals at Torretfn, to turn back. He
then withdrew Carothers' consular exequator and declared 
him persona non grata in Mexico. The State Department 
promptly denied Huerta's charges but, in the process, was 
itself guilty of inaccuracy by insisting that Carothers 
had reported only information concerning the safety of 
foreigners.
Huerta was even more erroneous in his claims. His 
consul in El Paso had misinterpreted Carothers' despatch.
In the note in question, sent April 1, Carothers had re­
ported on the status of foreigners in Torreon; but Cobb, in
forwarding it to Washington, added a clause at the request
15
0'Shaughnessy to State Department, April 5, 1914, NA 
125.36582/67; State Department to 0'Shaughnessy, April 6 , 
1914, ib i d ./71a; L t . G. M. Courts to Admiral Fletcher,
April 5, 1914/11459; War Department to State Department, 
April 7, 1914/11459; New York T i m e s , April 4, 6 , 1914, p.
2; Mexican H e r a l d , April 6 , 1914. A consular exequator 
is a statement of permission, usually in the form of an 
executive order, given to a consul, which grants him 
authority to make representations in behalf of his 
nationals. See Stuart, American Diplomatic and Consular 
Practice, 298-301.
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of local Constitutionalist officials. They pointed out to 
him that they allowed Carothers' despatches to come out of 
Mexico on their telegraph lines as a courtesy; but now 
they requested that the State Department refrain from re­
leasing their contents to the press, because the battle was
16
in a critical stage. Carothers, therefore, was not
guilty of the charges leveled by Huerta. The usurper, well
aware of the agent's increasingly friendly relations with
Villa, had reason enough to want him removed from northern
Mexico; his consul's misinterpretation of Carothers' note
of April 1, provided the old general with an adequate
pretext for recalling the agent's consular e x e q u a t o r . ^  At
any rate the Department paid no heed to Huerta's directive
and Carothers continued as if he still had some recognized
18official status in Mexico.
Villa's victory at Torret/n, followed quickly by 
triumphs at San Pedro de las Colonias and Viesca, was by
X 6
Cobb (for Carothers) to State Department, April 1, 
1914/11366.
^ B e f o r e  the Torreon campaign, Huerta's consuls along 
the border had reported Carothers' activities among the 
revolutionaries in northern Mexico. These consular 
despatches may be found in A G R E , L-E-773, Leg. 12.
X8
Bryan decided that since the Administration had not 
acknowledged as legitimate any of Huerta's actions since 
October 10, 1913, there was no need to pay any heed to the 
revocation of Carothers' exequator. See Bryan to Lansing, 
April 6 , 1914, National Archives, Record Group 59, Papiers 
of Robert Lansing, General Correspondence, Vol. 2.
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all odds his greatest. In terms of strategy and men and
materials deployed, it was the most impressive Consti-
19tutionalist victory to date. Not only did Villa cover
himself with glory on the battlefield, but his humaneness
in occupying the stricken city also caused his stock to
rise in Washington and throughout the world. He maintained
complete order, allowed no looting, and quickly established
a civil government. He encouraged the local merchants to
reopen their shops and to reprovision their depleted
stocks via his railroad. Meanwhile, he fed the poor from
his army’s rations. For the first time in the revolution,
the victor did not execute his prisoners, and the wounded
20received the same treatment as the wounded victors.
A few days after the occupation of the city, Carothers 
wrote to General Hugh Scott, insisting that V i l l a ’s humane 
treatment of prisoners was a direct result of their 
conference on the El Paso-Ju^rez bridge. Scott, who 
recently had been appointed Assistant Chief of Staff of 
the Army, sent the letter to the President. Showing his
19 Quirk, The Mexican Revolution. 24-26. Quirk sug­
gests that the victories at San Pedro and Viesca, where 
Villa caught and destroyed General Velasco's armies, were 
as important as the one at Torrerfn, because they elimi­
nated any chance of counterattack.
20
Ulmer to Hamm, April 8 , 1914/11706; Hamm to State 
Department, April 13, 19, 1914/11703, 11706; Carothers to 
State Department, April 6 , 1914/11419; EJL Paso Morning 
T i m e s , April 3-5, 1914; John Reed, Insurgent Mexico (New 
York: International Pub., 1969), 144.
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own gratification for the rebel general’s recently ac­
quired humaneness, Wilson, in reply, conceded that "General
21
Villa certainly seems capable of some good things."
On the heels of these good reports, however, came 
disturbing news of Villa's renewed intimidation of the 
Spaniards. The day after he occupied Torreon, he had all 
the Spaniards congregated into three buildings. That 
afternoon he went before them and, in a lengthy harangue, 
again charged that they had openly aided the Huertistas.
He insisted that he had enough evidence to execute several 
of them. Because of these few, he claimed, all would be 
in danger if he allowed them loose on the streets; there­
fore, he was going to deport all of them to El Paso for 
their own good. An investigating committee would be 
established in Juarez, and all who could establish their 
innocence would be allowed to return to Torreon. The 
property of those who could not would be confiscated. 
Carothers and Acting Consular Agent I. M. Ulmer were 
present when Villa addressed the gathering. Both of them, 
along with Consul Hamm of Durango, British Consul Cunard 
Cummings of Gcfmez Palacio, and several members of Villa's 
staff, appealed to the caudillo to reverse his decree but
21
Carothers to Scott, April 9, 1914, and Wilson to 
Scott, April 16, 1914, Hugh L. Scott Papers, Division of 
Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Box 15.
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2 2their pleas were unavailing.
Carothers, his use of the telegraph restricted 
because of the Constitutionalists' military needs, hastened 
to El Paso to file his report on the battle of Torreon and 
the subsequent persecution of the Spaniards. In Juarez, 
he found Carranza, who was in the process of moving his 
headquarters from Sonora to Chihuahua. Consequently, Bryan 
directed the agent to go over Villa's head and appeal 
directly to Carranza in behalf of the Spaniards. But the 
First Chief refused to countermand his general's orders. 
Instead, he, too, insisted that all Spaniards should leave 
Mexico before the Constitutionalists reached Mexico City. 
Echoing Villa, he charged them with supporting Huerta and 
warned that they could expect no mercy once the revo­
lutionaries seized power. Hoping that General Scott could 
work his magic a second time, Carothers even arranged for 
him to meet with Carranza on the international bridge.
This conference, however, induced no change of heart on 
the part of the flinty old First Chief. With Carranza's 
attitude coinciding with Villa's, Carothers warned that 
Washington should expect more depredations against 
Spaniards in the future arid that he could do nothing to
22
Carothers to State Department, April 6 , 1914/11419; 
Ulmer to Hamm, April 8 , 1914/11706; Hamm to State De­
partment, April 13, 1914/11706; EJ^  Paso Morning T i m e s ,
April 7, 1914.
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23prevent them.
In the meantime, train loads of Spaniards began 
streaming into Juarez. Most of the refugees were destitute, 
having been forced to leave Torreon with nothing more than 
the clothes on their backs. Since they knew that 
Carothers had spoken in their behalf, they looked to him 
for aid and relief. When the special agent appealed to 
Washington for guidance in helping the unfortunates, the 
State Department secured Red Cross aid and, so that he 
might continue negotiating with the Constitutionalist 
leaders, relieved him of the responsibility of helping the 
refugees.^
When Carothers again approached Carranza, the First 
Chief fell back upon his earlier issued directive, in 
which, during the Benton affair, he had notified Washington 
that he would accept representations in behalf of foreign­
ers only from the diplomatic representatives of the 
nations directly concerned. Puzzled by Carranza's hot 
and cold attitude, Carothers made inquiries into the
23 State Department to Carothers, April 6 , 1914,
Foreign Relations, 1914 , 796; Carothers to State Department, 
April 7, 1914, ibid. , 798; Scott to Mrs. Scott, April 9, 
1914, Scott Papers, Box 4; New York T i m e s , April 8 , 1914, p. 
7; EJL Paso Morning Times , April 8 , 1914, EhL Pa/s , April 11, 
1914.
24 Carothers to State Department, April 8 , 1914,
Foreign Relations, 1914 , 799 ; State Department to Carothers, 
April 8 , 1914, ibid. , 799 ; E_1 Paso Morning Times , April 9, 
1914.
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reasons for the First Chief's renewed recalcitrance and 
discovered that it resulted largely from the advices of his 
Secretary of Gobernacit/n, Rafael Zubar^n Capmany, and 
Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Isidro Fabela, both of 
whom were intensely anti-American. The special agent, 
therefore, approached Carranza through a lesser advisor, 
Roberto V. Pesqueira, the former governor of Sonora. By 
this means, on April 12, Carothers secured an unofficial 
agreement with Carranza to the effect that, if his 
instructions specifically stated that a request for the 
protection of foreign interests had been made by that 
nation's diplomatic representative accredited to Washing­
ton, Constitutionalist headquarters would take the matter 
under consideration. Two days later, Fabela officially 
notified Carothers that this procedure would be acceptable 
in the f u t u r e . ^
During the course of these negotiations, Carothers1 
reports pointed up the apparent reasons why Carranza's 
and Villa's attitudes toward the United States differed so 
markedly. He noted that the First Chief seemed to fear 
that if he was too friendly toward the United States he 
2 5Carothers to State Department, April 9, 11 (two),
12, 14, 1914, Foreign Relations, 1914 , 801, 804-806. 
Carothers did not state what positions the above named 
Constitutionalist advisors held. For the nature of their 
offices, see Barragan Rodriguez, Historia . . . Consti-
tucionalist a , I, 219 , 424.
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might in some way compromise himself in the eyes of his
followers by seeming less than nationalistic. Villa, on
the other hand, feared nothing, Carothers reported, and no
matter what his followers thought, he acted according to
his own sense of justice. Because of the contrasting
attitude of the two leaders, Carothers recommended that he
make all his representations to Villa. He added, also,
that American consuls in northern Mexico could probably
secure results faster by dealing with "authorities de
facto in places where difficulties arise" rather than by
2 6referring them to Carranza.
Although more important matters soon preoccupied him, 
Carothers, as part of his duties, continued to work for a 
favorable settlement for the Spaniards. He was not success­
ful in every case, but by the end of June, he had worked 
out an arrangement whereby most of the refugees were 
allowed to return to their property. Throughout the re­
mainder of the year, nonetheless, there continued to be 
isolated cases of revolutionary depredations against 
Spaniards but there were no more instances, as in the case
Chihuahua and Torrec^n, of mass confiscations and depor- 
27
t at ions.
26carothers to State Department, April 11, 12, 1914, 
Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 4 , 804-805.
^ C a r o t h e r s  to State Department, June 21, 1914, NA 
312.52/335. The 312.52 (Protection by the United States of 
Spanish Subjects in Mexico) file in the National Archives 
contains the case histories of the State Department’s
240
In no other sector had the Constitutionalist forces 
by this time achieved the success of Villa's Division of 
the North. Separated from Carranza's government by the 
Sierra Madre Occidental, Villa, although he repeatedly 
professed his loyalty to the First Chief, appeared to be a 
power unto himself. To forestall any thought of inde­
pendent action by Villa and to take advantage of his 
victories, Carranza decided in March, 1914, to move the 
seat of his provisional government from Sonora to 
Chihuahua. The First Chief and the officials of his govern­
ment arrived in the city of Chihuahua as Villa was mopping 
up the Federalist armies at San Pedro. The campaign com­
pleted, Villa returned to Chihuahua, and there the two 
caudillos met for the first time since the Madero revo-
i -• 28lution.
At first there was harmony; the First Chief commended 
Villa for his recent victories and Villa reaffirmed his 
loyalty to the First Chief. But Villa quickly became dis­
enchanted with some of Carranza's appointees, particularly 
with General Manuel Chao, who was made governor of 
Chihuahua. As a soldier, moreover, Villa viewed with
efforts to aid the Spaniards. For representative examples, 
see Foreign Relations, 1914 , 806-38.
2 8 /
Barrag^n Rodriguez, Historia . . . Constitucion-
a l i s t a , I, 425 , 433-41 ; Alamada, La Revolucion en el
Estado de Chihuahua, II, 86- 8 8 , 95; Quirk, The Mexican
Revolut i o n , 16-19.
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mounting suspicion the First Chief's "sweet-scented" 
civilian advisors. Because they did not fight, Villa 
considered them slackers and less than genuine revo­
lutionaries. Carranza, himself, made the mistake of 
pointing out to Villa their differences in origin and 
political training. From this time on, Villa disliked 
the First Chief. He later reminisced: "I saw that I
could not open my heart to him . . . There was nothing
2 9in common between that man and me." The breach between
the two rebel leaders as yet was small but it boded ill
for the future of the revolution.
Carothers was greatly disappointed at the lack of
cooperation between the two chieftains. "I had expected
when Carranza arrived that complete fusion would result
between him and Villa," he wrote to Bryan, "but such is not
the case." Noting that Villa still went about his business
raising men and money, purchasing munitions, and planning
his next campaign without consulting the First Chief,
Carothers further lamented, "Carranza has not assumed
30control of anything so far." The American agent was even 
more disheartened when he realized the extent of their 
mutual antagonism. While in El Paso after the Torredn
29 .
Guzman, Memoirs of Pancho V i l l a , 189; Quirk, The 
Mexican Revolution, 18.
30
Carothers to State Department, April 9, 1914/11461;
copy in Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 50.
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campaign, he found that the Villista officials and the 
newly arrived Carrancista officials quarreled constantly. 
One source of the antagonism, he discovered from conver­
sations with some of Villa's advisors, was that Carranza 
resented their friendly attitude toward the United States. 
The reason for his own refusal to be more friendly, they 
charged, was to make himself appear more nationalistic 
than they. When Carothers asked what would happen if 
Carranza openly offended the United States, Lazaro de la 
Garza, an intimate of Villa, replied that 'Villa would not
stand for it" and would "instruct Carranza to change his
31
policy or get out."
Whether de la Garza's comments were designed purely to 
discredit Carranza or were a sincere statement of the 
Villistas' attitude toward the United States, they were 
about to be put to the test by a drastic turn in the re­
lations between Wilson and Huerta. Meanwhile, the Ad­
ministration was gravely concerned over the estrangement 
between Villa and Carranza and directed Carothers to 
secure as much information as possible bearing on the re­
lations between the two and to determine the "probable
alignment of subordinates in the event of an open
32rupture. . . ."
In Vera Cruz, meanwhile, John Lind was allowing his
^ C a r o t h e r s  to State Department, April 12, 1914/11755.
■^State Department to Carothers, April 13, 1914/11479.
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anxieties to drive him to the brink of paranoia. His 
trepidations began in February with the appearance of a 
scurrilous cartoon journal entitled Mister L i n d , which 
seemed to focus anti-Americanism in Huertista Mexico 
directly at him. The March issue was even more vituper­
ative than the first. They both pictured him as the 
personification of everything that was bad in Yankee 
imperialism. In February, also, John R. Silliman, the 
American Consul in Saltillo, reported that Lind was the 
subject of a very popular anti-American satire being 
dramatized in a local theatre. That same month, James 
Creelman, an American journalist who had earlier gained 
fame by reporting a personal interview with President 
Porfirio Diaz, which helped to spawn the revolution, 
published an article in a New York newspaper, the contents 
of which were widely circulated in Mexico. It was 
intensely critical of Lind's clandestine encouragement of 
the revolutionaries and, by implication, blamed him for the 
death of hundreds killed in the civil war. Not sur­
prisingly, Admiral Fletcher reported that Lind seemed 
"disturbed and not in the best of health and shows fear for 
his personal safety." Edith 0'Shaughnessy, wife of the 
American charge', also commented on the special agent's 
disturbed state of mind. Because of Lind's anxiety, Admiral 
Fletcher despatched a permanent guard of Bluejackets and
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33Marines to the consulate.
Allowing his emotions to rule, Lind, in his hatred for 
Huerta, refused to seek any settlement with the dictator 
save the destruction of his regime by military force. In 
mid-March he shunned an opportunity to reopen peaceful 
talks when Huerta, aware that his sources of credit were 
not inexhaustible, sent his recently appointed Minister of 
Foreign Relations, Jos^ Lcfpez Portillo y Rojas, to Vera 
Cruz to speak with Lind. Portillo y Rojas promised that 
if Wilson would lift the "money embargo" and retore the 
"arms embargo," Huerta would resign after elections to be 
held in July. Lind, in reply, stated his conviction that 
President Wilson "would not recede one iota" from his 
previously stated demand that Huerta eliminate himself 
immediatley. In reporting the Mexican diplomat's proposal 
to Washington, Lind urged that it be rejected outright.
He insisted that Huerta could not be trusted to deal in 
good faith and that the offer for ewnewed negotiations was 
designed only to "induce non-action by the United States." 
Wilson and Bryan agreed. Despite the fact that Wilson 
informed the press that Portillo y Rojas was an honorable 
man and his proposals were worthy of consideration, he did
Fletcher to Daniels, February 4, 1914, Daniels 
Papers, Box 39; Silliman to State Department, February 11, 
1914/10928 ; 0'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat * s Wife in M e x i c o , 194, 
229-30; Stephenson, L i n d , 257 ; Mister L i n d , I (February, 
March, 1914), in Lind Papers, Box 13.
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not even instruct Lind to pursue the parleys past the
initial conversation. Portillo y Rojas, therefore, returned
to Mexico City without a formal response to Huerta's latest 
34proposition.
Shortly after Portillo y Rojas's departure, Nelson 
0' Shaughnessy, suffering from sciatica, came to the warmer 
climate of Vera Cruz at his doctor's instructions. Unable 
to eliminate his frustrations by direct action against 
Huerta, Lind displaced them by attacking 0'Shaughnessy.
Ever since his own failure in November to secure Huerta's 
resignation by diplomatic pressure, Lind had resented the 
fact that 0 'Shaughnessy had continued to seek a more 
honorable way for the dictator to eliminate himself. At 
the time, the special agent had warned Washington that the 
charge' was being duped. After that, he grew increasingly 
suspicious of 0 'Shaughnessy's continued friendly relations 
with Huerta and his officials. Lind was particularly 
chagrined by the fact that Mrs. 0'Shaughnessy was so fond 
of the old dictator. Huerta, moreover, returned their 
friendship and, at official receptions and other social
35occasions, went out of his way to give them his attention.
34Lind to State Department, March 19, 1914/11218; New 
York T i m e s , March 19-23, 1914, p. 1. Neither Wilson nor 
Bryan revealed publicly that they would not negotiate with 
Huerta but, when the British Ambassador inquired of their 
intentions, Wilson replied that he would not. See Grieb, 
United States and H u e r t a , 119.
3^Lind to State Department, November 15, 1913,
February 17, 22, 1914/9760, 17169, 10954; Lind to Wilson, 
January 10, 1914, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 101. At
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Lind saw sinister implications in all this but
especially in 0'Shaughnessy1s arrival in Vera Cruz so soon
after the departure of Portillo y Rojas. In a personal
letter to Bryan, Lind insisted that the charge's stated
claim for coming— to mend his health— was a subterfuge,
that he was actually there as Huerta's spy. He had come
at the dictator's behest to ferret out Washington's true
3 6response to his recent overture. Despite his suspicions, 
Lind did not think 0'Shaughnessy intentionally disloyal but 
that somehow his Catholic background was betraying him into 
supporting the Church-backed dictator. "I guess," he wrote 
to Bryan, "the explanation is that he was raised by 
Tammany, educated by the Jesuits and . . . corresponds with
Cardinal Gibbons." The special agent also concluded that 
the charge' had been corrupted by long residence abroad.
"He has never drawn a breath of American air," Lind 
lamented. With 0' Shaughnessy' s arrival in Vera Cruz, Lind's
the Pass Christian cnnference, Lind must have revealed his 
displeasure for the 0'Shaughnessys' friendship with Huerta. 
In the last cited item above, Lind explains at length the 
suspicions he had expressed verbally.
3 6
Lind to State Department, March 22, 23, 1914/11237, 
11248. Before 0'Shaughnessy went to Vera Cruz, the New York 
Times reported that he was bed-ridden with his illness. Mrs. 
0 'Shaughnessy noted in a letter that the doctor recommended 
that her husband go to the coast. See New York T i m e s , March 
20, 1914, p. 1; 0'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's Wife in M e x i c o , 
229.
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enmity became to pronounced that reporters noticed the 
strained relations between the two diplomats.
0' Shaughnes sy, still in pain, was so distressed by the 
agent's attitude that he returned to Mexico City after 
only two days' convalescence. The day of his departure, 
Lind recommended to Washington that the charge' be recalled 
immediately.^
But Wilson did not recall 0'Shaughnessy, nor did he
give any indication that, in the near future, he would
adopt a more vigorous policy. By the end of March, with
Villa's victory at Torredn yet to be accomplished, Lind was
certain that the civil war in Mexico had reached a
stalemate. Certain, also, that his pleas for intervention
had been ignored in Washington, he became openly critical,
almost condemnatory of the Administration's failure to
accept more responsibility for ending the strife. "It
seems to me," he wrote to Bryan, "that the time has passed
3 8for being overly scrupulous. . . ." Believing that
further efforts to move the President would be useless, he 
asked for and received permission to return to the United
•^Lind to Bryan (personal), March 23, 1914/27482; New 
York T i m e s , March 23, 1914, p. 1; ib i d . , March 24, 1914, 
p. 2. James Cardinal Gibbons was a severe critic of the 
anti-clerical Mexican revolutionaries; hence, of the Wilson 
Administration's Mexican policy as well. See Arthur S. 
Link, W i l s o n : The Struggle For Neutrality, 1914- 1915
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 468.
3 8
Lind to State Department, March 27, 1914/11313.
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States. On April 3, he departed for New York aboard one
39of the presidential yachts, the Mayf1ower. As he sailed,
he had no reason to suspect that he still had a critical 
role to play in the contest between Wilson and Huerta.
As Lind prepared to depart from Vera Cruz, Carranza 
directed General Pablo Gonzalez, Commander of the Army 
Corps of the Northeast, to commence the attack against the 
oil-rich Tampico region held by the Federal forces. On 
April 9, two days after the battle for the port city began, 
a whaleboat from the American gunboat Dolphin put ashore to 
procure gasoline. The crew, because they landed in a 
combat zone, were arrested by Federal soldiers. The 
sailors were soon released by the commander, General 
Ignacio Morelos Zaragoza, who immediately sent his regrets 
to Admiral Henry T. Mayo aboard the Dolphin. Admiral 
Mayo, however, was not satisfied. Knowing of Wilson's 
attitude toward Huerta, he felt that he would be expected 
to uphold American prestige to the utmost. Mayo, there­
fore, demanded a twenty-one gun salute to the American flag 
within twenty-four hours. When Wilson was notified of the
incident, he commented: "Mayo could not have done other-
,,40w x s e .
S^Lind to State Department, March 29, 1914, and State 
Department to Lind, March 31, 1914/11327; New York T i m e s , 
April 3, 1914, p. 2.
^ R o b e r t  E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor (Louisville: 
University of Kentucky Press, 1962), 1-32; Ted C. Hinckley, 
"Wilson, Huerta and the Twenty-one Gun Salute," The 
Historian, XXII (February, 1960), 201-202.
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Lind's arrival in Washington, on April 13, came 
precisely at the time when Wilson needed moral support.
The day before, Huerta refused to fire the salute, claim­
ing that to do so would be to offend Mexico's national 
dignity. On April 14, before the President met with his 
cabinet to discuss possible punitive measures, he had a 
conference with Lind. If Wilson needed any assurance that
forceful action was needed, he surely received it from his 
41special agent. Although there is no record of what Lind
said, the British Ambassador reported that he used "very 
violent l a n g u a g e . H e  probably insisted that the ports 
of Tampico and Vera Cruz be seized. Even more important, 
as salve for Wilson's sense of humanity, Lind probably sug­
gested, as he had in his despatches, that the people of 
those cities so despised Huerta's exhorbitant taxes and
military impressment that they would not offer much
4 3resistance and might even welcome the invasion. Later
41 Quirk, Affair of Honor, 49-50; Stephenson, Lind,
263.
42
British Ambassador quoted in Grieb, United States 
and H u e r t a , 147.
Lind to State Department, February 4, March 12, 23, 
1914/10965, 11227, 27482. Under oath before the Fall Com­
mittee in 1920, Lind denied ever having suggested the 
taking of Vera Cruz or Tampico, either in his despatches or 
verbally. He also denied having claimed that American 
troops might be welcomed in Vera Cruz. See testimony of 
Lind, Investigation of Mexican A f f a i r s , 2363. Lind's bi­
ographer, George M. Stephenson, accepts this testimony.
See L i n d , 264. Yet, the above cited despatches reveal that 
he did make such claims.
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that same day, Wilson ordered the Atlantic fleet to Mexican 
44waters.
The entire situation was soon blown entirely out of
proportion. Huerta agreed to the salute, but only if
Admiral Mayo responded with a shot-for-shot salute to the
Mexican flag. Rejecting this solution, Wilson went before
Congress on April 20 to secure its approval for the use of
armed force to induce Huerta to recognize "the rights and
dignity of the United S t a t e s . " ^  That evening, Lind, along
with Secretaries Bryan, Daniels, and Baker, and the chiefs
of staff of the army and navy, met with Wilson at the White
House to detail plans for a possible naval blockade and
4 6invasion of Tampico and Vera Cruz. Familiar with both
ports and the surrounding military installations, and having 
already given considerable thought to possible military 
operations in Mexico, Lind doubtless contributed his views 
to this counsel of war.
Before Congress could act on Wilson's request, com­
pletely different circumstances prompted him to take 
immediate action. On April 20, the day Wilson addressed 
Congress, Consul Canada at Vera Cruz reported that the 
44
Quirk, Affair of Honor, 50-68; Hinckley, "Wilson, 
Huerta and the Twenty-one Gun Salute," The His t o r i a n , XXII 
203-205.
46
Stephenson, L i n d , 263-64; Baker, Woodrow W i l s o n , IV,
328-29.
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German freighter Ypiranga, laden with arms and ammunition
for Huerta, was due to arrive the next day and discharge
its deadly cargo. The arms of the Ypiranga completely
distracted the President from his point of honor. He had
recently been informed that those arms had been purchased
for Huerta in the United States under the very noses of
Treasury Department agents and, in an attempt to conceal
their destination, had been shipped to Mexico by way of
Odessa, Russia, and Hamburg, Germany. Angered by Huerta's
attempted trickery, Wilson used the Y p i r a n g a 's arrival at
Vera Cruz as a pretext to do what Lind had been advising
for months. In the early morning hours of April 21,
without Congressional sanction, he ordered Admiral Fletcher
47to seize the Vera Cruz customs house. Since he was only
attempting to thwart Huerta and meant the Mexican people 
no harm, Wilson, accepting Lind's counsels, anticipated 
little or no resistance. But Huerta's garrison at Vera 
Cruz did resist and the fighting cost Mexico over 200 lives, 
the United States only nineteen. The day following the 
invasion, Congress gave its consent for the President to 
uphold the nation's honor by force, to what was now a sham
4 7Meyer, "Arms of the Y p i r a n g a ," H A H R , L (August,
1970), 546-56. Further proof that Wilson was merely look­
ing for a pretext to intervene is provided by the fact 
that the Ypiranga was allowed to discharge its cargo at 
Puerto Mexico, some 200 miles south of Vera Cruz.
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fait accompli.^®
A side light of the Vera Cruz incident was the formal
disgrace of Nelson 0'Shaughnessy. After his return to the
United States, Lind continued to criticize the charge' and
urge his recall. Huerta, not Wilson, ultimately performed
this service when, after the Marines landed in Vera Cruz,
he handed the charge' his passports. His relations with
Huerta friendly to the end, 0'Shaughnessy returned to the
United States to face Wilson's scorn. After being
thoroughly chastized, he was shipped off to a minor
secretaryship in the Embassy at Vienna. Never again given
a post commensurate with his abilities or experience, after
a brief stint in Austria he was dropped from the diplomatic 
49service. Lind doubtless applauded, if he did not even
encourage, the abasement of the former charge'.
Wilson was shaken and horrified by the unexpected 
spilling of blood in Vera Cruz. His plans for a large- 
scale invasion of Mexico to give Huerta the coup de grace 
were abandoned when, on April 25, Argentina, Brazil, and 
Chile offered to mediate the conflict and Wilson accepted.
A number of factors besides the President's natural 
revulsion to death and violence prompted this decision.
^ Q u i r k ,  Affair of H o n o r , 78-103; Hinckley, "Wilson, 
Huerta, and the Twenty-one Gun Salute," The H i storian,
XXII, 205-206.
^ Q u i r k ,  Aff air of Honor , 109; New York T i m e s , April 
16, 1914, p. 2; ibid. , September 9, 1914, p. 9; ibid. ,
June 15, August 27, 1915, p. 5; Mexican H e r a l d , May 1, 16, 
1914.
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American and world opinion had been shocked and outraged 
by the aggression in Vera Cruz. Having explained that his 
sole purpose was to uphold national honor, Wilson could see 
that by continuing military operations until Huerta was 
eliminated he would run further afoul of public opinion.
By using the ABC mediators as his pawns, he hoped not only 
to eliminate Huerta at the negotiating table but, at the 
same time, to allay Latin American suspicions of Yankee 
imperialism. Huerta, now cut off from his main sources of 
revenue, was also willing to m e d i a t e . ^
Another development that caused Wilson to stop short
of a full-scale invasion was the violent reaction of
Venustiano Carranza. After the Dolphin incident at
Tampico, and during the diplomatic impasse that followed,
the State Department paid little attention to what the
Constitutionalists' attitude might be. The War Department,
however, did alert its garrisons on the Mexican border and
sent Brigadier General John J. Pershing to Fort Bliss at 
51
El Paso. On the day Marines landed in Vera Cruz,
Huerta forced Wilson to concern himself with the attitude 
of the rebels when he issued an amnesty decree and invited 
them to join with him in defending Mexico's sovereignty.
■^Quirk, Affair of Honor, 114-20; Link, New Freedom, 
401-407.
^ P a u l  S. Horgan, Great R i ver: The Rio Grande in
North American History (2 vols. , New York: Rinehart &
Co., Inc., 1954), II, 916.
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Before the fighting in Vera Cruz ended, therefore, the
President directed Bryan to have Carothers inform Carranza
that the actions of the United States should not be
construed as war against the Mexican people but as merely—
and here he was not entirely truthful— an attempt to force
Huerta "to make proper reparation for the arrest of the
American s a i l o r s . " ^
On the morning of April 22, Carothers, from El Paso,
5 3telegraphed Wilson's message to Carranza in Chihuahua.
The First Chief's reply, which reached the special agent 
later that day, bristled with anger. In characteristic 
fashion, Carranza declared that since Huerta was a usurper, 
he had no constitutional power to accept demands for re­
dress of grievances or make reparations to any foreign 
government. The Constitution of Mexico, he continued, 
clearly stated that the acts of a usurper, whether they be 
domestic or international in nature, were punishable by 
the constitutional authorities of Mexico, and no one else. 
He concluded his reply with an open threat of war:
. . . the invasion of our territory and the stay
of your forces in the port of Vera Cruz, 
violating the rights that constitute our existence
52
State Department to Carothers, April 21, 1914, 
Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 4 , 480.
53
Carothers to State Department, April 22, 1914/
1159 6; EJL Paso Morning T i m e s , April 23, 1914.
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as a free and independent sovereign entity, 
may indeed drag us into an unequal war . . .
which until today we have desired to avoid.54
The prospect of war electrified the city of El Paso.
Even before receiving Carranza's reply, Carothers detected
"a very strong undercurrent of resentment" among the
Constitutionalist authorities in Juarez. Tension mounted
when rumors reached El Paso that Constitutionalist and
American troops had already clashed further down the Rio
Grande at Ojinaga. Then came news that Villa was on his
way to the border with 12,000 troops and a trainload of
artillery. Every hardware store sold out of firearms and
ammunition within hours of the first rumors. Every train
leaving El Paso, to the east, west, and north, was loaded
to capacity. General Pershing placed his troops at the
international bridge and all possible fords near the city.
Reinforcements were sent speeding from Fort Sam Houston
in San Antonio and from Fort Hauchuca in southeast
A r i z o n a . ^  Tension also mounted in Washington. Bryan
^ C a r o t h e r s  (containing Carranza's reply) to State 
Department, April 22, 1914, Fo reign Relat ions, 1914 , 483- 
84. This document is probably a State Department trans­
lation of Carranza's telegraphic message to Carothers, the 
original of which was sent to Washington by mail after 
Carothers telegraphed his own translation. The original 
must have been cited in Foreign Relat i o n s , because it 
differs slightly from Carothers' translation. See 
Carothers to State Department, April 22, 1914/11618; copy 
in Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 51.
55carothers to State Department, April 21, 22, 1914/ 
11587, 11596; General Tasker Bliss to War Department, April 
23, 1914 (three), Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 106; El 
Paso Morning T i m e s , April 23, 1914.
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issued instructions for all consuls in Mexico to encourage
Americans to leave as soon as possible, and Wilson promptly
5 6reimposed the arms embargo.
When Villa arrived in Juarez, Carothers immediately 
crossed the river to determine what the Mexicans' 
intentions were. Villa greeted him cordially with the 
traditional Mexican abrazo for all the reporters to see and 
exclaimed aloud that "there would be no war between the 
United States and the Constitutionalists." To emphasize 
his friendship for the United States, he proclaimed that 
the Marines "could keep Vera Cruz and hold it so tight that 
not even water could get in to Huerta." Carothers noted 
that Villa also professed that "no drunkard, meaning 
Huerta, was going to draw him into a war with his friends." 
He insisted that he had come to the border to restore 
confidence between himself and the United States. Then he 
asked Carothers to dine with h i m . ^  So as to ease the 
tension in El Paso, Carothers first telephoned Zach Cobb, 
the Customs Collector, and asked him to inform authorities 
that Villa was not belligerent and that all was well. That
5 6State Department to All American Consuls in Mexico, 
April 22, 1914, Foreign Relat i o n s , 1 9 1 4 , 671; New York 
T i m e s , April 24, 1914, p. 1.
^ C a r o t h e r s  to State Department, April 23, 1914/11654; 
New York Times , April 24, 1914, p. 1; E_1 Paso Morning Times, 
April 24, 1914; "Our Debt to Villa," Literary Digest ,
XLVIII (May 16, 1914), 1166; Guzman, Memoirs of Pancho 
V i l l a , 190-91.
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5 8
night, Carothers was a hero in El Paso.
Villa, alone, among the Constitutionalist generals
took a peaceful stance following the Vera Cruz invasion.
Indeed, the others had encouraged Carranza to make his
59bellicose pronouncement. Villa, in his conversations
with Carothers, claimed that he had openly disagreed with 
Carranza's advisors and had hastened to disassociate him­
self from them by coming to the border to make his own 
6 0views known. He may, as he claimed, have realized that
a perpetual arms embargo, which would result from the 
rebels taking a hard line against the United States, would 
stall the war against Huerta. On the other hand, he may 
simply have realized how valuable Wilson's good will might 
be in the future. At any rate, Carothers was confident of 
Villa's sincerity. Bryan was ecstatic. Referring to the 
independent stand, he urged Carothers to inform Villa that 
"it shows a largeness of view on his part and a compre­
hension of the whole situation which is greatly to his 
credit." Bryan also directed his agent to reveal that 
"public opinion in the United States has been greatly
^®Cobb to State Department, April 23, 1914/11656; Ray­
mond G. Carroll, "United States Agents Powerful in Mexico," 
New York S u n , August 15, 1915.
^ L e t c h e r  to State Department, April 22, 1914, Foreign 
Relations, 1914 , 484 ; Barrag^n, "From the Memoirs of Don 
Venustiano Carranza," ^1 U n iversal, June 22 , 1931, NA, RG 
76/148.
60carothers to State Department, April 23, 1914/11654; 
Guzman, Memoirs of Pancho V i l l a , 190-91.
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6 1
disturbed by General Carranza's attitude. . . ." If
this was an invitation for Villa to challenge Carranza's 
obdurate stand, it was not long in being accepted.
On April 25, Villa, through Carothers, sent a 
personal letter to President Wilson, in which he re­
iterated what he had told the special agent two days 
before. He also openly disavowed Carranza's stand and 
rather apologetically assured the American President that 
he could disregard the First Chief's warlike tones, that
they were just his means of defending the dignity of the 
6 2
Republic. Villa also told Carothers confidentially
that he would force Carranza to change his attitude. In a 
letter to General Scott, Carothers stated his firm con­
viction that "if Carranza is not careful, Villa will over- 
6 3
throw him." When, shortly thereafter, Villa returned to 
Chihuahua and Carranza's attitude began to soften., Carothers 
and the American press naturally assumed that Villa had 
forced his h a n d . ^
The possibility of his forces splitting was, no doubt,
61
State Department to Carothers, April 24, 1914/11654.
^ V i l l a  to Wilson, April 25, 1914/11714; copy in 
Wilson Papers, Series IV, Box 51.
Carothers to State Department, April 25, 1914/11704; 
Carothers to Scott, April 25, 1914, Scott Papers, Box 15.
64
Carothers to State Department, April 27, 29, 1914/ 
11731, 11770 ; "Our Debt to Villa," Literary Digest ,
XLV I I I , 1166-67.
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a sobering thought and helped persuade Carranza to modify
his stand. Actually, he had already notified Washington
through Consul Letcher that he wished to avoid armed 
6 5
conflict. Carothers also received word that some of the
other Constitutionalist generals had waivered and were now
6 6urging moderation. Carranza, moreover, began receiving
messages from one of his Anglo-American agents in the
United States, Sherbourne G. Hopkins, who advised that
American public opinion was greatly inflamed by the First
Chief's recent warlike pronouncement. Hopkins counseled
that, when the time seemed opportune, Carranza should issue
a statement to the effect that, since the United States had
occupied only Vera Cruz, the Constitutionalists were
satisfied that Mexican sovereignty would be respected. On
May 4, after Wilson had accepted the ABC mediation,
Carranza's agent in Washington, Rafael Zubarifn Capmany,
addressed a note to Bryan which embodied the suggestions
6 7that Hopkins had made.
During the last days of April and the first weeks of
6 5
Letcher to State Department, April 22, 1914, Foreign 
Relations, 1 9 1 4 , 484.
f l  f\
Carothers to State Department, April 25, 1914/11704; 
copy in Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 51.
67S. Gil Herrera (Hopkins) a Carranza, April 23, 1914, 
A G R E , L-E-861, Leg. 5; Hopkins to Carranza, April 24, 1914, 
copy in Scott Papers, Box 15; Zubaran Capmany to State De­
partment, Foreign Relations, 1914 , 496-97.
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May, preparations went on for the ABC mediation. Both 
Wilson and Huerta chose noteworthy delegates to meet with 
the mediators at Niagara Falls, Ontario. The mediators at 
first assumed that the only matter under consideration was 
the settling of the conflict between the United States and 
the Huerta government. But before the deliberations got 
underway on May 20, Wilson made it clear that he intended 
for the conferees to arrange for the elimination of 
Huerta and the establishment of a new provisional govern­
ment which he could recognize. Since the American Presi­
dent insisted upon delving into the internal affairs of 
Mexico, the mediators extended an invitation to the Consti­
tutionalists to send delegates, and Carranza accepted the 
offer in "principle."
The mediators labored manfully under numerous handi­
caps. When, in attempting to promote general peace between 
all the conferring parties, they urged Carranza to declare 
an armistice before entering into the negotiations, the 
First Chief refused. Under pressure from Wilson, he did 
agree to send delegates but the ABC mediators refused to 
accept them, declaring that their presence would be counter 
to the spirit of a peace conference. All the conferees and 
Wilson, meanwhile, were at loggerheads over the composition 
of a provisional government. To top off the madcap 
situation, Carranza and his agents repeatedly declared that 
the Constitutionalists would not admit the right of the
261
mediators to interfere with the progress of their revo­
lution, nor would they allow Wilson to help in establishing 
a new provisional government. In anyone entered the 
negotiations with a spirit of compromise, it was Huerta.
Wilson, of course, had no intention of compromising with
-1, 68 the usurper.
On July 1, the conferees signed several protocols.
It was agreed that the composition of the provisional 
government would be determined by the warring factions in 
Mexico and that the United States would recognize it. The 
provisional government was to grant amnesty and compensate 
foreigners for their losses during the civil war. The 
United States agreed that it would not demand reparation 
for the Tampico incident, thus disposing of Wilson's 
absurd point of honor. The conferees also invited 
Carranza to enter into direct negotiations with Huerta for 
the creation of a new provisional government. On July 2, 
after Carranza stood on his Plan of Guadalupe and declared 
that he would continue fighting until all vestiges of the
6 9usurper's regime was destroyed, the conference adjourned. 
The ABC mediation, therfore, accomplished little except an 
indefinite suspension of hostilities between the United 
States and the Huerta government. Carranza's refusal to
68Link, New Freedom, 405-13; Gri e b , United States and 
H u e r t a , 159-77.
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accept a negotiated peace once more thwarted W i l s o n ’s plans 
for guiding the reconstruction of Mexico.
Government and public opinion in the United States, 
disturbed by Carranza’s initial response to the Vera Cruz 
landings, was little assuaged by his attitude toward the 
mediation. For this, John Lind was partially responsible. 
Paradoxically, the special agent's sympathies were with 
the Carrancistas. Having established contacts with 
Carranza’s agents in the United States— Zubar^n Capmany, 
Cabrera, and Juan F. Urquidi— during and after the Vera 
Cruz incident, he found them well-educated and as thoroughly 
middle-class as he. As a result, his earlier stated fears 
of their possible revolutionary excesses evaporated. His 
suspicions of more radical revolutionaries, such as Villa, 
whom he had earlier boosted, and Zapata, never disappeared. 
Little time passed, however, before he accepted the 
Carrancistas' goals for Mexico as his own. His trust in 
them was such that he no longer saw a need for the United 
States to intervene and aid in the reconstruction of 
Mexico. Equally significant, the Carrancistas considered 
him their most trustworthy and sympathetic friend in the 
United States. Although their press comments were often 
anti-American, they periodically reminded the Mexican 
people that John Lind was their closest American f r i e n d . ^
70stephenson, L i n d , 266-69, 274; Fabela, Historia 
Diplom^tica de la Revolucicfn Mexicana, I, 367-71; Lind to 
Bryan, April 16, 1915, Bryan Papers, Box 43; Lind to Bryan,
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Lind played a curious dual role during the ABC pro­
ceedings. Wilson retained him in Washington as an advisor 
to the Secretary of State and the American delegation at 
the Niagara Falls Conference. As the conference pro­
gressed, however, he increasingly advised the Carrancistas, 
and, more and more, his ideas coincided with theirs. Even
before the negotiations began, in a memorandum to the
President, he prophesied the results:
I am fully convinced . . . that the mediation
will result in nothing. Its greatest value, so 
far as the Mexican situation is concerned, is in 
the fact that it has afforded the Americans an 
opportunity to e s c a p e . 71
Lind was disturbed when he discovered that Wilson 
hoped to promote a new provisional government in Mexico. 
"The Mexicans of the north are, as you already appreciate, 
very sensitive about doing anything that smacks of taking 
orders from outside," he wrote to Bryan. Insisting that a
military victory by the rebels was the only solution, he
noted further t h a t :
April 21, 1915, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 129; Lind 
to Wilson August 2, 1915, ibid. , Series IV, 125; Zubar^n 
Capmany a Carranza, June 19, 1914, Isidro Fabela (ed.), 
Documentos Historicos de la Revolucidn Mexicana, Vol. Ill: 
Carr a n z a , Wilson e_l ABC (Mexico, D.F. : Fondo de Cultura
Econdmica, 1962), 127-28; Churabusco (Mexico City), May 
11, 1914; El^  Pueblo (Mexico C i ty), March 21, 27, 1915. 
Lind's suspicions of Villa and Zapata resulted partly from 
Carrancist a propaganda, which branded them as dangerous 
s elf-seekers.
71 Lind, Memorandum, April 30, 1914, Wilson Papers,
Series II, Box 108.
264
. . . the problem we have to deal with is a
victorious army with a score of politically 
inexperienced but ambitious chiefs— every 
one including Zapata a potential candidate 
for the dictatorship.
"The only safe course for us in the mediation proceedings,"
7 2he concluded, "is to remain as listeners."
Before the mediation conferences had proceeded far,
Lind found himself in almost total disagreement with
Wilson and Bryan. He spent more and more time in consul-
73
tation with the Constitutionalist junta. In fact, when
Carranza declared that the Constitutionalists would not 
recognize the right of the mediators to involve them­
selves in M e x i c o ’s internal affairs, Lind helped draft the 
74statement. Almost simultaneously he sent Bryan a
cautiously worded protest against the Administration’s
7 2
Lind to Bryan, [n.d.], ibid.
73
New York T i m e s , May 27, 28, 1914, p. 1; ibid., June 
10, 1914, p. 2; Mexican H e r a l d , May 31, 1914; New York 
S u n , July 18, 1914.
74 Draft of memorandum with notations to the effect 
that Lind helped prepare it, [n.d.], Lind Papers, Box 3. 
Portions of this draft are identical to Zubar^n Capmany a 
los plenipotenciarios del ABC, May 27, 1914, Carranza, 
Wilson 2. el A B C , 43-44. See also Zubarin Capmany, repre­
senting General Carranza, to the Mediators, May 28, 1914, 
enclosure no. 8 of The Special Commissioners to State De­
partment, May 31, 1914, Foreign Relations, 1914 , 519. The 
different dates assigned to Zubar^n Capmany's note by the 
above cited publications results from the fact that the 
first citation represents the date when Zubaran Capmany 
sent the note to Juan F. Urquidi with instructions for 
him to present it to the mediators, while the second 
citation represents the actual date that the mediators 
received the document.
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continued attempts to create a new provisional government 
through mediation, since, according to the Mexican Consti­
tution, Huerta, a usurper, could not legally be a party to 
arranging his successor. "We should not worry about the 
succession," he counseled. "That will take care of it­
s e l f ."75
That there was no open break between Lind and the Ad­
ministration was owing to the fact that the Administration’s 
policy, despite the fact that Carranza refused to accept 
it, was designed to aid the revolutionists. To the casual 
observer, therefore, Lind and Wilson seemed to be in basic 
agreement. Indeed, the Huerta delegation at Niagara Falls
assumed that Wilson's policy resulted largely from Lind's 
7 6counsels. Wilson no more than Lind was willing to 
support the mediators' demand for a Constitutionalist cease 
fire. Wilson, moreover, conveniently turned his back while 
the rebels procured arms in the United States in violation 
of the embargo and shippped them to Tampico, which had 
been captured by the Constitutionalists on May 13. When 
Huerta's delegates protested to the mediators, Wilson 
apologized, claiming ignorance of the illicit arms trade, 
but Lind made no excuses. Instead, he informed Sherbourne 
Hopkins, who was purchasing arms for the rebels, that the 
arms traffic would attract less unfavorable attention if
75Lind to Bryan, May 29, 1914, Bryan Papers, Box 30.
76uew York T i m e s , July 3, 1914, p. 3.
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the illicit cargoes were first shipped to Havana, where 
new ship's papers could be secured, then delivered to 
T a m p i c o . ^  Despite their common sympathy for the Consti­
tutionalists, Wilson never endorsed Carranza as 
enthusiastically as did Lind.
Although his services were not officially terminated 
until August— probably to enable him to draw a full year's 
salary— Lind returned to Minnesota in early June. He 
continued to communicate with Wilson and Bryan on Mexican 
affairs. His advices were virtually ignored for the re­
mainder of 1914 and most of 1915, because the Adminis­
tration tended to favor Villa and Zapata over Carranza 
during that time. Lind's steadfast support of the First 
Chief ultimately drew charges from the anti-Administration 
New York S u n , to the effect that he was a paid agent of 
the Carrancista faction. He denied ever receiving money 
or any other compensation from Carranza, and there is 
little reason to doubt his word. He was such an unabashed 
supporter of the First Chief that, once he left the employ 
of the Wilson Administration, he would have seen nothing
^ G r i e b ,  United States and Huerta, 172-75; Buckley, 
conversation with Sherbourne Hopkins, October 4, 1919, 
Buckley Papers, File no. 233; Testimony of Sherbourne G. 
Hopkins, April 29, 1920, Investigation of Mexican A f f a i r s , 
2412-14; New York T i m e s , July 10, 1914, p. 2. For 
details of the taking of Tampico, see Barragan Rodriguez, 
Historia . . . Constitucionalista, I, 471-75; Quirk,
The Mexican Revolution, 27-28.
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unethical about receiving compensation from the revo­
lutionaries. 7 ®
During World War I, Lind again served the Wilson Ad­
ministration, first as a Commissioner of Conciliation in 
the Department of Labor, then as an umpire for the 
National War Labor Board. As did so many reformers of the 
Progressive Era, he also served on his state's Commission 
on Public Safety, which was dedicated to promoting 
patriotism, ferreting out supposedly dangerous aliens, 
and suppressing would-be opponents of the war effort. In 
this capacity, he was largely responsible for the 
suppression of the syndicalist Industrial Workers of the 
World in Minnesota. In 1917, at his suggestions, the De­
partment of Justice secured convictions against the 
Minnesota leaders of the I.W.W. on criminal conspiracy 
charges. Following techniques suggested by Lind, the 
Justice Department broke the power of the I.W.W. elsewhere 
in the Midwest, as the local union leaders were successively 
convicted on conspiracy charges. Despite his role in the 
repression of the I.W.W., Lind refused to support a move 
to oust the socialist mayor of Minneapolis, Thomas Van 
L e a r .79
78stephenson, L i n d , 284-305; New York T i m e s , June 10, 
12, 1914, p. 2; New York S u n , July 16, 1914, November 5, 
1915; Testimony of Lind and Buckley, Investigation of 
Mexican A f f airs, 812, 2364.
79stephenson, L i n d , 332-33; William Preston, Jr.,
Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of R a d i c a l s ,
1903-1933 (New York: Harper and Row, Pub., 1966), 99,126-28.
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In his old age Lind remained true to his midwestern
progressive heritage. He supported the Conference for
Progressive Political Action and its candidates, Robert
La Follette and Burton K. Wheeler, in the presidential
campaign of 1924. But in 1928, he refused to endorse A1
Smith because of the New Y o r k e r ’s affiliation with Tammany
Hall. On September 18, 1930, he died at his home in 
8 0Minneapolis. Certainly he had been the most publicized
and controversial and, at times, the most influential of 
Wilson's special agents in Mexico.
All of Lind's diplomatic efforts in Mexico had met 
with failure. Indeed, his protracted stay may have 
served to harden Huerta's will to remain in power. But as 
a gatherer of information and as a propagandist, he was 
much more successful. Even before his departure, his 
promptings had influenced the President to establish 
permanent contacts with the Constitutionalists and to lift 
the arms embargo. The military intervention he so often 
pleaded for doubtless resulted, in part, from his counsels.
He left Mexico believing that his efforts had gone 
for naught. But Wilson must have been pleased with his 
overall performance. Lind had pursued his task with the 
zeal of a progressive reformer, and the principles he 
strove to uphold mirrored Wilson's own New Freedom. In 
the Minnesotan's mind, Mexico contained all the same
^ S t e p h e n s o n ,  L i n d , 342-66.
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evils he had sought to eradicate in the United States 
during his political career: a corrupt political regime
(in this case, Huerta's provisional government) sustained 
by a privileged group of business interests (in this 
case, hacendados and British concessionaires) who did not 
have the public interest at heart. He had a progressive's 
faith that such malignant political and economic con­
ditions could be eliminated by an enlightened elite (in 
this case, the Constitutionalists of the North) working 
through democratic institutions. Since free elections, 
the traditional Anglo-American technique of eliminating 
such evils, seemed temporarily unworkable in Mexico, Lind 
accepted as axiomatic the assumption that intervention by
the United States would advance Mexico toward the es-
81
tablishment of a progressive capitalist democracy. Only
after he returned to the United States did he realize that 
the price of such advancement— control of the Mexican 
Revolution by the United States— was greater than the 
revolutionary leaders, at least, Carranza, were willing to 
pay. In the process, he learned something that had 
escaped his president— that the Mexicans were capable of 
solving their own problems.
8 XLarry D. Hill, "The Progressive Politician as a 
Diplomat: The Case of John Lind in Mexico," The A m e r i c a s ,
XXVII (April, 1971), 372.
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CHAPTER VIII
HOLDING THE LID ON
Wilson's disappointment at his failure to influence 
Carranza through the ABC powers was assuaged somewhat by 
the more encouraging results of George Carothers1 efforts. 
By May, 1914, he was a familiar figure in all the Consti­
tutionalist camps east of Sonora. His work by this time 
was drawing a great deal of praise. After the border 
crisis, which followed the Vera Cruz invasion, subsided, 
General Pershing, in his report to General Tasker H.
Bliss, noted: "Carothers has so far succeeded in direct­
ing the Constitutionalists along rational lines.
British Consul Cunard Cummings was even more complimentary 
in a letter to Zach Cobb, which he asked to be forwarded 
to Carothers's superiors:
On several occasions I accompanied Mr. Carothers 
on visits to Constitutionalist leaders, and 
invariably found genuine pleasure how matters 
calling for the most delicate handling have been 
with rare tactfulness carried to successful issue, 
how misunderstandings have been corrected, wrong 
impressions removed, rashness and violence curbed, 
and how Mr. Carothers has with masterful diplomacy, 
assisted by his thorough knowledge of the language
^Pershing to Bliss, June 2, 1914, John J. Pershing 
Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Box 
372.
270
271
and character of the Mexican people, exercised 
a strong controlling influence over his 
listeners, impressing them with his kindness, 
frankness and the justice of sound reasoning, 
exhibiting at all times the attitude of strong 
determination, thus often bringing about 
abandonment of intentions, which if perservered 
with, must have produced dangerous complications.2
Zach Cobb himself offered even more encouragement for the
future. In a letter to General Scott, he wrote: "I see
a splendid possibility, through the diplomatic work of
Carothers, to get the Constitutionalists to agree to the
3
President's program as it develops."
In his relations with Carranza, the State Department 
agent continued to enjoy only mixed success. His efforts 
to protect American oil interests at Tampico, for 
example, pointed up again the difficulty in securing a 
completely satisfactory agreement from the First Chief. 
Fearing reprisals from the Federal armies, most Americans 
had fled Tampico following the Vera Cruz invasion. Other 
foreigners fled the area because of the fighting between 
the Constitutionalists and the Federals. With millions of 
dollars worth of oil properties left to the caprice of the 
contesting forces, Bryan instructed Carothers to attempt 
to persuade Carranza to arrange with the Federals to 
neutralize the oil producing areas. In his own inimitable 
way, Carranza replied that the Constitutionalists had not 
2
Cunard Cummings to Cobb, April 30, 1914, NA 125.36582/
85.
^Cobb to Scott, May 2, 1914, Scott Papers, Box 15.
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driven the foreign oil field workers from their jobs and 
that neutralization of the oil fields was not necessary, 
since his troops controlled the area and would insure the 
protection of foreigners and their interests. This 
arrangement was not precisely what Washington had re­
quested but it was acceptable to the oil men. Several 
minor irritants resulted from the Constitutionalists' 
occupation of Tampico, but by the end of May most of the
oil workers were back on the job and, at least temporarily,
4
the oil companies had little with which to quarrel.
Carothers' relations with Villa provided the Ad­
ministration with its greatest source of encouragement. 
Officially their relationship remained the same; Carothers' 
primary responsibility, at least until July, 1914, was to 
protect the interests of foreigners. But privately the 
two became fast friends. Villa provided Carothers with a 
private rail car— actually a converted boxcar, with sleep­
ing and kitchen facilities. Carothers was also provided 
with two Chinese servants, one of whom, the agent claimed,
could cook as well as the best New York chef."* Villa and
4state Department to Carothers, April 28, May 8 , 14, 
1914, Foreign Relat ions , 1914 , 690-91 , 700, 702; Carothers 
to State Department, May 1, 20, 1914, ibjid. , 695 , 700 ;
State Department to Clarence Miller, American Consul, 
Tampico, May 6 , 14, 15, 1914, ibid. , 697 , 701-702 ; Miller 
to State Department, May 8 (two), 14, 15, 17, 21, 1914, 
ibid., 698-99, 702-704.
^Edward L. Tinker, "Campaigning With Villa," South­
west R e v i e w , XXX (Winter, 1945), 150-52. Tinker was a 
journalist who traveled with Carothers in the private car 
during one of Villa's campaigns.
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Carothers spent many hours discussing the nature of the 
revolution and America's response to it. In this 
respect, the friendship served Villa better than the 
United States, because he was always aware of what 
behavior would have the most favorable impact north of 
the border.
Wilson and Bryan were definitely pleased by the 
favorable impression of Villa that was emerging in the 
American press. In a popular parlance of the day, he had
g
become the "Mexican man of the hour." During the early 
months of 1914, before the outbreak of war in Europe,
Villa received tremendous press coverage. He provided 
newspaper and magazine correspondents with a railroad car 
of their own. At least a dozen reporters were with him 
most of the time, and he readily made himself available 
for interviews.^ For the most part, these correspondents 
wrote glowing accounts of Villa's exploits and character. 
The reporter from The World's Work claimed that if the 
United States wanted something "put through," Villa was
g
Gregory Mason, "The Mexican Man of the Hour," Out­
l o o k , CVII (June 6 , 1914), 292.
^Herman Whitaker, "Villa-Bandit-Patriot," Independent, 
LXXVII (June 8 , 1914), 450-51. For an analysis of Villa's 
relations with the press and the myths that resulted, see 
Nancy Brandt, "Pancho Villa: The Making of a Modern
Legend," The Americas, XXI (October, 1964), 146-62.
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g
the man to deal with. For the first time, it appeared to
another writer, the revolution had developed "a strong man 
9
of its own." Probably the correspondent most enamored 
with Villa was John Reed of the New York W o r l d . His 
romanticized accounts pictured the rebel chieftain as 
combining the best qualities of Robin Hood and Napoleon.
By Reed's account, Villa was vindicating Wilson's Mexican
. . 10policy.
Reed, in fact, was so impressed by Villa that, when 
he returned to the United States, he contacted Wilson's 
secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, and asked for an opportunity 
to pass on some of his impressions directly to the Presi­
dent. Instead of the President, Assistant Secretary of 
State William Phillips met with Reed on April 24, the 
approximate time of Villa's displays of friendship follow­
ing the Vera Cruz landings. Reed painted Villa as having 
no political ambitions. His passion was to help his 
fellow Mexicans. Carranza, on the other hand, Reed 
pictured as an aristocrat, who looked upon his peon
O
Joseph Taylor Rogers, "Pancho Villa at First Hand," 
The World's W o r k , XXVIII (July, 1914), 265.
9
"Northern Mexico Lost to Huerta," Literary Digest , 
XLVIII (January 24, 1914), 144.
"^Reed quoted in "The Rise of Villa's Star," ibid. 
(April 18, 1914), 889. Reed incorporated his newspaper 
and magazine accounts into the previously cited book, 
Insurgent Mex i c o .
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11
followers as a subject race. Some time later, Wilson did
grant Reed an interview and gave the journalist permission
12
to use their conversation as the subject of an article.
All the correspondents were not as impressed with 
Villa as was Reed. Even the most hostile commentators ad­
mitted, nonetheless, that while Villa's professions of 
friendship for the United States might have been for 
selfish reasons, he had saved Wilson from an embarrassing 
situation. Congressman William Kent of California proba­
bly expressed the majority opinion when he proclaimed that 
"now, between us and a general war there seems to be but
one thing, and that is the fact that there is one man down
13there, one strong man, Villa. . . ."
An editorial in the New York Wo rid probably came 
closest to expressing Wilson's own view: "We have many
remarkable proofs of this man's (Villa) capacity for 
leadership but not one of them has been more conclusive 
than his willingness to be advised and assisted by the 
11
Reed to Tumulty, April 8 , 1914, Wilson Papers, Series 
IV, Box 121; Phillips to Bryan, April 24, 1914/24262.
12
Wilson to Reed, June 17, 1914, Wilson Papers, Series 
II, Box 111; Tumulty, Memorandum, June 22, 1914, ibid. In 
this memorandum to the President, Tumulty reports that 
there are certain items in the draft of Reed's article that 
might prove embarrassing to the Administration. He was 
certain that the President would want them eliminated 
before it was published.
13
Cong. R e c ., 63 Cong., 2 Sess. (April 27, 1914),
7339; New York T i m e s , April 28, 1914, p. 3.
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14
United States." Certainly Villa, among the Constitution­
alist leaders, seemed most willing to accept American 
guidance. There seemed little hope of securing it through 
Carranza. The State Department had chosen Carothers
because of his ability to influence Villa; the decision had
already paid dividends. In President Wilson's own words, 
"General Villa . . . often shows some susceptibilities of
the best influences.
The Vera Cruz intervention gave Villa an opportunity
to exhibit his friendliness for the United States, but it
also openly revealed, for the first time, that he and 
Carranza did not see eye to eye. The first days of May, 
1914, found Villa in Torrecfn preparing for an assault on 
Zacatecas, the one remaining Federal stronghold between 
him and Mexico City. Determined to beat all other Consti­
tutionalist armies to the capital, Villa planned his 
campaign without consulting Carranza; but the First Chief 
would not be ignored. He and his advisors decided that it 
was time to curb their impetuous colleague. Rather than 
allow Villa to march rapidly southward, Carranza ordered 
him to the East to capture Saltillo, a mission which 
logically should have been assigned to General Pablo 
Gonzalez, commander of the Army Corps of the Northeast.
^ New York W o r l d , June 20, 1914.
15Wilson to Scott, April 16, 1914, Scott Papers, Box
15.
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At first Villa refused to be sidetracked, but after a 
heated argument with the First Chief, he agreed to the 
Saltillo campaign. Villa having capitulated, Carranza 
hoped that he had bought enough time to allow General 
Obregc^n to strike across the mountains of Tepic and 
Jalisco, through Guadalajara, and arrive in Mexico City 
before Villa.
As Villa marched on Saltillo, Carranza hastened to 
Durango to see General Panfilo Natera, the revolutionary 
chief of the state of Zacatecas. In another move designed 
to thwart Villa, the First Chief entrusted Natera with the 
task of capturing the important city of Zacatecas. But 
Natera was unequal to the task. For three days his armies 
hammered at the Federal implacements but were repulsed 
each time with heavy casualties. Villa, meanwhile, routed 
the Federal garrison at Paredc^n, leaving the approaches 
to Saltillo clear of opposing forces. Shortly thereafter 
the Huertistas evacuated Saltillo without a fight and Villa 
occupied the city on May 21. Villa might then have struck 
southward, following the retreating Federals toward San 
Luis Potos^, but he did not trust General Gonzalez, who, 
sitting in nearby Monterrey, could menace his lines of 
communications out of Chihuahua. In the first days of June, 
therefore, Villa turned Saltillo over to Gonzalez and
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returned to the more cordial surroundings of T o r r e o n . ^  
Shortly after Villa's return to Torreon, Carothers 
journeyed to El Paso to file a lengthy report on the 
Saltillo campaign. While he was at the border, relations 
between Villa and Carranza reached a breaking point.
Consul Letcher reported from Chihuahua that he had re­
ceived information from Carrancista officials that the 
First Chief had arranged to deny the Division of the North
ammunition and supplies and was determined to limit Villa's
17authority to the state of Chihuahua. Carothers,
puzzled by similar reports that appeared in the El Paso
newspapers, reported his own belief that there was "no
18
serious trouble between Carranza and Villa." He was 
shocked, therefore, when he returned to Torreon and dis­
covered that relations between the two revolutionary 
chiefs had, indeed, deteriorated during his absence from 
V i l l a 's s i d e .
Villa was in a rage. The First Chief, he charged, 
was attempting to curtail the operations of the Division 
of the North by censoring communications and tying up all
"*"^Quirk, The Mexican Revolut i o n , 28-30; Barragan 
Rodriguez, Historia . . . Constitucionalista, I, 475-83.
17
Letcher to State Department, June 4, 1914/12160; 
copy in Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 54.
18
Carothers to State Department, June 6, 1914/12170;
El Paso Morning Tim e s , June 4, 5, 1914.
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the railroad rolling stock. Villa also told Carothers 
that a shipment of ammunition, which he had personally 
paid for, had arrived in Tampico from Havana and that the 
Carrancistas were holding it. He warned that unless it 
was delivered immediately, he would break with Carranza. 
Carothers urged patience and promised to personally 
intercede with the First Chief, who now made his head­
quarters in Saltillo. The estrangement was doubly alarm­
ing, the special agent reported to Washington, because 
Villa was paying so much attention to politics that he 
was losing much of his old fighting energy. For example, 
he showed no inclination to go to Natera's aid at 
Zacatecas. Carothers, moreover, was not sure at all that
he could do anything to prevent the split in the Consti-
19
tutionalists' ranks.
With the ABC mediation failing to oust Huerta as 
planned, Wilson was naturally concerned over any falling 
out among the revolutionaries that might in any way slow 
the pace of the war against the usurper. Carothers was
20
urgently directed to use every means to prevent a split.
By the time these instructions reached him, the agent, 
attempting to appease Villa, had already made his way to 
the First Chief's headquarters. On June 13, he interviewed
-^Cobb (for Carothers) to State Department, June 12, 
1914/12219; copy in Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 55.
20
State Department to Carothers, June 13, 1914/
12219.
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Carranza, who reported that conditions were "improving." 
Carranza knew better; the next day he gleefully informed 
Carothers that after a heated six-hour telegraphic 
conversation, Villa had angrily resigned as commander of 
the Division of the North. Carranza insisted that Villa's 
arbitrary exercise of powers that belonged only to the 
First Chief had precipitated the break. The special 
agent was dismayed by Carranza's attitude and later re­
called that the First Chief "appeared to be overjoyed
that the breach had come, and would not listen to my
,,21reas oning. . . .
Hoping to influence Villa to change his mind and be 
more cooperative, Carothers immediately returned to 
Torreon. There he discovered that Carranza had not been 
entirely candid. The break, as Consul Edwards of Juarez 
had already reported to Washington, had resulted when the 
First Chief ordered Villa to detach 5000 of his troops to 
General Natera. Villa and his advisors, both civilian 
and military, had interpreted the order as a deliberate 
attempt to split and weaken the Division of the North.
The Villistas attempted through hours of telegraphic 
communication to explain their reluctance to break up their 
21
Carothers to State Department, June 11, 1914, NA 
125.36582/88; Carothers to State Department, June 13, 14, 
1914/12226, 12228; copies of both in Wilson Papers,
Series II, Box 55; Testimony of Carothers, Investigation 
of Mexican Affairs, 1771.
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highly successful army and even offered to march en masse 
on Zacatecas, but Carranza refused to revoke his order.
22
In a fit of pique, Villa then tendered his resignation.
By the time Carothers reached Torreon, however, the 
officers of the Division of the North, having been forced 
to chose between their general and the First Chief, had 
refused to accept Villa's resignation and had declared 
their intention to stand by him. Feeling more righteous 
than ever, Villa took charge of the railroads and 
telegraphs in the area he controlled. His men also 
quietly removed the Carrancistas from their offices in 
Juarez and Chihuahua. Villa even dispatched an officer 
and a troop of men aboard a special train to Tampico, 
where they virtually stole the ammunition Villa claimed 
was his and returned it to Torreon. Then, in open de­
fiance of Carranza, Villa began his own campaign against 
23
Zacatecas.
Since telegraphic communications were made uncertain 
by the break, Carothers was again forced to travel to El 
Paso to make his report and get new instructions. Villa 
had asked him to impress upon President Wilson the fact 
that the Villistas would engage in no hostile action
22
Edwards to State Department, June 16, 1914, Foreign 
Relations , 1914 , 541-42; Carothers to State Department, 
June 18, 1914, ibid. ; Testimony of Carothers, Investi­
gation of Mexican A f fairs, 1771.
23
lb i d . ; EJL Paso Morning Times , June 17, 18, 1914.
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against Carranza. He wanted Washington to know that he 
planned to proceed south alone, but if he met other 
revolutionary armies he would encourage them to join him. 
Villa especially wanted Carothers to make clear his view 
that the General's actions would speed the progress of 
the revolution. The American agent also noted that the 
Chihuahua strong-man would gladly accept mediation by 
American officials. Carothers had not been in El Paso 
a day when news arrived that seemingly made mediation un­
necessary. Villista officials reported that Carranza had 
"graciously" consented for Villa to "proceed south to
Mexico City" and had agreed "to postpone settlement of
24differences between them until later."
On June 20, Villa began his attack on Zacatecas, and 
within four days the city was his. Carothers, who was in 
Juarez at the time, relied upon information provided by 
the Villistas and reported that, as in the case of Torreon 
and Saltillo, Villa promptly restored order, established a 
civil government, and tended to the poor. Foreign lives 
and property, according to the Villistas, were carefully 
guarded. The only prisoners executed were snipers who 
continued to fire after the surrender. The wounded 
prisoners again received medical attention. As a result 
of such humane treatment, the Villistas claimed that 2000 
24
Carothers to State Department, June 18, 1914/12294;
El Paso Morning T i m e s , June 19, 1914.
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25prisoners had joined their ranks.
Although distressed by the rift between Villa and 
Carranza, Wilson and Bryan must have been pleased by 
Villa's growing strength— strength that had earned him the
nickname of Centaur of the North and his continued
humaneness and cooperation. Villa, for his part, was re­
ceiving ample cooperation from Carothers. The special 
agent's dispatches revealed that he sympathized over­
whelmingly with the Villista faction. Many of his diplo­
matic efforts which were directed to the State Department 
and to Carranza were made in Villa's behalf.
Those who criticized the Wilson Administration's 
Mexican policy naturally gave the Villa-Carothers relation­
ship close scrutiny. Senator Fall, a constant critic, up­
braided the State Department for bypassing Marion Letcher 
(an old friend), the regular consular representative in 
Chihuahua. Fall claimed that Carothers would serve the 
interests of the United States only to a degree, then 
would do what was necessary to protect his own property
interests in Torreo'n. Fall further maintained that
2 6
Carothers had admitted as much. Frank Mondell of 
Wyoming, a leading Republican critic in the House, found
^ C a r o t h e r s  to State Department, July 5, 1914/12473; 
Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 32-33; Barragin Rodriguez, 
His toria . . . Constitucionalista, I, 536-37.
2 6
C o n g . R e c ., 63 Cong., 2 Sess. (March 9, 1914), 
4519-20.
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the relationship between Villa and Carothers disgusting. 
Referring to the abrazo Villa had given Carothers at 
Juarez following the Vera Cruz incident, Mondell said that 
the American agent could "fondle" Mexican bandits if he
chose to, but that he should not imply in his public
comments that the United States approved of Villa's
. . , 27actlvities.
In Mexico, Carranza had become increasingly dis­
satisfied with the Villa-Carothers friendship. On June 
28, at the First Chief's direction, Alfredo Breceda and 
Rafael Zubar^n Capmany, Constitutionalist agents in Wash­
ington, issued a statement to the press, condemning 
Carothers' activities. They charged that while Carothers 
"posed . . .  as the confidential agent of the State De­
partment," he was, in fact, serving as "a political
2 8
attache and adviser of Villa in international matters." 
Similarly they charged that Carothers' dispatches 
contained pro-Villa propaganda and that Villa's insub­
ordination was prompted by the agent's promises of support
29from the Wilson Administration.
27Ibid. , (April 27 , 1914), 7331.
2^New York W o r l d , June 28, 1914.
29
Ibid.; New York T i mes, June 28, 1914, II, p. 1; New 
York S u n , June 28, 1914. The S u n , which was extremely anti- 
Administration, tended to expand the criticism of Carothers 
more than the other newspapers.
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The most serious charges came from one of the Ad­
ministration's friends, Republican Congressman William 
Kent of California. In early June, Kent brought to the 
attention of the President several letters sent him by 
Rene Leon of El Paso and Maurice Leon of New York. The 
Lecfns , who professed to be Constitutionalist sympathizers, 
charged that Carothers was accepting lucrative business
opportunities from Villa. Kent thought the charges worthy
* . . . . •  30of an investigation.
Considering their own reliance upon righteousness in
the conduct of diplomacy, Wilson and Bryan would
certainly have insisted upon an investigation had not
Carothers himself earlier reported the business proposal.
According to the agent, however, the offer came not from
Villa but from a wealthy h a c endado, who wanted Carothers
to manage his large cotton plantation near Torreon.
Previously, Carothers noted, Villa had confiscated the
cotton from the plantation, and it was no longer in
production. Under arrangements made with Villa, Carothers
proposed to return the land to cotton production and pay
3 0Rene Leo^ to Kent, June 5 (two), 1914, Bryan-Wilson 
Correspondence; Kent to Wilson, June 10, 1914, ibid. ; 
copies of all three in Bryan Papers, Box 43; Wilson to 
Bryan, June 12, 1914, Wilson Papers, Series IV, Box 124; 
Kent to Wilson, June 17, 18, 1914, ibid. Wilson was 
interested enough in the Leo^-Kent correspondence that, 
before passing it on to Bryan, he prepared a condensation 
of the letters on his own portable typewriter. See ibid.
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the revolutionary army a tax of $15.00 per bale. The
special agent also reported that Villa was willing to
allow the other hacendados the same privilege. In this
way the land would again produce and the armies would have
a steady income. Well aware that such an activity might
draw criticism to himself and to the Administration,
Carothers asked if his brother could operate the plantation
until the Constitutionalists were victorious. If this
arrangement was not satisfactory, he regretfully reported
that he would be forced to resign from the service of the 
31
Department.
Wilson would not accept Carothers' proposed ar­
rangement and directed Bryan to inform the special agent
that if he accepted the business offer, he would have to
32resign from the Department. When Bryan telegraphed the
President's decision, Zach Cobb interceded in the agent's
behalf. Carothers "is the best diplomat I ever saw in
dealing with the Mexican people," he wired the Secretary
of State, "and is patriotic in placing his duty to the
33government above personal interests." Carothers mean­
while, reported that he was prepared to accept the business 
opportunity unless the Department specifically requested 
31
Carothers to State Department, May 27, 1914/12343.
"^Wilson to Bryan, June 5, 1914/12343.
33
State Department to Carothers, June 4, 1914/12343;
Cobb to State Department, June 4, 1914, NA 125.36582/83.
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not to. With the tension between Villa and Carranza
mounting in early June, Bryan decided that Carothers
would be needed. On June 5, he asked the agent to forego
the business offer and continue his work with Villa. The
following day, the special agent replied that he had
declined the overseer job and would immediately turn his
34efforts toward concilating Villa and Carranza.
Since the President knew of Carothers* business 
opportunity, he exhibited no alarm in his return corre­
spondence to Congressman Kent. When the Leons persisted 
in their accusations later in June, Kent himself investi­
gated further and determined that they were representing
a group of French capitalists who were inclined to support
35Carranza in hopes of securing concessions. Bryan, none­
theless, remained suspicious enough to carry through a 
plan that had been initiated earlier— to send a second 
special agent into Constitutionalist territory.
As early as April 24, 1914, when the antagonism 
between Villa and Carranza was first manifested, Boaz 
Long, Chief of the Department's Division on Latin American 
3 ACarothers to State Department, June 4, 1914, NA 
125.36582/82; State Department to Carothers, June 5, 1914, 
ibid. ; Carothers to State Department, June 6, 1914, ibid♦/ 
84.
35
Kent to Wilson, June 29, 1914, Wilson Papers,
Series II, Box 56; Wilson to Kent, June 30, 1914, ibid. ; 
Wilson to Kent, ibid. , Series IV, Box 124.
288
3 6Affairs, suggested such a move. Nothing was done about
his suggestion until the Department was presented with
the prospect of Carothers' possible resignation. Then
Long suggested to the Secretary of State that several
Spanish-speaking agents, who knew Mexican politics and
were sympathetic to the Administration's designs for the
future of Mexico, be sent to deal with the rebel leaders.
In pursuance of this proposal, Long nominated Leon J.
Canova to be sent immediately to Mexico to work with
Carothers until he was thoroughly familiar with the
Constitutionalist leaders. If he proved capable, he might
then be attached to Carranza's headquarters or, if
37Carothers resigned, take his place.
As was the custom urfder Wilson, Secretary Bryan 
submitted the proposal to the President for approval before 
taking action. Wilson heartily agreed with the wisdom of 
Long's plan but preferred to get an expert opinion of 
Canova's qualifications before tendering an appointment. 
Consequently, he directed Bryan to have Canova call upon 
General Hugh L. Scott, currently Deputy Chief of Staff of 
3 6Long to Bryan, April 24, 1914, Wilson Papers,
Series II, Box 107. At this time Long actually nominated 
one William A. McLaren, whom Chief Counselor Robert 
Lansing, Assistant Secretary William Phillips, and John 
Lind all recommended, to serve as an agent. I was not 
able to determine why McLaren did not receive an 
appo intment.
37
Long to Bryan, June 1, 1914/12342.
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3 8
the Army, for an interview. On June 8 , Canova met with
Scott at Princeton, New Jersey. Afterwards, the general
reported that Canova's credentials were quite satisfactory.
At the same time, Scott, who admired Carothers and
approved of his work, warned that the respective duties of
Carothers and Canova be carefully designated so as to
prevent any possibility of their working at cross-purposes.
He also recommended that Carothers approve of the new
39agent before he was permanently assigned. Both John
Lind and Robert Lansing added their endorsements to
Scott's. The decision was made, therefore, to send a
40second agent among the Constitutionalists.
Canova's State Department dossier reveals that he had 
wide experience among Latin American people. Born of 
Spanish-speaking parents in St. Augustine, Florida, on 
February 22, 1866, and orphaned at an early age, Canova 
moved about Florida working at various jobs until Henry 
George, Jr., befriended him in 1893 and gave him a job 
with a Jacksonville newspaper. Canova was soon doing 
special work for the New York Wo rid and later became the 
Associated Press representative for Southern Florida.
3 8Wilson to Bryan, June 5, 1914, Wilson Papers,
Series II, Box 56.
39 Bryan to Scott, June 8 , 1914, Scott Papers, Box 15; 
Scott to Bryan, June 9, 1914, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence.
40 Bryan to Wilson, June 13, 1914, Bryan Papers, Box 
43; Wilson to Bryan, ibid.
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While serving as a reporter, he became a sympathizer of 
Cuban revolutionaries and assisted them in planning and 
launching filibuster expeditions from the Florida coast. 
When the Spanish-American War broke out, he went to Cuba 
to cover the war for the Associated Press. After the war, 
he remained in Cuba to serve as correspondent for the New 
York W o r l d . He soon found better opportunities with the 
Cuban press and served successively as managing editor of 
two of Havana's leading newspapers, the Herald and La 
L u cha. In 1909, when the Cuban government created an 
official information bureau, the president named Canova 
to head it. He served in that capacity until September, 
1913, when he returned to the United States to allow his 
children to attend American schools. While in Cuba,
Canova wrote two books that were published in the United 
States, Cub a ' s New Government (1909) and Cub a (1910).^
In need of a job, Canova, short and round-faced, had 
actively sought a position with the State Department. On
Memorandum attached to Long to Bryan, June 1, 1914/ 
12342 ; Regis ter o f the Department of Sta t e , 1917 , 80; Who's 
Who In A m e rica, XII (1922-1923), 612; photograph of 
Canova in ELL Pueblo, October 20, 1914. During and after 
the Spanish-American War, Canova must have become ac­
quainted with many officers of the United States Army, 
because he offered a list of officers' names as references. 
See Canova to Bryan, June 9, 1914/12252. He may well have 
known Bryan during the war, because the salutations of his 
letters to the Secretary of State usually read: "My Dear
Colonel." During the war, Bryan was a colonel in the 
Nebraska volunteers. See Paolo E. Coletta, William 
Jennings B r yan, Vol. I: Political Evangelist, 1860-1908
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964), 226.
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May 24, he addressed a letter of application to the De­
partment in which he revealed, among other things, a great 
sympathy for the Mexican revolutionaries. If they were to 
avoid the chaos that free Cuba had experienced, he warned, 
they might well look to the United States for guidance.
To lay the foundation for such an arrangement, he believed 
it necessary for the State Department to send to Mexico a 
number of representatives who spoke Spanish and under­
stood the nature of Latin-American characteristics, 
customs, and politics. If the United States was to 
successfully back the "right" revolutionary leaders, these 
agents, thought Canova, should not only scrutinize the 
professed purposes and aims of the various leaders but 
should "go deeper— and fathom their intentions and am­
bitions; to eat, sleep, and live with these men, so as to 
better be enabled to analyze their general intelligence, 
their qualifications to govern, their sense of responsi-
4
bility, and, in fact, to take their exact moral measure." 
Certainly Canova's expressions were fully in keeping with 
Wilsonian foreign policy, and they must have caught the 
eye of both the President and Secretary of State.
Canova may well have purposely designed his remarks 
to impress Bryan and Wilson. Future events were to prove 
that he was an opportunist. In fact, he may have been 
coached by Boaz Long to make such pleasing comments.
^ C a n o v a  to State Department, May 24, 1914/12342.
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Except for his interview with Scott, Canova's dealings had 
been with the Chief of the Department's Division of Latin 
American Affairs. Long had never sympathized with the 
Administration's Mexican policy. A "deserving Democrat" 
from New Mexico, Long had received his appointment in May, 
1913, because he was a friend of Vice-President Thomas R. 
Marshall. His sole claim to experience in Latin America 
rested with the fact that he ran a commission business 
with a branch office in Mexico City. He had Wall Street 
connections and, from the beginning, was an advocate of 
"dollar diplomacy." At every opportunity he sought to 
promote the security of American investments in Latin 
America. For that reason he had been ill at ease while 
such agents as Hale and Lind served in Mexico. He had no 
quarrels with Carothers' work, since, before June, 1914, 
Carothers was engaged primarily in protecting foreign- 
owned property. Canova, who in time was to reveal that 
he shared some of Long's attitudes, was the only agent 
actively recruited by the Division Chief. Long desired 
to recruit others; but his disagreements with Bryan 
became so pronounced by June, 1914, that he was relieved 
as Division Chief and appointed Minister to El Salvador. 
There he continued to promote American business interests
43and, from time to time, express views on Mexican affairs.
^ G r i e b ,  United States and H u e r t a , 72; Link, Woodrow 
Wils on and the Progressive E r a , 100; Link, New F r eedom, 97- 
98; Colletta, Progressive Politican and Moral Statesman,
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Despite his association with Long, Canova's cre­
dentials, plus the endorsement from Scott, seemed to mark 
him as an ideal candidate to serve in Mexico. The grow­
ing rift between Villa and Carranza, moreover, cried for 
the increased attention of the State Department. Accord­
ingly, on June 19, Canova received an assignment as 
"special representative on roving mission" and was di­
rected to proceed to El Paso to meet Carothers. He was 
granted a salary of two hundred dollars per month and all 
legitimate expenses. His primary duty was to make an 
exhaustive study of conditions in Mexico and to familiarize 
himself with all the principal leaders. Nothing was said 
about a later assignment to Carranza's headquarters. The 
only restriction placed on him was that he was to remain
with Carothers until he was deemed experienced enough to 
44go on his own. Although it was not stated in his
written instructions, his despatches from Mexico reveal 
that he was also to determine if there was any validity 
to the charges recently leveled at Carothers.
Since, on the very day Canova received his ap­
pointment, Carothers had requested that the Department 
provide funds for an assistant, he was more than pleased 
to welcome Canova when he arrived in El Paso on June 25.
112; Link, The Struggle for Neutrality, 498-99.
44
State Department to Canova, June 19, 1914, and
State Department to Carothers, June 20, 1914/12343.
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Carothers was quite satisfied with the new agent. Canova,
for his part, reported within days that all the Department
had heard of Carothers* effectiveness was true. Their
immediate friendship allowed them to work in harmony from
the beginning. After spending two days in El Paso and
J u a r e z , during which Canova familiarized himself with
Constitutionalist activity in the area and met local
officials, the two American agents set out to join Villa,
45who only days before had captured Zacatecas.
Since the rail lines south of Juarez were damaged by
washouts caused by unusually heavy rains, the two
Americans were forced to take a roundabout route by way
of San Antonio and Saltillo. This long detour, however,
was not an inconvenience, since Saltillo was Carranza's
headquarters, and Canova gained an excellent opportunity
4 6
to meet the First Chief and his cabinet. But trouble
loomed in their path. While Canova and Carothers were 
conferring in El Paso, Carranza, determined to slow Villa's 
southward march and to punish his insubordination, 
immobilized the Division of the North by cutting off all 
supplies of fuel and ammunition. Denied access to 
4 5
Carothers to State Department, June 19, 1914, NA 
125.35682/93; Carothers to State Department, June 25, 1914/ 
12348; Canova to State Department, June 28, 1914/12386;
Cobb to Scott, Scott Papers, Box 15; E^ l Paso Morning 
T i m e s , June 27, 1914.
A fi
Carothers to State Department, June 26, 1914, NA
125.36582/93.
295
supplies from the border by the arms embargo and by wash­
outs on the rail lines, Villa could do nothing but watch 
other Constitutionalist armies sweep southward toward 
Mexico City and ultimate victory. With each mile of 
victorious march by Generals Gonzalez and Obregon, V i l l a ’s 
resentment toward the First Chief mounted. The schism 
between the two revolutionary leaders now seem irrepa­
rable. ^
In Washington Wilson and Bryan were still hopeful of
maintaining revolutionary solidarity. Accordingly,
Carothers and Canova were directed to "urgently appeal"
to both Carranza and Villa "to forget their differences
and cooperate for the securing of reforms necessary to
4 8the restoration of peace." In order to avert any mis­
understanding between the agents and the regularly 
accredited consuls (as had arisen between Carothers and 
Letcher) in Northern Mexico, the Department issued a 
directive informing the consuls that they should co-
49ordinate their efforts with those of the two agents.
47 Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 33-34.
48
State Department to Carothers, June 30, 1914/12381a.
49 Secretary of State to certain American Consuls,
July 1, 1914, Foreign Relat i o n s , 1914 , 553. Just prior to 
the issuance of this directive, Consul Letcher of Chihuahua 
had explained that his failure to cooperate with Carothers 
was due mainly to the Department's failure to clarify the 
responsibilities of the agents. See Silliman to State De­
partment, June 11, 1914, NA 125.36582/131.
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The main obstacle to the effectiveness of the agents 
was not the American consuls but Carranza. By this time 
the Carrancistas had leveled their charges against 
Carothers for his supposed promotion of Villa's insub­
ordination. Carothers, therefore, was highly suspect in 
Carrancista territory. There was a great deal of specu­
lation along the border that, at worst, the two agents 
would be turned back at Laredo or, at best, that Carranza 
would ignore them if they were allowed to proceed to 
Saltillo.50
There were no incidents. In fact, Carothers and 
Canova were invited to join Carranza's party at Monterrey 
and rode the same train to Saltillo. The trip gave 
Carothers an opportunity to introduce Canova to the First 
Chief's advisors. The day of their arrival, July 1, 
they sought a conference with the First Chief. Despite 
the fact that a large crowd of people was waiting to see 
Carranza, the two Americans were ushered in ahead of them 
and granted a half-hour interview. After being introduced 
and exchanging pleasantries with the First Chief, Canova 
allowed Carothers to do all the talking while he took 
detailed notes on the conversation. Here, at the first 
opportunity, Canova exhibited a talent for describing and 
and capturing detail that none of the other agents in
^ New York W o r l d , June 28, 1914; EJL Pas o Morning
T i m e s , June 30, 1914.
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Mexico ever mastered. While Carranza ranted about his 
insubordinate general, Canova noted every facial ex­
pression and gesture and described every change in tone
* • 51 of voice.
While in route to Saltillo, the two agents were 
informed that General Gonzalez had arranged for a com­
mission of Carrancista generals to go to Torreon to meet 
with a commission of Villista generals in an attempt to 
hammer out some accommodation between the two factions.
This conference of generals, then, was the main topic of 
Carothers1 interview with Carranza. The First Chief 
quickly made clear that his generals had gone on their own 
initiative and not at his instruction. When Carothers 
urged him to cooperate in arranging a solution, the old 
chieftain replied that if the trouble between the two 
continued, it would be Villa's fault. "Villa thinks he 
is indispensible to the Constitutionalist cause,"
Carranza stormed. "Well, he is mistaken. No individual 
who defies constituted authorities is indispensible. . . ."
He ended his harangue by indicating that there could be no 
conciliation unless Villa agreed to be obedient in the
51
Canova to State Department, July 2, 1914/12462; 
Carothers to State Department, July 5 , 1914/12472. Canova's 
despatches bear evidence of his newspaper training. He was 
a keen observer, and, in pursuance of his instructions, he 
described in detail all that he saw. His reports are a 
veritable storehouse of information about the personalities 
and conditions in revolutionary Mexico.
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* - 52 future.
After the interview, the two Americans discussed the 
Carranza-Villa dispute with Heriberto Barron, an influ­
ential newspaper editor. Barron indicated that if the 
breach were not sealed soon, many of the Carrancis tas 
would go over to Villa, since he was accomplishing more 
militarily than anyone else. With the situation being so 
critical, Carothers decided to accompany the Carrancista 
generals to Torreo’n and use his influence with the 
Villistas in attempting to repair the breach. Taking a 
chance on Canova's inexperience, he also decided to leave 
the new agent in Saltillo. This way, he hoped, Carranza 
would not feel slighted, and, with Canova pressuring the 
Carrancistas, and himself the Villistas, there was a
C O
chance in aiding the estranged parties to a conciliation.
In Torreon Carothers found Villa unrepentant. When 
the special agent revealed that his government wished above 
all for Villa to settle his differences with the First 
Chief, the general replied: "Is it possible that a great
nation like yours cannot see what kind of man Carranza is2" 
He then insisted that the First Chief was surrounding him­
self with politicians and slackers who were primarily 
concerned about their own futures and would, in the
5 2T,Ib i d .
53
Ib i d . ; Carothers to State Department, July 2, 1914,
NA 12 5.36582/96; Carothers to State Department, July 5,
1914/12472.
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long-run, establish a regime as despotic as those of the
past. Villa claimed that the armies were beginning to
see that Carranza was not seeking reform and that he was
not the leader who could save the country from further
revolution. As a temporary expedient, however, Villa
agreed to conciliate the First Chief, since a break could
54only help Huerta.
Conciliation did, indeed, reign at Torreon. On July 
8 , after five days of wrangling, the Villista and 
Carrancista generals worked out an apparently satisfactory 
settlement. The Pact of Torredn, as the agreement was 
called, stipulated that the Division of the North 
recognize Carranza as First Chief, but that Villa should 
remain in command of the Division. Carranza was to 
supply Villa with all the fuel and ammunition he needed, 
and Villa was to report all his actions to the First Chief 
for acceptance. The conferees also drew up a list of 
twelve men from which Carranza was to pick his cabinet 
when he became interim president following the victorious 
revolution. This clause was inserted to insure that some 
Villistas were included. The interim president, upon 
taking office, was to call a convention, the delegates to 
be chosen by the division commanders on the basis of one 
delegate for every 1000 troops in the ranks. The con­
vention was to be a preconstitutional devise which would
54
Carothers to State Department, July 5, 1914/12472.
300
decide upon a plan of government, institute needed reforms, 
and call elections for the regular government. In 
addition, the agreement stated that no member of the army 
could be a candidate for the presidency, nor could the 
interim president seek the permanent office.
Carothers reported that the agreement was even more
of a diplomatic victory for Villa than appeared on the
surface. In addition to the formal pact, the Carrancistas
agreed to two secret informal provisions: that General
Felipe Angeles, who was Villa's closest advisor, would be
commander of all the Constitutionalist armies, and that
the railroads would be administered by Eusebio Calzado,
also Villa's man. Carothers thought it significant that
the generals of the Northeast had allied with those of the
North in calling for a convention and in eliminating
Carranza from possible contention for the elective 
5 6
presidency. Both provisions were counter to the First
Chief's Plan of Guadalupe.
From Saltillo, Canova reported that Carranza showed 
signs of relief upon hearing that the generals in Torreon 
were working toward an agreement. But when he received 
the finished pact, he refused to ratify it. He did tell 
Canova, however, that as far as he was concerned the
^ " P a c t o  de Torredn," Gonzalez Ramirez, Planes 
politicos otros documentos, 152-57 ; Carothers to State 
Department, July 8 , 9, 1914/12470, 12717.
56Tfc. .Ibid.
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difficulties with Villa were settled. He also told the
American agent that if another rupture occurred, "it will
5 7come through some act of Villa." Despite Carranza's 
refusal to accept the letter of the Pact of Torreon, the 
Constitutionalists once again presented a facade of 
solidarity.
Canova, meanwhile, had studied Carranza and his
advisors carefully and had begun to report his impressions.
His assessment of the First Chief was, perhaps, the most
balanced yet received by the State Department. Carranza,
he revealed, was "an able man, a good executive who
5 8
maintains exceptional order in his district." He also
noted that Carranza was a gentle man who loved flowers and
was uncommonly affectionate toward his wife and two
daughters. Canova found that the First Chief, when
satisfied that all was going well, could be a most pleasant
companion. The special agent was especially impressed by
59Carranza s honesty and integrity.
Canova's reports from Saltillo also tended to promote 
another dark image of Carranza. Canova was surprised that 
the First Chief was not greeted by the people with adu­
lation. Instead, when he walked among them, "a deep hush
^ C a n o v a  to State Department, July 10, 14 (two), 
1914/27406, 12501, 12564.
5 8
Canova to State Department, July 10, 1914/27406.
59 Ib id.; Canova to State Department, July 5, 8, 14,
1914/12495, 12474, 12564.
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prevailed." They seemed more embarrassed than pleased by 
fi n
his presence. Canova also noted, as had others before
him, that Carranza was rigid in his beliefs and was
inclined to take offense at even the slightest difference
of opinion; hence he was inclined to make "pets" of those
who agreed with h i m . ^
Canova was cordially received by Carranza's advisors,
and he established a number of friendships in Saltillo
that were to last the duration of his mission. A number of
the Carrancistas took the American into their confidence;
6 2
some were apparently influenced by his appeals. He was
particularly proud of one incident. After he had im­
pressed upon one of Carranza's anti-Villa cabinet members 
the necessity of disposing of personal jealousies and of 
maintaining harmony within the Constitutionalist camp for 
the sake of the revolution, the official arose, clutched 
Canova in an abrazo, and exlaimed, "Que Simpatica" (how
understanding). Shortly thereafter that same official
6 3sent Villa a personal note of conciliation.
The Carrancistas, Canova found, went out of their way 
to downgrade Villa's achievements. The victories of other
6 0
Canova to State Department, July 2, 1914/12462.
61
Canova to State Department, July 5, 8 , 1914/
12495, 12474. 
Ibxd.
63
Canova to State Department, July 14, 1914/12654
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generals were celebrated with speeches and the ringing of 
church-bells, while those of the Division of the North 
were only grudgingly mentioned to the people. Even those 
who were willing to acknowledge that Villa was a good 
soldier, true to the revolutionary cause, believed that he 
was too susceptible to the influences of certain members 
of the Madero family. Having failed to win prominence in 
politics through martyred President Madero, they now 
sought to use Villa. After many conversations with the 
Carrancistas, and even before meeting Villa, Canova was 
inclined to believe that their criticisms were prompted 
primarily by jealousy of Villa's success and his popularity 
with the p e o p l e . ^
Canova to State Department, July 8 , 10, 14, 1914/ 
12474, 27406, 12564. The letter dated July 10, bearing 
the file number 27406, was not received by the Index 
Bureau of the Department of State until July, 1924.
Perhaps the explanation for the delay in its being placed 
in the regular Department files is that it was withheld by 
Bryan, as were some of the reports of Del Valle and Hale. 
The July 10 letter and several others from Canova were not 
addressed to the Department but to Bryan at Thirteenth and 
Clifton Streets, Washington, D.C. These letters were much 
more intimate and opinionated than regular ones received by 
the Department.
The charges that the Maderos were politically am­
bitious may have resulted from the high degree of nepotism 
practiced by Francisco Madero when he was president.
Eleven different members of the Madero family held govern­
ment offices during his administration. Whether justified 
or not, this led to charges that they were using their 
kinsman president to further their own ambitions. See 
Ross, M a d e r o , 223; Gonzalez Ramirez, Las Ideas - La 
V iolencia, 312-16. During the Constitutionalist Revo­
lution, several members of the Madero family, notably 
brother Raul, who was a colonel in the Division of the 
North, and other members of the Madero clique, notably
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His experience in Carranza’s camp also gave Canova 
some definite ideas about the future of the revolution. 
The agent believed that the spirit of revolution was so 
ingrained in the Mexican people that the slightest dis­
satisfaction with the results of the current revolution 
would sprout a new one. "The only salvation for this 
country," he wrote to Bryan, "is a supervision over its 
affairs by the United States. . . ." Lacking the
confidence in the Constitutionalists that Lind had 
exhibited, Canova insisted that the United States should 
insist upon a supervisory plan similar to the Platt 
Amendment. He acknowledged that the Constitutionalists 
might resist, but he thought they might also acquiesce 
if the United States offered a $100,000,000 loan, which 
they could use to speedily implement their program of 
reform. With such funds at their disposal, the Consti­
tutionalists could rest assured that their revolution 
would be c o m p l e t e . ^
Certainly Canova's proposal fit within the framework 
of Wilsonian foreign policy. Considering his cordial 
relations with the Carrancistas and his faith that he
Miguel D^az Lombardo, M a d e r o ’s Minister of Public 
Instruction, joined forces with Villa or supported him in 
one way or another. See Guzman, Memoirs of Pancho V i l l a , 
121, 147, 223, 282.
fi s
Canova to State Department, July 10, 1914/27406.
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could persuade them to accept American supervision, Canova
seemed to be the ideal agent to accompany Carranza. In
fact, he asked for permission to accompany the First Chief,
first to Tampico, then southward through San Luis Potosif,
as he advanced on Mexico City. Carothers agreed that
6 6Canova should remain with the First Chief. But Bryan 
over-rode his agents' advice because he and Wilson had 
already decided to try another agent in Carranza's camp, 
one who was on even more friendly terms with the First 
Chief.
Until recently the Vice and Deputy Consul at 
Saltillo, John Reid Silliman, the new agent, received his 
appointment through the most extraordinary circumstances. 
On April 21, at the time of the Vera Cruz intervention, 
he, along with his wife, the consular clerk, Joseph R. 
Marchani, and most of the other Americans in Saltillo, 
were arrested by the Federal commander, a nephew of 
Huerta, General Joaquin Maas. Having quarreled with 
Maas in the past, Silliman expected the worst. The 
Consulate was sacked and the possessions, including a 
copy of the State Department's "red code," were confis­
cated. When some of the consul's dispatches, which 
contained comments concerning both rebel and Federal 
6 6
Canova to State Department July 18, 1914/12554; 
Carothers to State Department, July 18, 1914, NA 125.
36582; State Department to Carothers, July 18 (two), 1914/ 
12554.
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military activities, were decoded by General Maas's 
officers, Silliman was charged with espionage. Although 
Mrs. Silliman was released to the custody of the British 
Vice Consul, Silliman was held incommunicado in a vermin- 
infested prison for twenty-one days. During that time, 
while his health began to fail, he was repeatedly 
threatened with execution. He was forced to endure even
greater anxieties when, on May 6 , the other Americans were
6 ireleased, while he was left alone to face his tormentors. ‘ 
Following directions from Washington, the Brazilian 
Minister in Mexico City, J. M. Cardoso de Oliveira, who 
represented the interests of the United States following 
the Vera Cruz incident, made an earnest appeal in 
Silliman's behalf and, on May 11, secured his release.
En route to safety, Silliman endured even more ordeals.
The train ride from Saltillo to Mexico City, which 
normally would take twelve hours, took seven days. His 
train was repeatedly attacked by revolutionary bands.
fi 7
Silliman to State Department, February 13, 1914, NA 
125.8276/11 ; H. Booth to Bryan, May 5, 1914, ibid. , 125. 
8273/28; Canada to State Department, May 11, 1914, ib i d ./ 
14; Dr. J. Franklin Moore to State Department, including 
transcript of an interview with Boaz Long, May 22, 1914, 
ib i d ./60 ; Silliman to Bryan, June 18, 1914, ibid./8 8 ; 
Mexican H e r a l d , April 28, May 12, 13, 1914; New York 
T i m e s , May 5, 6 , 1914, p. 2; ib i d . , May 8 , 9, 1914, p. 1. 
At the same time of Silliman's arrest, the American Consul 
General at Monterrey, Phillip Hanna, and the American 
Consular Agent at San Luis Potosif, William Bo n n e y , were 
arrested. They were quickly released. See Hanna to State 
Department, Foreign Relations, 1914 , 659-60 ; New York 
T i m e s , May 6 , 1914, p. 2.
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Further delays resulted from intermittent damage to the
rail line. Arriving in Mexico City in ill health, he was
allowed two days to recuperate before being whisked to 
6 8
Washington.
Both Silliman and Wilson had been members of the 
Princeton class of 1879, and Silliman returned to a hero's 
welcome at the class reunion held June 13. Although he 
did not see the President at the reunion, Silliman 
journeyed to Washington shortly thereafter and, on more 
than one occasion, discussed his trepidations with his old 
classmate. In the process, he urged that the vice 
consular post at Saltillo be elevated to a higher grade. 
Wilson, as a gesture of solace for Silliman's ordeal, 
gave his old friend a verbal agreement that he would re­
ceive a promotion. The lone obstacle to his return to 
Mexico was the charges of espionage still hanging over his 
head. This impediment was removed, however, when Cardoso 
de Oliveira reported, on June 8 , that the charges had been
j j 69dropped.
68state Department to Oliveira, May 4, 5, 15, 22, 
1914, Foreign Relat i o n s , 1914 , 660-62 , 664-65 ; Oliveira to 
State Department, May 5, 10, 11, 22, 1914, ib i d . , 662-65 ; 
Mexican H e r a l d , May 23, 25, 27, 29, 1914; New York T i m e s , 
May 12, 1914, p. 1; ib i d . , May 13, 1914, p. 2; ib i d . , May 
14, 1914, p. 3; ibid., May 23, 1914, p. 4.
69silliman to Wilson, April 16, 1915, Wilson Papers, 
Series II, Box 129; Silliman to Bryan, June 20, 1914 
(two), Bryan Papers, Box 30; Wilson to Bryan, July 20, 
1914, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 111; Bryan to Wilson, 
July 2, 1914, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence; State De­
partment to Oliveria, June 6 , 1914, Foreign Relations,
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Alabama-born and reared, Silliman, white-haired and
dignified in appearance, was fifty-nine years old in 1914.
Slow and deliberate in his speech and movements, he had
moved to Texas after graduating from Princeton and had
worked first as a railroad clerk, then as an insurance
agent. Moving to the Mexican state of Coahuila in 1897,
he engaged in farming and dairying. In 1907, he was
appointed Vice and Deputy Consul at Saltillo. During his
residence in that city, he was befriended by Carranza,
who was governor of the state, and by Isidro Fabela, who
later became Carranza’s Foreign M i n i s t e r . ^
While in Washington in June, 1914, Silliman
professed to be on intimate terms with Carranza. When
Bryan showed an interest in the relationship, the consul
prepared a memorandum for the Secretary of State, depict-
71ing the First C h i e f ’s character in glowing terms. Lind,
1 9 1 4 , 6 6 6 ; Oliveira to State Department, June 8 , 1914, 
i b i d ., 667; New York T i m e s , June 7, 1914, p. 9; New York 
S u n , July 14, 1914, in Buckley Papers, File no. 233.
7ORegister of the Pepartment of S t ate, 1 9 1 7 , 137; 
Carroll, "United States Special Agents Powerful in Mexico," 
New York S u n , August 15, 1915; New York T i m e s , May 5, 1914, 
p. 2; New York W o r l d , July 3, 1914; Testimony of Buckley, 
Investigation of Mexican A f f a i r s , 812; Fabela, Historia 
Diplomatic de la Revolucion M e x i c a n a , I, 229; photograph 
of Silliman in E_1 Pueblo , November 5, 1914.
7lBryan to Wilson, January 22, 1915, Bryan Papers,
Box 43; Bryan to Wilson, June 11, 1914, Wilson Papers, 
Series IV, Box 49. The first cited letter above reveals 
that Silliman definitely claimed to be on intimate terms 
with Carranza. By the second cited letter above, Bryan 
conveys to Wilson Silliman’s estimate of Carranza’s 
character. The letter describes the memorandum, but the 
memorandum, itself, was not to be found.
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meanwhile, suggested that Silliman would be an ideal agent
to assign to Carranza’s headquarters. The decision was
made, therefore, to send Silliman back to Saltillo as a 
72
full consul. His past friendship with Carranza, Bryan 
and Wilson hoped, would allow Silliman to establish a re­
lationship such as Carothers enjoyed with Villa.
Silliman returned to Saltillo on July 8 and, accord­
ing to his own testimony, "no American should have hoped 
for a more friendly personal reception. . . . "  He 
apparently bore no written instructions and, at first, was 
considered only a consul. But from the tenor of his 
first report, it is clear that he had been directed to make 
a last-ditch appeal for Carranza to cooperate with Huerta's 
delegates to the Niagara Falls Conference. On July 9, 
accompanied by Canova, Silliman conferred with Carranza 
and Fabela. As an incentive for cooperation with the 
Huertistas, the consul held out the prospect of immediate 
diplomatic recognition by the United States and the ABC 
powers. But Silliman's appeals proved no more effective 
than those previously made by other representatives of 
the Wilson Administration. The First Chief replied that 
the only matter he would discuss with anyone was Huerta's
72
Ib id. ; Regis ter of the S t at e Department, 1 9 1 7 , 137; 
New York T i m e s , July 3, 1914, p. 3. The position of 
Consul at Saltillo was not created until January, 1915.
By executive order of July 3, 1914, Silliman was made a 
full consul, but served at a vice consular post.
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unconditional s u r r e n d e r . ^
Wilson and Bryan must have been disappointed that 
even an old friend could not move Carranza to cooperate 
with the United States. They would have also been dis­
appointed in their new agent had they been in Saltillo to 
witness his first confrontation with the First Chief. 
Canova reported that he had "never listened to anything so 
distressing." Silliman, he revealed, was not competent in 
expressing himself in Spanish. It took him two hours and 
forty-five minutes to say what should have taken fifteen 
minutes. Every few words, he had to ask for guidance 
from Foreign Minister Fabela. He often wandered from the 
subject at hand and interjected his personal experiences. 
When he told the First Chief of his imprisonment by 
General Maas, his voice broke and his eyes filled with 
tears. During Silliman's lengthy dissertation, Canova 
reported, Carranza and Fabela exchanged embarrassed
glances, rolling their eyes upward in a sign of 
74impatience.
During this meeting, Silliman also gave another clue 
as to what his unwritten instructions included. His 
reception by the First Chief would obviously determine 
his future status, because he asked Carranza and Fabela 
for letters of recommendation that he might forward to
7^Silliman to State Department, July 10, 1914/12469.
74Canova to State Department, July 22, 1914/27426.
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Washington. Canova was thoroughly disgusted by Silliman’s 
pandering after the approval of the First Chief and recom­
mended that Consul General Phillip Hanna of Monterrey be 
assigned to Carranza's headquarters instead. When 
Canova's report was received in Washington, President 
Wilson was, indeed, disturbed, but only at Silliman's lack 
of fluency in Spanish. He apparently was more impressed 
by Silliman's own report of the cordial reception given 
him by the Carrancistas. He, therefore, recommended no 
change in Silliman's st a t u s .^  Bryan, meanwhile, moved to 
remedy the agent's most obvious deficiency— his poor 
Spanish. The secretary of State arranged for an employee 
of the Pan American Union, John W. Belt, who spoke and 
wrote fluent Spanish, and who was about to visit Mexico 
in the company of Luis Cabrera, to call upon Silliman and 
offer his services as a stenographer. Silliman found
Belt quite satisfactory and employed him as a consular
. „ _ 76as sis t a n t .
While the revolutionary leaders in Northern Mexico 
quarreled and Wilson's agents scurried about attempting to 
promote revolutionary solidarity, Victoriano Huerta's 
power steadily deteriorated. During the spring and summer
^ W i l s o n  to Bryan, July 30, 1914/27480.
7 6
Silliman to State Department, July 25, 1914, NA 
125. 8273/100; Department to Silliman, July 27, 1914, ib id.; 
Silliman to State Department, July 30, 31, 1914, ib i d ./ 
103, 104.
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of 1914, the provisional president gradually became 
estranged from his cabinet and the legislature. Militarily 
he was sorely pressed by Villa from Zacatecas; by Obregon, 
who had captured Guadalajara on July 8 ; and by General 
Jesus Carranza, who was driving toward San Luis Potos^. 
Zapata, moreover, controlled the countryside around the 
national capital and, from time to time, made forays into 
the suburbs. The port of Vera Cruz was still occupied by 
American forces, and Tampico was in the hands of the 
rebels. Cut off from his main sources of revenue and un­
able to obtain arms or credit, Huerta resigned on July
15, turned over the government to his Secretary of Foreign
7 7
Relations, Francisco Carbajal, and fled the country.
The dictator had fallen, and Wil s o n ’s intervention 
had been a decisive factor in his elimination. Months of 
a steadily applied policy had finally borne fruit. But 
there were still potantial pitfalls in the way of the 
Puritan President's design for the renovation of Mexico.
Rausch, "Huerta," 225-31; Quirk, The Mexican Revo­
lution , 45-48 ; Barrag^n Rodr/guez, Historia . . . Consti-
tucionalista, I, 564-71; Womack, Zapata, 186-88. Huerta 
having gone into exile in Europe, returned to the United 
States in June, 1915, to arrange a counterrevolution with 
Pascual Orozco. Arrested in El Paso for conspiracy to 
violate the neutrality laws of the United States, he died 
in custody on January 13, 1916, of cirrhosis of the liver 
and complications following gaul bladder surgery. See 
George J. Rausch, Jr., "The Exile and Death of Victoriano 
Huerta," Hispanic American Historical Re v i e w , XLII 
(February, 1962), 131-51.
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The continued success of his policy now depended upon the 
maintenance of solidarity within the Constitutionalist 
camp. Wilson and Bryan were encouraged, therefore, when 
Carranza, upon receiving the news of Huerta's flight, 
asked Canova to go to Torreon and assure Villa that the 
Carrancistas wanted peace within the revolutionary family. 
Accordingly, Bryan directed the agent to join Villa as 
Carranza had suggested and to impress upon him the folly 
of further discord. He was also to remind the Centaur of 
the North that his actions in the future would have a 
great bearing on the manner in which the new revolutionary 
government was received by the world powers. Carothers 
was directed to do the same, while Silliman was ordered to 
remain constantly with Carranza and make similar repre­
sentations. Silliman's new instructions constituted the
first official designation of his status as an executive 
7 8agent. The demise of Huerta, therefore, saw no slacken­
ing in the activities of the special agents.
Canova's journey to Torreon was as arduous as it was 
fruitless. Traveling by rail, he was forced to stand in 
an overcrowded passenger coach. When he arrived on July 
19, he was suffering from the malady— diarrhea and severe 
abdominal pains— that so often plagues newcomers to Mexico.
78canova to State Department, July 14, 1914/12564; 
State Department to Canova, July 16, 1914/12501; State De­
partment to Carothers, July 20, 1914, Foreign Relations, 
1914 , 567 ; State Department to Silliman, July 16, 1914, 
ibid. , 5 64.
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Finding that both Villa and Carothers had gone to Juarez, 
and feeling too ill to remain there alone without medical 
attention, Canova decided to return to Monterrey, where 
Carranza had moved his headquarters. After a bone- 
harring return ride on the floor of a boxcar, Canova's
illness was so accute that he required over a week to
- 79 recuperate.
Even while Special Agent Canova was convalescing in
Monterrey, he received orders on July 22 to proceed to
Zacatecas and investigate reports of atrocities committed
against the Roman Catholic clergy in that city. Among the
other acts of cruelty, the French Charge' d'Affaires in
Washington reported that two French Christian Brothers had
been executed. Coincidentally, General Natera, whose
forces were occupying Zacatecas, was in Monterrey meeting
with the First Chief when Canova received his orders.
Carranza, obviously well disposed toward Canova, directed
Natera to cooperate fully with the American agent. The
First Chief also wired the acting governor of the state of
80
Zacatecas to assist Canova.
The trip to Zacatecas exposed Canova to even more of
7 9Canova to State Department, July 22 (two), 25, 
1914/12588, 27426, 12650.
80
Clausse, Charge' d'Affairs of the Republic of France, 
to State Department, July 16, 1914, NA 312.51/57; State 
Department to Canova, July 22, 1914, ibid./63a; Canova to 
State Department, July 27, 1914, ibid./73.
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the hazards of diplomacy in revolutionary Mexico. When 
the agent arrived at the depot at the previously arranged 
time of departure, Natera was not to be found. Canova and 
Fabela then spent hours searching the houses of prosti­
tution until they found the general dead drunk. Having 
discovered from his recent trip to Torreon that traveling 
in a crowded passenger coach on a Mexican train was an 
experience to avoid, Canova decided to ride a boxcar to 
Zacatecas. Taking a folding cot, which was not part of 
his "necessary" equipment, the special agent found himself 
a large enough spot between boxes of dynamite and 
ammunition and, preferring the company of high explosives
to the crowds in the passenger coaches, enjoyed a
81relatively comfortable trip to Zacatecas.
Arriving there on August 1, Canova, for the first time, 
seems to have become fully aware of the horrors of the 
revolutionary war. Zacatecas was the first city he visited 
that had only recently been ravaged by war. Accustomed to 
the relative prosperity of the farming areas around 
Saltillo and Torreon, the special agent was appalled by 
the physical damage done to this mining town and by the 
suffering of the people. Having associated with the upper- 
classes in Cuba and with the gentlemen in Carranza's camp, 
Canova naturally gravitated toward the same type of people 
in Zacatecas. From what was left of the upper and
O 1
Canova to State Department, August 4, 1914/12826.
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middle-class element, he received an entirely different 
account of the battle and occupation of the city from the 
one Carothers had reported. Carothers had relied upon the 
word of the Villistas; Canova upon those who claimed to be 
victims of V i l l a ’s justice. They insisted that there had 
been wholesale despoliation of private property and that 
there had been unspeakable acts of cruelty committed 
against the Federals and the clergy. Canova also reported 
that the "better" element of Zacatecas begged for 
intervention by the United States. The peons, he con­
tinued, were happy with the course of the revolution and
8 2
enjoyed "lording it over the more intelligent people."
As directed, Canova appealed to General Natera to 
ease his persecution of the clergy. The general would do 
nothing to prevent the forced taxation and confiscation of 
church property, but on August 7, he did allow one church 
to reopen for mass. That day literally thousands 
crowded before the church to celebrate their first mass 
in over a month. Afterwards, Canova was not sure whether 
it was his pleas or those of the thousands of devout 
Roman Catholics in the city that persuaded the harsh
8 2
Ibid. ; Canova to State Department, August 10, 14, 
1914/12888, 12979; Canova to State Department, August 3, 
1914, NA 312.51/80. Canova's reconstruction of the battle 
of Zacatecas and the occupation that followed was so 
vividly gory that Bryan directed him to be more factual 
and to delete "opinion" from his official reports. Bryan 
to Carothers, August 15, 1914/12826.
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8 *Mexican general to moderate his stand against the church.
Canova had been in Zacatecas ten days when he re­
ceived orders to join General Obregdn. With Carranza 
refusing to accept any terms from Provisional President 
Carbajal other than unconditional surrender, there was 
grave concern in Washington that Obrego'n might carry the 
fighting into the heart of Mexico City. Wilson and Bryan, 
therefore, wanted one of their agents to accompany the
general and plead for clemency for the hapless populace
8 4
of the capital. Although Canova was nearer to Obregon's
advancing army than any of the other agents, he was unable
to rendezvous with Obregcfn before he entered the capital,
because the rail lines between Zacatecas and Mexico City
8 5had been heavily damaged by the retreating Huertistas.
Silliman, meanwhile, had been ordered to urge the 
First Chief to receive representatives from Carbajal and 
to use his influence in arranging the transfer of the 
capital into the hands of the revolutionaries. Joined by 
Consul General Hanna, Silliman called upon Carranza in 
Monterrey on July 19 and handed him the Department's note. 
The First Chief expressed appreciation for the "good 
offices" extended by the United States and agreed to meet 
8 3
Canova to State Department, August 10, 1914/12888.
84
State Department to Canova, August 11, 1914/12832b.
8 5
Canova to State Department, August 14, 16, 1914/ 
12863, 12880.
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with any "duly accredited and fully authorized repre­
sentatives" of the Mexico City government. He insisted, 
however, that the only terms he would discuss were the 
unconditional delivery of the capital to the Consti­
tutionalists and the unconditional surrender of the 
Federal armies. He also suggested Saltillo as a meeting 
place and recommended that Carbajal's delegates come
/ g g
directly north by way of San Luis Potosi.
Carranza's proposal was forwarded to Carbajal through
Cardoso de Oliveira, the Brazilian Minister to Mexico City.
Carbajal at first balked at sending representatives into
the enemy's territory; but when the Wilson Administration
refused to support his request for a conference in neutral
New York, he relented and agreed to the meeting in
Saltillo. In an apparent effort to preserve some dignity,
the delegates, General Lauro Villar, Chief Justice of the
Supreme Military Court, and David Gutierrez Allende,
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, instead of taking
Carranza's proposed route to Saltillo, journeyed instead
8 7
by way of Vera Cruz and Tampico.
While these arrangements were being made, fear gripped 
8 6State Department to Silliman, July 16, 1914, Foreign 
R elations, 1914 , 564 ; Silliman to State Department, July 
19 , 1914, i b i d . , 566.
8 7
State Department to Oliveira, July 20, 23, 1914, 
Foreign Rel a t i o n s , 1 9 1 4 , 566 , 568; Oliveira to State De­
partment, July 22 , 24 , 26, 27 , 1914 , i b i d . , 567-68, 570 , 
572-73.
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Mexico City. Oliveira reported that the Zapatistas * 
attacks on the suburbs had increased since Huerta's resig­
nation. The populace feared, moreover, that the army might 
disband, leaving the city to the mercy of looters. Most 
frightening of all, the Brazilian Minister informed Wash­
ington, the city newspapers were reporting Carranza as
having declared that he would "resort to reprisals and
8 8
bloodshed" upon occupying the capital.
With such threats weighing on his mind, on July 23, 
Wilson, through Silliman, warned the First Chief that the 
United States, hence other powers also, might withhold 
recognition of a government established by the Consti­
tutionalists unless guarantees were given on several 
accounts. The President again demanded respect for foreign 
lives, property, and debt obligations. He then insisted 
upon a "most generous amnesty" for "political and mili­
tary opponents." Recalling the depredations against the 
church and clergy in Zacatecas, he also insisted that there 
be no "unitive or vindictive action toward priests or
89
ministers of any church, whether Catholic or Protestant."
Silliman, meanwhile, had accompanied Carranza to 
Tampico, and Wilson's note found him in the port city. The
8 8
Oliveira to State Department, July 22, 1914, ibid. , 
567-68; New York T i mes, July 20, 1914, p. 1; ibid. , July 
22, 1914, p. 3; ibid., July 24, 1914, p. 5.
89 State Department to Silliman, July 23, 1914,
Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 4 , 568-69.
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agent must have been certain what the First Chief's 
response would be, because, prior to receiving it, he 
cabled Washington, informing the Administration of the 
factors that would condition the reply. Recognizing what 
Wilson and Bryan often chose to ignore, Silliman reminded 
them that the Constitutionalists were bent on social 
revolution. The revolutionaries, he pointed out, blamed 
the aristocrats and large land owners for the failure of 
Madero's revolutionary government. These same elements 
had also supported Huerta's regime. He felt certain that 
the rebels would insist upon punishing them. He also re­
ported that the Constitutionalists believed that the 
Church and priesthood had foresaken their spiritual 
mission and, for their own self-interest, had allied with 
Huerta against the interests of the people. Severe 
restrictions on the activities of the Church could, there­
fore, be e x p e c t e d . ^
Foreign Minister Fabela, in replying for the First 
Chief, was not as explicit as Silliman had been, but his 
message was clear. He promised that the lives and property 
of foreigners would be "protected in the future as they 
have been in the past." As for the other points in Wilson's 
note, Fabela declared that they would be "decided accord­
ing to the best interests of justice and our national 
90
Silliman to State Department, July 27, 1914/12634.
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91interests." But Wilson was just as unyielding as 
Carranza. He directed Silliman to remind the First Chief 
that "our advice offered, and everything in out telegram 
of the 23d, cannot be modified nor can we recede from it 
in the least. . . ." He further warned that without
recognition from the United States, a Constitutionalist 
government "could obtain no loans and must speedily break 
d o w n ."92
Such threats from the President of the United States
might have deterred a lesser man, but Carranza calmly
proceeded to arrange the surrender of Mexico City on his
own terms. He was careful enough, however, not to cut
off his lines of communication with Washington. Silliman
was accorded every courtesy. He attended all social
functions with the First Chief. Fabela introduced him to
the crowds in flattering terms, while President Wilson was
93toasted as the friend of the Constitutionalists.
The agent soon discovered that this courtesy did not 
include a voice in arranging a peace with the Federals. 
Determined that the Federal representatives should come in 
to him on his own terms, Carranza, when he discovered that
91
Fabela to Silliman, July 27, 1914, Foreign Relations, 
1914 , 575.
92
State Department to Silliman, July 31, 1914, ibid. ,
576-77.
93
Silliman to State Department, July 23, 25, 26, 1914/
12519, 12619, 12620; New York Times, July 24, 1914, p. 5.
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they were on their way to Tampico, refused to meet them at
the port city and insisted that they adhere to his
original proposal by meeting in Saltillo. Reporters who
accompanied Carbajal's representatives were turned back
at Tampico, while the representatives themselves were
herded aboard a military train like prisoners of war and
whisked incognito to Monterrey. Dumped from the train
with no directions, they attempted to persuade Consul
Hanna to escort them to the Texas border; but he persuaded
94them to press on to Saltillo.
When Silliman discovered that the envoys had arrived 
in Saltillo, he offered to help them arrange an interview 
with Carranza. As it turned out, the envoys' secretary, 
Salvador Urbina, was an old friend of Cabrera and Fabela. 
These two, then, arranged for Urbina to meet with the 
First Chief and establish a time for a formal conference. 
Carranza insisted that Villar and Gutierrez Allende first 
meet with two of his own underlings to determine if they 
were prepared to discuss peace on his terms. When it 
became apparent that they wanted assurances that certain 
officials of the Huerta regime would be given amnesty, 
Carranza broke off the conferences before they really 
began. Now more fearful for their own safety than ever, 
the Federalist commissioners asked Silliman to escort
9 4Hanna to State Department, August 1, 1914/12704;
Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 51-52.
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them to the United States, but the First Chief insisted
that they return the way they came. Silliman then could
do no more than provide them with enough money to pay
9 5
their return fares to Tampico.
Failing to secure an unconditional surrender 
agreement from Carbajal, and determined to personally 
supervise the siege of Mexico City, Carranza, accompanied 
by Silliman, departed from Saltillo on August 6 . While 
they journeyed southward, the Brazilian Minister worked 
feverishly to prevent the destruction of the beautiful 
city. By the time Carranza was nearing Obrego'n's head­
quarters at Teoloyucan, Cardoso de Oliveira met with 
Obrego'n and Silliman, who had hastened ahead of the First 
Chief in order to be at the conference. Soon joined by 
Carranza, the Constitutionalist leaders again refused to 
make any accommodation with Carbajal; but they did agree 
to a formula for the peaceful occupation of the capital.
By the terms of this agreement and another made the 
following day between Obregcfn and representatives of the 
Federal Army, Carbajal resigned and fled to Vera Cruz, the 
Federal Army evacuated the city piecemeal, and the Consti­
tutionalist army took its place. On August 15, the 
occupation was peacefully accomplished as Eduardo Iturbide, 
Governor of the Federal District, turned over to Obregon
^^Silliman to State Department, August 1, 2, 3 (two), 
4 (two), 1914/12700, 12716, 12721, 12727, 12733, 12746, 
12735.
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control of the capital city’s police force. With both
Silliman and Canova on hand, Carranza made his grand and
9 6triumphal entry into the city on the 20th.
The Constitutionalists were triumphant. Silliman
thought it a most encouraging sign for future cordial
relations with the Constitutionalists the fact that when
he entered the city alone on August 18, with the stars and
stripes fluttering on a make-shift staff connected to the
front bumper of his automobile, the Constitutionalist
9 7soldiers stood and cheered as he passed. But Mexico's
problems were not solved and more troubled times lay 
ahead. Pancho Villa was noticeably absent from the 
coterie of generals that surrounded the First Chief during 
his impressive entry into Mexico City. The strong man 
from Chihuahua was not one to be slighted. Nor was the 
Puritan in the White House one to be ignored. Together, 
these two, with the help of the special agents, were to 
seek their own solution for Mexico's problems.
96 Oliveira to State Department, August 8 , 9 (two), 
12, 13 (two), 1914, Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 4 , 582-86; 
Silliman to State Department, August 13, 20, 1914, i b i d . ,
586-88; EJL Sol (Mexico City), August 18, 1914; New York
T i m e s , August 12, 13, 1914, p. 9; ibid. , August 16, 1914,
II, p. 8 ; ibid. , August 21, 1914, p. 10.
97 Silliman to State Department, August 18, 1914,
NA 125.8276/15.
CHAPTER IX 
SEARCHING FOR THE RIGHT COMBINATION
In Washington it appeared by mid-August, 1914, that 
the demise of Huerta had only contributed to the rise of 
another caudillo —  Carranza. As the armies of Obregon and 
Gonzalez approached Mexico City, the First Chief had them 
arrayed so as to prevent either Villa or Zapata from 
sharing in the triumph or challenging his authority in 
the national capital. After occupying the city, he made no 
move to create a more representative provisional govern­
ment. He was contemptuous of the foreign colony and the 
diplomatic corps.^ State Department agent Leon Canova 
described the scenes as the Carrancistas, either by 
military tribunal or outright murder, began eliminating 
their enemies in the capital. The generals occupied the 
sumptuous mansions on the most exclusive boulevards and
avenues, while their soldiers were allowed to seize their 
2
own booty. "Soldiers openly state they were promised
1-Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 58-62 ; Womack, Zapat a , 
194; Francisco Ramirez Plancarte, La. Ciudad de Mexico 
durante La Revolucion Constitucionalista (Mexico, D.F.: 
Ediciones B o t a s , 1941), 70-71.
^Canova to State Department, August 25, 26, 27, 1914/ 
13129, 13013, 13020.
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3
loot," Canova reported, "and they want it now." Wilson 
looked southward at the situation that he had helped to 
create and decided that still more changes were in order.
The President’s plans began to evolve well before 
Carranza’s armies occupied Mexico City, and they were 
initiated by Pancho Villa. In late July reports from 
northern Mexico and the border indicated that Villa was 
busy recruiting men, confiscating everything he could get 
his hands on, and arranging to sell the goods in the 
United States. The reports also indicated that he was
buying large quantities of arms, dynamite, and fuel in
4
the United States and smuggling it into Mexico. With 
only other revolutionary armies to fight, Villa's military 
preparations seemed ominous. Any southward advance might 
bring him into conflict with Obrego'n or Gonzalez.
Actually Villa did not contemplate warfare except as a 
last resort. On about July 25, he called in his friend, 
State Department Agent George Carothers, outlined his 
future plans, and urged the American to go to Washington 
and personally explain the situation to President Wilson. 
Zach Cobb, who had great faith in Carothers’ ability to 
direct Villa's energies into constructive channels, urged
3
Canova to State Department, August 29, 1914/13039.
^Bliss to War Department, July 20, 1914/12559; Cobb
to State Department, July 24, 1914/12601; Letcher to State
Department, July 25, 1914/12614.
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that the Chihuahua strong man's request be honored. 
Accordingly, on July 28, Bryan directed Carothers first to 
secure Villa's pledge to maintain the peace in his absence, 
then come at once to Washington. Having already secured 
such a pledge, Carothers departed from El Paso the next 
day."* At this stage he was as much the agent of Pancho 
Villa as the agent of the United States.
Bryan had another reason to confer with Carothers; 
namely, the persistent charges of his misconduct while 
serving the Department. Although Bryan had been inclined 
to pass off as Carrancista propaganda the earlier charges 
leveled by the Leon Brothers, he could not ignore similar 
claims made by Special Agent Canova. As part of his 
duties, Canova had made inquiries into the Carothers- 
Villa relationship. His confidential reports to Bryan 
were devastating. "Since I have been in Mexico," he 
wrote in late July, "I have heard him (Carothers) de­
scribed as a 'crook,' 'blackmailer,' 'gambler,' and 'woman- 
chaser.'" Canova insisted that it was an "accepted fact" 
that while Carothers "is Special Agent of the State De­
partment, he represents Villa with far greater zeal." 
Carothers' "zeal" could be accounted for, Canova explained,
^Carothers to State Department, July 27, 1914, NA 125. 
36582/101, 102; State Department to Carothers, i b i d ./101; 
Cobb to State Department, July 27, 1914, Wilson Papers, 
Series II, Box 58; JS1 Paso Morning T i m e s , July 28, 1914;
El Sol, July 31, 1914; El PaJ^s. August 1, 1914.
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by the fact that he had been given lucrative business 
opportunities by the Mexican general, including gambling 
concessions in Chihuahua and Juarez. Word also reached 
Canova that Carothers had made contacts in the United 
States, through which Villa disposed of confiscated goods, 
notably, large amounts of foreign-owned cotton from the 
Torreon district. Equally damaging, Canova reported that 
Carothers might be encouraging the antagonism between
g
Villa and Carranza.
Canova's informants, whom he never named, also 
claimed that Carothers had, indeed, taken over a cotton 
plantation near Torreon. The opportunity had been 
presented him, not by the owner, but by Villa, who had 
confiscated the land. Canova's informants also indicated 
that Carothers had arranged with J. F. Brittingham, a 
Gomez Palacio soap-maker, for the hacienda to be tempo­
rarily managed by one of Brittingham's associates. 
Brittingham had agreed to help Carothers in return for a 
contract to take all the plantation's cotton seed at a 
reduced price. Carothers' family, meanwhile, was living 
in Brittingham's home in Gomez Palacio. All these 
activities, Canova noted, reportedly allowed Carothers to
"spend money like a prince.
^Canova to Bryan, July 22, 1914, NA 111.70022/48.
This report was not turned over to the Department's Index 
Bureau until November 14, 1916.
^Ibid.; Canova to Bryan, August 6 , 1914/27407.
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On August 1, Carothers met with the Secretary of State 
and was personally confronted with the charges. He 
categorically denied each. Describing the conference for 
the President, Bryan wrote that he was inclined to believe
g
Carothers. Several days later, the agent penned a 
memorandum for the Secretary. Again denying any wrong­
doings, he insisted that he had no income except from his 
salary paid by the Department and that his real estate 
and mining properties in and around Torreon, which were
valued at only 25,000 pesos, were not currently making
9
him any income. His words in his own defense may have
been satisfactory, because he was returned to his duties a
few days later; but more likely, Bryan and Wilson
reasoned that his ability to influence Villa was an asset
that overbalanced any of the debits that his alleged
shady dealings might produce. Even Canova admitted that
Carothers was extremely capable, that he had that "shade
of dignity with a democratic spirit" that commended him
so highly for his kind of work. Canova later admitted,
moreover, that he had "yet to witness a single act of his
(Carothers) which has not been for the good of the 
„10s ervice.
Q
“Bryan to Wilson, August 2, 1914, Wilson Papers,
Series IV, Box 254; New York T i m e s , August 7, 1914, p. 8 .
9
Carothers to Bryan, August 11, 1914, NA 125.36582/
111.
^ C a n o v a  to Bryan, October 20, 1914/13611.
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Carothers, meanwhile, held out hope for a peaceful 
solution to Mexico's problems. Villa's plan, as Carothers 
explained it to Bryan, called for the rebel general to 
remain in Chihuahua and increase the size of his army to 
60,000. He would not interfere with Carranza in the 
capital, but would insist upon the convention of revo­
lutionary generals as provided for in the Pact of Torreon. 
Under the formula of representation— one representative 
per 1000 troops— stipulated by the pact, he hoped to 
control half the delegates to the convention. Villa dis­
claimed any personal ambitions and insisted only upon a 
program of agrarian reform to benefit his followers. If 
chosen by the convention, he would accept an able 
civilian as provisional president but would prefer to see 
General Felipe Angeles, a reform-minded professional 
soldier who had become a close advisor, receive the office. 
Although the First Chief had not ratified the Pact of 
Torreo^, Villa believed that since he had abided by parts 
of it, he would accept the convention, too, if the United 
States applied enough pressure. If Carranza refused, 
Carothers revealed, renewed warfare was likely.'*''*'
Carothers' report gave Wilson and Bryan fresh food 
for thought. A new avenue for influencing the revolution 
and, at the same time, neutralizing the power of the
^ B r y a n  to Wilson, August 2, 1914, Wilson Papers,
Series IV, Box 254.
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pugnacious First Chief seemed to be opening. Their
immediate task, as they saw it after two or three days of
discussion, was to insure that Villa did not engage in any
hostile actions that would jeopardize the workability of
his own formula. With Carothers' reputation somewhat
under a cloud, they decided to send a new agent, a
personal representative from the President, to appeal to
Villa. They considered John Lind, but Wilson ruled him
out because of the "violent prejudice" directed at him by
certain representatives of the Roman Catholic Church.
Instead, he chose Paul Fuller, a prominent New York
attorney. "I formed a most delightful impression of Mr.
Fuller," Wilson wrote to Bryan. "He is a Democrat, is
full of sympathy with the purposes of the administration,
and is accustomed by long habit to deal with our friends
12in Latin America."
At age sixty-five, Paul Fuller was a frail man in
poor health when he accepted the mission and had to be
accompanied by his physician during his travels. He had a
deep sense of responsibility to the Administration and
13
served without salary. His parents being Forty-niners, 
he was said to have been born aboard a clipper ship as it 
12
Wilson to Bryan, August 5, 1914, Bryan-Wilson 
Correspondence; copy in Bryan Papers, Box 43.
13
The terms of Fuller's service are revealed in Bryan 
to Wilson, August 24, 1914, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 
114.
332
sailed through San Francisco's Golden Gate. Orphaned by
the age of ten, he had wandered eastward to New York City.
There he was befriended by Charles Coubert, a French
schoolteacher. After reading law and being admitted to
the bar, Fuller married his benefactor's daughter and
joined the old man's sons' law firm— Coubert Brothers.
Through the firm, one of the most prominent in the
country, Fuller made numerous international contacts and
was reputed to be one of America's foremost experts on
foreign law. During his career he learned Spanish and
enjoyed great success in dealings with Latin American
clients. It was this experience that no doubt commended
him to the President. Even before his appointment he had
discussed Latin American policy with the President and
had been considered a prospective emissary to Santo
Domingo. A possible conflict of interest prevented this
appointment. A Roman Catholic, he was, perhaps, the best
14
qualified and most able of Wilson's personal agents.
At a White House conference on August 9, Wilson 
presumably directed his new agent to appeal to Villa to 
remain at peace and allow the proposed convention to 
establish a new government through free elections. There
14
Ibid. ; New York T i m e s , November 30, 1915, p. 6 . 
Biographical data on Fuller is extremely sketchy. Most of 
the above information comes from his obituary. For one 
who was reputed to be internationally famous, his name 
rarely appeared in the newspapers and does not appear at 
all in the popular biographical registers.
333
is no record of their convention, but Fuller's reports 
indicated that this was the primary concern of his mission. 
They also reveal that Fuller was probably instructed to 
either confirm or refute Carothers' overwhelmingly 
favorable impressions of Villa. Departing immediately 
for the border, the new agent bore a personal letter from 
Wilson asking Villa to explain his hopes for the future 
of M e x i c o . ^
When Fuller arrived in El Paso on August 12, he was 
greeted by Zach Cobb, who promptly introduced the New 
Yorker to the local Villista leaders. Since Villa's 
whereabouts were uncertain at the time, the local chieftain, 
General Juan Medina, in order to avoid delay, decided to 
escort the envoy south, while others attempted to locate 
their leader. Arriving in Chihuahua on the 14th, the party 
was informed that Villa was in an inaccessible village 
hundreds of miles away. Only after two days of constant 
attempts at telegraphic communication was Villa reached and
Since there is no copy available, Wilson must have 
prepared the letter to Villa on his own portable type­
writer. The content of the letter, as in the case of 
Fuller's instructions, must be inferred from the infor­
mation in Fuller's report and Villa's return letter to 
Wilson. See Fuller, Memorandum for the President, August 
20, 1914, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 114; Villa to Wilson, 
August 18, 1914, ibid. The New York W o r l d , August 18, 1914, 
wildly exaggerated the purpose of Fuller's mission, claiming 
that he had been sent to warn Villa that American troops 
would march inland from Vera Cruz if he and Carranza fought 
over the occupation of Mexico City. Fuller was supposedly 
to warn Villa to keep away from the capital.
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a rendezvous arranged at Santa Rosalia, some six hours from
16Chihuahua by rail.
The delay allowed Fuller to take the measure of Villa's 
subordinates, especially of General Felipe Angeles, whom 
Villa had marked as a candidate for provisional president. 
The American agent was favorably impressed. He reported 
that the general was "a friend of free government" and had 
a "warm appreciation for President Wilson's attitude."
When Fuller queried Angeles about Villa's abilities, the 
professional soldier replied frankly that because of a 
lack of "early training" his chieftain was still an "in­
complete man," but that he was dedicated to his followers 
and their welfare. Angeles insisted that Villa had no 
political ambitions but that Carranza did. He described 
the First Chief, whom he had served before joining Villa's 
camp, as "arbitrary and suspicious in manner and act," a 
potential d i c t a t o r . ^
On August 16, after suitable introductions, Fuller 
conferred alone with Villa. The special envoy emphasized 
that Wilson desired Villa to avoid any armed conflict with 
Carranza's forces that might ruin the chances of the early 
formation of a constitutional government. After expressing
l^Cobb to State Department, August 13, 14, 1914/12844, 
12851; Fuller, Memorandum for the President, August 20, 
1914, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 114.
17
lb i d . ; Fuller to State Department, August 17, 1914,
ibid.
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a like desire, Villa warned that it might not be possible 
if Carranza continued to consolidate all political power 
into his own hands. He also expressed fear that the 
United States or some other foreign power, in order to 
protect its private interests in Mexico, might encourage 
this trend by extending diplomatic recognition to the 
First Chief’s provisional government. Sensing that he had 
found a bargaining point, Fuller, half asking and half de­
manding, told Villa: "If recognition should be withheld
. . . you will be held responsible for the preservation of
peace throughout Norther Mexico." In all apparent
18
sincerity, Villa accepted the responsibility.
Fuller than inquired into the authenticity of a 
statement attributed to Villa, and recently published in 
the Ell Paso T i m e s , in which the general supposedly 
declared that military men should not serve in the elected 
government and that agrarian reform should be accomplished 
by constitutional means. When Villa acknowledged that he 
had made the statement, Fuller asked the general to set 
forth in writing the objectives of his followers. Villa 
promised to prepare a statement before the agent 
departed.^
The next day Fuller joined Villa and several of his 
advisors in the general's private rail car for a return
18Ibid.
19Ibid.
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trip to Chihuahua. In a relaxed atmosphere, the revo­
lutionaries opened up and explained their fears and 
ambitions. Again Villa disclaimed any ambitions save to 
promote the welfare of his men. In order to insure justice 
for the common people, he and his subordinates insisted 
that all inequalities in the law must be eliminated. 
Insisting that he was forced into outlawry because he had 
defended his si s t e r ’s virtue against the carnal lusts of 
a rich land-owner, Villa claimed to be just one of many 
victims of such inequalities. The Villistas also in­
sisted upon land reform, claiming that the land would not 
be confiscated but that compensation would be made. But
above all they seemed to want a government which would be
20
more truly representative of all the people.
Inevitably the group got around to discussing 
Carranza. The consensus was that the strained relations 
between the revolutionary factions resulted primarily from 
a lack of trust on the part of the First Chief. They 
cited as an example the conduct of the Zacatecas campaign. 
Carranza's lack of trust in the Division of the North had 
needlessly cost the Constitutionalists hundreds of lives 
and had created hostility between the Villistas and the 
Carrancistas. Fuller then asked if it might be 
advisable for him to go to Mexico City and, in behalf of
20 Fuller, Memorandum for the President, August 20,
1914, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 114.
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peace, make similar representations to Carranza.
21Unanimously the Villistas replied that he should.
In Chihuahua on August 18, Villa presented Fuller
with a lengthy memorandum for President Wilson, outlining
the desires of his faction. The preamble might have been
penned by Wilson himself: "The principal aspiration of
the Division of the North . . .  is the establishment of a
democratic government, elected freely and without
official pressure. . . ." Neither the First Chief nor his
Plan of Guadalupe, the document continued, held out such
guarantees. The Division of the North, nonetheless,
conceded that it would accept a provisional government,
even if headed by Carranza, provided that he was not
eligible for the elective presidency. As a guarantee for
elections, the Division of the North was to remain intact.
Fuller added his own penciled comments to Villa's
memorandum. If Carranza followed his Plan of Guadalupe
and became provisional president, Fuller scribbled, he
would become ineligible for the constitutional presidency.
By his own declaration, Villa, a military leader, was also
ineligible. Thus, if all bargains were kept, neither
should despair that his chief antagonist would rule the 
22country.
^ V i l l a  to Wilson, August 18, 1914/27437; English
translation in Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 114.
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Taking his leave, Fuller made two additional appeals
to Villa: that there should be no vindictive treatment of
the defeated and that the Catholic Church, its priests and
property, be treated with justice. By special train,
Fuller then traveled to El Paso, where he boarded another
train for the east coast. He apparently intended to go to
his home in New York and report by mail, but while en
route, he received a wire from Bryan directing him to come
2 3directly to Washington.
While journeying eastward, Fuller set forth his 
impressions in a lengthy memorandum. Villa, he reminisced, 
was "an unusually quiet man, gentle in manner, low voiced, 
slow of speech, earnest and occasionally emotional in 
expression but always subdued with an undercurrent of 
sadness." He also noted that the rebel chieftain showed 
"no outward manifestation of vanity or self-sufficiency, 
is conscious of his own shortcomings. . . ." Fuller formed
no less favorable impressions of V i l l a ’s subordinates. He 
admired their frankness, apparent sincerity and dedication, 
and willingness to accept guidance from the United States. 
His written report could hardly have been more 
23 Fuller, Memorandum for the President, August 20, 
1914, ibid. ; State Department to Fuller aboard Train 22, 
Manhattan Limited, Pennsylvania Railroad, August 21, 1914/ 
12959a; New York T i m e s , August 20, 1914, p. 7.
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24complimentary to the Villistas.
While Fuller was in Santa Rosalia, Carothers rejoined 
Villa. Fuller's report indicates that the State De­
partment agent did not attempt to exert any influence in 
favor of Villa. Instead he traveled alone in his own 
private car and did not enter into the discussions.
Villa, however, did praise Carothers. The agent, he 
insisted, was an honest, straightforward man who never 
hesitated to speak his mind, no matter what the conse­
quences. Those who charged that Carothers was trying to
feather his nest through him, declared Villa, should come
25
forward with some proof.
If Wilson did not share this view, he still saw the
Carothers-Vi11a relationship as an advantage to be
exploited. The President had planned to meet with the
special agent and discuss his work, but the grave illness
of Mrs. Wilson prevented him from doing so. Thus,
2 6Carothers never met President Wilson. He returned to
Villa's side bearing instructions to make representations
27
similar to those already made by Fuller. But future
24
Fuller, Memorandum for the President, August 20, 
1914, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 114.
25T. ..I b i d .
2 6 Bryan to Wilson, August 2, 1914, Wilson Papers, 
Series IV, Box 254; Testimony of Carothers, Investigation 
of Mexican A f f a i r s , 1771.
27
State Department to Carothers, August 11, 1914,
Foreign Relations, 1914 , 584.
340
events indicated that his mission involved much more:
through Villa, the promotion of a provisional government
that would neutralize Carranza's power.
Conditions in the State of Sonora offered Carothers
an opportunity. Back from his self-imposed exile,
Governor Jos^ M. Maytorena had rebelled against Carranza's
attempt to impose a new government on his state.
Maytorena soon besieged Carranza's forces, commanded by
Colonel Plutarco Elias Calles, in the border hamlet of
Naco. During the fighting, shots from the attackers
rained on the American side of the border. At the same
time, Americans and other foreigners in Sonora were
complaining about the daily depredations committed by the
Yaqui Indians, who made up the bulk of Maytorena's 
28troops.
Fuller had spoken to Villa about the Sonora dis­
turbance, and the rebel general had promised to do all he
2 9could to promote peace. Carothers, however, was
specifically charged with the responsibility of pressuring
30Villa to arrange a peace settlement. Accordingly, on 
2 8
Frederick Simpich, American Consul, Nogales, to 
State Department, August 15, 18, 19, 23, 24, 1914/12875, 
12913 , 12937 , 12968 , 12984 ; E_1 Paso Morning Times ,
August 15-24, 1914.
29
Fuller, Memorandum for the President, August 20, 
1914, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 114.
30
State Department to Carothers, August 13, 1914/
12836.
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about August 20 or 21, Villa invited General Obregon,
whose home state was Sonora, to join him and aid in
mediating the differences between Maytorena and Calles.
Accepting the invitation with Carranza's permission,
Obregon left Mexico City on August 21 to join Villa in 
31
Chihuahua. Was the invitation to Obregon the fruit of
Villa's mind or was it proposed by Carothers as part of a
plan to check Carranza? The records do not reveal
concrete answers to this question. One thing is certain:
regardless of the origin of the invitation, Villa had more
than peace in Sonora on his mind when he extended it.
The Villa-Obregon conferences went smoothly from the
beginning. From Chihuahua Carothers reported that he
believed the two generals would "act in accord.
32
Conditions look favorable to me." Travel to Nogales,
where the conference with Maytorena was to be held, was
very difficult because no rail line crossed northern
Mexico from Chihuahua to Sonora. By appealing to General
Pershing and Custom's Collector Cobb, Villa's officials
in Juarez arranged for the Mexican generals to use the
3 3American rail line between El Paso and Nogales.
^ C a n o v a  to State Department, August 21, 22, 1914/ 
12959, 12960.
3 2
Cobb (for Carothers) to State Department, August 
26, 1914/13003.
^ B l i s s  to War Department, August 23, 1914, NA 812. 
2311/138; Cobb to State Department, August 25, 1914, ibid./ 
153.
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Exuberant Villa partisans almost sabatoged the whole 
proceedings. While Cobb was busy arranging a smooth 
passage for the two generals, the Villistas persuaded 
General Pershing to publicly greet them when they arrived 
in El Paso. While Pershing was most courteous, some of 
the Villistas staged a pro-Villa demonstration that was 
obviously intended to deride Obregcfn. Showing no 
resentment, Obregon remained cordial and continued with 
Villa to Nogales. Delayed temporarily, Carothers arrived 
in El Paso after the incident and was greatly disturbed 
when he discovered what had happened. In a jointly 
prepared telegram, he and Cobb recommended that since more 
demonstrations might have an adverse effect on the exist­
ing rapport between Villa and Obrego'n, on the return trip
they should not stop in El Paso for a banquet being
34planned in their honor.
Early in the morning of August 28, Villa and Carothers 
went to Nogales, Sonora, to confer with Maytorena, while 
Obregon, somewhat apprehensive of the attitude of the 
governor and his followers, remained on the Arizona side 
and breakfasted with his fiance, who had come to meet him. 
Later that day, after Villa and Carothers had arranged a 
34
Cobb to State Department, August 26, 1914, ibid./ 
149; Cobb (joint telegram with Carothers) to State De­
partment, August 27, 1914, ib i d ./15 7 ; Carothers to State 
Department, August 27, 1914/13018; Cobb to Bryan, 
personal, August 29, 1914/27428; El^  Paso Morning T i m e s , 
August 27, 1914.
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tentative agreement, Obregon joined the conference, and 
the three revolutionary leaders , aided by the American 
agent, hammered out the final agreement for the paci­
fication of northwestern Mexico. Despite Carothers' 
efforts to prevent it, Villa's partisans continued to
slight Obregon. Throughout the proceedings, however,
3 5Obregon conducted himself like a statesman.
On their return trip to El Paso, Villa and Obrego'n
asked Carothers to secure permission for General Pershing
to join them on the Mexican side of the border.
Although wanting to avoid the possibility of further
incidents, Carothers dutifully acceded to request the
meeting. For one reason or another, possibly at the
request of the State Department, the War Department had
already ordered Pershing not to meet again with the two
3 6Mexican generals. Instead, when they arrived back in
El Paso, Cobb had contrived to have identical telegrams
37of commendation from Secretary Bryan presented to them.
35carothers to State Department, August 28, 1914, NA 
812.2311/160; Carothers to State Department, August 30, 
1914/13042; Tucson Daily Citizen, August 28, 29, 1914; El 
Paso Morning T i m e s , August 30, 1914; Guzman, Memoirs of 
Pancho V i l l a , 293-304; Alvaro Obregcfn, Ocho m i 1 kilrfmetros 
en campafia (Mexico, D . F . : Libreria de la Vda. de Ch.
B ou ret, 1917), 266.
36carothers to State Department, September 1, 1914,
NA 812.2311/165; Adjutant General's Office to Commanding 
General, Southern Department, August 31, 1914, i b i d ./169.
37cobb to State Department, August 30, 1914 and 
State Department to Cobb, September 1 , 1914/13043.
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The American Customs Collector later reported that the
notes relieved much of the embarrassment which might have
resulted from the cancellation of the festivities that
3 8had been scheduled in the generals' honor.
Bryan and Wilson must have been heartened by a
return note from Obrego'n thanking the Administration for
39its interest in Mexico and aid in establishing peace.
Carothers saw encouraging signs for the future. "Villa
and Obregon are working in harmony and friendship," he
40wired the Secretary of State. More prone to emotional
expressions, Cobb wrote to Bryan that the Villa-0bregon
relationship had taken on the "effect of a love feast
. . . ." ^  He also praised Carothers, claiming that the
rapprochement between the generals was largely the result
42of his e f f orts.
Carothers continued to shepherd the two generals, 
returning with them to Chihuahua. There his efforts paid 
more dividends. Villa and Obregdn expanded their
3 8
Cobb to State Department, September 1, 1914/13065; 
copy in Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 62.
3 9Obregon to Cobb (for Bryan), September 1, 1914, 
Foreign R e lations, 1 9 1 4 , 593.
40
Carothers to State Department, September 1, 1914/
13063.
41
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discussion to include measures to prevent further revo­
lutionary discord and promote a government acceptable to 
all factions. On September 3, they agreed to a nine- 
point program that was essentially the same as the one 
Villa had outlined in the memorandum which Fuller took to 
Washington. Although Obregon was a loyal Carrancista, he 
agreed with the wisdom of the First Chief becoming 
provisional president, thus eliminating him from the 
elective presidency. The Villa-Obregon agreement also 
called for the revolutionary convention as provided for 
in the Pact of Torreon. They agreed upon provisions for
free elections and the conclusion that military men
4 3should not be eligible for civil offices. Whether by 
contrivance or pure coincidence, a Villa-Obregc^n axis 
had seemingly emerged.
After remaining in Chihuahua for several days to 
solidify his friendship with Villa, ObregJn asked 
Carothers to return with him to Mexico City. Carothers 
interpreted the invitation as more evidence of Obregdn's 
cordiality toward Villa and the United States. Sensing 
that Carothers' acceptance of the invitation would lend 
an aura of American support to the recently negotiated 
pact, Villa also urged the agent to go to Mexico City.
43 Cobb to State Department, Wilson Papers, Series II, 
Box 62; Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 69-70; Barrag^n 
Rodriguez, Historia . . . Constitucionalista, II, 67-70.
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4 4Bryan was only too pleased to grant permission. Things
were beginning to fall in place. Villa and Obregon had 
expressed a desire for peace and representative government. 
If their coalition was maintained, Carranza would be 
checked.
Paul Fuller, meanwhile, had returned to Washington, 
submitted his report and Villa's memorandum, and agreed to 
go to Mexico City to meet with Carranza. Again no written 
instructions may be found, but several months later Fuller 
confided the nature of his mission to a group of friends. 
"He stated confidentailly," recalled Chandler P. Anderson, 
a special assistant in the State Department, "that the 
object of his mission was conciliation and mediation 
between hostile elements, directed chiefly to bringing
4 5about a convention which would place Villa in control." 
Fuller's mission, then, complimented Carothers' and vice 
v e r s a .
By this time the character of Carranza's regime in 
Mexico City had emerged. The diplomatic corps had been 
so harassed that most of the emissaries had left the
44
Cobb (for Carothers) to State Department, September 
4, 1914/13111; State Department to Carothers, September 7, 
1914, ibid.
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Papers and Diaries of Chandler P. Anderson, Division of 
Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Box 21.
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46capital. Relations between Carranza and Zapata were
even more strained. Resentful that Carranza had de­
ployed troops to prevent the entry of other revo­
lutionaries into the capital, Zapata was abusive to 
envoys sent into his territory by the First Chief. He 
absolutely refused to compromise with the Carrancistas,
insisting, instead, that they pay homage to his Plan of
4 7Ayala or be prepared to fight.
On returning to Mexico, Fuller, this time accompanied 
by his wife, journeyed to Galveston by rail where he 
caught a steamer to Vera Cruz. Arriving on September 4, 
he was met by Silliman and Isidro Fabela, Carranza's 
Foreign Minister. En route to the capital, the special 
envoy conferred with Fabela. He suggested to the Foreign 
Minister that the duration of the revolutionary interim 
government should be short and that early provision 
should be made for free elections. Fabela scoffed at 
this suggestion, insisting that the interim government 
could carry out reforms more efficiently. When the 
American agent replied that only the elected repre­
sentatives of all the people should presume to inaugurate
4 fi
Silliman to State Department, August 21, 25, 1914/ 
12961, 12985; Oliveira to State Department, August 25, 
1914/12990.
4 7
Silliman to State Department, August 28, 1914/ 
13033; Canova to State Department, September 1, 1914, 
Foreign Relat i o n s , 1914 , 592-93 ; Quirk, The Mexican Revo­
lu t i o n , 63-66 ; Womack, Zap a t a , 203-10.
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reforms, Fabela insisted that elections would take time
and that a legislature would debate for months. Such
delays would only lead to renewed rebellions. The best
way to insure tranquility in Mexico, he contended, was
for the United States to extend diplomatic recognition
to the interim government and, thus, invest it with an
official nature. If the elected representatives of the
people wanted to change the policies adopted by the
4 8interim government, they could do so later.
Abruptly, Fabela changed the subject. He urged
that the American troops be withdrawn from Vera Cruz.
President Wilson, he reminded Fuller, had declared that
the invasion was directed only at Huerta, yet the troops
remained. He claimed that the Mexican people were
unified in their desire to see the Americans leave. Then
he claimed that the apparent signs of dissension among
his people were misleading. He maintained that most of
the governors and generals were devotedly loyal to
Carranza. Zapata, he noted, was an exception. He also
admitted that force might be necessary to subdue the
4 9revolutionaries of the South.
The regimen in Mexico City had abated somewhat by the 
time of Fuller's arrival. Taking steps to quiet the
48 Fuller, Memorandum for the President, September 18, 
1914, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 117.
49 lb i d .
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criticism of his arbitrary rule, on September 5, Carranza 
issued a call for a junta of Constitutionalist governors 
and generals to meet in the capital on October 1. His 
action was prompted no doubt by rumors of growing accord 
between Obregdn and Villa, who were still conferring in 
Chihuahua. At any rate, Fuller thought the proposed junta 
an encouraging step and commended the First Chief when 
they met later that same day. But he also reminded 
Carranza that President Wilson desired the early 
establishment of a constitutional g o v e r n m e n t . ^
In reply, the First Chief, echoing Fabela, claimed 
that an interim military government was necessary for 
institutional reforms. He blamed meddling by the United 
States for much of the disunity among the revolutionary 
factions. Denying that this was the intention of his 
President, Fuller offered to promote unity. He suggested 
that President Wilson address a note to Zapata through 
Silliman, urging him to renew negotiations with the 
Constitutionalists and notifying him that his refusal to 
do so would displease the United States. Carranza was 
caught off guard by Fuller's counterplay. At first he 
hedged, suggesting that he could not ask an alien to 
restore internal order in Mexico, but under Fabela's
~^Ib i d . : Fuller to State Department, September 5, 
1914, Foreign Relations, 1914 , 594 ; Silliman to State De­
partment, September 5, 1914/13119; jSJL Liberal (Mexico 
City), September 5, 6 , 1914.
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prodding he acceded to the proposal. Fuller then promptly 
wired Bryan, requesting that the overture be made to
Zapata. Two days later, Silliman received instructions
-  ^ 51 to do s o .
On September 7, while Fuller was still in Mexico
City, Obregon, accompanied by Carothers and two of Villa's
aids, returned from Chihuahua. The Villistas, both of
whom Fuller had met earlier, searched him out and explained
the agreement their chief had made with Obregon. They
were fearful that Carranza would not accept it and asked
Fuller to intercede. The New Yorker also discussed the
pact with Obregdn, who was just as reticent to assure the
5 2First Chief's acceptance.
Turning next to the First Chief, Fuller urged 
acceptance of the Villa-Obregon agreement. He told 
Carranza that the pact was "in consonance with the views" 
of President Wilson and that "its early realization would 
enlist the sympathy and approval" of the United States. 
Carranza gave no reply; instead, he took up the question 
of the evacuation of Vera Cruz. Again wielding a deft
“^ F u l l e r ,  Memorandum for the President, September 18, 
1914, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 117; Fuller to State 
Department, September 5, 1914, Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 4 ,
594; State Department to Silliman, September 7, 1914, ibid.
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hand at diplomacy, Fuller inquired: "To what organized
government could we make any transfer of so important a 
port. . . ?" There was currently "not even a provisional
government in existence," he continued, "but only a revo­
lutionary body in military occupation of the capital. . . ." 
Fuller then indicated that when a satisfactory provisional
government was established, he was certain that President
53Wilson would be most willing to evacuate Vera Cruz.
Carranza was enraged. He took out his wrath on
Silliman, who had accompanied Fuller but had lingered
behind in an attempt to sooth the First Chief. Turning
on the weaker of the two agents, he told Silliman that
unless he had authority to negotiate the evacuation of
Vera Cruz, he should leave the country with Fuller. His
rage intensifying, he complained that he was tired of
dealing with envoys who were supposedly clothed with
authority to discuss important international questions yet
did nothing but delve into Mexico's internal affairs.
Silliman was so intimidated by Carranza's outburst that
he was reluctant to even pursue attempts to bring the
55First Chief and Zapata together.
The Carrancistas were not in the least cowed by
53T, . .Ib i d .
54.,,,Ib i d .
55
Silliman to State Department, September 12, 1914/
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Fuller. The day after his encounter with the First Chief, 
the special agent dined with Fabela and the Carranza's 
private secretary, Gustavo Espinoza. Fuller expressed 
dismay at the revolutionaries' vengeful attitude toward 
officials of the defunct Huerta regime. He suggested that 
some distinction should be made between those who had 
definitely committed crimes and those who had done their 
duty as they saw it. Both Fabela and Espinoza insisted 
that no such distinction would be made, that it would 
only encourage those who might be treated with leniency 
to again plot against legally constituted authority.
Fuller came away from the meeting with the impression 
that, unless their power was curbed, the Carrancistas 
would make "proscription and confiscation . . .  a 
settled policy.
Just as Villa had done, before Fuller departed, 
Carranza presented the agent with a letter for President 
Wilson. The letters, however, differed greatly. Villa's 
had been lengthy and cordial and had urged the United 
States to aid in promoting peace in Mexico. It had also 
outlined a plan for the creation of a new government. 
Carranza's letter was short and businesslike. It only 
notified Wilson that Rafael Zubaran Capmany, the
"^Fuller, Memorandum for the President, September 18, 
1914, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 117; ET1 L i b eral, 
September 10, 1914.
353
Constitutionalist agent in Washington, had been directed
to immediately pursue negotiations leading to the
57evacuation of Vera Cruz.
En route to Washington, Fuller prepared a lengthy 
memorandum describing the Carrancistas and his relations 
with them. As might be expected, he had little of a 
complimentary nature to report. "Fabela I consider a 
retrograde influence," he wrote. "Carranza impressed me 
as a man of good intentions but without any sufficient 
force to dominate his petty surroundings, and greatly 
hampered by the fear of lowering his prestige which hinders 
him from adopting conciliating measures or correcting 
mistakes. . . ." He suggested, moreover, that the only
apparent solution to Mexico's difficulties lay in 
adherence to a plan such as proposed by Villa and Obregon. 
Significantly, he suggested that further bloodshed was 
preferable to allowing Mexico to return to pre­
revolutionary conditions, which, by implication, he indi­
cated might result if Carranza's rule continued 
unrestricted.
It is difficult to surmise with certainty what Fuller 
said to Wilson when they met privately in late September, 
but a reporter who claimed to know suggested that the
^ 7Ib i d . ; Carranza to Wilson, September 7, 1914, ibid., 
Box 116.
5 8Fuller, Memorandum for the President, September
18, 1914, ibid. , Box 117.
354
agent warned that Carranza could never restore order to 
59his country. Certainly there is no reason to think
that his verbal report was any less critical than his 
written memorandum. After making his report, Fuller 
returned to his law practice and did not visit Mexico 
again. But he remained a close associate to the Presi­
dent and, from time to time, was called upon to give 
advice on Latin American affairs.
On September 9, prospects for cooperation among the 
revolutionary factions were given another boost by 
Obregon. Attempting to enlist Carranza's support in form­
ing a new provisional government as provided for in his 
agreement with Villa, Obregon issued a public appeal for 
American withdrawal from Vera Cruz. He also urged Villa 
to do the same, and Villa accommodated his newly found
friend in the Carrancista camp by replying that he would
6 0lend his support to such an appeal. Hoping to abet 
this budding revolutionary unity, Wilson directed Silliman 
to ask Carranza to designate "responsible officials" to 
whom the port might be surrendered. Receiving the
59 New York W o r l d , November 14, 1914, cited in Link, 
Struggle For Neutrality, 248.
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President's note on September 15, Silliman, with a dramatic
flare, delayed delivering the message until the 16th, the
anniversary of Mexican i n d e p e n d e n c e . ^  At almost the same
time, Silliman reported discouraging news to Washington.
Carranza and Zapata, he cabled, were hopelessly rent, and
there seemed to be little hope of averting armed conflict
between the two. Having discussed the situation with
Carothers, who was then in the capital, Silliman also
revealed that Villa would probably not approve of an
6 2attack on Zapata.
Zapata now appeared to be the fly in the ointment.
Of all the revolutionary leaders, the Wilson Adminis­
tration had had the fewest contacts with Zapata. Even 
those contacts had proved unsatisfactory. Indeed, the 
circumstances surrounding the attempts were, to say the 
least, bizarre. To fully understand them, moreover, we 
must digress several months to March, 1914, when Hubert 
L. Hall first appeared in Vera Cruz and attempted to 
arrange contacts between the Zapatistas and John Lind.
61
State Department to Oliveira, September 15, 1914, 
Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 4 , 598; Silliman to State Department, 
September 16, 1914, ib i d . ; Silliman to Carranza, September 
15, 1914, A G R E , L-E-861, Leg. 5. Wilson's proposal to 
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A Morman, Hall was a New Englander by birth, but had 
lived more than twenty years in Mexico. For a time he was 
a hotel proprietor in Cuernavaca. After the Zapatistas 
occupied the city, the hotel business was no longer 
profitable, so he turned to other pursuits. When the 
agrarian reform program of the Madero Administration 
floundered, Hall and several businessmen of Mexican 
nationality attempted to organize a program of their own. 
The plan, which was to dominate Hall's thinking for years 
to come, was to borrow enough capital from the national 
agricultural bank, La. Ca.j a de Prestamos , to purchase land 
for a colony, then sell shares on easy terms to the land­
less. Unable to secure the loan, Hall's colonizing plans
6 3
were temporarily abandoned. How he sustained himself
thereafter is a mystery.
Hall never blamed Zapata for his losses. Rather he 
blamed the oppressive conditions in Morelos which had 
spawned the revolution. In fact, he became absolutely 
enamored of Zapata. His devotion to the revolutionary 
leader of the South made him prey for a huckster named 
A ^
Hall to Bryan, May 21, 1914, Wilson Papers, Series 
II, Box 109; Womack, Za p a t a , 236-37. Hall claimed that 
Jorge Vera Estafiol and Alberto Garcia Granados, both 
government officials and well-known throughout Mexico, 
were among the backers of his colonizing scheme. La^  Ca.j a 
de Prestamos was created in 1908, during the D^az regime, 
to underwrite privately sponsored reclamation and 
irrigation projects such as Hall's. See Gonzalez 
Ramirez, E_1 Problema Agr a r i o , 171-73.
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/ b 4
Jacobo Ramos Martinez. Bearing falsified credentials 
which granted him sole authority to represent Zapata to 
officials of the United States, Ramos Martinez contacted 
the gullible Morman sometime in February or March, 1914, 
and asked him to serve as intermediary between himself 
and John Lind, who was still in Vera Cruz. Since Ramos
f
Martinez claimed to be seeking arms and supplies for 
Zapata, Hall, anxious to help, made the contact. Although 
distrusting the Zap at is t a s , Lind, willing to embrace any 
scheme that would hasten the fall of Huerta, swallowed 
Ramos Martinez's bait, as did Arnold Shanklin, the Ameri­
can Consul General in Mexico City. Since he claimed that 
he was in constant danger, a system of code names was 
adopted by the conspirators to shield Ramos Martinez and 
preserve the secrecy of the plot to aid Z a p a t a . ^
b 4 '
Ramos Martinez had been Lieutenant Governor of
Morelos during the Madero Administration. Hall may or may 
not have known him at that time. Ramos Martinez's re­
lations with Zapata at that time were not cordial. See 
Womack, Zapata, 141.
C. C
Lind to State Department, March 23, 1914/20 609-1/2; 
draft in Lind Papers, Box 3; copy of Shanklin to Lind, 
April 1, 1914, Buckley Papers, File no. 233. The first 
cited letter is one of many dealing with Hall filed under 
that document number. In all there are over 300 pages of 
correspondence, mostly from Hall to the State Department, 
plus newspaper articles and pamphlets. One cannot read 
Hall's correspondence without being struck by the depths 
of his devotion to Zapata and the people of Morelos.
One can only conjecture how Buckley secured a copy of 
the second cited letter. He may have gotten it from 
Consul Canada of Vera Cruz. Canada and Buckley were of 
like mind in being critical of Wilson's Mexican policy.
The consul resented Lind's clandestined relationships with 
the revolutionaries. So that Canada could understand the
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Since the whole plot began to emerge only days before 
Lind's departure from Mexico, the Minnesotan was not able 
to see it through. On the eve of his departure, Hall 
appeared in Vera Cruz a second time. This time he was 
accompanied by Ramos Martinez, who, claiming to be in great 
danger, pleaded for asylum. Before Lind could arrange it, 
his ship sailed for home. When Consul Canada of Vera Cruz 
expressed doubt that asylum was in order, Ramos Martjfnez 
hastily departed the city, claiming that he had been 
dealt with in bad faith. Before leaving, however, he 
persuaded Hall to go to Washington in his place. Hall, 
being an American, had little trouble in securing funds 
for his passage from C a n a d a . ^
code and relay to Washington messages from Ramos Martinez, 
Lind conveyed a copy of this letter to the consul before 
departing from Vera Cruz. See copy of Lind to Canada, 
April 5, 1914, ib i d . The code names of those involved in 
the conspiracy were as follows: Lind-"Juirez", Shanklin-
"Paz", Ramos Martinez-"Brady", and Hall-"Clark."
Although Zapata was not a party to the conspiracy, he was 
given the code name "Dix." Since correspondence in the 
State Department files reveals that these code names were 
utilized by the correspondents, the copies of the letters 
in the Buckley Papers appear to be authentic.
6 6
Ib i d . ; Lind to State Department, April 6 (two), 
1914/11409, 11415; Canada to State Department, April 9, 17, 
1914/11457, 11539; State Department to Canada, April 13,
16, 1914/11457, 11539; Shanklin to Lind, April 11, 12, 
1914/27474. Bryan ultimately approved his asylum request, 
but Ramos Martinez refused to accept it unless Consul 
General Shanklin accompanied him to the United States. 
Bryan would not approve this request.
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In Washington, Hall impressed State Department 
officials with his sincerity and quickly won their confi­
dence. Until his appearance in Washington, Wilson and 
Bryan had given scant attention to the revolution in 
southern Mexico. Appearing almost daily at the State De­
partment, Hall attempted to fill that void. Besides his 
conversations with Bryan and others in the Department, he 
prepared a lengthy memorandum for President Wilson. In
near rapturous terms, he described Zapata and the movement 
6 7
he led. It was by far the most flattering description
the Administration had yet received. Hall's accounts
definitely shed new light on the revolution of the South
and temporarily made the Administration more well disposed 
6 8toward Zapata. Still hoping to promote his coloni­
zation scheme in Mexico, Hall also met with officials of 
the Department of Agriculture and gathered all the infor­
mation he could on the latest techniques in agricultural 
education, extension work, land reclamation, irrigation,
69and other matters. He remained in Washington all summer.
67Hall to Bryan, May 14, 1914, Wilson Papers, Series 
IV, Box 254; copy in State Department files, 812.00/23126.
^ D a v i s  to Shanklin, October 22, 1914/17474.
fi Q°7Hall describes his activities during the summer of 
1914 in his voluminous correspondence. One must consult 
many letters in reconstructing his activities. They are 
too numerous to cite individually, but are all filed under 
document number 812.00/20609-1/2. Benjamin G. Davis,
Chief Clerk of the State Department, with whom Hall 
conversed almost daily, also described Hall's activities. 
See Davis to Bryan, August 22, 1914, Wilson Papers,
Series IV, Box 124.
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When Ramos Martinez re-appeared in Vera Cruz shortly 
after the American invasion, the Administration was more 
willing than ever to discuss means of aiding Zapata. 
Communicating through Consul General Shanklin, who also 
came to Vera Cruz, the Department negotiated with the bogus 
Zapatista agent throughout the summer of 1914. The 
available evidence indicates that what he was really after 
was money— $20,000 to $50,000 —  for himself, not for Zapata. 
He tried to extort it from the State Department, but Bryan 
was willing to supply Zapata only with arms and supplies. 
Having been informed by Ramos Martinez that the Zapatistas 
desperately needed medical supplies, the naive Secretary 
of State did arrange for the Red Cross to supply them.
When he arranged for Ramos Martinez to meet with Carranza's 
agents, the charlatan attempted to extort funds from them. 
Carranza, who had been willing to offer supplies in return 
for Zapata's pledge of loyalty, interpreted the episode as 
just one more annoying case of American meddling.
Strangely, there is no evidence that Bryan at least before 
late August, ever suspected that Ramos Mart/nez was any­
thing other than the legitimate agent of Z a p a t a . ^  By 
that time he was so exasperated at dealing with the
70The correspondence and other documents relating to 
the negotiations are filed under document number 812.00/ 
27474. A lengthy but often inaccurate account of the Ramos 
Martinez affair may be found in Teitelbaum, Woodrow Wilson 
and the Mexican Revolution, 143-60.
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temperamental Mexican that he decided it would be better 
to send a State Department Agent to deal with Zapata.
It seemed especially advisable when both Silliman and 
Canova reported in late August that clashes between 
Carranza and Zapata seemed likely.7^
B r y a n ’s thoughts naturally turned to Hall. In a
letter to President Wilson, the Secretary described Hall
"as a very honest and earnest man" who "has shown more
interest [in Mexico] I think than any other American. . . ."
Exaggerating a bit, he claimed that Hall was "an intimate
7 2
friend of Zapata. . . ." Ben G. Davis, Chief Clerk of
the Department added a very attractive note in suggesting 
that Hall would probably be willing to serve with only his 
expenses being paid. Agreeing that he should serve on 
that basis, Wilson prophesied that Hall "may be extremely 
useful to u s ."73
Hall journeyed as far as Vera Cruz with Paul Fuller.
By the time he arrived there, the situation had
7^Silliman to State Department, August 23, 1914,
Foreign Relations, 1914 , 589 ; Silliman to State Department, 
August 24, 1914/12986; Canova to State Department, August 
27, 30, 1914/13019, 13041.
72
Bryan to Wilson, August 22, 1914, Wilson Papers, 
Series II, Box 124. In his correspondence, Hall never 
claimed to be an intimate of Zapata, only that he had 
seen the leader of the South on several occasions.
73
Davis to Bryan, August 22, 1914, i b i d . ; Wilson to 
Bryan, August 25, 1914, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence.
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drastically changed. The Red Cross, meanwhile, had sent
the Director of its Atlantic Division, Charles Jenkinson,
into Zapata's stronghold. Besides bearing personal
felicitations from Zapata to President Wilson, Jenkinson
emerged from Morelos with the news that Hall was persona
non grata in Zapatista country and that it would be
74dangerous for him to go there. Upon receiving this
news, Bryan cabled Vera Cruz, directing his newly appointed
agent to remain there until Fuller had an opportunity to
7 5fully investigate Zapata's grievance.
Hall was completely bewildered by this turn of events. 
Only later did he discover that Zapata was suspicious 
because of his association with Ramos Martinez. After 
discussing the matter with Silliman, who had come to Vera 
Cruz to meet Fuller, Hall jumped to the conclusion that 
Jenkinson was responsible for the misunderstanding. 
Jenkinson had discussed the Ramos Martinez episode with 
Zapata, and the rebel chieftain had assumed that Hall was
^ J e n k i n s o n  to Wilson (enclosing Zapata to Wilson, 
August 23, 1914), September 8 , 1914, Wilson Papers, Series 
II, Box 116; Silliman to State Department, August 26, 29, 
1914/13015, 13040. Jenkinson made an earlier trip into 
Morelos in December, 1913. At that time he also brought 
out a letter from Zapata to Wilson, but it was never 
answered. See Teitelbaum, Woodrow Wilson and the Mexican 
Revolution, 152-53. For Jenkinson's own description of 
his Red Cross service among the Zapatistas, see Charles 
Jenkinson, "Vera Cruz, What American Occupation Has Meant 
to a Mexican Community," The Survey, XXXIII (November 7, 
1914), 133-34.
75State Department to Canada, August 30, 1914/13040.
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just as guilty. Hall, however, was just as certain that
Jenkinson was attempting to supercede him and carry on his
own negotiations with Zapata. Silliman did not help
matters. He told Hall that he had heard some disparaging
reports of his past conduct. The irate Morman, thinking
that he was the victim of some conspiracy by Jenkinson
and Silliman, pleaded to no avail for permission to go to
7 6Zapata and vindicate himself.
Hall spent three agonizing weeks in Vera Cruz, all 
the while begging for permission to go to Mexico City.
On September 21, he received a letter from Silliman, 
indicating there was no hostility toward him in the 
capital. This was all he needed. Without departmental 
permission, he journeyed inland a few days later. He 
spent nearly two weeks in Mexico City, attempting to 
establish contacts in Z a p a t a ’s country. During that time 
he sent to Washington lengthy and extremely critical re­
ports of Carranza's regime. At length, a doctor friend 
from Morelos came for him. A few days later, on about
^ S h a n k l i n  (for Hall) to State Department, September 
4, 1914/13108; Hall to Davis, September 5, 8 , 12, 13, 14, 
15, 16, 1914/20609-1/2; Bryan to Shanklin (for Hall), 
September 4, 1914/13136a. Silliman had received word 
from a doctor in Mexico City that during the Decena 
Tragica, Hall, serving as a Cruz Blanca (a Mexican relief 
organization similar to the Red Cross) worker had given 
aid only to those who were attempting to depose Madero. 
Hall denied this charge, claiming that he assisted the 
wounded on both sides.
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October 8 , he disappeared into Zapata’s stronghold. He 
received no encouragement from Washington; indeed, after 
the cable directing him to remain in Vera Cruz, he re­
ceived no communications from Washington. Curiously 
enough, he had left Washington without formal credentials. 
Despite his requests for some before he went to Morelos, 
none were f o r t h c o m i n g . ^
Back in Cuernavaca, the pertenacious Morman was 
highly suspected. The Zapatista officials at once wanted 
to see his credentials. He, of course, had none. The 
Zapatistas were very distressed over their relations with 
the United States. Through Jenkinson they had attempted 
to establish official relations with Washington but had 
received no reply. They could not understand why 
Carranza and Villa were accorded representatives from the 
United States and they had not. But most embarrassing of 
all for Hall, the day after his arrival in Cuernavaca he 
was presented with a letter from Zapata, in which the rebel 
chieftain revealed that Ramos Martinez had never
77
lb i d . ; Hall to Davis, September 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 
20, 26, 28, 30, October 1, 3, 5, 8 , 1914/20609-1/2, 27430, 
27431, 27432, 27433; Shanklin (for Hall) to State De­
partment, September 21, 1914/13242. In a lengthy letter 
dated September 11, 1916, Hall reviewed his tribulations 
and claimed that he received his instructions from Bryan 
while riding in a carriage en route to B r y a n ’s home. That 
particular day, Hall recalled, the Secretary of State was 
so busy that they had no other opportunity to meet and 
discuss his mission. He, therefore, received his 
instructions verbally. See/20609-1/2 ; copy in Buckley 
Papers, File no. 233.
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legitimately represented the Zapatistas and that he was 
currently a wanted man. At first refusing to believe 
this news, the gullible American recovered his per­
spective after several days and reported what the State
Department already knew: "Ramos Martinez has deceived
,,78
us .
Despite the Zapatistas 1 suspicions, Hall reported that
he was treated cordially. He, nonetheless, renewed his
pleas for official credentials. While he waited vainly,
he continued his descriptive correspondence to Washington.
In contrast to conditions in Mexico City, he reported,
Morelos was quiet and the people were living in peace and
harmony. There was no looting, the government was
functioning to everyone's satisfaction, a program for
breaking up the large haciendas and distributing the land
to the peasants had been inaugurated, and the crops were
being harvested. In short, the Zapat is t as were carrying
79out their own tidy revolution.
Once in Zapata's mountains, Hall had great difficulty 
communicating with the outside world. Occasionally, 
when other messages were sent out, he was allowed to send 
7 ft
Hall to Davis, October 11, 12, 14, 21, 1914/20609- 
1/2, 27436, 27424; Zapata to Hall, October 12, 1914/27453.
79 lb i d . ; Womack, using different sources, largely 
substantiated Hall's descriptions of the Zapat is t as and 
their local revolution. See Z a p a t a , 211.
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a letter to Washington; but he received no return corre­
spondence. Bryan waited until October 22 before even 
attempting to communicate with Hall. Having received 
Hall's plea for credentials, and possibly fearing for his 
safety, Bryan directed Davis to send a message to Hall 
through Consul General Shanklin. It was not the letter 
of credentials that Hall had asked for. Addressed "to whom 
it may concern," the letter reviewed Hall's activities in 
Washington in behalf of the Zapatistas, then stated that 
the Department had been "pleased to place its facilities, 
unofficially, at Mr. Hall's disposal" and had permitted him 
"to transmit and receive information through its agents 
. . . ." The note closed by endorsing Hall's character,
but it said nothing about his future relations with the 
80Department.
Even this innocuous letter might have been some 
comfort to Hall, had Shanklin known how to get it to him.
So Hall remained in Cuernavaca and brooded because his 
country had forgotten him. In time the Zapat is t a s ' 
suspicions of him dissipated, and he got along quite well. 
Certainly the Administration had no compelling reason to 
claim him. With him periodically sending lengthy and 
informative letters to Washington, the State Department 
enjoyed all the benefits of his efforts without facing any 
liabilities.
®^State Department to Shanklin, October 22, 1914/27474.
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The Administration, meanwhile, read off as hopeless
any attempt by the United States to bring Zapata and
Carranza together. But Jenkinson had reported seeing
Villista agents in Morelos and claimed that Zapata and
Villa were working in harmony. If Villa and Obregon
could some to some agreement with the First Chief, hope-
81
fully Zapata would accept it. The promotion of the Villa-
ObregJn axis, then, seemed to offer the best avenue for the
adjustment of all grievances.
The Washington-inspired coalition, however, was
enduring severe trials. On September 13, Carranza
notified Obregon that the provisions of the pact he and
Villa had agreed to some ten days before were too momentous
to be decided upon by two or three men and that they would
be reviewed by the revolutionary j unt a which was scheduled
8 2
for the capital on October 1. The most serious test of
the coalition's strength, however, came from within.
Renewed conflict in Sonora between Maytorena and the 
Carrancistas, now led by General Benjamin Hill, again pro­
vided Obregon with a pretext to travel north to meet with 
Villa. Departing from Mexico City on September 13, he was 
accompanied by Carothers , C a n o v a , and General Juan Cabral,
81
Silliman to State Department, August 26, 1914,
Foreign Relations, 1914 , 591.
82 Barragan Rodriguez, Historia . . . Constitucion-
alista, II, 71.
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who earlier had been designated to replace Maytorena as 
governor of Sonora. Since Carranza’s occupation of the 
capital, Canova had been relatively idle. He had dis­
tressed the Brazilian Minister, who was still officially 
in charge of American affairs in Mexico City, because he 
operated independently and had not even called at the 
legation. Feeling that Canova was surplus in the Mexican 
capital, Bryan had directed the agent to return to Wash­
ington for reassignment. Taking advantage of the comfort
of Carothers' private car, he traveled north with the 
8 3Obregdn party.
Carothers had been directed to proceed to the border 
with General Cabral and lend his effort to the re­
pacification of Sonora. Aware that Obregdn bore an 
invitation for Villa and his chiefs to attend the j unt a 
in Mexico City, the agent paused in Chihuahua long enough 
to discuss the matter with the Centaur of the North. The 
rebel leader was beside himself with rage because Carranza 
had not accepted outright the Villa-Obrego’n pact. The 
First Chief's .j unt a would be rigged, he warned. The State 
Department agent pleaded that Obregdn was an honorable man 
and that he and the other generals would enforce justice.
8 3
Simpich to State Department, September 9, 10, 1914/ 
13137, 13153; Cobb to State Department, September 10, 1914/ 
13146; State Department to Silliman, September 11, 12, 
1914/13153, 13167; State Department to Canova, September 
10, 19l4/13174a; Canova to State Department, September 11, 
1914/13164.
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Forced to leave for the border before he could pacify the
strong man of the North, Carothers persuaded Canova to re-
84
main behind and continue the effort.
When Carothers arrived in El Paso, a wire from Canova 
awaited him. Canova and Obrego'n had again spoken to Villa, 
and Villa had agreed to send representatives to the junta 
if Carranza would agree to immediate elections and the 
establishment of a civil government. The j unt a , he de­
manded, must be short and to the point and must not act as 
a governing body. Canova despaired that a complete break
would result if Carranza refused to accede to Villa's 
85provisos.
On the afternoon of September 19, Canova had another 
appointment with Villa, but when he arrived at the general's 
headquarters he found that Villa and Obregrfn were quarrel­
ing violently. The American agent quickly moved to a court­
yard adjoining the headquarters building, where he could 
hear the conversation without appearing to be eavesdropping. 
Villa had just received a telegram from Sonora which laid 
the blame for the renewed hostilities on the Carrancis tas. 
Suspicious of Obregc/n because he had compromised with 
Carranza on the matter of the revolutionary convention,
84
Carothers to State Department, September 19, 1914/ 
13227; copy in Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 63; Canova 
to State Department, September 22, 1914/13323.
3 5Carothers to State Department, September 19, 1914/
13227.
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Villa now charged the general with dealing in bad faith
on the pacification of Sonora. Villa called in a squad
of soldiers and threatened to kill Obregon unless he
ordered General Hill's troops to evacuate Sonora.
Although Obregon refused, Villa's temper subsided and,
after some discussion, Obregon wired Hill to withdraw a
short distance from the trouble-spot. Their friendship
apparently restored, the two generals went dancing
8 6
together that night. The incident seemed to have
passed, but a series of resulting misunderstandings
brought Mexico again to the brink of civil war.
Rumors reached Mexico City that Villa was holding
Obregon prisoner in Chihuahua. Carranza, fearing renewal
of hostilities, not only suspended rail traffic south of
Torreon but countermanded Obregon's withdrawal order to 
8 7
General Hill. Villa, meanwhile become more and more
conciliatory, had agreed that his delegates should 
accompany Obregon to the .j unt a . On September 21, the two 
generals sent a joint telegram warning Carranza not to 
8 6
Ibid. ; Canova to State Department, September 22, 
1914/13323; Guzman, Memoirs of Pancho V i l l a , 312-18; 
Obregdn, Ocho mil kildmetros en campana, 312-14. Villa's 
and Obregdn's accounts of the incident differ greatly. 
Canova offers a more balanced treatment.
87
Silliman to State Department, September 21, 22, 
1914/13243, 13268; Silliman to State Department, September 
23, 1914, Foreign Relations , 1914 , 605; Belt to State De­
partment, September 25, 1914/13292.
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attempt to control the proposed meeting. Carranza refused
to accept it as authentic. When Villa's delegates,
accompanied by Obregcfn, were stopped at TorrecJn, Villa
interpreted this as an attempt by Carranza to prevent him
from being represented. Obregrfn was returned to
8 8Chihuahua, where he became a virtual prisoner.
Carothers, who had been sitting in El Paso, attempting
to deal with the troubles in Sonora and Chihuahua, and
unable to treat either satisfactorily, was ordered to
hasten to Villa's side and use his influence to calm the
89
rebel chieftain. He arrived too late. Villa had with­
drawn any recognition of Carranza and declared his intention 
to move at once on the capital to oust the "dictator." 
Canova, who witnessed the whole turn of events, reported
that Villa, "his eyes dancing and his face smiling," was
90delighted at the opportunity to fight Carranza.
The entire impasse was most unfortunate since it re­
sulted from a series of misunderstandings. It pointed out 
a weakness in the State Department's representation in 
Mexico. One of the primary responsibilities of the agents 
8 8
Canova to State Department, September 22, 25, 1914/ 
13247, 13326; Carothers to State Department, September 22, 
23, 1914/13217, 13247; El Paso Morning Times, September 24, 
1914.
89
Carothers to State Department and State Department 
to Carothers, September 23, 1914/13271.
90
Canova to State Department, September 23, 25, 1914/ 
13275, 13326.
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was to make every effort to prevent a renewal of warfare.
Yet, during this time of crisis, there was absolutely no
communications between Silliman in Mexico City and Canova
and Carothers in Northern Mexico. Each was allowed by
the Department to become so engrossed with one factional
leader that the positive benefits of close coordination
between all the agents was ignored. Had there been some
planned liaison between them, the misunderstanding might
well have been detected and the breach prevented.
In the long run, it was Obregcfn, not the American
agents, who averted war. The general's staff, meanwhile,
was distraught, fearful for their commander's safety.
They urged him to remain with Canova at all times, and
they pleaded with the agent to intercede in his behalf.
Canova did speak first to one of Villa's closest advisors,
Eugenio Aguirre Benevides , then to Villa himself. Obrego'n,
he argued, was anxious to find a settlement suitable to
the Villistas and, if allowed to go to Mexico City, would
attempt to pressure Carranza into making concessions.
After one long interview, Villa abruptly revealed that
Obregon would be sent to El Paso. Canova again argued the
necessity of sending Obregon directly to Mexico City, but
Villa said that his decision would stand. Carothers had
91not yet arrived to lend his influence.
91 Canova to State Department, September 25, 1914/
13326; Canova to Bryan, personal, October 9, 1914/27411.
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Dejected, Canova revealed Villa's plans to Obregon.
He assured the Mexican general that he would accompany him
to the border to insure his safety. But Obrego'n was more
despondent over the prospect of renewed warfare than he
was concerned for his own safety. "This situation is
criminal, Mr. Canova," he lamented, "for everything
possible should be done by both sides to avoid another 
9 2revolution." Just before Obregdn and Canova were to
depart for El Paso, Villa reversed his decision and sent
word that Obregon would be allowed to go directly to
Mexico City. Obregon thanked Canova for his efforts and
promised to do everything in his power to persuade
Carranza to relent so that a reconciliation might be
accomplished. Only weeks later did Canova discover that
Villa had sent ahead a train with an officer and some
soldiers who were supposed to stop Obregon's train, take
him off and assassinate him. When Aguirre Benevides, who
also wished to avoid further bloodshed, discovered the
plot, he braved Villa's wrath, intervened without Villa's
knowledge, and allowed Obrego'n to pass unharmed to Mexico 
93C ity.
The combined pressures of Carothers, who shortly
9 2Canova to State Department, September 25, 1914/ 
13326 ; Obregdn, Ocho mil kilo'metros en camp ah a , 315-16
93 Ibid.; Canova to Bryan, personal, October 9,
1914/27411.
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arrived from the border, Canova, Aguirre Benevides, and 
others of Villa's staff eventually had their effect on 
Villa. Carothers' influence appears to have been crucial. 
Before his arrival in Chihuahua, Villa had been anxious 
to fight. Within a day after Carothers' arrival, Villa 
agreed to call of his advance on Mexico City and accept 
a peaceful solution. He at first suggested that Fernando 
Iglesias Calderon, an old reformer who had vehemently 
opposed Huerta, assume control of the provisional govern­
ment. When Carranza rejected this proposal, Villa on 
September 30 issued a "Manifesto to the Mexican People,"
setting forth his grievances and urging the people to
94join him in demanding representative government. That
same day, Obregon, who had the coolest head throughout 
those trying times, persuaded Carranza to accept one more 
conciliation attempt. Under pressure from the American 
agents and his own advisors, Villa also acceded to send 
delegates to meet with Carranza's at Zacatecas. With 
Carothers in attendance, the conference, which was 
dominated by Obrego'n, agreed that Carranza's j unt a should 
meet in Mexico City only to usse a call for a larger revo­
lutionary convention to be held at Aguascalientes. It was 
to convene on October 10, all factions were to be 
94 Carothers to State Department, September 26, 1914, 
Foreign R e lations, 1914 , 605; Belt to State Department, 
September 29, 1914, i b i d . , 606; Francisco Villa,
"Manifesto to the Mexican People," ibid. , 607-608.
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represented on the basis provided for in the Pact of
Torrecfn, and Carranza was to relinquish his authority as
9 5First Chief to this larger body.
When the j unta met in Mexico City, the generals lived
up to their bargain. More encouragingly, Carranza ac-
9 6
cepted their decision. The Administration's friendly
relations with Villa seemed to have paid off. Even 
Canova, who had seen Villa at his very worst, conceded 
that the Centaur of the North was "a great man, in a way.
He has genius, and there is much to admire in him, but 
at heart he is plainly a savage . . . With proper train­
ing and counseling," he prophesied, "Villa can be developed
9 7into a great character. . . . "  But even as Canova 
praised Villa it was becoming daily more apparent that 
Alvaro Obregon was the more likely instrument of the 
destruction of Carranza's power. In the same message in 
which he lauded Villa, Canova was only slightly less 
complimentary of Obregon. He is "a frank, likeable fellow," 
the agent wrote, "a good mixer, democratic, expresses 
9 5Cobb (for Carothers) to State Department, October 1, 
1914/13353 ; Testimony of Carothers, Investigation of 
Mexican A f f a i r s , 1774.
96
Canova to State Department, October 2, 1914, Foreign 
Relations , 1914 , 608; Belt to State Department, October 2, 
3, 6 , 1914/13354 , 13366, 13399 ; El P u e b l o , October 4, 1914.
9 7
Canova to Bryan, personal, October 9, 1914/27411.
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9 8
himself well and is not a hot head." Fuller, who met
Obregon in Mexico City, was also impressed. In his final
report to Wilson, Fuller characterized Obrego'n as "a stern
soldierly man, . . .  a man of discretion . . ." who was
"unwilling to admit to a stranger that his chief might be
made to yield to pressure." But Fuller implied that the
9 9Obregon hinted as much. At any rate, Obregcin and
Villa seemed to have vindicated W i l s o n ’s policy. But the 
man in the White House, as future events were to prove, 
would have been wise to look not to Villa in the future 
but to Obregcfn, who was the stronger of the two.
98., . j lb id.
9 9Fuller, Memorandum for the President, September 18,
1914, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 117.
CHAPTER X
THE RETREAT BEGINS
The fall and winter of 1914 witnessed still another 
shift in Wilson's Mexican policy: if not the emergence
of neutrality, then certainly a growing reluctance to 
become further involved in the revolutionaries' factional 
squabbles. As the delegates assembled for the revo­
lutionary Convention of Aguascalientes, Secretary of State 
Bryan suggested to the President that he personally urge 
both Villa and Carranza to cooperate with the Convention 
in creating a constitutional government."'' Wilson neither 
replied to Bryan nor made such an appeal to the factional 
leaders. Once the Convention began its deliberations, he 
made no attempt to influence its decisions. Perhaps his 
mind was occupied more with the problems of war-torn 
Europe. He may well have been satisfied that the Villa- 
Obregon coalition had matters well in hand and, working 
through the Convention, would promote a constitutional 
regime. On the other hand, he may have reasoned that 
interference by the United States would alienate the
"'"Bryan to Wilson, October 7, 1914, Bryan-Wilson 
Correspondence.
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apparently cooperative Carrancistas and give their chief a
pretext for scuttling the Convention. Or he may have just
assumed that, having aided in raising Villa to a pinnacle
of power, it was time to give him an opportunity to sink
or swim alone. Yet Villa's actions in nearly assassinating
Obrego'n may have caused Wilson to pause before extending
2
further support. Such a shift in policy at this par­
ticular juncture was uncharacteristic of Wilson, since the 
deliberations at Aguascalientes seemingly offered him 
tantalizing opportunities for molding Mexican institutions 
more along Anglo-Saxon lines.
Whatever Wilson's attitude might have been, it was not 
always shared by his special agents. While the Convention 
met, the agents received no extraordinary instructions. It 
was a time of relative inactivity for George Carothers. He 
remained with Villa, who was encamped at Guadalupe, a rail 
center some 100 miles north of Aguascalientes, and merely 
reported the general's impressions (which were almost en­
tirely favorable) of the Convention's proceedings. Notice­
ably missing were the constant reminders and suggestions 
from the State Department, which aimed at guiding Villa 
in a proper course of action. Carothers later complained
2
The documents give no clues as to the reasons for 
Wilson's policy shift. In fact, the exchange of ex­
pressions between the White House and the State Department 
concerning Mexican Affairs decreased markedly in October 
and November.
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3
at the lack of guidance from Washington. The only request
that the Administration made of Villa during this time was
that he aid in ending the fighting on the Sonora-Arizona
border between Maytorena and the Carrancistas. At
Carothers' suggestion, Villa referred the matter to the
Convention, which despatched General Ramon V. Sosa to
Sonora to put an end to the conflict. Sosa's efforts
4
proved unavailing and the fighting continued.
For his part, Villa made only one significant request 
of Carothers. He asked the agent to request that the Ad­
ministration suppress various revolutionary juntas in New 
Orleans, San Antonio, and El Paso, because they were 
hostile to his interests. True to the Administration's 
emerging policy of non-involvement, Carothers was directed 
to reply that unless Villa could give specific evidence 
that these organizations were violating the neutrality 
laws of the United States, the Justice Department could 
not move against them.^
The period of the Convention of Aguascalientes was 
Leon Canova's busiest time in Mexico. The Administration,
3
Testimony of Carothers, Investigation of Mexican 
A f f a i r s , 1770.
4
State Department to Carothers, October 16, 1914/ 
13547a; Cobb (for Carothers) to State Department, October 
21, 1914/13548.
^Cobb (for Carothers) to State Department, October 6,
1914, and State Department to Cobb (for Carothers),
October 8, 1914/13417.
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having recalled him in September, reconsidered its decision 
because of Canova's efforts during the Villa-Obregon 
quarrel in Chihuahua, and decided to retain him in Mexico. 
At first he was directed to accompany Villa and assist 
Carothers. After the calling of the Convention of 
Aguascalientes, he was directed to observe the sessions 
and report.  ^ Sending as many as four coded messages daily 
by Mexican telegraph was job enough in itself. The 
telegraphers so butchered the messages that Canova often 
had to repeat them two or three times before Zach Cobb, 
who relayed them from El Paso, could understand them. In 
order to insure that Washington got an accurate account, 
Canova periodically codified the briefer telegraphic
despatches into letters that ran up to twenty pages. Even
his telegraphic messages became so lengthy and vivid that 
acting Secretary of State Robert Lansing directed him to
leave all unnecessary detail and opinion to his letters.^
£
State Department to Canova, September 23, 1914/13272; 
State Department to Canova, October 4 , 1914/13391 ; E_1 Paso 
Morning T i m e s , October 5, 7, 1914.
^Lansing to Canova, October 29, 1914/13619. Many of 
Canova's despatches from Aguascalientes are found in 
Foreign Relations, 1914 , 610-27 ; but these are only a 
small portion of his reports. Collectively, his messages 
constitute one of the richest and most colorful sources 
for reconstructing the events of the revolutionary con­
vention. Robert E. Quirk, who has written the standard 
monograph on the Convention, relies as heavily upon 
Canova's accounts as those of Vito Alessio Robles, the re­
cording secretary of the Convention. See The Mexican 
Revolution, 101-31.
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Canova's early reports may well have encouraged 
Wilson's hands-off policy. On the eve of the Convention, 
the special agent was apprehensive. Villa marched his 
troops into Zacatecas. Carranza's armies surrounded the 
convention city to the South. Canova reported from 
Aguascalientes that the arriving delegates were fearful 
for their safety. But when the convention convened, these 
anxieties evaporated. Villa, true to his promise, kept 
his troops one hundred miles away at Guadalupe. General 
Natera remained neutral, and his troops protected the 
Convention. The delegates, Canova reported, mingled in
g
"a spirit of cordiality and good fellowship. . . ."
Previously antagonistic personalities found themselves
applauding one another's comments. The delegates, however,
were in no mood to humor the factional leaders. Even the
Carrancistas, Canova noted, were determined that the First
Chief should "take a back seat" to the Convention. Nor
would Villa, who had lost prestige because of his
treatment of Obregon, be allowed to dominate the proceed- 
9
m g s  .
g
Canova to State Department, letter, October 9, 1914/
27411.
9
Canova to State Department, letters, October 5, 8 ,
9, 1914/27410, 13518, 27411; Cobb (for Canova) to State 
Department, October 6 , 8 , 12, 1914/13415, 13437, 33490.
The traditional historical view of the Convention of 
Aguascalientes is that it was dominated by the Villistas 
and that Villa, with thousands of troops nearby, intimi­
dated the Carrancistas. The whole affair, therefore, was
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Canova quickly developed a close affinity for the 
convention delegates as they assembled and began deliber­
ations in the Morelos Theatre. His descriptions of the 
scenes were charged with emotion aroused when the body 
declared itself sovereign, and then, each member, in 
affirmation of fidelity to his purpose, signed and kissed 
the Mexican flag. Led by Obregon, the Convention adopted 
the formula for representation prescribed by the Pact of 
Torreon: only military men who commanded as many as 1000
troops were seated. So that no one could gain unfair 
advantage by late recruiting, the size of the armies at 
the time of the battle of Zacatecas was established as the 
proportional base for representation. In another show of 
good faith, the Convention sent a commission, led by 
General Felipe Angeles, to Morelos to invite Zapata to 
send d e l e g a t e s . ^  The conventioneers' personal conduct 
was exemplary. "Few of the men attending the convention," 
Canova wrote to Washington, "have any knowledge of 
parliamentary proceedings, many are men of limited
a sham. Carranza encouraged this view. Robert E. Quirk 
applied a corrective in the previously cited work, The 
Mexican Revolution, 105-106 , 114. Citing convention re­
cords, he substantiates Canova's view that the Convention 
was at first independent of factional control. Only 
after the Carrancistas withdrew did the Villistas and 
Zapatistas dominate.
"^Cobb (for Canova) to State Department, October 11 
(two), 12 (three), 14 (two), 15, 16, 1914/13454, 23463, 
13469, 13474, 13490, 13507, 13511, 13513, 13521.
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education and, it must be admitted, some are men of most
unsavory reputations and are dangerous in extreme."
Almost proudly, he noted that their "proceedings have
been so well conducted and so orderly, that I . . .
11cannot but compliment them."
Canova mingled freely, almost as if he were a dele­
gate. He was frequently photographed with the con­
ventioneers, including the chairman Antonio J.
12
Villarreal. While the Convention bided its time, waiting 
for the Zapatistas, Canova renewed old acquaintanceships 
among the Carrancistas and brought them together with his 
newly found friends among the Villistas. Instead of 
heaping recriminations upon the other faction’s leaders, 
each side was almost maudlin in bemoaning the shortcomings 
of its own leader. Villarreal, the Carrancista military 
governor of the state of Nuevo L e d n , decried the stubborn­
ness of the First Chief. Not to be outdone, General 
Eugenio Aguirre Benevides , a Villista, claimed that keep­
ing Villa in line was like catering to a spoiled child.
To that, Villarreal retorted that Villa was tractable most 
of the time, whereas Carranza was impossible to deal with 
all of the time. Not realizing how prophetic they were, 
^ C a n o v a  to State Department, October 14, 1914/13572.
■^Pablo Casasola, Historia Grafica de la RevoluciJn 
Mexicana, 1910- 1960 (4 v o l s . ; Mexico, D.F.: Editorial F.
Trillas, S.A., 1960), II, 905-908.
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both Villerreal and Aguirre Benevides mused that peace 
might be easier achieved if Villa and Carranza were sent 
on diplomatic m i s s i o n s . ^
On October 17, Villa created a temporary stir by 
personally appearing in Aguascalientes. He, too, kissed 
and signed the flag, and Canova reported that the Con­
vention was delirious with joy when Villa and Obregon met 
at the front of the theatre and locked arms in an abrazo.
For the remainder of the day, Canova reported, exhor-
14tations of patriotism flowed like wine. Carothers, who
accompanied Villa to Aguascalientes, reported that Villa
was overwhelmed by the reception he received and had
pledged himself to support any provisional president the
15Convention might chose. The special agent also told
reporters from Mexico City that Villa thought that the
prospects for lasting peace were g o o d . ^
The Convention was even more lively after the arrival
of the Zapatistas. The delegation was led by the
intellectual elite of the revolution of the South. Among
/
them were Antonio Diaz Soto y Gama, a one-time anarchist 
13 Cobb (for Canova) to State Department, October 12 
(two), 1914/13469, 13474; Canova to State Department, 
letter, October 21, 1914/13633.
■^Cobb (for Canova) to State Department, October 18, 
1914/13529; El Liberal, October 18, 1914.
^ C a r o t h e r s  to State Department, October 18, 1914, 
Foreign Relat i o n s , 1914 , 611.
~*~^ E1 P u e b l o , October 18, 1914.
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who was thoroughly conversant in the ideas of Kropotkin, 
Bukanin, and Marx, and Otilio E. Montaflo, collaborator 
with Zapata in drafting the Plan of A y a l a . ^  No one out­
side Morelos knew much about the Zapatistas; consequently, 
they were viewed with great curiosity by the other dele­
gates. Since the number of soldiers serving Zapata was 
a mystery, many were surprised that only a delegation of 
twenty-six came to Aguascalientes. The Carrancistas were 
relieved, because Villa had thirty-seven, and even a
coalition of Villistas and Zapatistas could not outvote
X 8
the rest of the assembly.
Chnova reported that the Zapatistas were shy and 
cautious and did not mix well with the other delegates. 
They were not shy, however, in attempting to impose their 
own program on the Convention. On October 27, Paulino 
Martinez mounted the rostrum and declared that the 
Zapatistas would not even accede to be seated as dele­
gates until the Convention adopted the Plan of Ayala as 
its sole standard of conduct. Before the assembly quit 
muttering over Martinez’s demands, Diaz Soto y Gama rose 
and challenged the Convention’s courage to ignore Villa 
and Carranza and strike some independent blows for the
^ C a n o v a  to State Department, October 28, 1914/13619; 
Quirk, The Mexican Revolution. 107; Womack, Za p a t a . 193, 
396 ; Cockroft, Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican 
Revolution, 71-73.
18
Quirk, The Mexican Revolut i o n , 107-108.
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welfare of all Mexicans. He chided them for paying homage
to the flag. It was not the flag of liberty, he declared,
but the banner of tyrants, such as Diaz and Huerta. He
snatched the flag from the rostrum, crumpled it in his
fist, and waved it tauntingly at the crowd. Again,
pandemonium reigned in the Morelos Theatre. But whereas
Canova had found the excitement produced by Villa and
Obregon's embrace exhilarating, he was frightened by the
uproar created by the Zapatistas. "The members of the
Convention rose to their feet, their faces livid with
indignation, trembling, and shaking their fists at the
speaker," Canova wrote to Bryan shortly afterward. "The
delegates screamed at one another, with left hands
pounding their chests, and their right hands on their
pistols, for all were mad." Ready to flee himself, the
special agent revealed that "from the crowded boxes and
galleries of the theatre, humanity was tumbling over it-
19self in a mad effort to escape imminent danger."
The threat of violence was only temporary. Tempers 
cooled, and the delegates allowed the Zapatistas to con­
tinue their appeal for the Plan of Ayala. Their audacity 
paid dividends. In a conciliatory mood, two days after 
the incident, the Convention adopted the Plan of Ayala 
"in principle," but retained the right to reject those
■*"^Cobb (for Canova) to Bryan, October 28, 29 , 1914/ 
13619, 13702.
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clauses that did not conform to the purposes of the Con- 
20vention. Although Canova was suspicious of Soto y
Gama's radicalism, he complimented the Zapatistas on their
persuasiveness and ability to win acceptance of their 
21
vx e ws.
On November 1, the Zapatistas also gave evidence of 
willingness to compromise by giving up their demand for a 
triumverate provisional executive, with one representative 
from the Army of the South, and agreed to support Eulalio 
Gutierrez, military governor of the state of San Luis
i
Potosi and a mild Carrancista, as provisional president.
Gutierrez was deemed independent enough that even the
22Villistas supported him. Canova was ecstatic. "Surely,
the Republic of Mexico was born again last night by the
selection of a man [around] whom all factions and elements
2 3
could center without discord," he wrote to Bryan. The
American agent was certain that Mexico was well on the way 
to solving its problems. Regardless of his overall 
optimism, he was forced to interject a discouraging note. 
20
Cobb (for Canova) to State Department, October 30, 
1914/13638.
21
Canova to State Department, letter, November 10, 
1914/13924.
2 2
Canova to State Department, November 2, 1914, 
Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 4 , 617; Quirk, The Mexican Revo­
lut ion , 115-18.
23
Canova to State Department, letter, November 2,
1914/13738.
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Carranza not only refused to attend the Convention, or
send a delegate to represent him, but absolutely refused
to acknowledge the assembly’s right to declare itself 
24sovereign.
Ominously, Carothers reported from Guadalupe that
Villa was furious over Carranza's recalcitrance. Villa
promised the special agent that he would apply no pressure
on the Convention to take punitive action, that he would
wait patiently, but if he was ordered to take the field
against the First Chief, he would "do so with keen 
2 5
pleasure." Even Villa became hopeful when the Con­
vention chose Gutierrez as provisional president. He 
immediately wired the Convention of his satisfaction and, 
to Carothers, he pledged his full support of the new 
provisional president. Speaking for himself, Villa, and 
V i l l a ’s staff, Carothers optimistically telegraphed the 
Department: "We all believe end of trouble is in
s i g h t .
John Silliman, meanwhile, had gone to Washington at 
Carranza's behest to confer personally with President 
Wilson. Well aware that Carothers had earlier visited
24
Canova to State Department, October 23, 1914,
Fo reign Rel a t i o n s , 1 9 1 4 , 612; Cobb (for Canova) to State 
Department, October 30, 1914/13638.
25
Carothers to State Department, October 23, 1914, 
Foreign Rel a t i o n s , 1914 , 611-12.
2 6
Cobb (for Carothers) to State Department, November
3, 1914/13671.
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Bryan in Villa's behalf, Carranza, on September 23, placed 
a special train at Silliman's disposal and requested that 
the American agent take a message to Washington. Leaving 
his assistant, John W. Belt, behind to represent the De­
partment in the First Chief's headquarters, Silliman de­
parted immediately for the border, even before receiving
2 7authority from his superiors. The special agent was, 
therefore, not available to lend any influence during the 
critical period while Obregon and the other conciliatory 
Carrancista generals were arranging the Convention of 
Aguascalientes. It is doubtful that he could have been 
of much service, since Carranza ignored him except when 
it was convenient to do otherwise.
Wilson and Bryan were not at all satisfied with
Silliman's service to the State Department. In August,
they had even considered replacing him. In the end, they
decided that because he was Wilson's old friend he at
least presented an aura of personally representing the
2 8President of the United States. This decision 
signaled their admission that they could do little to 
influence Carranza. Although they had retained Silliman's
27
Silliman to State Department, September 23, 1914, 
Foreign Relat i o n s , 1914 , 605 ; Silliman to State Department, 
September 25, 1914, NA 125.8273/120; Nueva Patria (Mexico 
City), September 26, 1914.
2 8
Bryan to Wilson, August 17, 1914, Wilson Papers,
Series II, Box 114; Wilson to Bryan, August 18, 1914,
Bryan Papers, Box 43.
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services, Wilson and Bryan did not wish to confer with him 
in October, especially since the agent's coming would be 
counter to their emerging policy of non-involvement.
When Silliman arrived in San Antonio, he received a 
telegram from Bryan, directing him not to proceed further 
unless he thought it absolutely necessary. Replying that 
he thought a conference with the President was "de-
29
sirable," the special agent continued on to the capital.
At no time before his arrival in Washington did 
Silliman reveal his reasons for coming. Since he de­
parted before the calling of the Convention of 
Aguascalientes, while Villa and Carranza were still very 
much at odds, the special agent had, more than likely, 
been asked to present Carranza's view of the conflict.
More definitely, he had been requested to renew the First 
Chief's demand for the evacuation of American troops from 
Vera C r u z . ^
As earlier revealed, Wilson had agreed to the
evacuation on September 16, after first Carranza, then
29
State Department to Silliman, October 1, 1914, NA 
125.8273/125; Silliman to State Department, October 2, 
1914/13363; New York T i m e s , September 27, 1914, II, p. 11; 
Ibid. , October 5, 1914, p. 11.
30
Silliman never revealed in his correspondence the 
exact nature of his visit, nor is there a record of his 
conversations with either Wilson or Bryan. There is 
little reason to doubt the accuracy of an account of his 
visit in the Washington P o s t , October 9, 1914, which re­
vealed that the Vera Cruz evacuation was the primary 
subject of his discussions with the President.
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Obregon and Villa, requested that he do so. Although
Wilson made the offer in good faith, at the time he was
not aware of all the implications involved in the
evacuation. General Frederick Funston, the American
commander in Vera Cruz, revealed, for example, that the
local merchants feared that the Constitutionalists might
force them to pay extra import duties on items for which
they had already paid duties to the American authorities.
He also indicated that Mexicans, who had served the
American military government, feared reprisals at the
hands of the Constitutionalists, as did the hundreds of
refugees, including priests and nuns and ex-Huertistas,
who had crowded into the port city. These revelations
had prompted Wilson, on September 22, to direct Robert
Lansing, the acting Secretary of State, to notify
Carranza that the evacuation would not take place until
he specifically guaranteed that there would be no
31punitive measures of this nature. The receipt of this
message may well have prompted Carranza to send Silliman 
to Washington.
Anticipating help from the American agent, the First 
Chief was slow in replying to Lansing’s note on September 
22. Impatiently, Bryan, on October 1, renewed the request 
31
War Department to State Department, September 21, 
1914, Foreign Relat i o n s , 1914 , 601-602; State Department 
to Oliveira, September 22, 1914, ibid., 603.
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for guarantees. Four days later, Foreign Minister Fabela
finally delivered a note to the Brazilian Minister,
Cardoso de Oliveira, which ignored the demand for
guarantees and merely notified Washington that General
Ccindido Aguilar had been designated to receive the port of
32Vera Cruz from General Funston. When Silliman arrived 
in Washington at approximately the same time, he walked 
into a hornets1 nest. Wilson and Bryan were in no mood 
to listen to any pro-Carranza trappings. Instead, they 
directed their agent to personally address a message, 
informing Fabela that his note had not been "suf­
ficiently explicit" on the matter of guarantees. When, 
again, no reply was immediately forthcoming, Silliman
was sent packing back to Mexico to extract the guarantees
33from the First Chief.
En route to Vera Cruz, Silliman told reporters in
Havana that he was confident the evacuation problems
34
could be "straightened out." He also sent encouraging
news from Vera Cruz. He spoke to General Aguilar, who was
quite willing to issue a proclamation embodying the
35guarantees requested by President Wilson. Upon
32gtate Department to Oliveira, October 1, 1914, 
i b i d . , 608; Oliveira to State Department, October 5, 1914, 
i b i d . , 609 .
33state De partment to Oliveira (conveying Silliman to 
Fabela, October 7, 1914), October 7, 1914, ib i d . . 609-10; 
Was h i n g t o n  P o s t , October 9, 1914.
3^New York T i m e s , October 13, 1914, p. 7.
35canada (for Silliman) to State Department, October 
16, 1914/13514.
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returning to Mexico City, Silliman reported that even the
Convention had instructed Carranza to adhere to the de-
3 6mands of the United States. Knowing well Silliman's
pro-Carranza attitude, the capital city press, meanwhile, 
had interpreted the agent's conversations with Aguilar as 
preliminaries to the immediate withdrawal of American 
troops. His return to Mexico was heralded as evidence 
of growing cordiality between the United States and 
Carranza. ^
Following his instructions, Silliman was forced 
to dispel this impression. He again pressed the First 
Chief for guarantees that no punitive action would be 
taken against the people of Vera Cruz. In reply,
Carranza acknowledged the justice of the American demands, 
but refused to accede to them. If he did so, he in­
sisted, he would set a dangerous precedent by allowing 
a foreign power to dictate what constituted proper
treatment of Mexican nationals by their own legally
3 8constituted authorities. Carranza's super-sensitive
nationalism again proved a stumbling-block, and the
Vera Cruz matter remained unsettled until late November.
^ S i l l i m a n  to State Department, October 19, 1914/ 
13537.
37E1 P u e b l o , October 18, 20, 1914; El L i beral,
October 18, 1914; 121 Democrat a (Mexico City), October 19, 
1914.
33Silliman to State Department, October 19, 1914/ 
13537.
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The First Chief, of course, still considered himself to 
be the only legal authority in Mexico. By taking this 
stand, he defied not only Wilson but the Convention, 
which demanded with equal vigor that it was the guardian 
of Mexican sovereignty.
Carranza set himself against the Convention as soon 
as it adopted measures that were counter to his Plan of 
Guadalupe. His opposition was not born of cynicism. He 
was convinced of his own rectitude. There were cynics 
aplenty among his close advisors. During the first days 
of the Convention, while Silliman was absent, Belt re­
ported that Fabela was contemptuous of the deliberations 
at Aguascalientes. The Carrancista Foreign Minister told 
the acting American agent that only war could solve the 
conflict between his chief and Villa. He off-handedly 
suggested that it would be better to get the fighting 
over with now, while Mexico was prostrate, rather than 
allow her to be rebuilt, then destroy herself again.
Luis Cabrera, another of Carranza's closest associates, 
told Belt that he, too, had little faith in the Con­
vention's ability to find amicable solutions to Mexico's 
problems. More fighting seemed inevitable, especially
since the Convention was made up entirely of military
39men and accepted no civilian influence.
3 9
Belt to State Department, October 8 (two), 1914/ 
13433, 13443.
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By the time Silliman returned to Mexico City,
Carranza seemed resigned to the necessity of fighting
Villa. On November 2, the special agent reported that
the First Chief had left the city. Although ostensibly
on a sight-seeing tour of the pyramids at Teotihuacan,
Silliman informed Washington that he did not expect
Carranza to return. Since Mexico City was occupied by
the soldiers of General Lucio Blanco, a delegate to the
Convention, the First Chief and his civilian entourage
did not feel secure there. Silliman reported that
Carranza had taken refuge with General Francisco Coss in
Cdrdoba. The American agent also reported that the First
Chief, safe in his new sanctuary, had announced his
40willingness to fight those who opposed him.
Perhaps the’ cynics were correct. It seemed more and 
more apparent that, despite its promising beginning, the 
Convention could not restore harmony in the revolutionary 
family. Carranza’s intransigence remained a stumbling 
block. The Convention also became intractable, insisting 
that Carranza adhere strictly to its dictates. In making 
their decisions, the delegates seemed more intent upon 
subjecting their former chief to their will than upon 
promoting the welfare of the Mexican people. If the early, 
40
Silliman to State Department, October 19, 20, 22
(two), November 3, 4, 1914/13535, 13547, 13570, 13571,
13675, 13689 ; Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 104-105.
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seemingly constructive, actions of the Convention had en­
couraged Wilson to adopt a hands-off policy, conversely, 
its later, nihilistic tendencies may well have pointed up 
the folly of siding with any faction and encouraged him 
to continue non-involvement.
In the last days of October and the first days of 
November, the Convention attempted a complete transfer 
of power from the First Chief to its own provisional 
president. On October 29, Carranza, speaking through 
General Obregcfn, indicated a "disposition" to resign if 
the Convention would compel Villa and Zapata to do the 
same. The Convention made no decision concerning Zapata 
but did vote overwhelmingly to accept the resignations 
of Carranza and Villa. Although Villa expressed a will­
ingness to abide by this mandate, he also reported that 
his troops were ready to support the assembly should 
Carranza decline. A commission headed by Obregdn was 
sent to notify Carranza that his resignation had been 
accepted. When the First Chief refused to receive the 
commission at Cordoba, the Convention declared that un­
less he surrendered the executive power to the Pro­
visional President by 6:00 p.m., November 10, he would be 
declared a rebel. Carranza thereupon directed his 
generals to withdraw from the Convention and take command 
of their respective units. When the allotted time
397
41elapsed, the Convention declared him a rebel.
The civil war was renewed as Gutierrez called Villa
out of "retirement" and ordered him to take the field
against Carranza. Before the battle began, there were
last-ditch attempts to avert bloodshed. Various plans
for exiling both Carranza and Villa were proposed by the
generals. The two chief antagonists even agreed to
accept one or more of these plans if the other first gave
evidence of compliance. While these tragi-comedies were
being enacted, with none of the performers showing the
divine spark necessary to bring them to happy conclusion,
42Villa was driving southward.
Canova remained convinced that the Convention was 
making the right decisions. Literally smitten by the 
atmosphere of this assemblage, he could find no faults 
with its actions. At the same time, Carranza became the 
arch-villain in his eyes. "The continuance of General 
Carranza in power," he wrote to Bryan shortly after the 
First Chief had refused to turn over the executive power
41
Canova to State Department, October 29, 30,
November 2, 5, 9, 10, 1914, Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 4 , 615- 
20; Cobb (for Canova) to State Department, November 2, 4, 
5, 6 , 11, 1914/13658, 13684, 13694, 13704, 13741;
Silliman to State Department, November 9, 1914/13729.
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Canova to State Department, November 14, 15, 16, 
1914, Fo reign Relat i o n s , 1914 , 622-23 ; Carothers to State 
Department, ib i d . , 625; Silliman to State Department, 
November 11, 12, 13, 14, 16 (two), 18, 1914/13742, 13756, 
13772, 13779, 13793, 13795, 13816.
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to Gutierrez, "would in no manner symbolize the triumph of
the revolution, for it would only mean the overthrow of
one dictator to place another in power." The First Chief,
Canova insisted, had forgotten all the altruism that
moved him when they first met in Monterrey during the
month of June. Now, only personal ambition directed his 
43actions.
Carranza's generals also drew Canova's ire. When
many of them broke with the Convention and sided with
the First Chief, Canova too readily assumed that they did
so because of disappointed political ambitions. Generals
Eduardo Hay, Antonio Villarreal, and Alvaro Obregdn, he
insisted, had all "hoped that presidential lightening
44
would strike them. The other delegates, however, had
grown wise to their ambitions and had eliminated them as
45
presidential prospects.
Villarreal and Hay, Canova believed, had then sought 
to salvage some measure of pre-eminence by promoting the 
interests of their close confederate, Lucio Blanco. The 
plot was actually initiated by a group of unscrupulous 
Americans, which Canova called the "Brownsville syndicate." 
The syndicate was headed by Frank W. R a b b , U.S. Customs
^ C a n o v a  to State Department, November 6 , 1914/13788.
44
Canova to State Department, November 12, 1914/
13923.
45
Canova to State Department, November 10, 17, 1914/
13924, 13935.
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Collector at Brownsville, Texas; M. J. Slatter, publisher
of a Brownsville newspaper; and Edwin Brodix of San
Antonio. Canova thought that Senator Morris Sheppard of
Texas might also be implicated. Although Canova did not
suggest it in his despatches, the syndicate members may
well have been acquainted with Blanco, Hay, and Villarreal
for some time, since all three were from Northern Mexico.
Although he only supposed that Hay and Villarreal were
involved, the special agent claimed to have proof that
Blanco was receiving financial support from the syndicate.
In return, they expected land grants and business con-
4 6cessions from Blanco if he attained power.
In September, Canova reported R a b b 's presence in 
Mexico City but made no mention of the syndicate. In 
late October, Rabb came to Canova in Aguascalientes and 
hinted that the special agent would be richly rewarded if 
he used his influence with the members of the Convention 
to promote Blanco for the provisional presidency.
According to his report of the episode, Canova declined 
to support Blanco. The syndicate, nonetheless, had 
continued to direct pro-Blanco propaganda at the delegates. 
After Gutierrez was elected provisional president , the 
syndicate's plans changed. Hay and Villarreal supposedly 
became involved. Their scheme now called for Blanco to 
perform some act of heroism against Carranza that would 
46
Canova to Bryan, letter, November 12, 1914/27413.
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endear him to the Conventionists; then, when Gutierrez's 
temporary term expired, Blanco would be in a position to 
succeed h i m . ^
After Carranza showed irrevocably that he would not 
support the Convention, Canova, although claiming that he 
was not a party to the Brownsville syndicate's machi­
nations, decided, on his own, to encourage the conspirators 
as a means of eliminating the First Chief. Pointing out 
that Blanco's troops occupied Mexico City, the special 
agent suggested to Slattery and Brodix that their hero 
could demonstrate his devotion to the Convention by seizing 
Carranza and holding him hostage. The Carrancista oppo­
sition would, he hoped, falter, the convention would be 
grateful, and Blanco would certainly stand in line to 
succeed Gutierrez as provisional president or, possibly 
better, be a logical candidate for the elective presidency. 
According to Canova*s report of the incident, the two 
American conspirators l^eft immediately for the capital. 
Carranza, meanwhile grew wary of Blanco and fled to
47 Ib i d . ; Canova to State Department, September 2, 
1914/27409. In September, Canova assumed that Rabb was 
merely on vacation in Mexico. The special agent had even 
sent one of his lengthy reports to the border with Rabb.
The syndicate's conspiracy may well have been operational 
at that time. In the month of September, Blanco played a 
critical role in persuading the other Carrancista 
generals to agree to the Convention of Aguascalientes.
His subsequent actions revealed that he was extremely 
ambitious. See Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 84-85 , 89.
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Cordoba. The syndicate, nevertheless, continued to plot
4 8Blanco's rise to power. The upshot of these fruitless
connivances was to again point out to Washington how the 
personal ambitions of many of the Mexican leaders seemed 
to take precedence over statesmanship.
While Canova pilloried Carranza and his generals, he 
also extolled Villa's virtues, picturing him as the most 
stable influence in Mexico. "General Villa is the only 
individual who can put the country on a peaceful footing 
and establish confidence," he wrote to Bryan. "Were he 
to leave the country at this time, or before a duly
Canova to State Department, letter, November 12, 
1914/27413. Before Bryan received the above letter, M. J. 
Slattery, Senator Sheppard, and one Henry Borden tele­
graphed Secretary of Treasury M c A d o o , requesting that 
Customs Collector R a b b 's leave-of-absence be extended.
Each insisted that Rabb was performing invaluable service 
in promoting peace in Mexico. When McAdoo brought the 
matter to Bryan's attention, the Secretary of State 
replied that he knew of no service Rabb could provide in 
Mexico. See McAdoo to Bryan (conveying Sheppard to 
McAdoo, November 3, 1914; Borden to McAdoo, November 6 , 
1914; Slatter to McAdoo, November 8 , 1914), November 9, 
1914, and Bryan to McAdoo, November 11, 1914/13765.
Later, Blanco asked Silliman to appeal for an extension 
of R a b b 's leave. With Bryan absent from Washington,
Acting Secretary of State Robert Lansing, handled the 
matter and did not request the customs collector's re­
call. Not until December, when Carothers became aware 
of R a b b 's activities, did he and Canova request that 
R a b b 's leave be cancelled. Even then the Treasury De­
partment requested proof of wrongdoing before recalling 
him. See Silliman to State Department, November 14, 
1914/13778; Lansing to McAdoo, November 16, 1914/ibid.; 
McAdoo to Lansing, November 23, 1914/13893; Carothers to 
State Department, December 9, 1914/13985; Bryan to McAdoo, 
December 10, 1914/ibid.; A. Peters, Assistant Secretary 
of Treasury, to Bryan, December 15, 1914/14035; Testi­
mony of Carothers, Investigation of Mexican Affairs, 
1779-80.
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elected Administration is inaugurated in office, Mexico
4 9would witness, and be the victim of anarchy. . . . "
Canova also sanctioned the Conventionist war against 
Carranza. "Sometimes it is necessary that a painful 
surgical operation has to be undergone in order that the 
body may return to good health," he concluded. "And 
while I regret to say it, a clash of arms will be in the 
end the best thing for the country, for it will clarify 
the political atmosphere.
More than Carothers, Canova had become Villa's 
champion in the State Department. More accurately re­
flecting the Administration's current attitude, Carothers 
remained noncommittal. He neither justified nor advocated 
the Conventionist, hence the Villista, cause. He merely 
reported the general's actions to Washington. When 
Carranza was declared a rebel, Carothers, in business­
like fashion, informed Bryan that he had designated Canova 
to remain with Provisional President Gutidrrez, while he 
accompanied Villa and the Conventionist armies. In the
process, he would see to the protection of foreign lives 
51
and property.
49 Canova to State Department, letter, November 12, 
1914/13923.
^ C a n o v a  to State Department, November 16, 1914/13866.
■’^ Cobb (for Carothers) to State Department, November 
4, 8 , 11, 17, 18, 19, 20, 1914/13692, 13714, 13745, 13807, 
13814, 13833, 13838.
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Among the American agents, however, Carothers re­
mained the main target of Carrancista rancor. Even before 
the Convention disowned the First Chief, the Constitution­
alist agents in Washington issued a press release de­
claring that Carothers was trying to put Villa in power
5 2in order to secure large concessions for himself. After 
the break, El_ P u e b l o , one of Carranza's Mexico City 
organs, devoted its November 12 editorial section to an 
attack on Carothers. The column declared that he did not 
possess the qualities of a serious diplomat. He was 
merely an "intruder" who, under the protection of diplo­
matic immunity, was attempting to influence the Convention 
against Carranza and in favor of Villa. He was particular­
ly condemned for having gone to Washington to plead 
Villa's case to Wilson and Bryan (the editorial failed to 
mention that Silliman had just returned from a similar 
mission in Carranza's behalf). Branding Carothers "an
active agent of discord" and a "propagandist of rebellion,"
53the editorial demanded his recall. During the remainder 
of his service in Mexico, Carothers was a target of the 
Carrancista p r e s s . ^
52
New York T i m e s , October 29, 1914, p. 4; New York 
W o r l d , October 29, 1914.
5 3
"Carothers," EJL Pue b l o , November 12, 1914, p. 3.
54
New York H e r a l d , December 21, 1914; 121. P u e b l o . 
January 9, 1915; E_1 Democrat a (Mexico City), September 8 ,
9, October 24, 28, 1915.
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Only incidently did the Carrancistas criticize Canova.
They accused him of allying with Carothers to present a
far too optimistic view of the proceedings of
55Aguascalientes. On the other hand, press comments 
concerning Special Agent Silliman were uniformly compli­
mentary. On November 5, El Pueblo made it clear that 
Silliman did not share the views of the other agents in 
Mexico. Even during the negotiations for the evacuation 
of Vera Cruz, when Silliman was supposedly dictating 
W i l s o n ’s terms, he was depicted as a fair-minded diplomat. 
Perhaps hoping to induce the Wilson Administration to 
have Silliman join him again, Carranza personally sent
word to E_1 Sol that Silliman had always been impartial
5 6and just in his dealings with the Constitutionalists.
As Villa mounted his campaign on Mexico City, the 
Carrancista generals made agonizing decisions. The 
Conventionist armies were larger and better equipped. Yet 
the near assassination of Obregdn revealed that an 
alliance with Villa could be hazardous. The key figure 
was Obregdn. He had worked diligently to promote peace 
among the revolutionary factions. He had been willing to 
support Gutierrez until the provisional president turned 
Conventionist forces over to Villa. Chosing between the
-*-*El Pueb l o , October 26, November 4, 1914; New York 
W o r l d , November 20, 1914.
~*^ E1 P u e b l o , October 20 , 30 , November 5, 1914; El 
Sol, November 12, 23, 30, 1914.
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lesser of two evils, Obrego'n sided with Carranza.
Gonzalez preceded him, and their decisions swayed others. 
Without their support, Carranza would have been no match 
for the Conventionists. As it turned out, he was a 
formidable f o e . ^
At the outset of the fighting, the First Chief's 
situation was precarious to say the least. His forces 
hemmed in at Cdrdoba and Puebla, he had no access to the 
North nor to the nearby port of Vera Cruz. Since mid- 
October he had remained immovable in his refusal to dis­
avow punitive measures against the people of Vera Cruz. 
After his break with the Convention, prudence dictated 
that he give in to Wilson's demands. On November 9, he 
issued a proclamation of amnesty for all Mexicans who 
had served the American government in the port city. The 
next day, Fabela notified the Brazilian Minister that the 
Chamber of Commerce of Vera Cruz had circulated a 
petition among the commercial interests of the city 
which revealed that they were satisfied they would re­
ceive fair treatment from the Constitutionalists. Claim­
ing that their action had been spontaneous, Fabela 
revealed that the First Chief had magnanimously agreed to 
levy no further duties in cases where they had already
"^Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 123-26.
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5 8been paid. Villa, meanwhile, sent word to Washington
through Carothers that the port should be turned over to
t 5 9authorities designed by Gutierrez. Holding the port 
for the Conventionists was fraught with danger, because 
the Constitutionalists now looked upon the possession 
of the city as necessary to their very survival. The 
possibility of clashes between American and Consti­
tutionalist troops, therefore, seemed a distinct 
possibility.
True to his recently adopted policy of non-entangle­
ment, Wilson, on November 13, directed Bryan to send word 
to the Brazilian Minister, Carothers, and Canova, who, 
in turn, were to notify Carranza, Villa, and Gutierrez 
that the United States would begin evacuating her troops 
from Vera Cruz in ten days. No authorities were desig­
nated to receive the port. Nothing more than an official 
notice of evacuation was given. Orders were sent to
General Funston that he was to make no arrangements with
6 0representatives of any faction. By early afternoon of
5 8
Silliman to State Department, November 9, 1914, 
Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 4 , 618; Oliveira to State Department, 
November 10, 1914, ib i d . , 618-20.
59 Cobb (for Carothers) to State Department, November 
10, 1914/13734.
fi n
Wilson to Bryan, November 13, 1914/13766; State 
Department to Oliveira, Carothers, Canova, and various 
United States Embassies, November 13, 1914, Foreign Re- 
lat ions , 1 9 1 4 , 621-22; War Department to Funston,
November 20, 1914, ibid., 625.
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November 23, the last troops had embarked, and, shortly 
thereafter, General Aguilar, who was lurking nearby, 
occupied the city in the name of the Constitutionalists. 
Carranza's possession of Vera Cruz proved a decisive 
factor in his war against the Conventionists. The city 
became the seat of his provisional government and the 
port proved invaluable as an access to outside sources 
of supply.^
With Villa driving relentlessly toward Mexico City, 
Carranza ordered his remaining troops evacuated on 
November 19. Since it was feared that looting and civil 
disorder would follow the evacuation of the Consti­
tutionalist troops, Carranza's directive caused wide­
spread alarm in the city. Silliman and Cardoso de 
Oliveira reported that the departing soldiers were doing 
their share of the looting. All the automobiles, horses, 
and any other items that the army could utilize were 
confiscated. The homes of the Constitutionalists' 
enemies were systematically sacked. More frightening 
than the looting by the Constitutionalists, was the 
prospect of a hun-like decent upon the city by the 
Zapatistas, who were already occupying the suburbs. On 
the 20th, Carrancista officials invited the diplomatic 
corps to follow the retreating armies of Puebla; other­
wise, the Constitutionalists would accept no responsibility
^ Q u i r k ,  An Affair of H o n o r , 169-70.
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for their safety. Realizing that such a move would imply
at least moral support of Carranza, the diplomatic corps
6 2unanimously declined the invitation.
Causing further alarm, rumor spread that Villa and 
Zapata had promised their troops two hours of un­
restricted looting upon capturing Mexico City. Although 
Silliman and Cardoso de Oliveira suspected the fleeing 
Constitutionalists of spreading the rumor in order to 
discredit their opponents, Acting Secretary of State 
Lansing directed Carothers to look into the matter. The 
special agent promptly replied that Villa had issued 
orders to the effect that anyone caught looting or 
molesting civilians would be executed on on the spot.
Carothers further revealed that Villa was maintaining
6 3excellent order in the cities and towns he occupied.
The ever-ambitious Lucio Blanco, after listening to 
the pleas of Silliman and Oliveira, defied the orders of 
Carranza and Obregon and agreed to remain behind in the 
capital city to insure order until the Conventionists 
6 2 Silliman to State Department, November 19 (two),
20 (two), 21, 1914/13829, 13832, 13844, 13848, 13854; 
Oliveira to State Department, November 20 (two), 1914/ 
13845, 13849.
6 3
Oliveira to State Department, November 20, 21, 
1914/13845, 13863; State Department to Carothers, November 
21, 1914/13845; Cobb (for Carothers) to State Department, 
November 21, 25, 1914/13856, 13906; Carothers to State 
Department, December 16, 1914/14061.
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arrived. No doubt still looking for any opportunity to
establish a reputation for gallantry, his courage
ultimately failed him as attacks by the Zapatistas
intensified, and he, too, evacuated the hapless city.
Retiring to Toluca, Blanco maintained a precarious
neutrality for about a week before casting his lot with
64the Convention.
Apprehension got the best of Silliman as well. Ad­
mitting that he had "been able to accomplish very little 
with Carranza," the special agent still believed he 
should rejoin the First Chief. The Brazilian Minister, 
anticipating an increase in his activities with the 
arrival of the Conventionists, recommended to Washington 
that Silliman be retained in Mexico City to aid in the 
work of the Brazilian Legation. Considering all of 
Cardoso de Oliveira's work in behalf of the United States, 
Secretary of State Bryan was pleased to partially repay
the Minister for his efforts by directing Silliman to
6 5remain in Mexico City.
On the evening of November 24, the Zapatistas began 
6 4
Silliman to State Department, November 21, 23, 24 
(two), 1914/13854, 13895, 13881, 13888; Oliveira to State 
Department, November 24, 1914/13858; Silliman to State 
Department, November 22, 1914, Foreign Relations, 1914, 
625-26.
f i
Canada (for Silliman) to State Department,November
24, 1914/13886; Oliveira to State Department, November
25, 1914, and State Department to Oliveira, November 27, 
1914, NA 125.8273/131.
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occupying the capital. A commisssion sent by Minister 
Cardoso de Oliveira was assured that order would be 
maintained. Contrary to expectations, the Zapatistas were 
more timid than fearsome. Allene Tupper Wilkes, daughter 
of Dr. Henry Allen Tupper of the International Peace 
Forum, who was present at the time, wrote that the 
soldiers from the South, instead of looting, went quietly 
from door to door begging for food. There were a few 
incidents of violence. A disagreement flared between 
some soldiers and the police. The Zapatistas being 
country folk, and fearing that they were being attacked 
by a machine of war, fired on a fire engine as it clanged 
down a dark street. For the most part, the city was quiet 
and order r e i g n e d . ^
Zapata, himself, arrived in the capital on the 26th. 
Ever wary, he remained near the railway station and refused 
to even go to ceremonies held in his honor at the National 
Palace. Silliman personally called upon the revolutionary 
chieftain and thanked him for the peaceful conditions en­
joyed by the city's inhabitants. Zapata was most cordial, 
and prospects for friendly relations seemed good. But on 
6 6
Canada (for Silliman) to State Department, November 
24, 1914/13888; Silliman to State Department, November 25, 
30, 1914/13896, 13939; Oliveira to State Department, 
November 25, 27, 1914/13898, 13919; Allene Tuper Wilkes, 
"The Gentle Zapatistas," H a r p e r 's W e e k l y , LX (January 16, 
1915), 56-57; New York T i m e s , November 25, 1914, p. 1; 
Ramirez Plancarte, La Ciudad de M e x i c o , 255-56.
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the 28th, as Villa's armies approached, Zapata again 
disappeared into his mountain r e t r e a t . ^
Bryan was cheered by the recent events in Mexico City. 
"The situation seems to be clearing up . . . ," he wrote
to the President. Assuming that the Conventionists would 
make short work of Carranza and that Gutierrez's govern­
ment would soon be the power to reckon with, Bryan recom­
mended that a note be sent to the provisional president, 
offering congratulations and restating the position of 
the United States on the matter of protection of foreign 
interests and the granting of amnesty to political 
enemies. Wilson refused to be drawn into even the 
slightest association with the Conventionists. He told 
Bryan that such a note should be sent only "through some 
person known to be persona grata to those now in charge
of affairs in Mexico City and who can convey it
6 8confidentially and unofficially." Gutierrez received 
no encouragement from Washington.
By December 1, Villa was on the outskirts of Mexico 
6 7Silliman to State Department, November 30, 1914/ 
13939; Oliveira to State Department, November 29, 1914, 
Foreign Relat ions , 1914 , 627 ; JS1_ Pueb lo (Vera Cruz) , 
December 3, 1914. The staff of IS1 Pueb lo evacuated 
Mexico City along with the Carrancista forces and re­
established in Vera Cruz as the principal organ of the 
Constitutionalist faction.
6 8Bryan to Wilson, December 2, 1914, and Wilson to
Bryan, December 3, 1914, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence.
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City, in Tacuba. There, Carothers, who accompanied Villa, 
and Canova, who accompanied Gutierrez and the Permanent 
Commission chosen by the Convention, were reunited. The 
two American agents immediately entered the city to 
establish liaison with the Brazilian Minister. In a 
meeting with Cardoso de Oliveira and Silliman, it was 
agreed that each agent would have a specific sphere of 
authority. Carothers was to handle matters involving 
Villa, while Canova was to continue making representations 
to Gutierrez and the Permanent Commission of the Con­
vention. Cardoso de Oliveira was to be informed of and 
acceded to all important decisions. When Gutierrez chose 
a Foreign Minister, Cardoso de Oliveira would conduct 
official relations between Washington and the Convention.
Silliman was to remain at the disposal of the Brazilian 
69Legat i o n .
These matters having been decided, Carothers and 
Canova were presented to the diplomatic corps at a 
reception given by Minister Cardoso de Oliveira. The 
diplomats were unanimous in their concern for the con­
tinued peace of the capital. The currently quiet 
conditions had not overcome Villa and Zapata's blood­
thirsty reputations. The ministers complained that there
69
Oliveira to State Department, December 1, 1914, NA 
125.36582/114; Cobb (for Carothers) to State Department, 
December 5, 1914/13965; Canova to State Department, 
December 8 , 1914/14048.
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were still rumors current that Villa and Zapata planned 
murder, pillage, and rape upon entering the city in force. 
The two American agents assured the diplomats that their 
fears were unfounded, but added that they would again 
appeal to the two generals for renewed guarantees of
i 70clemency.
The next day, Carothers went on a mission for Villa, 
an action that was more characteristic of his past 
activities. He joined Roque Gonzalez Garza, who also 
represented Villa, and two Zapatistas who had accompanied 
Villa from Aguascalientes, in journeying to Cuernavaca. 
Their purpose was to draw Zapata out of his stronghold. 
Until now, Villa had not coordinated his military effort 
with Zapata’s. As a result, the chieftain of the South 
had become wary of Villa* He feared that the Con- 
ventionists might occupy Mexico City as Carranza had in 
August and completely ignore the interests of the people 
of the South. Carothers and Gonzalez Garza hoped to 
dispell those fears. After being cordially received, they 
presented Zapata with a letter from Villa and attempted 
to persuade him that he would be safe in Mexico City. 
Zapata told Carothers that Villa alone, among the revo­
lutionary leaders, had ever commanded his slightest 
confidence. Still he refused to leave his sanctuary 
altogether. He would agree only to hold a preliminary
7Qlbid. ; Testimony of Carothers, Investigation of
Mexican A f f a i r s , 1775.
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conference with Villa in Xochimilco at the edge of his 
71domain. It was the first time that anyone had been able
to coax Zapata out of his mountains.
Canova, meanwhile, accompanied Gutierrez and Villa
into Mexico City. They entered with no fanfare, and few
people even knew that Villa was present. This was as
Villa wanted it. He did not want to alienate Zapata by
giving the slightest appearance of occupying the city.
He remained only to attend the ceremony establishing
Gutierrez and the Permanent Commission in the National
72Palace, then he retired to Tacuba.
On December 4, both Carothers and Canova took part in 
one of the most dramatic and picturesque events of the 
entire revolution, the first meeting of Pancho Villa and 
Emiliano Zapata. In a borrowed automobile, the two 
agents motored out to Xochimilco. Upon arriving they 
found no activity. Fearful that the conference had been 
abandoned, they sped back toward Mexico City. While en 
route, they came upon Villa and his party leisurely 
trotting along on horseback, taking in the scenery as they
^ C o b b  (for Carothers) to State Department, December 
6 , 1914/13966; Carothers to State Department, December 16, 
1914/14061; EJL Monitor (Mexico City), December 6 , 1914;
El Paso Morning T i m e s , December 8 , 1914.
7 2Cobb (for Canova) to State Department, December 7,
8, 1914/13974, 14048; El M o n i t o r , December 4, 1914.
415
went. When they arrived in the city of the floating 
gardens at midday, a great throng had gathered to see the 
two already legendary leaders. The city was brightly 
decorated, and well-drilled school children sang songs of 
welcome. Zapata greeted Villa warmly. He was deeply 
appreciative that Villa had ventured into Zapatista 
territory. The Centaur of the North treated him as an 
equal, quite a change from the treatment Zapata had re­
ceived from C a r r a n z a . ^
The two Americans joined in the conference held in 
the municipal school building. Canova reported that, at 
first, Villa and Zapata "sat in an embarrassed silence, 
occasionally broken by some insignificant remark, like 
two country sweethearts." Finally, someone called 
Carranza an old "cabrdn." The ice broken, the room 
errupted with profanity. Canova captured the color of 
the meeting. His characterizations are well worth 
quoting in length. Pointing out the distinct contrast 
between the two chieftains, the special agent noted:
General Villa, tall, robust, weighing about 
180 pounds, with a complexion almost as florid 
as a German, was wearing an English (pith) 
helmet, a heavy brown sweater, khaki trousers, 
leggings and heavy riding shoes. Zapata to his 
left, with his immense sombrero shading his 
eyes so that they could not be seen, had a dark
^ C a n o v a  to State Department, December 8 , 1914/ 
14048; EJL M o n i t o r , December 5, 1914; Womack, Za p a t a , 220. 
Edgcomb Pinchon, Zapata the Unconquerable (New York: 
Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1941), 298-300.
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complexion, thin face, a man much shorter in 
stature than Villa and weighing about 130 
pounds. He wore a short black coat, a large 
blue silk neckerchief, pronounced lavender 
shirt and used alternately a white hanker- 
chief with a green border and another with 
all the colors of the flowers. He had on a 
pair of black, tight-fitting Mexican trousers 
with silver buttons down the outside seam of 
each leg . . . Sitting in the semi-circle as
we were, and watching every play of his 
[Villa’s] and Zapata's countenance, I could 
not but measure Villa as the highest type of 
warrior, a man of great energy and unbounded 
self-confidence. Zapata . . . seemed to be
studying Villa all the time . . . He is an
idealist. One may say a dreamer, like the 
ill-fated Jose Marti of Cuba . . . One
wonders in looking at him where his qualities 
of a leader are hidden, but it seems to have 
been his honesty of purpose, his constancy to 
the interests of his people and his unfailing 
kindness to them, which have made him the 
great leader he is. . . .74
After they had dined, the two leaders retired to an 
adjoining room for a private conference, at which time 
they agreed on future military campaigns against 
C a r r a n z a . ^  When Carothers considered that enough time 
had elapsed for adequate exchange of expressions, he 
entered the room. With no current instructions from 
Washington to guide him, the special agent let his past
Canova to State Department, December 8 , 1914/ 
14048. The passage quoted above, plus other portions of 
Canova’s report, are often quoted or cited. For example, 
see Link, The Struggle For Neutrality, 264 ; Quirk, The 
Mexican Revolut i o n , 135-36 ; Womack, Zap at a , 220-21;
Atkin, Revolution: M e x i c o , 1910- 1920 , 2 32-33.
7 5 /
"Pacto de Xochimilco," Gonzalez Ramirez, Planes / 9 9  - ■
Politicos £  otros documentos, 113-21.
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experience be his guide. He told the revolutionary 
chieftains that "the world was watching their actions" and 
that "the peace of Mexico depended upon their joint co­
operation." He also intimated that they could expect the 
continued friendship of the United States. The two 
generals, in turn, expressed their gratitude for the moral 
support that they had received. They insisted that they 
expected no other form of assistance and would attempt 
to vindicate W i l s o n ’s faith in their previous efforts.
They also revealed that their armies would enter Mexico 
City jointly on December 6 , and pledged that it would be a 
peaceful occupation. The American agents were relieved. 
Ever optimistic, Canova reported to Bryan that the union
affected at Xochimilco offered "great promise for the
7 fiearly establishment of peace in Mexico." Receiving an 
Associated Press account of the Xochimilco conference 
even before the reports of his agents, Bryan was equally 
optimistic. He again proclaimed to President Wilson that
the end of their troubles in Mexico seemed to be in
• u *  7 7  sight.
At first, Bryan's optimism seemed justified. On the 
6th, Villa and Zapata, side-by-side, at the head of their 
7 fi
Canova to State Department, December 8 , 1914/14048; 
Carothers to State Department, December 16, 1914/14061.
^ B r y a n  to Wilson, December 7, 1914, Wilson Papers,
Series II, Box 69.
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unified armies, made their triumphal entry into the
capital. Both Carothers, who worked to promote the union,
and Canova, who so ably described the chieftains’ first
encounter, did not witness the colorful procession. Both
were ill, Carothers delirious with fever from a severe
case of tonsillitis, Canova with a bad cold. The
historian could well use an eye-witness account of the
entry which might have come from Canova's pen. Fortunately,
7 8
photographers caught the scenes for posterity. From
Accounts of the entry that reached them, the two agents
were able to determine that it was entirely peaceful.
When Carothers was well enough, he made an investigation
and found that the populace of the city was welcoming the
7 9Conventionist armies with open arms.
On December 10, Villa sent word to Carothers that he 
was leaving for the North. Still quite ill, Carothers 
struggled to his rail car and made the journey. As they
7 8Oliveira to State Department, December 9, 1914, NA 
125.36582/116; Cobb (for Carothers), December 15, 1914/ 
14017. Canova did prepare a brief account of the entry 
which he reconstructed second-hand. See Canova to State 
Department, December 8 , 1914/14048. Photographs of the 
Villa-Zapata entry into Mexico City, and the even more 
famous ones of Villa sitting on the presidential throne 
in the National Palace, with Zapata by his side, have 
been reproduced in numerous publications. By far the most 
complete photographic account appears in Casasola's in­
valuable photographic history of the Mexican Revolution. 
See Historia G r ^ fica, II, 940-48.
7 9Carothers to State Department, December 16, 1914/
14061.
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traveled northward, Villa informed the special agent of 
his and Zapata's plans for the defeat of Carranza. The 
Conventionist forces were to be divided into three 
armies: one under Cabral, to clean up Sonora; one under
Zapata, to take Puebla and Vera Cruz; and his own, to 
conquer all northeastern Mexico, including Monterrey, 
Saltillo, Tampico, and Matamoros. The months of riding 
in a converted boxcar had taken their toll of Carothers' 
health. On the advice of his physician, he requested a 
two-week leave of absence. In doing so, he assured Bryan 
that "nothing of importance" would happen before January
Carothers was allowed no respite. Upon his arrival
in El Paso, he was directed to proceed to Naco on the
Sonora-Arizona border to attempt to end the strife that
81had raged there since September. During the months in
which Governor Maytorena beseiged General Hill in the
samll border town, a number of Americans had been killed
or wounded by stray bullets that crossed the border.
The War Department, meanwhile, sent some 5000 troops
under the command of General Tasker H. Bliss to watch
8 2
over the troubled area. On December 9, Bryan addressed
80lbid.; Carothers to State Department, December 16, 
1914, NA 125.36582/117.
SlCarothers to State Department, December 17, 1914/ 
14030. No copy of orders to Carothers was found, only 
his acknowledgement of receipt of the orders.
82ciendenen, Uni ted States and Pancho V i l l a , 141-42.
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identical notes to Carranza and Gutierrez, warning that
unless the firing across the border ceased, the U. S.
Army would "take such steps as may be necessary to protect
8 3
American lives. . . ." Gutierrez immediately wired
Maytorena to do everything possible, including the
suspension of hostilities, if necessary, to prevent
further firing across the border. In characteristic
fashion, Carranza denied any responsibility. He claimed
that the Carrancista troops, with their backs to the
border, were not firing at the United States. He also
denied that there was any justification for United States
84involvement in the Naco affair.
Carothers* job, then, was to secure a cease-fire 
agreement from the local commanders. The special agent 
conferred at length with Maytorena on December 18. 
Maytorena, anxious to avoid a clash with American troops, 
suggested that he withdraw his forces five or ten miles 
inland from Naco and that the port of Naco, Arizona, be 
closed to General Hill. Without access to supplies from 
across the border, Maytorena revealed, the Carrancistas 
would be forced to evacuate the town. With Hill being
O  O
State Department to Canada and Silliman, December 
9, 1914, Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 4 , 649.
O /
Silliman to State Department (conveying copy of 
Gutierrez to Maytorena, December 10, 1914), December 10, 
1914, ibid., 649-50; Zubar^n Capmany to State Department, 
December 12, 1914, ibid., 650-51; Canada to State De­
partment, December 13, 1914/13997.
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forced Inland for supplies, the fighting between the two
forces would take place away from the border. Since
General Bliss endorsed this move, Carothers recommended
8 5that the port of Naco be closed. Bryan also endorsed
Carothers' suggestion. Although Wilson expressed
sympathy for such a policy, he wrote to Bryan that he was
not certain that he had the legal right to close the port
8 6on such a pretext. Whereas months before he would have
cast aside such legal subtleties, he now insisted upon
consulting the law before taking action.
While Bryan looked into the legality of the matter,
General Hugh L. Scott, who had also been ordered to the
border to aid in arranging a cease-fire, joined Carothers,
and on December 24, they announced that they had
8 7negotiated a satisfactory settlement. Carrancista
generals Hill and Calles , as well as the First Chief's 
personal representative, Roberto V. Pesqueira, signed the 
agreement, but Maytorena refused, claiming that he first 
had to have orders from Provisional President Gutierrez. 
Both Gutierrez and Villa signified their acceptance of the 
8 5Carothers to State Department, December 19, 1914, 
Foreign Relations , 1914 , 652-53 ; 151 Pas o Morning Times , 
December 19, 1914.
8 6Bryan to Wilson, December 21, 1914, and Wilson to
Bryan, December 23, 1914, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence.
8 7
Scott to War Department, December 24, 1914/14100.
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arrangement, but Maytorena still hedged. Through Felix 
Sommerfeld, one of V i l l a ’s commercial agents on the 
border, Scott even secured a special order from Villa, 
directing Maytorena to evacuate the border town. On 
December 26, Maytorena began withdrawing his forces, but 
he either could not control his Yaqui Indian troops or 
only started the evacuation as a ruse. When some of 
Hill's troops moved out into the open, they were fired
g
upon. By December 30, the seige was on again in earnest.
On January 2, Villa announced that he would settle 
the matter once and for all. Through Sommerfeld, he 
notified Scott and Carothers that 8000 troops were on 
their way to Naco and, if they were allowed eight hours of 
fighting, would take the border town. Although both the 
Americans felt friendly toward Villa, they knew that such 
a battie would likely result in more shooting across the 
border. Scott, therefore, requested Carothers to urge 
Villa, who had returned to Mexico City, to personally come 
to the border and negotiate a cease-fire. On January 3, 
Carothers notified Washington that Villa had agreed to
8 8
I bid. ; Scott to Mrs. Scott, December 26, 27 , 1914 , 
Scott Papers, Box 4; Scott to Mrs. Scott, January 1, 1915, 
i b i d ., Box 5; Enrique Llorente, Confidential Agent of the 
Provisional Government of Mexico (Convention) to State De­
partment, December 26, 1914, Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 4 ,
654.
423
89come.
Villa was absenting himself from Mexico City at a
critical time. While he was in the North, arranging his
future military campaigns, conditions in the capital
changed drastically. Zapata had also vacated the city to
begin preparations for his attack on Puebla. Mexico City
was left in the hands of their more ruthless henchmen,
who immediately began a wholesale liquidation of political
enemies. On December 14, Canova reported that as many as
90
150 had already been executed. When, at Bryan's re­
quest , Silliman urged Gutierrez to end the executions, 
the Provisional President replied that he had not
authorized them, that the Villistas and the Zapat istas
91had not consulted him first. It was also apparent 
that he could no nothing to halt them.
The purge was only one of several incidents which 
made Gutierrez realize that Villa and Zapata intended to 
do as they pleased, regardless of whom had been delegated 
authority by the Convention. He had no army of his own,
89
Scott to Mrs. Scott, January 1, 1915, Scott Papers, 
Box 5; Happer (for Scott) to Carothers, January 3, 1915, 
ibid. , Box 16; Carothers to State Department, January 3, 
1915/14128.
90
Silliman to State Department, December 12, 1914/ 
13999; Canova to State Department, December 14, 15, 1914/ 
14008, 14018.
91
Bryan to Silliman, December 13, 1914, Foreign Re-
l a tions, 1 9 1 4 , 628-29; Silliman to State Department,
December 15, 1914/14019.
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no means of compelling them to submit to his will. Seek­
ing an escape from his dilemma, Gutierrez renewed 
communication with Obregon, Gonzalez, and other Consti­
tutionalist generals. He urged them to join him in 
organizing another convention in San Luis Potos^ which 
would eliminate Villa, Zapata, and Carranza. Since he 
was not at all secretive about his plans, Villa got wind 
of them in Guadalajara, where he was planning a campaign 
into Jalisco. Returning to the capital, he at first put 
Gutierrez under close surveillance, then quarreled 
violently with him, and ultimately placed him under house 
arrest. As usual, Villa's rage did not last long. With 
the intercession of General Jose I. Robles, he and 
Gutierrez were apparently reconciled. When Villa de­
parted for the border to join Carothers and Scott, he
9 2seemed to have matters under control.
Having set things in order in Mexico City, Villa 
arrived in Juarez on January 8 , 1915. He had a friendly 
chat with Scott and Carothers that evening on the inter­
national bridge between El Paso and Juarez. The next 
day, at a formal conference held in El Paso, Villa again 
tried to persuade the American negotiators to allow him 
to make a lightning attack on Naco and Agua Prieta after
92 Silliman to State Department, December 23, 26, 29,
30, 31, 1914, Foreign Relat i o n s , 1914 , 634-35 ; Silliman
to State Department, December 22, 28, 1914/14070, 14095.
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first giving American citizens an opportunity to with­
draw a safe distance away. When Scott replied that he 
could not accede to such a proposal, Villa insisted that 
the United States was being unreasonable. Carothers and 
Scott held fast and their perserverance paid off. Later 
that day, they persuaded Villa to direct Maytorena to 
sign the agreement made in December. All parties were 
to evacuate Naco. The Carrancistas were allowed to 
occupy Agua Prieta, nearby to the East. Maytorena might 
occupy Nogales, on the border west of Naco. Neither 
side was to attack the other in its border bastion. On 
January 11, Scott and Carothers brought together Maytorena 
and General Calles, who had replaced Hill, to sign the
formal agreement. The evacuation of Naco began shortly 
93thereafter.
Whatever Wilson's motives, his non-involvement policy 
had done nothing to diminish Villa's ascendancy. However 
coarse Villa's methods, he had proved his resourcefulness 
and his continued willingness to cooperate with American 
officials. If Wilson's policy was designed to give Villa
93
Scott to Mrs. Scott, January 9, 11, 1915, Scott 
Papers, Box 5; Carothers to State Department, January 9, 
1915, U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1924), 789; Agreement of 
January 11, 1915, between Governor Maytorena and General 
Calles, i b i d . , 789-90; Testimony of Carothers, Investi- 
gation of Mexican Af fairs , 1776 ; EJL Paso Morning Times , 
January 9, 10, 1915; Scott, Some Memories of a. S o ldier, 
505-13.
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a chance to prove himself, the strongman from Chihuahua 
certainly presented a facade of success. But many 
Mexicans, some who had trusted and supported him, were 
beginning to look beneath the veneer and abhor what they 
saw. The seeds of discord he had sown by his high­
handed methods in Mexico City were already bearing bitter 
fruit. Although he appeared to be at his zenith— a 
position he gained with the help of the United States—  
his power was already declining.
CHAPTER XI
A STEADY DISINTEGRATION
In his Jackson Day address delivered at Indianapolis 
on January 8 , 1915, Wilson re-affirmed his policy of non­
involvement in Mexico. In terms that would later give 
so much hope to millions in Europe, he proclaimed: "I 
hold it is a fundamental principle . . . that every people 
has the right to determine its own form of government 
. . . Insisting that the revolutionaries in Mexico
were slowly working toward that end, he further declared: 
"And so far as my influence goes, while I am President 
nobody shall interfere with them."'*' Wilson probably 
meant each of these words when he spoke them. But at the 
time, conditions in Mexico seemed to be vindicating his 
non-involvement policy. Within a very short time, 
conditions deteriorated and the President’s policy was 
repeatedly put to the test.
The special agents were inextricably involved in the 
events that marked this deterioration. The system of 
diplomatic representation in Mexico caused the Adminis­
tration numerous difficulties during the early months of
*"New York Times , January 9, 1915, p. 4.
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1915. Only in George Carothers did the State Department
have an agent who carried on effective relations with a
Mexican leader. Carothers understood Villa's moods. He
knew when best to confront the general directly and when
to use the services of influential intermediaries, such
as General Scott and certain Villa subordinates. The
total result was that Villa continued to express a will-
2
ingness to cooperate with the Wilson Administration.
Villa did cause anxious moments. However strong he 
appeared to be during the early months of 1915, he was 
operating at a disadvantage. The Constitutionalists 
commanded greater financial resources because they 
controlled the ports of Vera Cruz and Tampico, along with 
the oil fields surrounding the latter. Villa depended 
solely on income from the sale of confiscated goods and 
taxes, particularly those on mining properties. As the 
civil war intensified, the number of depredatory incidents 
in Northern Mexico involving foreigners increased. 
Repeatedly Carothers was called upon by the State De­
partment to make representations in their behalf, and,
2
Among other things, Villa evidenced his friendship 
for the United States by revealing to Carothers that the 
Japanese were trying to line up alliances in Mexico which 
they could call upon for support in case of war between 
the United States and Japan. He told General Scott the 
same thing when they met at El Paso in early January.
See Carothers to Bryan, personal, February 5, 1915,
Bryan Papers, Box 43; Scott to Carothers, February 23, 
1915, Scott Papers, Box 17; Carothers to Scott, March 26, 
1915, i b i d .
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3
usually, Villa responded favorably.
The civil war, by causing many of the mines to close,
ultimately cut off such a share of income that Villa was
forced to take drastic steps. On March 19, he decreed
that all mining property abandoned in Northern Mexico, if
not reclaimed and put into operation within four months,
would be confiscated. Those mine operators whose taxes
4
were in arrears were given ninety days to pay in full.
With the foreign-owned mining industry up in arms over
the decree, Bryan directed Carothers to remind Villa that 
many of the mines had been abandoned, and the miners 
forced to flee, because of the dangers presented by the 
civil war. Easing fears slightly, Villa revealed that 
the decree was not designed to hurt legitimate mine 
operators. He told Carothers that it was meant to prevent 
speculators from taking advantage of the war by purchasing 
abandoned mines at a fraction of their values and later 
attempting to sell them to Mexican investors at an un­
deserved profit. When this reply did not satisfy Bryan,
3
Carothers to State Department, January 2, 7, March 
18, 1915/14130, 14160, 14731; Cobb (for Carothers), March 
18, 1915/14626; State Department to Carothers, February 
5, 1915, NA 125.1236/22; Cobb (for Carothers) to State 
Department, February 12, 1915, i b i d ./25. For repre­
sentative cases involving forced loans levied against 
foreigners and satisfactory settlements of these problems, 
see Foreign Relations, 1915 , 983-96.
4
Mining decree issued by Francisco Villa at 
Monterey, March 19, 1915, ibid. , 894-95.
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Carothers was again directed to press for repeal of the 
decree. Villa ultimately capitulated. He told the Ameri­
can agent that the decree would not be enforced until he 
could guarantee transportation facilities for the miners. 
Villa also assured Carothers that he would not allow the 
decree to cause any international embarrassments for the 
United States.'’
The other agents did not enjoy such success. John 
Silliman, who was never very effective in his relations 
with Carranza, was no longer even attached to the First
C hi e f ’s headquarters. He remained in Mexico City,
*
assisting the Brazilian Minister. Leon Canova, the only 
State Department agent who ever rivaled Carothers in 
effectiveness, forfeited his potential influence with 
members of the Convention when the Department involved him 
in attempts to save the lives of some of the Mexicans 
being purged by the Villistas and Zapatistas. Both 
Canova and Silliman were directed to appeal for the lives 
of all political prisoners, but the case that most 
attracted Bryan's attention was that of Eduardo Iturbide. 
It may be recalled that Iturbide, as Governor of the 
Federal District, had arranged the transfer of Mexico 
City into the hands of the Constitutionalists following
"’State Department to Carothers, April 7, 15, 1915,
ibid. , 895-96, 899 ; Carothers to State Department, April
12, 16, 1915, ibid., 899, 901.
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the fall of Huerta. At the urging of the diplomatic corps, 
he again assumed control of the city after the Carrancistas 
evacuated in late-November. In both instances, he had 
done much to maintain order and had earned the gratitude 
of the foreign colony. Upon entering the city, the 
Zapatistas showed no gratitude for his efforts. Instead, 
they charged him with crimes against the peasant population 
of Morelos, including the execution of some laborers on 
his hacienda and the impressment of many others into
g
H u e r t a 1s a r m y .
Canova was not immediately involved. In fact,
Iturbide took refuge in the home of a British subject,
H. A. Cunard Cummins, where Carothers was also staying. 
Presenting Carothers with a testimonial signed by members 
of the diplomatic corps, the British Charge' d'Affaires, 
Thomas B. Hohler, urged the special agent to intercede in 
Iturbide1s behalf. Luckily, Carothers was never impli­
cated in the affair. Shortly after Iturbide sought 
asylum, the American agent left the city with Villa.^
Bryan then directed Silliman to "do everything in your
g
State Department to Silliman, December 8 , 1914, NA 
312.12/94a; Silliman to State Department, December 14, 
1914/14010; ELL Paso Morning T i m e s , December 23, 1914;
New York Wo r i d , December 24, 1914.
^Oliveira to State Department, December 9, 1914, NA
312.12/95; Carothers to State Department, December 26,
1914, ibid./164.
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g
power to save Iturbide." Bryan's determination to
protect Iturbide was predicated, no doubt, by reports from
Cardoso de Oliveira and Silliman to the effect that the
charges against the former Mexican official were not valid
and that he was being persecuted for political reasons.
Certain that Iturbide would not receive a fair trial, they
claimed that he was incapable of the crimes attributed to
9
him by the Zapatistas.
Interpreting his instructions liberally, Silliman, 
along with Cardoso de Oliveira and Hohler, first planned 
to send Iturbide to Vera Cruz in the company of John W. 
Belt, Silliman's assistant who had recently been granted a 
leave. This plan was foiled when Cardoso de Oliveira and 
Silliman took Conventionist Secretary of War Jos^ I.
Robles into their confidence and asked that Iturbide be 
granted a salvo conducto (safe conduct passport). Sympa­
thetic but not willing to risk involvement, Robles 
10refused. Assuming that Silliman, who was not attached
to any faction, was the one to conduct the unfortunate 
Mexican to safety, Canova used his influence with the
®State Department to Silliman, December 13, 1914, 
Foreign Relations. 1914 . 628-29.
9oiiveira to State Department, December 9, 1914, NA 
312.12/95; Silliman to State Department, December 16,
1914, lb.id - /100.
lOsilliman to State Department, December 9, 1914, and 
State Department to Silliman, December 11, 1914, i b i d . . 
125.8273; Silliman to State Department, December 16 fawo) , 
1914, ibid., 312.12/100, 104; Canova to State Department, 
December 16, 1914/14097.
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Conventionists to secure salvo conductos for Silliman and 
an unnamed friend. According to Canova's report of the 
incident, this plan fell through because Silliman lacked 
the courage to carry it through.^'*'
With Silliman faltering and Bryan appealing for 
someone to help Iturbide, Minister Cardoso de Oliveira 
took matters in hand. He asked Canova to escort Iturbide 
to the border. Securing salvo conductos directly from 
Provisional President Gutierrez, who was sickened by the 
purge, Canova spirited Iturbide aboard a north-bound 
train early in the morning of December 22. When the de­
parture was delayed, Canova went to the loading platform 
to inquire about the difficulty. There he came face to 
face with General Villa. Covering his nervousness, the 
special agent struck up a conversation. Villa asked 
Canova where he was going. When the agent replied that he 
was going to the border to get his wife, Villa insisted 
that, upon their return to Mexico City, they should dine
with him. Thus, Canova left Mexico City still on the
12best of terms with the Conventionist leaders.
11 Silliman to State Department, December 19, 21,
1914, ibid./ 1 0 6 , 108; Oliveira to State Department, 
December 22, 1914, ibid./ 1 1 5 ; Canova to State Department, 
December 27, 1914, ibid./131; Canova to State Department, 
December 20, 1914/27415.
12 State Department to Silliman, December 17, 1914,
NA 312.12/103; Oliveira to State Department, December 22, 
1914, ibid./115 ; Silliman to State Department, December 
22, 1914, ibid./112 ; Canova to State Department, December
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Canova was no sooner out of the capital than the
storm broke. The day of his departure, it was common
knowledge that he and Iturbide were on their way to El
Paso. Silliman blamed Canova's indiscreet relations with
reporters for the exposure, but Silliman was just as
likely at fault. Unwilling to approach them himself, he
had asked a reporter friend, John W. Roberts of the El
Paso Times, to intercede with the Zapatistas for Iturbide's
safety. Roberts, who often mingled with the agents, was
not always candid in his dealings with them. The very
day of Canova’s departure, Roberts filed his story on
13
the escape. It was accurate in almost every detail.
The Zapat is t as were furious at Iturbide's escape.
The most vocal among them was Manuel Palafox, who served 
virtually as Zapata's secretary of state, but who currently 
was the Conventionist Secretary of Agriculture. Without
20, 1914/27415; New York S u n , December 28, 1914. Canova 
started his letter on December 20, but did not complete 
it until December 23, as his train approached Zacatecas.
13
Silliman to State Department, December 21 (two), 
1914, NA 312.12/108, 110; K1 Paso Morning T i m e s , December 
23. 1914. An intimate of Carothers, Canova, and Silliman, 
Roberts witnessed and reported much of their activity.
In August, 1916, during the Presidential election campaign, 
he tried to sell his information to the Republican 
National Committee. If the Committee chose to attack the 
Wilson Administration's Mexican policy, he claimed that he 
could provide a great deal of information concerning the 
activities of the special agents. See Roberts to G. R. 
Scrugham, August 29, 1916, Albert B. Fall Papers, micro­
film copies, Zimmermann Library, University of New 
Mexico, Reel no. 33.
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consulting Gutierrez, he issued orders for Iturbide to be
removed from the northbound train and returned to stand
trial. At the same time, he issued a statement to the
press, condemning Silliman and Canova and charging that
each had received a 500,000 peso bribe from Iturbide.
After consulting with Palafox, Villa, too, sent an order
14
for Iturbide's arrest.
Canova's and Iturbide's experiences as they 
traveled northward could scarcely have been more exciting 
had they been fabricated in the mind of a dime novelist. 
Soldiers and secret police repeatedly attempted to enter 
their compartment. Each time Canova feigned ignorance 
of Iturbide's whereabouts and claimed diplomatic immunity 
to prevent entry. Claiming further that upholding the 
dignity of his country prevented him from submitting to 
a search, he warned of the dire consequences that would 
result from forceful entry and maltreatment of a repre­
sentative of the United States Government. Thoroughly 
terror-stricken by the time the train approached 
Chihuahua, Iturbide decided to leave the train and 
strike off on his own. When the train was again stopped 
14
Silliman to State Department, December 23, 1914,
NA 312.12/117; Oliveira to State Department, December 24 
(two), 1914, ibid. /119 , 120; Ell Paso Morning Times , 
December 23, 25, 1914; New York W o r l d , December 24, 27, 
1914. Silliman suspected Roberts of being responsible 
for the bribery charge.
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just south of Chihuahua, Iturbide made his escape through 
a window under the cover of darkness, while Canova 
shouted warnings through the closed compartment d o o r . ^
When Canova was informed in Chihuahua that the car 
in which he was riding would be detached and left for 
repairs, the special agent made no protest and serenely 
exited his compartment. Astonished when they did not 
find Iturbide, the soldiers declared the car to be fit 
to continue the journey. After again lecturing the 
searchers on the necessity of upholding the dignity of 
his government, Canova continued on to Juarez in the same 
compartment. At Juarez, reporters were also astonished 
to find that Iturbide was not accompanying Canova. The 
special agent gave the press a detailed account of his 
trip, emphasizing every indignity that he had endured but 
steadfastly denying that Iturbide had ever been with 
him. ^
On December 29, the New York Times reported on good 
authority that Canova had, indeed, aided Iturbide's 
escape, and, by January 2, it was known in El Paso that 
Iturbide had safely crossed the border near Presidio,
^ C a n o v a  to State Department, December 20, 29, 1914/ 
27415 , 27418; EJL Paso Morning T i m e s , December 28, 1914; 
New York T i m e s , December 28, 1914, p. 4.
16
Canova to State Department, December 28, 29, 30,
1914/27417, 27418, 27419; E_1 Paso Morning T i m e s , December
27, 1914; New York W o r l d , December 29, 1914.
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T e xas. ^  Villa knew very well what had happened. At
Gdrnez Palacio, during his perilous journey northward,
Canova conferred with Carothers and asked him to plead
with Villa by wire to uphold the salvo conductos.
Incorrectly assuming that Villa would sustain his actions,
Canova told Carothers to be completely candid with the
general. Contrary to expectations, Villa did not uphold
the salvo conduct o s . Instead he continued to condemn
Canova's complicity in Iturbide's escape. At first,
Carothers did not take Villa seriously. He reported to
Bryan that Villa had probably condemned Canova in order
18to mollify the Zapatistas. Even Canova did not take
Villa seriously. He wrote to Bryan that he believed the
episode would serve to enhance his reputation for bravery
in Villa's eyes. Villa, he assumed, would applaud acts
of gallantry regardless of what prompted them. "I
really believe General Villa will chuckle over the whole
19matter," he concluded.
l?New York Times , December 29, 1914, p. 1; E_1 Paso 
Morning Times, January 2, 1915. Before leaving the train, 
Iturbide told Canova that he planned to hire a horse and 
guide and make for the border near Presidio. Canova 
learned that Iturbide crossed the border on December 31. 
Appearing incognito in El Paso shortly afterward,
Iturbide took a train to the East Coast of the United 
States. See Canova to State Department, January 1, 4, 
1915, NA 312.12/150, 157.
l^Carothers to State Department, December 26, 1914, 
January 8 , 1915, i b i d ./ 1 6 4 , 174; Canova to State De­
partment, December 29, 1914/27418.
^ C a n o v a  to State Department, December 30, 1914/ 
27419.
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Both agents were wrong. Villa continued to denounce 
Canova and demand his recall. He remained immovable even 
to explanations that the special agent had merely acted 
on orders from his superiors. Carothers made another 
appeal when the general came north to settle the problems 
at Naco. Villa softened his attitude somewhat in 
Carothers1 presence, but suggested that feelings were 
running so strongly against Canova in Mexico City that, 
if he returned, embarrassing and potentially dangerous 
incidents would likely result. Although Canova still re­
quested permission to return to his duties, Bryan directed
20him to come to Washington for reassignment. Thus, the
Department lost one of its agents in Mexico.
Minister Cardoso de Oliveira was disappointed at 
losing Canova's services, especially since he was the 
only one with influence among the Conventionists. "[I]
have not enough words to emphasize his merits to you," 
he wrote to Bryan. Noting that he was personally 
responsible for the orders which directed Canova to aid 
Iturbide, Cardoso de Oliveira apologized to the Secretary 
of State for having denied the Department of the con­
tinued services of so valuable a representative. Carothers
20oiiveira to State Department, December 26 (two), 
1914, NA 312.12/126, 127; Carothers to State Department, 
January 2, 8 , 1915, i b i d ./154 , 174; State Department to 
Canova, January 4, 1915, ib i d . /15 7; Canova to State De­
partment, January 4 , 1915/27420; EJL Paso Mo rning T i m e s , 
January 6 , 1915.
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was similarly saddened by Canova’s recall. Bryan had no
intention of allowing Canova’s gallantry to go unrewarded.
In February, he recommended to the President that the
former agent be given a clerical post in the Latin
American Division of the State Department. In April,
Canova was made Assistant Chief of the division; in July, 
22the Chief. In that post, which he held until 1918, he 
was to continue to reveal an immense capacity for 
int rigue.
Denied Canova's services in Mexico, Bryan sought to 
vindicate him, as well as Silliman. He directed Cardoso 
de Oliveira to secure proof of the bribery charges or a 
complete retraction. Palafox, a tough, swarthy little 
revolutionary, at first refused to do either. Instead, he 
demanded that Silliman also be recalled. He claimed that 
the a g ent’s association with Carranza made him an enemy 
of the revolution. Oliveira refused to be cowed. In a 
memorandum addressed to Zapata and Villa, instead of
?1
Oliveira to State Department, December 26, 1914, NA 
312.12/126; Carothers to State Department, January 8 , 1915, 
ibid./174.
22 Bryan to Wilson, Bryan Papers, Box 43; Register of 
the Department of S t a t e , 1 9 1 7 , 93. While serving as Chief 
of the Division of Latin American Affairs, Canova earned 
the reputation in Mexico of being an interventionist. An 
undated memorandum in the Archivo de la Secretaria de 
Relaciones Exteriores in Mexico City, which outlines his 
career, reveals that this was the official government 
impression of him. See "Informacion cerca de Leon J. 
Canova," A G R E , L-E-849, Leg. 1.
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Palafox, he set forth the reasons why the United States and
other foreign powers had wanted Iturbide's life spared.
He included copies of B r y a n ’s instructions on this score.
As a result, Palafox made a partial retraction of the
charges, claiming that they had been based on second-hand 
23
information.
Bryan refused to accept the partial retraction. If
there was no absolute proof, he wrote to Oliveira, then
Palafox must admit the innocence of the two agents. Under
pressure from other ministers in the Conventionist pro-
24
visional government, Palafox made a full retraction.
Bryan’s headstrong behavior may have vindicated Canova 
and Silliman, but it heightened Zapatista resentment 
against the United States. On Janaury 15, the day after 
Palafox withdrew his allegations, several members of the 
Zapata delegation to the Convention (which began meeting 
again in Mexico City on January 1) denounced President
23silliman to State Department, December 24, 1914, NA 
312.12/118; Oliveira to State Department, December 29,
1914, January 3, 1915, i b i d ./145 , 156 ; State Department to 
Oliveira, December 27, 1914, ibid./ 1 2 7 ; Bryan to Wilson, 
December 24, 1914, Bryan Papers, Box 43; "A Resume of the 
Case of Eduardo N. Iturbide, respectfully submitted to the 
consideration of Generals Francisco Villa and Emeliano 
Zapata," [n.d.], A G R E , L-E-847, Leg. 10; copy in Oliveira 
to State Department, December 28, 1914, NA 312.12/137.
24state Department to Oliveira, January 4, 1915, 
ibid./156; Silliman to State Department, January 13, 1915, 
ibid./17 5 ; New York T i m e s , January 14, 1915, p. 6 . In 
making his retraction, Palafox sought to save face by 
claiming that he had been so busy at the time he signed 
the statement of charges that he had not been aware of 
the exact nature of the document.
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Wilson as a meddler who lacked true sympathy for the ob-
25jectives of the Mexican Revolution.
This attack upon the President would have been less
portentious had not the Zap at is t as seemed so determined
to speak for all the Conventionists. In December and
January, the followers of Zapata steadfastly strove to
increase their influence. It became more and more
apparent, moreover, that the Villa-Zapata marriage was
one of convenience rather than holy wedlock. The purge
in Mexico City witnessed Zapat is t as killing Villistas and
vice versa. Canova reported from El Paso that a potential
estrangement between Villa and Zapata was likely because
the Zap at is t as were determined to "hold a balance of
power" in the Convention. From Mexico City, Silliman
also reported that Zapata's followers were determined to
2 6dominate the proceedings.
If Wilson and Bryan paid any attention to the re­
ports of H. L. Hall, they must have been aware of this 
tendency long before Canova and Silliman reported it. Hall 
of course, had no official connection with the State De­
partment. The Zapatistas at Aguascalientes had been 
curious enough to make inquiries to Canova concerning 
25
Silliman to State Department, January 16, 1915/ 
14223; New York T i m e s , January 16, 1915, p. 4.
2 g
Canova to State Department, December 30, 1914/14131;
Silliman to State Department, December 31, 1914/14115.
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Hall's status. At the direction of the Department, Canova 
had replied that Hall had no official status, but that he 
had championed the Zapatistas during his stay in Washington 
and through his correspondence from Cuernavaca. This 
statement, plus the fact that Hall gave much of his time to 
volunteer service at the local Cruz Blanca hospital, 
apparently satisfied them that he was acting in their
- 27 i n t e r e s t s .
Cloistered in Cuernavaca, Hall faithfully reported 
the attitudes of the Zapatistas. His rambling letters 
revealed that they at first had little faith in the Con­
vention; but after achieving more success than expected 
at Aguascalientes, including acceptance of the principles 
of their Plan of Ayala, they grewincreasingly determined 
to dominate the Convention, hence the revolution. He 
did not attribute these ambitions to Zapata personally, 
but to others, such as Diaz Soto y Gama and Palafox. The 
Zapat is t as 1 greatest virtue, he implied, was their 
inflexibility; they did not compromise their principles.
On the other hand, they thought Villa too worldly, too 
willing to compromise, because he consorted with holdovers 
of the Madero regime. Assuming that wealth inevitably 
corrupts, they suspected the Villistas because of the
abundance of munitions and supplies they commanded. The
27Cobb (for Canova) to State Department, November 4,
1915, and State Department to Cobb (for Canova), November
5, 1914/13679.
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meeting at Xochimiloc and the joint entry into Mexico City,
Hall revealed, had served to confirm the Zapatistas1
suspicions. The Villistas adorned themselves in gaudy
uniforms and cruised about in automobiles. Their
ostentation smacked of past reactionary regimes. It
2 8compromised their revolutionary virtue.
For his part, Villa distrusted Zapata because he had
allowed so many ex-federals to join his revolutionary
army. Carothers reported Villa as saying that many of
these ex-federals should be tried as criminals rather than
29
treated as allies. Nor was Villa satisfied that Zapata
was prosecuting the war against Carranza vigorously 
enough. After capturing Puebla in December, Zapata 
withdrew most of his forces to Morelos. Obregon had 
little trouble in retaking Puebla in early January.
Nothing stood between him and Mexico City. Villa was 
infuriated. Zapata's claim (even if it was true) that 
the ex-federals had deserted at a critical point in the 
battle, and were responsible for the defeat, hardly 
satisfied Villa. He was beginning to learn that Zapata's
2 8
Hall to State Department, October 21, 26,
November 3, 6 , 8 , 9, 13, 25, December 2, 3, 1914/27424, 
27436, 20609-1/2.
2 9 Carothers to State Department, December 16, 1914/
14061; Womack, Z a p a t a , 222-23; Quirk, The Mexican Revo­
lution, 154.
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30first concern was always the protection of Morelos.
Gutierrez was disenchanted with both Villa and Zapata.
In addition to their factional disputes, the Villistas and
Zapat is t as subjected the provisional president to constant
harrassment. After failing a second time to establish an
accord with Obregon to eliminate Carranza, Villa, and
Zapata, Gutierrez gathered some of his loyal followers
on January 15 and fled the capital with most of the funds
in the Conventionist treasury. Establishing a rump
government in San Luis Potosi, he was menaced by both
Villa and Obrego'n and again forced to flee. For a time,
he endeavored to re-establish his government in Nuevo Leon.
In June he renounced any alim to political power. In
Mexico City, meanwhile, Roque Gonzalez Garza, presiding
officer of the Convention, and a loyal Villista, was
31given authority to exercise executive power.
The disintegration of Conventionist unity underlined 
the inadequacies of the State Department's system of 
representation in Mexico. Only through Carothers did the 
Administration have satisfactory communications with a 
factional leader. For a time, Silliman served as
^ B a r r a g a n  Rodriguez, Historia . . . Consti-
tucionalista, II, 176-77 ; Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 
166-67, 172-75.
31lb i d . , 166-75.
445
Gutierrez's confessor. But the Provisional President's
flight put an end to that liaison. Upon assuming
executive authority, Gonzalez Garza, who hoped for cordial
relations with the United States, made overtures to 
33Silliman. H. L. Hall, who had accompanied the
Zapatistas to Mexico City, pointed out that Silliman was 
unacceptable as a representative to the Convention. The
Zapat is t as looked upon him as little more than Carranza's
34 .spy. Even Carothers complained of Silliman s in­
adequacy in this respect. "I do not believe he 
[Silliman] will do the Government any good in his position 
in Mexico City," Carothers complained to Bryan, "because 
he is a coward and absolutely biased in his opinions . . .
The Government needs a man in Mexico City who is not 
afraid of the devil, and at the same time has sufficient
32 Silliman to State Department, January 9, 12, 13, 
1915/14173, 14188, 14195. On the eve of his defection, 
Gutierrez poured out his woes to Silliman and even hinted 
that he was negotiating with Obregon.
33
Silliman to State Department, January 23, 1915/
14271.
34
Hall to State Department, December 10, 17, 20, 23, 
27, 1914/20609-1/2.
35 Carothers to State Department, January 8 , 1915, NA 
125.36582/129. When Silliman received word from a State 
Department source that both Canova and Carothers were 
criticizing him, he demanded an opportunity to refute the 
charges. Bryan did not even reply to Silliman's request. 
Silliman to State Department, January 9, 1915, NA 125. 
8273/144.
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Hall also presented a potential problem. It may be
recalled that, in response to his request for written
credentials, Bryan sent a letter to Consul General
Shanklin on October 22, reviewing Hall's activities in
Washington and indicating that the State Department had
allowed him to "unofficially" report on conditions in
Cuernavaca. Hall did not receive this letter until he
arrived in Mexico City in early December. Although it was
not the letter of credentials he had hoped for, Hall
accepted it as such and went about passing himself off as
3 6a special agent of the State Department. For their
part, the Zap at is t as either accepted the letter as suf­
ficient credentials or, more likely, recognized his true 
status and sought merely to use him as a funnel through 
which to pass propaganda to Washington.
The legitimate agents resented Hall's activities. 
Silliman and Canova thought that he might have influenced 
Palafox against them. Before departing Mexico City,
Canova urged Cardoso de Oliveira to secure a note from 
Washington which would clarify Hall's status. Carothers 
felt that the Zapatistas should be informed of Hall's 
status in order to prevent a possibly serious misunder­
standing that would produce strained relations between
^ E 1  S o l , December 14, 1914.
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3 7them and the United States. Bryan did direct Chief
Clerk Ben Davis, to whom Hall addressed all his corre­
spondence, to again inform the misguided Morman that he 
was not an official representative of the State Department 
and that he should cease representing himself as one. The 
letter, addressed on January 19, did not arrive until
after Hall left Mexico City when the Zapat is t as evacuated
3 8in late January.
Hall returned to his volunteer work with the Cruz 
Blanca hospital in Cuernavaca. He also revivied and ex­
panded his plan to establish an agricultural colony in 
Morelos. His lengthy reports of conditions in Zapata's 
stronghold continued to flow into Washington. In 
describing the tumultuous sessions of the Convention, 
which met in Cuernavaca from early-February to mid-April, 
he invariably depicted Zapata's delegates as disinterested 
patriots. Villa's delegates, on the other hand, were 
pictured as obstructionist remnants of the Madero regime. 
If the Zapatistas sought to use Hall for propaganda
39purposes, they did not err in their choice of organs.
37silliman to State Department, December 24, 1914, NA 
312.12/118; Canova to State Department, December 27, 1914, 
i b i d ./ 1 3 1 ; Carothers to State Department, January 8 , 1915, 
i b i d . , 125.36582/129.
38Davis to Hall, January 19, 1915/20609-1/2. Hall 
did not receive this letter until he returned to Mexico 
City nearly three months later. See Hall to State De­
partment, April 5, 1915/20609-1/2.
39Hall to State Department, February 9, 17, 18, 27, 
March 3, 7, 12, April 4, 7, 13, 1915/20609-1/2. Claiming
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Events of late-January and early-February further 
revealed the need for more adequate representation in 
Mexico. The news of Gutierrez's defection caused the 
Zapatista garrison to bolt the capital, leaving the Con­
vention inadequately guarded. Thereupon, Villa invited 
the delegates to come north to his stronghold in Chihuahua. 
But they voted instead to move to Cuernavaca. Sensing 
that by doing so they might be at the mercy of the 
Zapatistas, many of Villa's delegates left the Convention 
and went to join their leader. Working manfully to insure 
a peaceful transfer of the city, Gonzalez Garza remained 
behind until the eleventh hour before fleeting to 
Cuernavaca. On January 28, within hours after the Con-
ventionists' departure, Obreg<Sn again occupied Mexico
40City in the name of the Constitutionalists.
that Manuel Palafox and the Diaz Soto y Gama brothers, 
Antonio and Ignacio, were subscribers to his plan, Hall 
proposed to establish a model agricultural community.
His program called for privately owned farms, but every 
other economic activity— stores, warehouses, tanneries, 
dairies, saw mills, etc.— was to be organized into co­
operatives. He planned topical surveys, soil analyses, 
reclamation and irrigation projects, and a variety of 
other improvements. He also proposed to establish an 
agricultural school modeled after Tuskegee Institute of 
Alabama. Just how much support he had for these 
grandiose schemes is impossible to determine.
40 Silliman to State Department, January 27, 28 (two), 
29, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915 , 648-49 ; Silliman to 
State Department, January 28, 1915/14303; New York T i m e s , 
January 28, 29, 1915, p. 1; Quirk, The Mexican Revo­
lution , 17 8 .
449
Shortly after Obregon occupied Mexico City, Carranza
proclaimed Vera Cruz to be the capital of the Republic.
Mexico City was reduced to the status of capital of the
newly created state, Valle de Mexico. Insisting that all
diplomatic representations be directed to his officials,
Carranza invited the diplomatic corps to join him in Vera
Cruz. Preferring withdrawal from Mexico to submitting to
Carranza's dictates, the diplomats unanimously agreed to
remain in Mexico City and await a possible turn of 
41events. With no means of effectively communicating
with the Convention in Cuernavaca, on February 5, Villa
declared Chihuahua the capital of his regime. He, too,
created a provisional government, but promised to disband
it when the Convention could effectively assume control
42
of civil affairs in Northern Mexico.
For obvious reasons, Secretary of State Bryan gave 
considerable thought to increasing the number of agents 
in Mexico. The search for new agents began early in 
January following Canova's recall to Washington. It 
intensified when Carothers temporarily threatened to resign. 
Offered a large retainer by several business firms to act 
as their counselor, Carothers wrote to Bryan that he owed
41 Oliveira to State Department, February 6 , 1915, 
Foreign R e l ations, 1 9 1 5 , 649-50.
42 Enrique Llorente, Confidential Agent of the Pro­
visional Government of Mexico (Convention), to State De­
partment, February 5, 1915, ibid., 650-51; Cobb (for 
Carothers), February 6 , 1915/14362.
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it to his family to accept such a lucrative offer. At 
first, he agreed to continue in the service of the De­
partment only until a replacement could be found. Bryan 
did not lack for candidates. He proposed several Mid- 
westerners, all "deserving Democrats," but President 
Wilson apparently was not impressed with their qualifi­
cations. He would have liked to send Paul Fuller to 
Mexico City, but felt that the New Yorker deserved a more 
prestigous assignment. Wilson did suggest that Bryan 
consult Fuller in chosing new State Department agents, and
the former presidential agent recommended two New York
• «. 43 acquaxntences.
Before any new appointments were activated, con­
ditions in Mexico changed significantly. The Conventionists 
evacuated Mexico City, and Carranza declared Vera Cruz the 
new capital of Mexico. It no longer seemed necessary to 
have a man in Mexico City if all diplomatic represen­
tations had to be directed to Vera Cruz. More importantly 
Carothers changed his mind about retirement. Bryan
43 Bryan to Wilson, January 6 , 22, 1915, Bryan-Wilson 
Correspondence; Bryan to Wilson, January 12, 1915, Wilson 
Papers, Series II, Box 124; Wilson to Bryan, January 14, 
1915, ibid. ; Bryan to Fuller, January 27, 1915, Bryan 
Papers, Box 30; Carothers to State Department, January 7 
(two), 8 , 1915, NA 125.36582/121, 129; State Department 
to Carothers, January 7, 1915, ibid./121; New York T i m e s , 
January 10, 1915, II, p. 10. In the above correspondence, 
Bryan did not refer to the nominees by first name. Those 
he mentioned were identified as D. J. Campeau of Detroit, 
Connally of Iowa, Graham of Illinois, and Hughes from 
Missouri. The two proposed by Fuller were referred to as 
Smith and Fearn.
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naturally urged Carothers to reconsider. "Owing to [the] 
limited number of persons possessing requisite qualifi­
cations, namely loyalty to the Administration, having 
friendship of Villa, and knowledge of the Spanish
language," the Secretary explained, it would be very
4 4
difficult to find an adequate replacement. General
Scott, meanwhile, was looking after Carothers' interests. 
He wrote to Bryan that Carothers was irreplaceable and 
that he deserved a raise in salary. Carothers' salary 
was, indeed, raised from $300 to $500 per month. The 
raise, plus Bryan's words of praise, changed Carothers' 
mind. Reporting that the salary increase would relieve 
the worry for his family's financial security, the 
special agent declared his willingness to continue in the 
service of the Department as long as he was needed. But 
when he asked for additional funds to hire a stenographer, 
his request was d e n i e d . ^
Despite his search for additional State Department
44
State Department to Carothers, January 12, 1915,
U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1916 (Washington: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1925), 479. There is no explanation 
for this document appearing in the 1916 edition instead of 
the 1915 edition of Foreign Relations.
45
Carothers to State Department, January 12, 30,
1915, NA 125.36582/12 4, 128; State Department to Carothers, 
January 30, February 3, 1915, ibid./125 , 128; Scott to 
Carothers, January 26, 1915, Scott Papers, Box 17;
Carothers to Bryan, February 5, 1915, Bryan Papers, Box 43.
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agents, Bryan made no new appointments. The Convention 
and Zapata were ignored. In February, without enthusiasm 
he reassigned Silliman to Carranza. On January 12, Bryan 
had suggested to Wilson that, since Silliman had never 
been very effective, he should be returned to his consular 
duties in Saltillo. Shortly afterward, the Secretary of 
State received a letter from Luis Cabrera, inquiring why 
Silliman had not been sent to Vera Cruz to represent the 
United States near the First Chief. Bryan thought 
Cabrera’s inquiry adequate justification to send the agent 
to Vera Cruz; but before he acted on the suggestion, 
Carranza made it practically necessary. On February 15, 
the First Chief directed his military commanders in the 
field not to receive representations from "confidential 
or consular agents of foreign governments." Obviously 
referring to the activities of Canova and Carothers, he 
declared that dealing with such agents in the past had 
produced "the inconvenient effect of breaking up the unity 
which should prevail in all the acts of the Constitution­
alist Government and tends to belittle the authority of 
the First Chief. . . ." Regardless of their nature, all
diplomatic representations should be directed to the
46Foreign Minister in Vera Cruz.
46gryan to Wilson, January 22, 1915, Bryan-Wilson 
Correspondence; Elisio Arredondo, Confidential Agent of 
the Constitutionalist Government of Mexico, to State De­
partment (conveying copy of Carranza to all military 
commanders of the Constitutionalist Army), February 15, 
1915, Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 5 , 652-53.
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It was obvious that the Administration had to have
someone in Vera Cruz. Consequently, the day after
Carranza issued his directive, Silliman was ordered to
return to the side of the First Chief. Belt, who had
been on leave in the United States for almost two months,
was again directed to join Silliman and act as his
assistant. Regular passenger service between Vera Cruz
and Mexico City disrupted by the Zapatistas , Carranza
sent a special train to fetch Silliman. On February 21,
Silliman received an enthusiastic welcome upon his
47
arrival in Vera Cruz.
Perhaps one reason why Bryan did not send any more 
State Department agents into Mexico was that Wilson had 
decided to send another presidential fact-finding agent. 
January, 1915, had witnessed rapid changes in the 
fortunes of the revolutionary factions. Contrary to 
expectations, Carranza seemed to be growing stronger. 
Although Washington probably did not yet recognize the 
fact, the First Chief had realized that his personal 
reform ideas were not sufficient to satisfy his generals, 
especially those who had attended the Convention of
47 State Department to Oliveira (for Silliman), 
February 16, 1915, NA 125.8273/157a ; Silliman to State 
Department, February 18, 1915, ibid./155 ; Silliman to 
State Department, February 19, 1915/14425; Canada to 
State Department, February 21, 1915/14427; New York T i m e s , 
February 19, 1915, p. 8 ; El_ P u e b l o , February 21, 1915.
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Aguascalientes. To solidify his support and gain more, 
Carranza, with Obregon's counsel, declared on December 12, 
1914, and January 6 , 1915, that he was amending his Plan 
of Guadalupe to provide for agrarian reforms, including 
the restoration of illegally seized peasant lands, the 
formation of new ej idos (communal farms), and the disso­
lution of large haciendas and industrial monopolies. In 
addition, Obrego'n, after occupying Mexico City, entered 
into negotiations with the syndicalist Casa del Obrero 
Mundial. In return for promises of labor legislation, the 
workers formed separate military units called "Red 
Battalions," and entered the war against Villa. As a 
result of Obregon's wise counsel, the promises of judicial 
reform, and the fact that he ended military government in 
local communities and allowed home rule, Carranza 
garnered thousands of new s u p p o r t e r s . ^
Obregcfn's defeat of the Zapatistas at Puebla and his 
reoccupation of Mexico City were the first signs that the 
Constitutionalists would not be easily toppled and that 
Mexico was in for its bloodiest months of civil war. From 
W i l s o n ’s point of view, what was more alarming about the
A o
"Adiciones al Plan de Guadalupe y Decretos Dictados 
Conforme a las mismas," Gonzalez Ramirez, Planes Politicos 
£  otros document o s , 158-64; Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 
151-52; Gonzalez Ramirez, Ell Problema A g r a r i o , 214-15; 
Edwin Liewen, Mexican Militarism, 1910-1940 : The
Political Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Army
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1968), 31,
59.
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internecine warfare was the fact that Carranza and Obregon 
seemed determined to punish the City of Mexico. Much as 
if it had a mind of its own and was responsible, the 
city was to be razed for having previously been the seat 
of reactionary regimes and the protector of wealthy 
exploiters. All usable equipment was stripped from the 
public buildings and sent to Vera Cruz. Public 
employees, including school teachers, were furloughed.
The newspapers were suppressed. All Villista and 
Zapatista currency was declared valueless. Since they 
were reserved for military use only, the railroads were 
not allowed to bring in the necessities of life. Just 
securing food became the paramount concern of most of 
the people. Harrassed by Obregon, many merchants closed 
their doors in self-defense; whereupon, he declared that 
they alone were responsible for the shortage of 
necessities. The Zapatistas destroyed the waterworks and 
public sanitation became a grave problem; but Obrego'n 
refused to repair the damage. When the diplomatic corps 
pleaded for relief for the stricken city, the general
49replied that he could not receive their representations.
49
Oliveira to State Department, February 3, 1915, 
Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 5 , 649 ; Oliveira to State Department, 
February 5, 1915/14353; Silliman to State Department, 
January 30, February 1 (two), 2, 4 (two), 5, 8 , 9, 12, 13, 
16, 1915/14316, 14325, 14329, 14337, 14352, 14356, 14357, 
14371, 14375, 14385, 14387, 14402; Ramirez Plancarte,
La Ciudad de M e x i c o , 324-36.
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Wilson was bewildered by the kaleidoscope of events 
in Mexico. As he indicated to Duval West, whom he had 
chosen as his new fact-finder, "the situation there has 
become so complicated that I feel that I have lost the 
threads of it."'^ In chosing West, a San Antonio attorney, 
the Administration was again rewarding a "deserving 
Democrat." But at least he had a reputation of being 
knowledgeable in Mexican affairs. The new agent owed his 
appointment to the two Texans in the Wilson Cabinet, 
Attorney General Thomas W. Gregory and Postmaster General 
Albert S. Burleson. Indeed, it was Gregory, an old 
friend, rather than Bryan who called the San Antonian to 
Washington.
A slightly-built man of age fifty-four, Duval West 
was a product of the Southwestern frontier. His father 
was one of the framers of Texas's first state consti­
tution. A professional hunter at age seventeen, young 
Duval killed meat for the Southern Pacific Railway survey 
expedition. For a time, he was a working cowboy. In 
1888, as a Deputy United States Marshal, he gained a 
measure of fame by winning a shootout with a band of 
train-robbers. Seeking the quieter life of a lawyer, he
“^ W i l s o n  to West, February 10, 1915, Wilson Papers, 
Series II, Box 126.
^ B r y a n  to Wilson, February 3, 1915, Bryan Papers,
Box 43; San Antonio Exp res s , February 1, 1915; New York 
T i m e s , February 2, 1915, p. 4.
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attended Cumberland University at Lebanon, Tennessee, 
before settling in San Antonio to practice his profession. 
Appointed Assistant Federal District Attorney for the 
Western District of Texas by President Grover Cleveland 
in 1893, West again gained notoriety by prosecuting 
author William S. Porter, who wrote under the pseudonym 
0. Henry, for embezzlement. Returning to private 
practice after serving as Adjutant to the 1st Texas 
Infantry, U.S. Volunteers, during the Spanish-American 
War, he was one of San A n t o n i o ’s most prominent citizens
52
when called to the service of the Wilson Administration.
West met with the President on February 9, Wilson's 
purposes were aptly expressed in the instructions he 
gave the special agent:
My wish is this: To have you meet and, as far
as possible assess the character and purposes of 
the principle men down there of the several 
groups and factions, in the hope that you may be 
able to form a definite idea not only as to their 
relative strength and their relative prospects 
of success, but also as their real purposes.
Above all, I want to find out just what prospects 
for a settlement there are and what sort of 
settlement it would likely to be. If the settle­
ment contemplated is not seriously intended for 
the benefit of the common people of the country, 
if the plans and ambitions of the leaders center 
upon themselves and not upon the people they are 
trying to represent, of course it will not be a 
permanent settlement but will simply lead to
5 2
Ibid. ; "When Duval West Showed His Nerve," San 
Antonio Express Sunday Magazine, February 7, 1915, p. 17; 
Dallas N e w s , May 15, 1949 ; Austin A m e r i c a n , May 18, 1949 ; 
Biographical File, Eugene C. Barker Collection, University 
of T e xas.
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further distress and disorder. I am very 
anxious to know just what the moral situation 
is, therefore, and just what it behooves us 
to do to check what is futile and what 
promises genuine reform and settled peace.
These instructions indicate that the President was con­
sidering re-assuming an active role in the settlement of 
Mexican affairs, but he wanted fresh information to 
guide him.
Strangely, Wilson directed West to go first to 
Villa's country rather than to the South, which seemed 
more rent with upheaval. Although the San Antonian 
reputedly spoke Spanish fluently, the State Department 
provided him an interpreter who also served as his 
secretary. Carothers came to the border to meet the new 
agent but brought news that a meeting with Villa would 
have to be delayed, since the general was on an expe­
dition in the western states organizing military cam­
paigns. By the time West arrived in El Paso, Carothers 
and Cobb had arranged for the President's personal 
representative to confer with Villa's subordinates. 
Availing himself of the comforts of Carothers' private 
car, West journeyed first to Chihuahua, then Monterey, 
before heading further south to join Villa at Guadalajara. 
In the process, he conferred with members of Villa's 
cabinet, the governors of Coahuila and Nuevo Leon,
^^Wilson to West, February 5, 1915, Wilson Papers, 
Series II, Box 126; Bryan to Wilson, February 9, 1915, 
ib i d .
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several important military officers, including General
54Felipe Angeles, and numerous municipal officials.
For the most part, West was not favorably impressed 
with the Villistas. Most of them, he suggested, were 
"hoping for benefits to themselves." In so characteri­
zing them, he exhibited a personal aversion for the crude, 
uneducated revolutionaries who held most of the positions 
of authority under Villa. The officials he admired, 
General Angeles and Secretary of Foreign Relations Miguel 
Diaz Lombardo, were well-bred and educated. West noted 
that otherwise "the man with the white shirt has 
apparently disappeared." The very absence of educated 
men, he concluded, made it impossible "to secure the 
services of men of experience and loyalty in the for­
mation and administration of a proper and just civil 
government, and to carry into effect wise and proper 
financial, educational, and great reforms. . .
Ibid. ; State Department to Cobb, February 13, 1915, 
NA 1 1 1 .70W52/44b; Cobb to State Department, February 13, 
19, 1915, ib i d ./44 ; West to State Department, February 19, 
March 2, 1915, ib i d ./4 5, 47 ; Cobb (for Carothers) to 
State Department, February 15, 22, 1915/14391, 14431; 
Carothers to State Department, February 18, 1915/14411;
San Antonio Express, February 17, March 1, 1915; El 
Paso Morning T i m e s , February 18, March 1, 1915.
55 Preliminary Report to the Honorable Secretary of 
State on the Conditions in Mexico by Duval West, acting 
under authority conferred by the President, dated 
February 10, 1915, requesting him to investigate same 
[n.d.]/14622.
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West was definitely distressed because these ad­
ministrators seemed imbued with the idea "that the 
property of the rich should be administered by the Govern­
ment for the benefit of the masses of people . . . The 
socialist idea, without definite expression," he re­
ported, "seems to prevail everywhere." West also com­
plained that the law, as administered by the Villistas, 
was harsh and unfair. People were condemned to death 
without the semblance of a trial. Property was 
confiscated without judicial process. Although
/
compensation was promised the former owners, even Diaz 
Lombardo was vague on just how this was to be 
accomplished.
West interviewed Villa twice: once in Guadalajara,
when they dined together, and again in Carothers1 
private car as they traveled northward toward 
Aguascalientes. Villa exuded optimism. He claimed that 
he could establish complete control of Northern Mexico 
within forty days. The Chihuahua strong man also in­
sisted that he could control Zapata. When West queried 
him concerning his resources , Villa claimed to have a 
large stock-pile of necessary staples— corn and beans—  
and an abundance of bullion. Pressing further, the 
American agent asked Villa if he could command the
461
services of "men of matured judgement and experience," 
and Villa replied, "'Yes, I have them— and can get them.'" 
West noted that he doubted if Villa could make good his
i • 57claim.
Concerned for the sanctity of private property, West 
asked Villa if he would encourage foreigners to develop 
his country once it was pacified. The revolutionary 
chieftain's answer must have startled officials in Wash­
ington when they read it. He suggested that foreigners 
"should not, or would not, be permitted to own lands."
He also indicated that he would prefer industry to be 
developed by Mexican capital. "I got the idea," West 
wrote in his report, "that he is standing upon the popular 
demand that 'Mexico should be for the Mexicans,' and that 
an open door to foreign investors means ultimate danger 
to the nation." West admitted, however, that Carothers 
strongly disagreed with this interpretation of Villa's 
remarks.
In his impressions of Villa, West was complimentary 
to a point. As did virtually everyone who ever met him, 
the special agent was struck by Villa's robust personal 
magnetism. "He is much stronger in native mentality than 
given credit for," West wrote to Wilson. "There can be
no doubt of his good hard common sense." Then he added a
57T. . .Ib i d .
58I b i d .
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critical note: "His views of important governmental
plans and policies to be undertaken by way of civil ad­
ministration must be, for the present, considered
59
entirely amateurish and tentative."
West's overall assessment of the Villista movement
contained a contradiction. Making a tentative conclusion
based on the briefing he received from Villa and Angeles,
he indicated that they would probably win a military
victory. While admitting, moreover, that perfect order
prevailed everywhere he went, that in all municipalities
the people seemed contented with their officials, and
that the churches, schools, and markets were open and
attended by great numbers of people, West still did not
think the Villistas had the ability to establish a stable
government and carry out reforms. Realistically, he
concluded that the accomplishment of reforms would
6 0
probably require the work of several generations.
West planned to travel from Guadalajara to Zapata's
59t, . .Ibid.
6 0Ibid. Arthur S. Link suggests that West "fairly 
exuded praise of Pancho and his regime in northern 
Mexico and confidence in Villa's ultimate triumph. Al­
though he did not say so openly, West implied that Pancho, 
and not the First Chief, was still the best hope for peace 
in Mexico." See The Struggle for Neutrality, 465. Close 
scrutiny of West's report does not seem to warrant such 
conclusions. Only in a military sense did West suggest 
triumph for Villa. Since he had not yet visited 
Carranza, he scrupulously avoided any comparison of the 
relative merits of the two chieftains or conclusions 
that would indicate that either was more capable than the 
other of establishing lasting peace.
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country; but safe conduct could not be arranged. In view 
of the critical conditions in Mexico City, Wilson de­
cided that he should go there next. Villa, however, 
could not guarantee safe passage into the city, so the 
special agent was forced to travel all the way back to 
the Texas border. Stopping in San Antonio to prepare a 
lengthy written report , he inquired of Bryan whether he 
should come to Washington or proceed directly to Mexico 
City via Vera Cruz. Since so much had transpired in 
southern Mexico since West started his mission, Bryan 
was inclined to have him come to Washington for additional 
briefing, but the President directed him to proceed
southward immediately. On March 15, one month after his
61
first entry, West set out again for Mexico.
Silliman, meanwhile, was wrestling with the problems 
that caused Bryan so much concern and was being re­
peatedly humiliated. One of the problems was the com­
plete degeneration of conditions in Mexico City. With
business at a standstill and food extremely scarce, the
6 2
populace grew panicky. Convinced that the suffering
f l 1
lb id. ; West to State Department, March 11, 13, 1915, 
NA 11 1 .70W52/46 , 48; State Department to Oliveira, March 
3, 1915, ibid./52; Oliveira to State Department, March 4, 
1915, ib i d ./3 ; State Department to West, March 12, 1915, 
ibid./6 ; Bryan to Wilson, and Wilson to Bryan, March 11, 
1915, ibid./47b; S an Antonio Exp res s , March 15, 1915.
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was induced by the city's merchants whose only reason for 
closing their doors was to avoid accepting Constitution­
alist paper money, Obregc^n warned them that he would "not
fire a single shot into any mob who may attempt to get
6 3what hunger has driven them to seize." On March 4, he
declared that all merchants who did not open their shops
and receive paper money would receive "severe punish- 
6 4m e n t ." Presumably, he meant this edict to apply even
to foreigners.
Fearing chaos, certain members of the foreign colony,
calling themselves the International Relief Committee,
amassed a fund to purchase relief supplies. But when they
appealed for access to the railroads, Obrego'n told them
that "the Mexican people do not need gratuitous help
6 5
from foreigners." Silliman reported, moreover, that 
Carranza, who still claimed that the railroads were needed 
entirely for military use, denied the committee this 
means of transporting their supplies to the stricken
6 3
Oliveira to State Department, March 2, 1915,
Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 5 , 654.
64
Oliveira to State Department, March 4, 1915, ibid. ,
657.
^ O l i v e i r a  to State Department, March 2, 1915, i b i d . ,
654.
6 6
Silliman to State Department, March 3, 1915, ibid. ,
654-55.
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Wilson and Bryan believed that only drastic measures 
could forestall a catastrophe. On March 6, they approved 
a strongly worded note drafted by Robert Lansing, Chief 
Counselor of the State Department, and sent it to 
Carranza and Obregc^n. "When a factional leader preys on 
a starving city to compel obedience to its decrees by 
inciting outlawry and at the same time uses means to 
prevent the city from being supplied with food," it de­
clared, "a situation is created which it is impossible 
for the United States to contemplate longer with 
patience." The two revolutionary leaders were then warned 
that "the Government of the United States will take such
measures as are expedient to bring to account those who
6 7are personally responsible for what may occur." Just
how seriously Wilson meant this threat was evidenced by
the fact that he directed Secretary of the Navy Josephus
Daniels to send the battleship Georgia and the cruiser
Washington to join the small naval force already at Vera 
68Cruz .
When Cardoso de Oliveira presented the message to
Obregon, the general replied that he was not authorized
to deal in international matters. On March 8, Silliman 
fi 7
Bryan to Wilson, March 5, 1915/14496A; Wilson to 
Bryan, March 6, 1915/14504-1/2; State Department to 
Oliveira and Silliman, March 6, 1915, Foreign Relations, 
1915 , 659-61.
f \ ft
Link, The Struggle for Neutrality, 462.
466
presented the note directly to Carranza, who read it with 
mounting indignation. He turned to the American agent 
and declared that the tone was insulting. Losing his 
habitual reserve momentarily, he turned to his Minister 
of Foreign Relations, Jesus Urueta, and stormed: "Do
not reply to this note, which is unworthy of any chancery 
representing a true democracy." Then the First Chief and 
his advisors protested to Silliman for being given sole 
responsibility for the suffering in Mexico City.
Throughout the uproar, Silliman remained silent. A Consti­
tutionalist army officer, who witnessed the scene, later 
reminisced that the agent's reticence probably prevented 
a complete break in relations, which, he wisely noted,
would have later been greatly regretted by the Consti- 
69tutionalists.
For a time the First Chief remained immovable.
Silliman worked feverishly to prevent intervention. Ac­
companied by Charles Douglas, Carranza's New York legal 
counsel, who had recently come to Vera Cruz for confer­
ences, the special agent called on the First Chief again 
on March 9 and repeated his appeal for the use of the 
railway in relieving the hunger in Mexico City. Carranza
69 Oliveira to State Department, March 7, 1915, Foreign 
Relations, 661; Silliman to State Department, March 8,
1915, ibid; Barragan, "From the Memoirs of Don Venustiano 
Carranza," EJL Universal, March 1, 1931, translation in NA, 
RG 76/148.
replied that it was not possible. Contrary to what he
had said earlier, on March 10, the First Chief gave
Silliman a written reply to Wilson's threat. Addressing
himself directly to the President in amiable terms,
Carranza disclaimed responsibility for the want and chaos
in Mexico City. He insisted that the United States was
being misinformed by "reactionaries" who were "attempting
to bring about complications which may cause the failure
71
of the ideals of the Mexican revolution." Privately,
Carranza was more caustic. He told Silliman confidentially
that he felt a "great personal resentment against the
Secretary of State." He held Bryan, alone, responsible
for the note of the 6th and declared that "the Secretary
7 2
personally sooner or later must respond to him for it."
With conditions in Mexico City still deteriorating, 
Carranza realized that his denial of responsibility was 
not likely to satisfy President Wilson. Rather than run 
the risk of a confrontation with the United States, he 
decided to abandon the city in order to avoid the onus 
Wilson had imposed upon him. On March 11, Obregon 
evacuated his troops. But Wilson refused to let the
^ S i l l i m a n  to State Department, March 9 (two), 1915/ 
14540, 14541.
^ S i l l i m a n  to State Department (conveying Carranza 
to Wilson, March 9, 1915), March 10, 1915, Foreign Re- 
lations, 1915 , 666-68.
7 2
Silliman to State Department, March 11, 1915/14547.
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matter rest. He sent a personal note to Carranza through 
Silliman, indicating that he had used stern language in 
the note of the 6th so that the gravity of his warning 
would be clear. Claiming that he did so as a friend,
Wilson, nonetheless, left the impression that the warning
73still stood in the event of future incidents. When
Silliman delivered the note, Carranza asked him to read 
it aloud in Spanish. Knowing how poorly Silliman spoke 
the language, the First Chief was no doubt trying to save 
some pride by humiliating Wilson's representative. The 
agent reported that when he had finished, the First Chief
made "no comment whatever." After a few embarrassing
74silent moments, Silliman changed the subject. A crisis
had been averted.
Conditions in Mexico City improved somewhat after
75the reoccupation by the Zapatistas. When the Convention
was re-established in the city shortly thereafter,
Gonzalez Garza recommended that it be neutralized.
Responding enthusiastically to this suggestion, Bryan
directed Carothers and Silliman to make appeals in this
regard to their respective charges. Villa expressed a
^ S t a t e  Department to Silliman, March 11, 1915,
Foreign Relations, 1915 , 668-69.
74
Silliman to State Department, March 12, 1915/14577.
^ O l i v e i r a  to State Department, March 11, 1915,
Foreign Relations, 1915 , 669 ; Oliveira to State Department,
March 15, 1915/14600.
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willingness to abide by a neutralization agreement, but
7 6
Carranza refused to consider it.
The conflict with Carranza over Mexico City had 
prompted Wilson to ready his weapons; a controversy over 
the port of Progreso on the Yucatdn Peninsula almost 
caused him to pull the trigger. In an attempt to pacify 
the peninsula in late-February, Carranza closed all the 
ports. In the process he prevented the exportation of 
some 200,000 bales of sisal hemp, which threatened 
American manufacturers and farmers with a serious shortage 
of binding-twine. In Washington, it appeared that the 
First Chief was prompted by no other reason than to spite 
the United States. Under directions from Bryan, Silliman 
asked Carranza to allow the exportation of the badly 
needed hemp. The First Chief, believing that the wealthy 
sisal planters of the peninsula had influenced the State 
Department to come to their aid, refused even this 
partial opening of the port of P r o g r e s o . ^
7 6Oliveira to State Department, March 29, 1915, 
Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 5 , 683 ; State Department to 
Silliman, March 29, 31, 1915, ib i d . , 683 , 685 ; State De­
partment to Carothers, March 29, 1915, ib i d . , 683 ;
Silliman to State Department, March 30, April 5, 1915, 
ib i d . , 684-86; Silliman to State Department, April 3, 
1915/14781; Cobb (for Carothers) to State Department,
April 6 , 1915/14795.
77state Department to Silliman, February 24, 1915, 
Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 5 , 821; Silliman to State Department, 
February 27, March 2, 1915, ibid. ; Barrag^n, "From the 
Memoirs of Don Venustiano Carranza," .El Universal, March 
8 , 1931, translation in NA, RG 76/148.
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Trying to assure Carranza that the United States was
not taking sides in the Yucatan conflict, Bryan directed
Silliman to propose that, in order to prevent the rebels
from profiting from the sisal trade, buyers in the
United States would hold in trust the purchase price of
the amount of sisal they exported. Luis Cabrera, the
First Chief's Secretary of Treasury, told Silliman that
this arrangement would be satisfactory, if the United
States would also agree to import supplies to the
Yucatecans through the port of Progreso. On March 10,
Bryan replied that this arrangement would be most satis- 
7 8factory. Considering past relations with Carranza,
this problem had apparently been settled with relative 
e a s e .
The settlement did not last. For one thing, Bryan 
received word from American sisal buyers and his consular 
agent at Progreso that the Yucatecans were so desperate 
for food that they might prevent the exportation of sisal 
unless they were allowed to import food. Silliman 
reported, moreover, that Carranza had refused to allow 
an American merchantman, the Morro Ca s t l e , to sail from 
Vera Cruz bound for Progreso. Naval authorities also re­
ported from Vera Cruz that a Constitutionalist gunboat was
E s t a t e  Department to Silliman, March 8, 10, 1915,
Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 5 , 822 , 823 ; Silliman to State De­
partment, March 9, 1915, i b id., 822.
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79on its way to bombard the port. After a Cabinet meeting
on March 12, in which the advisability of intervention was
discussed, Wilson directed Bryan to inform Carranza that
the United States did not recognize his right to blockade
the port of Progreso. If he did not open the port of his
own volition, American warships would be instructed to do
so. As if it would give Carranza some reassurance, the
Secretary of State was also to say that "we are doing
this in the interest of peace and amity between the two
countries and with no wish or intention to interfere with
8 0
her internal affairs. . . ."
With more warships already on their way to the
Mexican coast because of the Mexico City incidents,
conditions were ripe for armed conflict. Bryan was
confident that, if the Navy was forced to intervene, there
would be no bloody sequal to the Vera Cruz intervention,
81
because the Yucatecans were anti-Carranza. He might
well have recalled that Lind had counseled that there 
would probably be no shooting at Vera Cruz. Luckily, the
79w. P. Young, Consular Agent, Progreso, to State De­
partment, [n.d.], Bryan-Wilson Correspondence; State De­
partment to Silliman, March 11, 1915, Foreign Relations. 
1 9 1 5 . 823; Silliman to State Department, March 11, 1915,
NA 612.1123/66; State Department to Silliman, March 11, 
1915/14584a.
^ W i l s o n  to Bryan, March 12, 1915, Bryan-Wilson 
Correspondence; State Department to Silliman, Foreign Re- 
lations. 1 9 1 5 . 824.
8lBryan to Wilson, March 13, 1915, Bryan-Wilson 
Correspondence.
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Navy was not called into action. For one thing, Carranza's 
blockade was never very effective, and American ships 
began intermittently sailing with sisal cargoes. The 
tension was further eased because the Constitutionalist 
gunboat bound for Progreso ran into foul weather and was 
forced to return to Vera cruz. By the time Silliman 
worked up enough courage to confront Carranza with Wilson's 
new ultimatum (it took two days), the Constitutionalists 
had nearly succeeded in defeating the rebels in the 
Yucatan and had gained control of Progreso. The Consti­
tutionalist commander in the Yucatan, General Salvador 
Alvarado, was also wise enough to turn his back while 
American ships s a i l e d . ^
Silliman's timidity may well have been the most 
important factor in easing the crisis. He did not deliver 
Wilson's ultimatum as instructed. Instead, he merely 
told the First Chief and members of the cabinet that 
President Wilson had again requested that the order 
closing the port of Progreso be revoked. The Mexican 
conferees seemed aware that Silliman had received extra­
ordinary new instructions and played a cat-and-mouse game 
with him. Knowing well that the agent usually presented 
them with a copy of his instructions, they asked to see
^^Silliman to State Department, March 13 (two), 16,
18, 25, 1925/14585, 14586, 14607, 14623, 14693; Silliman
to State Department, March 19, 1915, NA 612.1123/157.
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the text of the President's request. Fearful of the
possible consequences, Silliman replied that he had been
instructed to make the appeal verbally. The First Chief
then asked that the response of the United States would
be if he refused the request. The American agent again
dodged the issue, claiming that he had not been instructed
in this regard. A Mexican stenographer noted that when
Carranza's secretaries pressed further for an answer to
this question, Silliman conferred with Belt, his
assistant, then replied that he had been instructed to do
no more than secure a positive or negative reply to his
President's request. Apparently having known all along
what his reply would be, Carranza abruptly announced that
8 3
he would accede to the reopening of the port.
Whether it was prudence or lack of courage that 
prompted him, Silliman had declined to court a crisis. In 
this regard he served both his country and Mexico well.
In the process, he was forced to endure the bantering of
8 3
Silliman to State Department, March 15, 1915,
Foreign Relations, 1915 . 824 ; Memorandum de un conversacion 
con El Sr. Silliman, March 15, 1915, A G R E , L-E-861, Leg. 5. 
Silliman's account of the conference gives no hint of the 
grilling he received. He merely noted that he "was not 
obliged to communicate in any way the President's 
intentions." Carrancista General Juan Barragan later 
claimed that Carranza opened the port of Progreso because 
Wilson threatened an arms embargo against the Consti­
tutionalists. See "From the Memoirs .of Don Venustiano 
Carranza," EJL Universal, March 8 , 1931, translation in 
NA, RG 76/148. State Department files record no such 
threat.
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Carranza's assistants. He also received a history lecture
from the First Chief, who pointed out that had Great
Britain insisted upon the exportation of cotton from New
Orleans during the Civil War in the United States, it
would have been comparable to the current demand of the
United States for the right to export sisal from 
84Progreso.
Considering the gravity of the recent strained re­
lations between the United States and Carranza, special 
agent West enjoyed a remarkably cordial welcome when he 
arrived in Vera Cruz on March 24. Owing to illness, 
Carranza was unable to meet with West until five days 
later. Beforehand, the special agent held several 
conferences with the Carrancista cabinet. The First Chief 
was still suffering from lumbago when he met West; conse­
quently, the conference was short. He told the San 
Antonian that his ministers would give him all the 
information he required and that he hoped it would 
dispell many of the misconceptions currently held in Wash­
ington. As promised, the Carrancista ministers proved 
amply c o o p e r a t i v e . ^
84Silliman to State Department, March 16, 1915,
Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 5 , 824.
8^Silliman to State Department, March 24, 1915, NA
111.70W52/8; Silliman to State Department, March 27,
1915/14716; West (enclosing Partial Report and Im­
pressions Received at Vera Cruz, March 24, 1915-April 5, 
1915), April 5, 1915/20721; New York T i m e s , March 30,
1915, p. 4.
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West had little opportunity to assess Carranza's 
character but did note that the First Chief was a "hard 
thinker, but not a man of action." In comparing the 
personnel around Carranza with Villa's advisors, he sug­
gested that "they are a much higher order. . . . "  He 
thought most of them were actuated by pariotism and 
seemed surprised to find that they were "devoting much 
study and work toward formulating the laws and reforms 
referred to in the Plan of Guadalupe." Their conception 
of reform needs, West noted, were virtually the same as 
the Villistas'. Taken as a group, he believed that the 
Carrancistas "would probably be able to develop the
8 6ability necessary to carry on a Civil Administration."
The Constitutionalists' weakness, West thought, was 
in military leadership. He noted that none of the 
civilian leaders would prophesy military victory. 
Apparently unaware that this was a war being fought along 
rail lines to control strategic points, West offered as 
evidence of the poor quality of military men the fact that 
so much of the countryside, supposedly under Constitution­
alist control, was in constant turmoil. Admitting that 
his opinions had to be considered tentative because he had 
no opportunity to meet the Constitutionalists' two fore­
most military men, Obregcfn and Gonzalez, West concluded
O
West, Partial Report and Impressions Received at 
Vera Cruz, March 24, 1915-April 5, 1915/20721.
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that "the Constitutionalist Government under its present
leaders cannot establish peace in Mexico, because of the
8 7
failure of its military leaders. . .
Rather elaborate arrangements had to be made for West 
to travel to Mexico City. Carranza provided a special 
train and an escort for the agent as far as Ometusco. To 
avoid a possible clash with the Zapatistas, the Brazilian 
Minister was directed to send certain designated 
individuals in carefully marked automobiles to meet the 
train. As it turned out, the tracks were destroyed well 
before the rendezvous point, and West and his secretary- 
interpreter were left alone in a detached car. After a 
long delay, a representative of the Brazilian Legation 
arrived with horses. From there, the party rode horse­
back to a point from which a Zapatista train picked them 
up and delivered them to Mexico City. Minister Cardoso 
de Oliveira, meanwhile, had arranged a reception so that
West could meet the diplomatic corps and officials of
88
the Conventlonist Government.
In his reports, West did not give much space to the 
Conventionist government. Roque Gonzalez Garza, Presi­
dent of the Convention, was described as a "well
87ibid.
8 8
Silliman to State Department, April 4, 1914, NA
1 1 1 .70W52/15; Oliveira to State Department, April 7, 1915,
ib i d ./18 ; Biographical File, Barker Collection.
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intentioned man." West also noted correctly that 
Gonzalez Garza was a Villa adherent, but that the Con­
vention was currently dominated by the Zapatistas. The
cabinet was scarcely mentioned. He did indicate that
the government maintained excellent order in Mexico City
and had made every effort to protect the lives and
89property of foreigners. He did not even mention the
complete absence of cooperation and constant quarreling 
between the Villista and Zapatista factions of the Con­
vention. Perhaps he did not do so because Cardoso de
Oliveira had already fully informed Washington of the 
imminent disintegration of the Convention as an effective 
deliberative body. On the eve of West's arrival,
Cardoso de Oliveira reported that Gonzalez Garzahad
intimated that he might leave the Convention and join
90Villa in the North.
While making preparations to visit Zapata, West 
discovered that the chieftain of the South was dis­
tressed by the previous treatment he had received from 
President Wilson. He was particularly annoyed because
89
Report to the President, through the Honorable 
Secretary of State, of conditions in Mexico by Duval West, 
acting under authority of the President, dated February 
10, 1915, this report being supplemental to Preliminary 
Report on the Villa Government and Preliminary Report on 
the Carranza Government heretofore made, May 11, 1915/ 
19181.
90
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Wilson had not answered the letter that Red Cross repre­
sentative Charles Jenkinson had forwarded to Washington in 
December, 1913. In the letter, Zapata had requested that 
Wilson receive a group from Morelos who would explain the 
nature of the revolution of the South and seek guidance 
from the United States. Before journeying into Morelos, 
West, therefore, asked the President for clarification on 
this score. Wishing to pave the way for his agent, Wilson 
alibied that he had prepared a reply, but that, owing to
a clerical misunderstanding, it was never sent. West was
91
deputed to make apologies.
Escorted by General Alfredo Serratos, West journeyed 
to Tlaltizapan on April 16 to meet with Zapata. The 
train ride through the mountains covered with lush 
tropical foliage impressed the American agent more than 
any of the other scenes he had witnessed. Meeting with 
Zapata in the mid-afternoon heat, West first offered 
Wi l s o n ’s apologies for not having answered the general’s 
letter. West then asked Zapata to explain his intentions 
for sending the letter. With no copy to guide him, Zapata 
asked for a delay while he conferred with his advisors. 
Seeking relief from the heat, West and his party took a
91
West to State Department, April 10, 1915, and State
Department to West, April 12, 1915/14832; draft of reply in
Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 129.
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short swim in a nearby river while waiting for Zapata's
reply. When the conference was resumed, the rebel
chieftain asked if Wilson would receive a commission of
Zapatistas in Washington. West could only reply that he
would make inquiries. Zapata seemed reluctant to discuss
any other matters with the special representative. He
left West with the impression that he trusted only his
own kind to adequately explain his purposes to President 
92
W i l s o n .
Before leaving Tlalt^zapan, West dined with Zapata 
on canned salmon and peaches, beans, chili, tortillas, 
and hot beer. Afterwards, they strolled leisurely back 
to the train, and West departed. Despite the brevity of 
the meeting, West formed firm opinions. "I was 
agreeably disappointed in Zapata," he wrote in his re­
port. Like most of the revolutionaries, "he believes 
that it is perfectly right that the property of the 
rich shall be taken and given to the poor." As far as 
his being able to influence a permanent settlement of 
affairs in Mexico, West wrote: "I do not think Zapata
may be taken into account other than being the
9 2 y
West, Mexico City to Tlaltizapan, April 16, 1915/
24272a. West's description of his meeting with Zapata
was apparently attached to his report of May 11, cited
above. President Wilson was apparently taken with the
descriptions of the journey and the meeting that he
detached it and later returned it to Bryan. See Wilson
to Bryan, June 18, 1915/24272a.
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representative of the people in the hills and mountains
9 3of his own scope of country."
Upon his return to Mexico City, West dutifully in­
quired if the President would receive a commission of 
Zap at is t a s . Bryan was inclined to accede, but Wilson was 
fearful that Zapata and the other factional leaders 
would interpret the move as connoting diplomatic 
recognition. Bryan was directed to reply that since the 
President had not received commissions from the other 
factions, he must decline to receive one from Zapata. 
Zapata was to be informed, however, that President Wilson
would welcome what ever explanatory documents the general
94would care to send. West made a good impression on the
Zap at is t a s . Before he left the city, they held a banquet
in his honor, and even Diaz Soto y Gama offered a toast
95of praise to the American agent. His mission completed,
West had difficulty leaving Mexico City. Fighting along
9 3 /
West, Mexico City to Tlaltizapan, April 16, 1915/
24272a.
94 West to State Department, April 19, 1915, and State 
Department to West, April 22, 1915, Foreign Relations,
1915 , 688-89 ; Bryan to Wilson, April 20, 1915, and Wilson 
to Bryan, April 21, 1915, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence.
The Zapatistas did send several documents including a copy 
of the Plan of Ayala with West. These documents are 
filed in the State Department's Internal Affairs of 
Mexico File, 812.00/15166.
9 5
"El Viaje de Mr. West," La. Verdad (Mexico City),
May 5, 1915; New York S u n , May 10, 1915.
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the rail line that brought him to the city prevented his 
return along the same route. Delayed for nearly ten 
days, he was finally taken to Puebla by automobile, where 
he met Belt. Escorted on to Vera Cruz, he just had time 
to dine with Silliman and Admiral William B. Caperton 
before sailing for h o m e . ^
While West was making his investigations in Vera 
Cruz, Mexico City, and Tlalt^zapan, conditions elsewhere 
underwent a drastic change. After his meeting with West, 
Villa went north to direct the campaigns against 
Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo, and Tampico. He hoped to defeat 
the Constitutionalists in the North before having to
return southward for the inevitable showdown with
/ 9 7 /Obregon. Unable to dislodge General Gonzalez from the
Tampico, Villa's campaigns on the border also went badly.
The Carrancistas put up stiff resistance, because they
were supplied from the United States. Villa complained
to Carothers because of the lack of reciprocity in the
demands of the State Department. He was expected to carry
on his attacks without firing across the border, yet the
Constitutionalists had complete access to supplies from
the United States. Bryan only replied that the laws of
9 6
Silliman to State Department, April 24, 27, 28, 29, 
1915, NA 111.70W52/24, 28, 29, 33, 36; El P u e b l o , May 1, 
1915; San Antonio Express, April 28, 29, 1915.
^ Q u i r k , The Mexican Revolution, 17 7, 214.
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the United States did not provide for the closing of the
9 8frontier in such conditions. At any rate, Villa had
not been able to complete his border campaigns before 
Obrego'n began pushing northward.
The decisive battle of this phase of the revolution 
was near at hand. On March 28, Carothers reported un­
usually heavy troop movements to the South. The next day, 
Villa appeared in Torreon and asked Carothers to go south 
with him "for a couple of days." They did not stop until 
they reached Irapuato. Obregon was just thirty-five miles 
to the east in Celaya. Villa boasted that he would 
"annihilate the enemy." Carothers, never doubting that he 
would, left the scene and went to Guadalajara to investi­
gate the complaints of some foreigners whose property had
99apparently been confiscated.
With the understanding that Zapata would hit 
Obregon1s supply lines which stretched from Vera Cruz to 
Celaya, Villa attacked Obregon's main force on April 6 and 
was repulsed. Even though aid from Zapata did not 
materialize, the enraged Villa attacked again on the 13th. 
Using a well-designed machine gun cross-fire, a maze of
9 8
Carothers to State Department, March 27, 1915, and 
State Department to Carothers, April 10, 1915/14849.
9 9Cobb (for Carothers) to State Department, March 29, 
April 3, 5, 6 , 8 , 12, 1915/14731, 14778, 14787, 14795, 
14784, 14836; Cobb (for Carothers) to State Department, 
March 28, 1915, NA 812.48/2152.
483
trenches, and barbed-wire entanglements, Obregon cut 
Villa's once proud army to pieces and sent the Centaur 
of the North retreating all the way to Aguascalientes. 
Carothers returned to Irapuato on the 12th, the day before 
Villa's second defeat. Villa was at the front. His 
loyal subalterns did not inform the American of the 
gravity of the situation. Consequently, his reports 
gave no hint. Silliman, on the other hand, was reporting 
from Vera cruz that Obregon was w i n n i n g . W h e n ,  even 
after it became apparent in Washington that Villa had 
been defeated, Carothers' reports indicated that Villa had 
the upper-hand, the State Department directed him to make 
a more careful investigation.'*'^
On April 20, Carothers suddenly appeared in El Paso. 
He reported that Villa had not revealed the true nature 
of things until three days after his defeat. The special
Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 221-25 ; Thord-Gray, 
Gringo R e b e l , 462-63; Liewen, Mexican Militarism, 34; 
B a r r a g a n R o d r / g u e z , Historia . . . Constitutionalista, II,
279-96.
■^^Cobb (for Carothers) to State Department, April 
12, 1915/14836; Silliman to State Department, April 7 
(two), 15, 1915/14809, 14810; Tinker, "Campaigning With 
Villa," Southwest Review, XXX, 154. Tinker, a journalist 
who had accompanied Carothers to Irapuato, indicated that 
the Villistas withheld the fact that Villa had already 
been repulsed once with heavy losses.
10 2Cobb (for Carothers) to State Department, April 15,
1915/14858; State Department to Cobb (for Carothers), April
19, 1915/14893.
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agent claimed, moreover, that he had telegraphed the news
to the border, but Cobb had never received the telegram.
Carothers assumed that Villa's telegraphers destroyed
the coded draft. Carothers1 full-length report, written
in El Paso, indicated that Villa had withheld the true
extent of his defeat. Villa told Carothers that he lost
only 6000 men and had escaped with his rolling stock
and other equipment intact. The Constitutionalist agency
in Washington claimed that he had lost 14,000 men, part
103of his rolling stock, and most of his artillery.
Regardless of the accuracy of either estimate, the defeat 
was decisive and marked the beginning of a disastrous 
decline for Villa. It also marked a change in the 
relationship between Villa and Carothers. No longer 
could the special agent trust the candor of the Mexican 
general.
Shortly after Celaya, Carothers reported that the 
pressure of defeat caused Villa to call in his forces from 
Jalisco and M i c h o a c a n . A t  the same time, Obregon's 
success took much of the pressure off the Constitutionalist 
garrisons at Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo and Tampico. By the 
end of April, the Villista seige on the border outposts 
103 Carothers to State Department, April 20 (two), 22, 
1915/14.897, 14898, 14935; Arredondo to State Department, 
April 16, 1915/14882.
10A
'Carothers to State Deparmtent, April 22, 1915/
14935.
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collapsed. That V i l l a ’s eclipse was recognized in Wash­
ington was evidenced when Bryan told representatives of 
the press that "the failure of Villa . . .  to capture 
Celaya and defeat Obrego'n has about convinced Adminis­
tration officials here that the man upon whom hopes had 
been pinned for pacification of Mexico cannot be relied
. , . . ii 106upon to save the situation.
Concurrent with the news of V i l l a ’s decline came
Duval West's reports on his observations in southern
Mexico. West arrived in Washington on May 9, in the
midst of the Lusitania crisis. More than two weeks
passed before the Texan was able to confer directly with 
10 7the President. On May 11, however, he submitted a
written report to the Secretary of State. He did not 
rehash what he had written before or amend his earlier 
reports to take into account the changes that had 
occurred since he first entered Mexico some three months 
before. His most noteworthy conclusion was "that a 
condition of permanent peace and order and the 
establishment of stable government . . . cannot be brought
1 A  C
Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 226 ; Barrag^n 
Rodriguez, His toria . . . Constitucionalista, II, 302-19.
106New York T i m e s , April 20, 1915, p. 1.
^■^New York T i m e s , May 10, 1915, p. 8 ; Ib i d . , May 
25, 1915, p. 9; San Antonio Express, May 10, 11, 12,
1915.
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about by any of the contending parties without the aid or
assistance of the United States." If the President wanted
a responsible government in Mexico, he would somehow have
to aid in its creation. How could this be accomplished?
West was not explicit. But he hinted, without specifying
which ones should be considered, that the best way the
United States could help was to recognize one faction or
a combination of factions and be prepared to support that
108
government to the hilt.
On May 24, West at last conferred with President
Wilson. The press reported that West spoke disparagingly
of all the factions, which was likely true. He
supposedly warned the President not to support any 
109faction. If he did so, then he controverted his
written recommendations. After the meeting, West returned 
to San Antonio. He did not serve the Administration 
again in a diplomatic capacity. In December, 1916, how­
ever, he was appointed Federal Judge for the Western
District of Texas. He served in that capacity until his
110
retirement in 1932.
10 8West, Report to the President . . . , May 11, 1915/
19181.
^■^New York Times , May 25, 1915, p. 9; ibid. , May 26, 
1915, p. 5; San Antonio Express, May 29, 1915.
^ ^ San Antonio Express , June 13, 1915; Austin Ameri­
can , May 18, 1949; Biographical File, Barker Collection.
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In assessing the conditions in Mexico, West erred in 
some respects. Most glaringly, he underestimated 
Carranza's military strength and overestimated Villa's.
He no sooner reported the Constitutionalists' lack of 
quality military leadership than Obregon won his smashing 
triumph at Celaya. West too readily assumed that the 
Mexican leaders, except for Zapata, who advocated 
confiscation of private property, did so only for 
pecuniary motives.
On the other hand, West's accounts were the most 
balanced and least biased yet received from a special 
agent. He was the first agent directed to call on Villa 
who was not absolutely smitten by the dynamic personality 
of the Chihuahua strong-man. He was the first to indi­
cate that Villa lacked the ability to peacefully ad­
minister to the needs of the Mexican nation. Other than 
Silliman, West was the only agent who did not ultimately 
find Carranza thoroughly obnoxious. He seemed to sense 
the First Chief's inner strength. He rightfully pointed 
out that Zapata's ideals did not embrace a sympathy or 
concern for the whole nation. By not associating agrarian 
reform with Zapata alone, West revealed how widespread 
the ideas, first espoused by the revolutionaries of the 
South, had become.
What would Wilson do with the information West had 
provided? The President must have asked himself the
488
questions that an editorialist of the New York Times posed 
when West was first sent to Mexico: "Perhaps after a few
weeks he [West] will be in a position to make wise sug-
111gestions, but will they be heeded? Can they be heeded?"
To answer these questions, Wilson would have to abandon 
his policy of non-intervention.
^'*'"Duval West's Mission," New York Tim e s , February 
12, 1915, p. 10.
CHAPTER XII
THE FINAL ACCOUNTING
During the first six months of 1915, Wilson faced 
near irresistible pressures for intervention in Mexico. 
His Republican opponents on Capital Hill led the cry. 
The habitual critics, Senators Henry Cabot Lodge and 
Albert B. Fall, insisted that it was the President's 
responsibility to restore order in Mexico. Refining 
their arguments somewhat, Senator William E. Borah of 
Idaho, normally not an interventionist, reasoned that 
once Wilson intervened against the dictator Huerta, he 
should have insured that the successor acted re­
sponsibly.'*' Even more intense was the demand for 
intervention voiced by the hierarchy and laymen of the 
Roman Catholic Church, who decried the anti-clericalism 
of the revolutionaries. As pressure from American 
Catholics mounted, Bryan felt constrained on April 22 
to issue a public statement, declaring that, while the 
Administration took note of every reported act of anti­
clericalism and lodged protests, it could not accept
*~C o n g . R e c . , 63 Cong., 3 Sess. (January 6 , 13, 
February 22, 1915), 1016-21, 1500-1502, 4274-84.
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persecution of the Church in Mexico as grounds for
military intervention.^
As already indicated, conditions in Mexico City
between January and March had driven the President to
consider intervention. The re-occupation of the city by
the Zapatistas in March brought temporary relief; but
shortly afterward, conditions deteriorated again. In
late March and thereafter, throughout April and May,
hunger, looting, and violence again resulted in appeals
for intervention from the foreign colony of the city.
Carranza continued to aggravate matters by denying the
use of his railroads to supply the city. He enraged
President Wilson in May by seizing some of the supplies
3
purchased by the International Relief Committee. John
W. Belt maintained in a personal letter to Bryan that
this Committee harbored a group of dissidents who courted
such incidents in hopes of provoking intervention.
Mostly Americans, they were, he warned, in communication
with business interests in the United States who also
4
hoped for intervention.
2
Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive E r a , 132; 
New York T i m e s , April 22, 1915, p. 6 .
3
Oliveira to State Department, March 26, 27, May 7, 
21, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915 , 682 , 689-91; Oliveira 
to State Department, April 3, 1915/14775; New York T i m e s , 
May 29, 1915, p. 1; ibid., May 31, 1915, p. 4.
4
Belt to Bryan, May 21, 1915, Bryan-Wilson
Correspondence.
491
Villa was also causing the United States concern. 
Having modified his demands against foreign-owned mining 
interests, his main source of revenue for a time came from 
the sale of cattle at El Paso. American stockmen's 
associations, protesting that many of the cattle were 
stolen from Americans, succeeded by late April in seriously 
curtailing Villa's sales in the United States. Villa then 
opened a slaughtering plant in Juarez and, through 
agreements with several American packing companies, began 
marketing processed beef. As a result, American stockmen 
appealed to the Department of Agriculture to stop this 
beef trade. Despite pledges from Carothers and the packing 
companies that Villa was not processing beef stolen from 
Americans, the Department of Agriculture did stop shipments 
of Villa's beef on the grounds that his abbatoir did not 
meet sanitation requirements prescribed by the laws of the 
United States.^ Carothers warned that Villa would be 
indignant over this turn of events and, in his opinion, 
"justly so." The special agent also indicated his fear 
that, as a result of the decision, Villa would not take
^Senator Charles A. Culberson (Dem.-Tex.) to Bryan, 
January 8 , 1915, NA 312.114P19; Carothers to State De­
partment, March 15, April 30, May 6 , 1915, ibid./5, 6 , 10. 
Carothers' letter of March 15 includes affidavits from 
American packing companies pledging that they were not 
trafficking in beef stolen from American ranches.
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favorable action on pending matters concerning foreign
. 6 property.
Carothers 1 prophecy held true. When, in mid-May, the 
Yaqui Indians of Sonora began raiding foreign-owned 
ranches, three Americans were brutally murdered. The 
Secretary of State directed Carothers to urge Villa to 
send troops to Sonora to end the trouble. In response, 
Villa told the agent that as long as the Carrancistas 
controlled the Sonoran border and he was expected to abide 
by the agreement made in January, which forbade him to 
attack border towns, he could not guarantee the safety of 
foreigners in Sonora.^
Intrigue in the State Department also swiftened the 
drift toward intervention. By the spring of 1915, there 
were several Mexican j untas in the United States either 
plotting counterrevolution or trying to win the support of
g
the Wilson Administration for plans to pacify Mexico.
Cobb (for Carothers) to State Department, May 9, 
1915, i b i d ./10.
^State Department to Carothers, May 17, 1915, NA 312. 
11/5980; Carothers to State Department, May 19, 21, 1915, 
i b i d ./6019, 6021.
g
One such counterrevolutionary movement centered 
around Pascual Orozco and Victoriano Huerta, who came to 
the United States from exile in Spain. See Meyer, Pas cual 
Orozco , 124-31; Rauch, "The Exile and Death of Victoriano 
Huerta," H A H R , XLII, 135-44. Federico Gamboa and other 
remnants of the Mexican Catholic Party, with the support 
of Catholic elements in the United States, tried to 
interest Bryan in a plan of pacification. Both Bryan and 
Wilson thought they smelled counterrevolution in the plot.
493
The movement that attracted the greatest attention of 
State Department officials was headed by Eduardo Iturbide. 
The plot was largely given shape by Iturbide's guardian 
angel, Leon J. Canova, who was currently the Assistant 
Chief of the Latin American Division. Supported by the 
United States, Iturbide would become a third force in 
Mexico which would overpower both Villa and Carranza. 
Besides Canova, the plan was supported by Assistant 
Counselor Chandler P. Anderson, Chief Counselor Robert 
Lansing, and the Secretary of Interior Franklin K. Lane. 
Bryan opposed the scheme at every turn. The upshot of the 
plot was a tumultuous Cabinet meeting of June 1, at which 
Bryan and Lane argued violently over the merits of 
Iturbide. Although the President did not take part in 
the argument, he accepted Bryan's advice that the plot 
smelled of reaction. The Cabinet meeting, nonetheless, 
convinced Wilson that he must abandon non-involvement and 
take a more active part in promoting a final settlement 
in Mex i c o .^
Wilson called it a "pig in a poke." See Bishop Charles 
Currier to Bryan, March 15, 1915/16810; Bryan to Wilson, 
March 16, 1915/ibid. ; Wilson to Bryan, March 16, 1915/ 
i bid. ; Bryan to Currier, March 19, 1915/ibid. Felix 
Diaz planned to foment an uprising in the State of 
Oaxaca. See Memorandum of a conversation with Honorable 
Leslie M. Shaw, July 15, 1915/23137.
^Link, The Struggle for Neutrality, 470-76;
Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 268-70.
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How could he become involved without courting a 
military confrontation? West had suggested recognizing 
one faction or a coalition of factions and supporting that 
government to the hilt. But which faction or factions?
Even before the climactic Cabinet meeting of June 1,
David Lawrence, a young journalist friend of Wilson, sug­
gested a means of narrowing the choices. A Princeton 
graduate, Class of 1910, Lawrence's associations with 
Wilson went back to when he was a reporter assigned to the 
university president's office by the undergraduate news­
paper. In 1911-1912, he had covered the Madero Revo­
lution for the Associated Press. A correspondent for the 
Washington bureau of the Associated Press since 1912, he 
was an intimate of the President and the leaders of the 
various Mexican j untas in the United States.^
Addressing a letter to the President on May 27,
Lawrence warned that famine would sweep Mexico and the 
cries for intervention would intensify if the revolutionary 
factions in Mexico and the various juntas in the United 
States continued to work at cross purposes. He suggested 
that besides the great personalities of the revolution 
(Carranza, Villa, and Zapata), there were many leaders who 
would willingly enter into a compromise agreement if it 
would mean peace. The President should appeal directly to
■^"David Lawrence," Current Biography , 19 43 (New York: 
The H. W. Wilson Co., 1944), 428.
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them, as well as to the great personalities, to resolve 
their differences over the conference table. A pro­
visional government created in such a manner, Lawrence 
proposed, should be accorded diplomatic recognition and 
given moral, financial, and military backing, while those
who abstained from the conference should be denied such
„ 11 support.
Wilson liked Lawrence's suggestions. He apparently
was preparing a note embodying the journalist’s ideas
12
before the Cabinet meeting of June 1. Afterward, he
sent the personally-drafted note to the State Department
for distribution to all American consuls and special
representatives in Mexico. The message bore a striking
resemblance to the suggestions in Lawrence's letter of
May 27. After reciting the troubles Mexico had faced for
over two years and describing her current destitute
condition, Wilson declared:
It is time . . . that the Government of the
United States should frankly state the policy 
in these extraordinary circumstances it becomes 
its duty to adopt. It must . . . lend its
active moral support to some man or group of men, 
if such may be found, who can rally the suffer­
ing people of Mexico to their support in an
^ L a w r e n c e  to Wilson, May 27, 1915, Wilson Papers, 
Series II, Box 130.
12
Wilson told reporters that he was preparing to 
announce a policy change aimed at ending the strife in 
Mexico. See New York T i m e s , May 29, 1915, p. 1.
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effort to ignore, if they cannot unite, the 
warring factions of the country, return to 
the constitution of the Republic so long in 
abeyance, and set up a government at Mexico 
City which the great powers of the world can 
recognize and deal with, a government with 
whom the program of the revolution will be a 
business and not merely a platform . . .  I 
feel it to be my duty to tell them that, if 
they cannot accomodate their differences and 
unite for this great purpose within a very 
short time, this government will be 
constrained to decide what means should be 
employed . . .  to help Mexico save herself and 
serve her p e o p l e . 13
Wilson had scrapped his non-involvement policy. But in
once more striving to aid in the solution of Mexico's
problems, he again revealed his naivete— as did his new
advisor, David Lawrence. He seems to have thought that
after some five years of fighting, the revolutionaries
could get together around a conference table, shed their
animosities, and end their revolution.
Remarkably, the first responses to the President's
note were encouraging. Through the Brazilian Minister
in Mexico City, Roque Gonzalez Garza, President of the
Convention, sent invitations to Carranza and Villa to
join the Convention in an armistice and negotiations
14leading to the formation of a provisional government.
Statement by the President, sent to all American 
Consuls and other special representatives in Mexico, June 
2, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 5 , 694-95.
14 tOliveira to State Department (conveying Gonzalez 
Garza to Carranza and Villa, June 3, 1915), June 4, 1915, 
ibid. , 697-98; State Department to Silliman and Carothers, 
June 5, 1915, i b i d ., 698.
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The First Chief even told Silliman that "he would 
disappoint any enemies of Mexico and the United States 
who expected defiance from him."'*''’ Carothers reported 
from Chihuahua that V i l l a ’s ministers were quite willing 
to cooperate. They felt certain that their chief would 
give a favorable reply.
Villa's personal reply was held in abeyance 
temporarily because he was locked in battle with Obregon. 
The battle at Leon de las A l d a m a s , which proved crucial 
in more ways than one, began on June 1. This time 
General Felipe Angeles was with Villa and advised him to 
fight a defensive battle. Refusing to learn from his 
experience at Celaya, Villa sent another massed cavalry 
charge at Obregon and was again soundly defeated. Having 
already evacuated his troops from Monterey on May 23, 
Villa's defeat at Leon further revealed the decline of 
his f o r t u n e s . ^  It was under these conditions that 
Carothers received Villa's reply to President Wilson's 
newest proposal.
Although his power and territory were shrinking, 
Villa gave Carothers a statement on June 10, boasting
■^Silliman to State Department, June 7, 1915/15161.
16 Cobb (for Carothers) to State Department, June 3 
(two), 1915/15119, 15125.
^ Q u i r k ,  The Mexican Revolution, 260-61 ; Barragan 
Rodriguez, Historia . . . Constitucionalista, II, 341-
47.
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that he still controlled the largest part of Mexico, yet
would humble himself for the sake of peace and negotiate
18with his enemies. At the same time, he sent a note
through Carothers and the State Department to Carranza and
Gonzalez Garza, accepting the Convention president's
19invitation to enter into peace negotiations. It was all
very encouraging, to a point.
Soon it became apparent in Washington that any hope
for a prompt settlement was illusory. For one thing, the
lesser chiefs did not come forward and demand peace. They
continued to defer to their factional leaders. The
Zapatistas did not support Gonzalez Garza's peace overtures
in the name of the Convention. Zapata, personally, urged
20the Convention to ignore Wilson's demands. In the
Convention, Diaz Soto y Gama denounced Gonzalez Garza and 
launched into a lengthy but apocryphal attack upon Presi­
dent Wilson and the United States. He even claimed that 
Duval West had demanded a bribe from Zapata in return for 
a favorable report on his faction. When Zapata refused, 
the raging revolutionary charged, West returned to 
18
Carothers to State Department (conveying Villa to 
Wilson, June 10, 1915), June 11, 1915, Foreign Relations, 
1 9 1 5 , 701-703.
19 Carothers to State Department (conveying Villa to 
Gonzalez Garza and Carranza, June 10, 1915), June 11,
1915, i b i d . , 703-704.
20
Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 258.
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Washington supporting Carranza, who evidently had paid the
bribe. Soto y Gama warned that Wilson's newest proposal
grew out of West's visit (here, he was partially correct)
and that, if adhered to, would benefit Carranza. The
Convention responded by forcing Gonzalez Garza out of
21
office and ignoring Wilson's plea. Again, the
Zapatistas revealed their disdain for anyone or any force
outside their own frame of reference.
Carranza, meanwhile, did not even bother to answer 
Gonzalez Garza's overture. After Obregon's victory at 
Leon, moreover, he felt less constrained than ever to 
negotiate with his enemies. Rather than admit the right 
of the United States to interfere in the internal affairs 
of Mexico, the First Chief did not even answer Wilson
directly. Instead, on June 11, he issued a "Manifesto to
the Mexican People," which embodied his answer. He 
announced the near-triumph of the Constitutionalist 
movement, called for his enemies to lay down their arms 
and submit to his authority, and promised the early 
establishment of a constitutional government through 
national elections. He promised law and order, protection 
to foreigners, separation of Church and state, but 
leniency to the clergy, and agrarian, judicial, and 
municipal reform. He also expressed hope that his
21
Oliveira to State Department, June 9 (two), 1915,
Foreign R e lations, 1915 , 699-700 ; Oliveira to State De­
partment, June 11, 1915/15482.
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government would soon be recognized by the world powers.
A copy of this manifesto was sent to the State Department 
by Carranza’s agent in Washington, but Silliman was 
allowed to learn of it as did the Mexican people— through 
the p r e s s .
While Wilson awaited the answers from the revo­
lutionary leaders, he was confronted with the immense 
problem of securing adequate reparation from Germany for 
the sinking of the Lus it ania. Because of the manner in 
which he addressed his demands to the German Government, 
Secretary of State Bryan, rather than be a party to war­
like threats, felt obliged to resign. To fill the 
vacancy, Wilson with some misgivings chose Robert Lansing. 
Where Wilson and Bryan were intuitive and idealistic,
Lansing tended to be more practical, coldly analytical,
23and realistic. As the President became more embroiled
in the affairs of Europe, the new Secretary of State 
devoted much time to the solution of the Mexican puzzle. 
Since he feared that the Germany might use Mexico as a 
focal point to stir trouble for the United States in Latin
2 2 Confidential Agent of the Constitutionalist Govern­
ment of Mexico to State Department, June 12, 1915,
Foreign Relations, 1915 , 705-707 ; Silliman to State De­
partment, June 11, 1915/15202; ILL P u e b l o , June 12, 1915.
23
Link, Wilson the Diplomatist, 27; Daniel M. Smith, 
"Robert Lansing," An Uncertain Tradition, 101-104.
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24America, he was anxious to find a quick solution.
Carranza, seeking a quick solution of his own in 
June, sent General Pablo Gonzalez marching on Mexico City. 
The prospect of another seige caused the Convention to 
have second thoughts about Wilson's conciliation proposal. 
On June 15, the Convention suggested an armistice, to be 
followed by a peace conference, at which the Carrancistas 
could be persuaded to accept some of the Convention's 
program of "political-social reform." Gonzalez refused 
the proposal and kept right on marching toward Mexico 
City.25
With all peace feelers being spurned by the 
Carrancistas, Wilson concluded that he should make the 
bait more appealing. Again, it was David Lawrence who 
suggested a means for speeding the First Chief to a 
peaceful solution. After speaking to Charles Douglas, 
Carranza's New York attorney, Lawrence reported to Wilson 
on June 16 that "Carranza realizes that without the 
approval of the United States no government can stand in 
Mexico and while there will be resentment over any
24 Louis G. Kahle, Robert Lansing and the Recognition 
of Venustiano Carranza," Hispanic American Historical 
Re v i e w , XXXVIII (August, 1958), 353.
25
Oliveira to State Department, June 14, 15, 16, 17,
1915, Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 5 , 708, 710-711, 712-713,
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outside interference, it will be accepted and the best 
2 6
made of it." Hoping that the prospect of recognition 
would move the First Chief, Wilson suggested to Lansing 
that he notify Carranza that the United States had not 
ruled out granting diplomatic recognition to his pro­
visional regime. The First Chief should also be made to 
realize that the United States would be reluctant to do 
so unless every effort was made to conciliate the warring 
factions.^
Lansing quickly drafted the message embodying the
President's suggestions and sent it to the White House for
approval. Wilson was pleased with the document, but he
was not sure Silliman could convey its intent with
adequate forcefulness. "I fear he [Silliman] rather
bores and irritates Carranza," he confided to Lansing.
"I think, therefore, that we had better seek others in
addition." Drawing from Lawrences's suggestions, Wilson
proposed that Charles Douglas, who was again on his way to
Vera Cruz, be asked to support Silliman's appeals to the 
2 8
First Chief.
0 A
Lawrence to Wilson, June 16, 1915, Wilson Papers, 
Series II, Box 131.
27 Wilson to Lansing, June 17, 1915, U.S. Department 
of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United St a t e s : The Lansing Pap e r s , 1914- 19 20 (2 vols. ;
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940), II, 535;
hereinafter cited as Lans ing Papers.
2 8
Lansing to Wilson, June 17, 1915/15285-1/2; Wilson
to Lansing, June 18, 1915/15286-1/2.
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Silliman received the note on June 18 and presented
it to the First Chief on the 21st. Oddly enough, he was
not instructed to await D o u g l a s ’s arrival; consequently,
he conferred alone with Carranza. The headstrong First
Chief referred the American agent to his manifesto of
June 11, claiming that by urging his enemies to submit,
he was, in fact, offering conciliation. Silliman asked
if he could go beyond this declaration and invite the
factional leaders to a conference. Thereupon, Carranza
replied that "under no circumstances would he treat with
Villa." He also showed Silliman a copy of a memorandum
sent to Gonzalez that was designed to forestall any
compromise with the Zapatistas. He told the special
agent that President Wilson was short-sighted for seeking
a solution through compromise, that a government so
created would fail. "The determination of the United
States to adopt any other measures than the recognition
and support of the Constitutionalist cause would be a
regrettable injustice," the First Chief declared. "If the
Government of the United States will maintain a neutral
attitude, the Constitutionalist cause will subdue the
29opposition and win recognition." Wilson was more than 
disappointed when he received the reply from Silliman.
29
State Department to Silliman, June 18, 1915,
Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 5 , 715; Silliman to State Department,
June 22, 1915, ibid. , 718-19.
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Admitting the failure of his conciliation attempts, he 
wrote to Lansing: "I think I have never known a man more
impossible to deal with on human principles than this man 
Carranz a ."^
Carranza's intransigence left Wilson in an embarrsss- 
ing situation; he could intervene as he had hinted that 
he would in his note of June 2 or he could seek another 
peaceful solution. Consequently, he greatfully embraced 
a plan proposed by Secretary Lansing. In March, when 
Lansing was still Chief Counselor, he had suggested that, 
should the United States find it necessary to intervene 
in Mexico, she should endeavor to do so in cooperation 
with the A.B.C. powers. In this way, Latin American 
resentment would be minimized and the action could be 
portrayed as a collective attempt by American nations to 
promote peace and stability in the Americas. At the 
time, Wilson had been favorably impressed with the idea. 
When Lansing revived it in a conversation in late June, 
Wilson eagerly urged him to arrange Pan-American co­
operation for some kind of intervention to end the Mexican
• n  31civil war.
The Pan-American conference was slow in materializing.
•30
Wilson to Lansing, July 2, 1915/15409-1/2.
31 Lansing to Wilson, March 8 , 1915, Lans ing Papers , 
II, 529-31; Wilson to Lansing, July 2, 1915, ibid. , 537 ; 
Wilson to Lansing, July 2, 1915/15409-1/2.
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Relations between the United States and Carranza, in the 
meantime, remained strained. The First Chief's stubborn­
ness was, no doubt, prompted primarily by his determination 
to preserve Mexican sovereignty, even when it might have 
been easier to humor President Wilson. Carranza was 
clearly undermatched when he dealt with John Silliman, 
and this encouraged him to be bold. In fairness to the 
American agent, it must be admitted that his orders from 
Washington often placed him in a compromising position.
Such was the case during an incident in July. Consul 
Canada of Vera Cruz reported in May and June that General 
C^ndido Aguilar, the Constitutionalist Governor of the 
State of Vera Cruz, was encouraging laborers to drive 
foreign owners from their properties. Always hostile 
toward the revolutionaries, Canada also indicated that 
depredations against Americans were particularly on the 
increase. Stung by the recent difficulties in dealing 
with Carranza, Lansing decided that stern measures were 
in order. On July 3, he directed Silliman to demand 
Aguilar's removal as Governor of Vera Cruz and that, if
he was not, the refusal would be considered "an unfriendly
3 2act toward the Government of the United States."
The demand for the removal of Governor Aguilar,
3 2Canada to State Department, May 27, June 18, 1915/ 
15352, 15344; State Department to Silliman, July 3, 1915/ 
15344.
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rather than mere appeals for him to cease his inflammatory 
activities, was a clear-cut challenge to Mexican 
sovereignty. As might be expected, Silliman shrank from 
the prospect of obeying his orders to the utmost. If 
Carranza refused, he warned Washington, it would create a 
grave crisis. He asked permission to withhold the note 
temporarily and discuss the situation with Charles Douglas, 
who had just arrived in Vera Cruz. Silliman held the 
note for a week before Lansing again directed him to 
present it to Carranza. This time, Douglas interceded.
He cabled the Secretary of State that he was personally 
investigating the matter. Hinting that Canada might have 
exaggerated the dangers in Vera Cruz, Douglas insisted 
that conditions were improving and asked for the De­
partment's patience. Lansing accpeted Douglas's counsel 
and informed Silliman that he need only bring the matter
of depredations to Carranza's attention and urge that
33conditions be improved. Lest Douglas become a cipher
through which the Department's full intentions were 
habitually commuted, Lansing directed Silliman to use
"great discretion" in dealing with Carranza's paid
i 34 couns e l .
33silliman to State Department, July 4, 8, 12, 1915/ 
15364, 15395, 15420; State Department to Silliman, July 
10, 1915/15395; Douglas to State Department, July 9,
1915, and State Department to Douglas, July 10, 1915/
15398.
3^State Department to Silliman, July 14, 1915/15439.
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Mexico City's ordeal remained an open sore, causing 
conflict between the United States and Carranza. By the 
end of June, General Gonzalez had clamped his seige on the 
city so tightly that virtually all communications with the 
outside world were cut off. Again, shortages of the 
necessities of life threatened mass privation. Making 
matters worse, Difaz Soto y Gama led the Convention, which 
was in its last dying throws, in creating a Comit^ de 
Salud Publica (Committee of Public Safety). Reminiscent of 
its French counterpart, the committee was to ferret out 
and eliminate all enemies of the revolution. By impli­
cation, foreigners might be included in the proscription. 
Considering past responses to similar situations, 
officials in Washington were remarkably silent during this 
ordeal. Their patience was rewarded on July 9, when the 
few remaining Conventionists evacuated the city without 
carrying out their threats. The next day Gonzalez and 
his troops took their place. The Carrancista general pro­
claimed an amnesty and promised that the railroads would
give priority to supply trains. On July 13, Silliman
35reported that food was on its way from Vera Cruz.
Official opinion in Washington hardened, however, when
■^Oliveira to State Department, June 22, 25, 29, 1915/ 
15336, 15337, 15412; Oliveira to State Department, July 4, 
11, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915 , 721 , 723-24; Silliman 
to State Department, June 27, 28, July 10, 11, 13, 1915/ 
15318, 15322, 15403, 15406, 15427; Silliman to State De­
partment, [n.d.]/15404.
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at the first Zapatista counterattack, Gonzalez again
evacuated Mexico City on July 17. Without effective city
government, and at the mercy of roving bands of
Zap ati s t a s , the people of the city suffered, perhaps,
3 6their severest two week period of the revolution.
Ignoring the fact that most of the outrages were committed 
by Zapata's troops, Lansing addressed a stern note to 
Carranza. He, in effect, demanded that the Constitution­
alists become more militarily effective. The Secretary 
directed Silliman to insist that the Constitutionalists 
re-occupy the city, this time permanently, and keep open 
the lines of communication. Carranza and his ministers
disdained to even reply to this latest threat from the 
37
United Sta t e s .
Tensions again eased when Gonzalez reinvested the
city on August 2 and reopened communications with Vera 
3 8Cruz. Mexico City's ordeal was over. The Constitution­
alists were there to stay, although Carranza was not sure 
enough of that fact to make it his capital. Minister
■^Oliveira to State Department, July 18 , 19 , 22 , 25 ,
29 (two), 30, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915 , 726-32 ; 
Silliman to State Department, July 21, 1915, ibid. , 727 ; 
Silliman to State Department, July 28, 1915/15568; Quirk, 
The Mexican Revolution, 276.
3 7
State Department to Silliman, July 29, 1915/15572; 
Silliman to Department, July 30, 1915/15591.
3 8
Oliveira to State Department, August 3, 4, 1915,
Foreign Rel a t i o n s , 1915 , 732-33 ; Silliman to State De­
partment, August 7, 1915/15686.
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Cardoso de Oliveira caused a temporary stir when he
announced, on August 9, that he was taking a well-earned
leave from the beleaguered city. He reported to Washington
that most foreigners thought that President Wilson's policy
had caused most of their woes. Since he had represented
the interests of the United States for so long, Cardoso de
Oliveira felt that they held him partially responsible.
Charles B. Parker, an embassy clerk who had been serving
Cardoso de Oliveira at the Brazilian Legation, was left to
39report on conditions in Mexico City. Still ineffective
despite the eased tensions, Silliman reported that his 
representations were systematically ignored. The Foreign 
Minister told the American agent that the tone of the 
State Department's notes were insulting; hence, the First
Chief had refrained from answering them and would continue
-  ^ 40 to do s o .
Carothers was also having his troubles in the North.
Villa misled the agent before and during the battle of
Ledn. Claiming victory when the battle was only in its
early stages, Villa sent word to Carothers, who passed
^ O l i v e i r a  to State Department, July 29, 1915, Foreign 
Relations, 1 9 1 5 , 731-32 ; Silliman to State Department, 
August 9, 1915/15713; Silliman to State Department,
August 11, 1915, NA 701.3212/32; New York T i m e s , August 11, 
1915, p. 1. Oliveira came to Washington to confer with 
Lansing and Wilson before returning to Brazil. See ib i d . , 
August 21, 1915, p. 9; ib i d . , August 24, 1915, p. 6 .
40silliman to State Department, August 9, 10, 12, 
1915/15713, 15731, 15749.
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the information on to Washington. When, after his defeat 
at LecJn, Villa prophesied victory in his next battle and 
Carothers so reported to Washington, the special agent 
drew an admonishment from the Secretary of State.
Lansing directed Carothers to report only the final out­
come of military engagements. The Department was not
41interested in Villa's prophesies.
Cobb and Carothers began to disagree on conditions in
northern Mexico. Beginning in May, Cobb sometimes added
notes to Carothers' despatches, claiming that Villa was
misleading the special agent. While Carothers continued to
be optimistic in early June, Cobb reported that Villa's
4 2
military strength was steadily deteriorating. Slowly
V
Carothers overcame his feelings of loyalty and admiration 
for Villa and saw things as they really were. His change 
of heart probably began when General A n g e l e s , who was on 
his way to visit his family in Boston, spoke to Carothers 
in El Paso. It was rumored that the general and Villa had 
quarreled following their defeat at Lec/n. Angeles 
expressed doubts about Villa's future and asked Carothers
41
Carothers to State Department, May 23, 26, 1915/ 
15063, 15080; Cobb (for Carothers) to State Department,
May 31, June 2, 9, 1915/15098, 15112, 15176; State De­
partment to Carothers, June 10, 1915/15176.
42
Cobb to State Department, May 31, June 7, 1915/
15098, 15155; Cobb (for Carothers) to State Department,
May 31, June 2, 3, 1915/15098, 15115 (two).
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to secure an interview for him with President Wilson, so
that he might propose a plan to eliminate "certain
elements" from both factions in order that the rest could
- 43come to some agreement.
After the interview with Angeles, the American agent's
expectations for Villa's ultimate victory disappeared from
his despatches. He began to report that conditions in the
area under Villa's control were deplorable. The soldiers
were taking everything, leaving large segments of the
population destitute. For a time, his attitude toward
Villa personally did not change. He claimed that Villa
was conscientious in his desire for peace. Carothers also
insisted that the Department of Agriculture's refusal to
allow Villa to export beef to the United States was
partially responsible for the increased confiscations
4 4
within the general's territory.
During Wilson's attempt to conciliate the revo­
lutionary factions, Carothers remained in El Paso in 
order to facilitate communications with Washington. Upon 
returning to Villa's side in mid-July, the metamorphosis 
of his opinions accelerated. Conditions were, even worse 
than he suspected. "I see conditions very critical in 
all northern Mexico," he reported upon his return to the
43
Carothers to State Department, June 18, 20, 1915/ 
15263, 15269.
4 4
Carothers to State Department, June 21, July 6, 1915,
NA 312.114P19/18 , 812.48/258.
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border. "While I do not see immediate signs of complete
collapse, I cannot see how existing conditions can last
much longer without it." Fearful that Villa would no
longer confide in him if he knew what was being reported
to Washington, Carothers urged the Secretary of State to
4 5withhold any public mention of his reports.
A note of apprehension now crept into the special
agent's notes. He reported that "Villa is becoming harder
4 6
to deal with. He is sorely pressed for money." He re­
ceived information that Villa had executed a Mexican 
rancher who refused to pay a forced loan. Such incidents 
were likely to increase, he warned, and foreigners would 
probably be involved. Appeals for ViLla to desist were 
liable to antagonize him to the point that life for 
foreigners in his bailiwick would become intolerable. 
Carothers hoped that his appeals, combined with those
of Diaz Lombardo and Angeles who would soon return to
47
Mexico, would be able to minimize the danger.
On July 26, Carothers reported that Villa had de­
manded a forced loan of $300,000 in gold from the mine 
operators of Chihuahua. Since the operators refused to
^ C a r o t h e r s  to State Department, July 19, 1915/15490.
^ C a r o t h e r s  to State Department, July 22, 1915/15518. 
4 7Ib i d . ; Carothers to State Department, July 23,
1915/15530.
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pay, Carothers feared that Villa would envoke his 
confiscatory mining decree of March 19. When the special 
agent, joined by Diaz Lombardo and other of Villa s ad­
visors, met with Villa in Torre^n and asked for modifi­
cation of his demands against the miners, Villa answered 
with more threats of confiscation. Journeying to 
Chihuahua, on July 31, he called a meeting of all the 
city's merchants. He charged that they were responsible 
for the shortages and resulting privation. They were de­
manding extortionate prices. Foreign merchants, he 
stormed, were the most felacious offenders. As a result 
of their treachery, he told them that he had decided to 
confiscate their stocks. He promised Carothers that 
foreign merchants would be compensated at the rate of 
cost plus fifteen per cent. At first he ordered all 
merchants expelled from Chihuahua but later modified 
his decree to allow foreigners to s t a y . ^
Prospectively more ominous, Carothers reported on 
August 2 that Villa had called a general meeting of mine 
operators at Chihuahua for August 9, supposedly to 
discuss regulation of the industry. At this announcement, 
the special agent hastened to the border where he could 
48
Carothers to State Department, July 26, 1915, NA 
812.63/143; Carothers to State Department, July 26, 29, 
August 1, 5, 1915/15540, 15582, 15606; Cobb to State De­
partment, July 28, 1915/15570; Letcher to State De­
partment, August 1 (two), 1915/15607, 15610.
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report more freely. He despondently wired the Secretary
of State that "Villa's ministers and diplomatic agents
have been practically set aside in name and Villa is
handling all matters himself according to his ideas."
Carothers further noted that the rebel general was dead
broke and would seize "everything in sight in order to
raise money . . . Unless he is curbed, I feel that he
49will stop at nothing. . . ."
Villa still professed his friendship for Carothers.
In a quiet conversation in Carothers' car just before the 
agent departed for the border, the Mexican general put 
his hand on Carothers' knee and said: "I believe you and
I will be friends until death, I feel that way towards 
you and believe you feel the same towards me." After­
wards, Villa's ministers came to the agent, one by one, 
and told him that he had more influence over Villa than 
did any other man. They urged him not to give up his 
attempts to hold their chief in c h e c k . C a r o t h e r s  was 
equally despondent. In a telegram to Lansing, he 
lamented that "Villa is now dedicating to extortion the
51cupidity he formerly used for military purposes. . . ."
Still not willing to abandon his friend, Carothers
^ C o b b  (for Carothers) to State Department, August 
2, 1915, NA 812.63/146; Carothers to State Department, 
August 3, 1915/15626.
5QIbid.
"^Carothers to State Department, August 5, 1915/15658.
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once again turned to General Hugh Scott for aid. In the 
past, because of his great admiration for the American 
general, Villa had accepted his direction. Shortly after 
Carothers made the appeal, Villa came to Juarez to confer 
with his commercial agents. On August 6 , the Department 
directed the special agent to endeavor to hold Villa on 
the border, because General Scott was on his way. So 
that they might have some bargaining point, Carothers then 
requested that the Secretary of Agriculture give him and 
Scott authority to discuss conditions under which Villa's 
Juarez slaughterhouse might be reopened. With a legitimate 
source of revenue at his disposal, the agent reasoned,
Villa might be more inclined to reverse his recent 
confiscatory d e c r e e s . ^
In Washington, Secretary Lansing was concerned that 
Villa's power might completely collapse before the Pan- 
American nations could apply pressure on Carranza. With 
no effective force to counterbalance the First Chief, 
they would not likely secure any concessions. He, there­
fore, asked President Wilson to direct Secretary of 
Agriculture Houston to allow Villa to resume his meat­
packing operation out of Juarez. At first the President 
was puzzled, unable to understand why Lansing would want
to bolster Villa and prolong the conflict in Mexico. When 
52
Carothers to State Department, August 3, 5, 1915/
15627, 15630; State Department to Carothers, August 6,
1915/157 57a.
516
the Secretary explained his purposes, Wilson agreed that
Villa should be allowed to export beef. As a result,
Lansing conferred with Houston, made arrangements, and
notified Carothers that, if V i l l a ’s abbatoir could meet
53inspection requirements, it could resume operations.
When Carothers and Scott met with Villa on August
10, they had a concession to offer. The two American
negotiators were encouraged after the first meeting.
They reported that Villa had agreed not only to call off
the proposed meeting of miners in Chihuahua but to return
54
all goods confiscated from the merchants of that city.
Two days later, a committee of mine operators from Chi­
huahua joined the conferences. Carothers and Scott 
convinced Villa that his demand for forced loans from 
the miners was impracticable. He needed their coal to 
fuel his railroad. He should strive to cooperate with 
the miners. As a practical matter, therefore, Villa 
agreed to allow the miners to use his railroads to import 
whatever equipment they needed to put their mines in 
operation and also promised military protection. The 
miners, for their part, pledged 1000 tons of coal to 
assist in the operation of the railroad. After the
conference was over, Carothers reported that Villa balked
53Lansing to Wilson, August 6 , 7, 1915, Lansing 
Papers . II, 545-47 ; Wilson to Lansing, August 7, 1915, 
i b i d . . 546; State Department to Carothers, August 9, 1915, 
NA 312.114P19/29a.
54carothers to State Department, August 10, 1915, 
Foreign Relat i o n s . 1915 . 934; Scott to State Department,
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at the settlement of several other matters. He and Scott 
had agreed that they should not press their luck and make 
more d e m a n d s . ^
Carothers and Scott had secured more than they had 
reason to hope for. The miners were quite pleased with 
the arrangements. Writing in behalf of the Mine and 
Smelter Operators Association, A. J. McQuatters praised 
the two American negotiators. He especially singled out 
Carothers, noting that there were few Anglo-Americans who 
could confront the Mexicans day in and day out with 
demands and still maintain cordial relations with t h e m . ^  
Ever Carothers1 champion, Scott added his own words of 
commendation: "No one but Carothers could accomplish what
he h a s . " ^  Certainly Carothers had not erred in calling 
for the aid of General Scott. Villa's awe of Scott is 
inexplicable. He was not similarly impressed with other
August 10, 1915, ibid. , 935; El_ Paso Morning T i m e s ,
August 11, 1915.
^ C a r o t h e r s  to State Department, August 12, 1915/ 
15739; incomplete version of this document in Foreign 
Relations, 1915, 935; El Paso Morning Times, August 13, 
1915.
5 6
McQuatters to Lansing, August 13, 1915/15815.
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Scott to Lansing, August 14, 1915/no document 
number. Scott also requested that Carothers be given 
stenographic help. In a pencil note attached to Scott's 
telegram, Canova indicated to the Secretary of State that 
Carothers did not need a stenographer, since most of his 
correspondence was by telegraph. Canova further sug­
gested that Carothers probably wanted a stenographer 
merely to enhance his image. See Scott to Lansing,
August 14, 1915, NA 111.70C22/11.
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American soldiers. Again Carothers had taken advantage
of that special chemistry, and the results were not
disappointing.
Neither Scott nor Carothers were euphoric about their
accomplishments. They realized that they had only bought
some time. In order to extend that time as long as
possible, Scott remained on the border temporarily to
5 8
continue aiding Carothers. Even with the reopening of
his slaughterhouse, V i l l a ’s strength continued to wane. 
Carothers urged, therefore, that Washington make every 
effort to promote some peaceful accomodation between the 
factions. He warned the Secretary of State that if Villa 
met with more defeats and his faction degenerated into
59small bands, their confiscatory measures would increase.
Villa saw the handwriting on the wall. While conferring
with Scott, he made a last-ditch attempt to end the ^.vil
war before he was defeated. He authorized the general to
negotiate an armistice with the Carrancistas, in order
that a conciliation conference could be held. Through the
American Consul in Monterey, the State Department attempted
to arrange a meeting between Scott and Obregon, but the
Carrancista general refused to negotiate under the aegis of
^ C a r o t h e r s  to State Department, August 24, 27, 1915/ 
15900, 15942. Scott remained in El Paso until August 27.
^ C a r o t h e r s  to State Department, August 13, 1915/ 
15756.
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6 0
the United States.
In Washington, Lansing was still planning the Ad­
ministration's next attempt to bring the Mexican civil 
war to a peaceful conclusion. While he arranged the 
conference of diplomatic representatives from Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Uraguay, Bolivia, and Guatemala to the 
United States, others in the State Department were 
communicating with the leaders of the various Mexican 
j unt as in the United States, all of whom claimed that they 
could pacify their homeland. Canova intensified his 
support of Iturbide. Even the President showed con­
siderable interest in General Felipe Angeles, who 
appeared briefly in Washington in July. Angeles could 
legitimately don the mantle of the revolution. Aware that 
Paul Fuller had previously reported very favorably on 
Angeles, Wilson urged Lansing to bring the ex-special 
agent into consultation in preparing for the Pan-American 
conference. In constant communication with Carrancista 
agents, ex-agent John Lind also got into the act. He sug­
gested immediate recognition of Carranza. When the Pan- 
American diplomats assembled on August 5, Lansing, Fuller, 
Canova, and others in the State Department were prepared 
to present an array of candidates to head a provisional 
6 0
Carothers to State Department, August 10, 1915/
15717; State Department to Hanna, August 13, 1915/ibid. ;
Bonnet to State Department, August 20, 1915/15864.
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government in Mexico.
Lansing and Fuller met with the six Latin American
diplomats in the Secretary's office on August 5 and 6 .
Suave and persuasive, Lansing appealed for their aid in
ending the strife in Mexico. Their task, as he saw it, was
to promote the establishment of a regime that would leave
the revolutionaries in power. Otherwise, the peace would
not last. The Latin American conferees agreed. They
concluded, also, that all the current factional leaders
should be eliminated. They then decided upon a two-step
plan of action that was wholly in keeping with Lansing's
line of thought. First, they would send a communication
to all the factions, inviting them to a peace conference.
A provisional government growing out of this conference
would be recognized. Second, they chose a committee of
three, including Fuller, to work out an arrangement for
selecting a government they could recognize, even if the
6 2
first step failed.
By the time President Wilson received Lansing's re­
port of the Pan-American conference, his thinking had
^ L i n d  to Lansing, July 23, 1915/17050; Lind to 
Wilson, August 2, 1915, Wilson Papers, Series IV, Box 
125; Link, The Struggle For Neutrality, 481-87 ; Teitel- 
baum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 270-76. Lind 
began appealing for the recognition of Carranza several 
months earlier. See Lind to Bryan, April 21, 1915, 
ib i d . , Box 129.
6 2
Lansing to Wilson, August 6, 1915, Lansing
Pa p e r s , II, 543-45.
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undergone a metamorphosis. He wrote to Lansing that the
conferees should not expect immediate elections but should
be prepared to accpet a provisional government that would
inaugurate reforms by decree. Apparently impressed with
Carranza's growing strength, he also notified Lansing that
he and the Latin American diplomats should not rule out
Carranza as a possible head of that provisional regime.
To do so, he warned, "would be to ignore some very big 
6 3facts." As the foremost of Wilson biographers has sug­
gested, Woodrow Wilson had finally accepted the Mexican
6 4Revolution on Venustiano Carranza's terms.
Conferring again with the Latin American diplomats in 
New York on August 11, Lansing launched into a discourse 
that embodied Wilson's ideas. The conferees, including 
Fuller, at first balked, but finally agreed to go ahead 
with the first step of their plan and invite the revo­
lutionaries to a conference. Discussion of the second 
step was postponed until they received the answers to their
Wilson to Lansing, July 8 , 10, 1915, ibid. , 547 ,
549.
64
Link, The Struggle For Neutrality, 491. Arthur S. 
Link suggests that Wilson's response to the Latin Ameri­
can diplomats' proposals initiated the trend which re­
sulted in the recognition of Carranza. Louis G. Kahle 
speculates that Lansing anticipated the recognition of 
Carranza from the beginning of the conferences and used 
tactics designed to make the Latin American diplomats 
believe that they had come to the decision of their own 
volition. See "Robert Lansing and the Recognition of 
Venustiano Carranza," H A H R , XXXVIII, 361-64.
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invitation. On August 13, Lansing and the six Latin
American diplomats made the following appeal to all the
civil and military leaders of Mexico:
We, the undersigned, believe that if the men 
directing the armed movements in Mexico— whether 
political or military chiefs— should agree to 
meet, either in person or by delegates, far from 
the sound of cannon, and with no other inspi­
ration save the thought of their afflicted land, 
there to exchange ideas and to determine the 
fate of and unyielding agreement requisite to 
the creation of a provisional government. . . ."
The diplomats offered to serve as mediators and to arrange
a neutral site within Mexico's borders. They indicated
that they expected an answer within a reasonable time,
6 6hopefully in ten days.
Since the notes were dispersed so widely throughout
Mexico, Carothers and Silliman played only a minor role in
securing answers. Carothers did no more than deliver the
note to Villista authorities in Juarez, who passed it on
to Villa. Carothers did report on the 16th that "the
joint note has caused a very favorable impression, both in
El Paso and northern Mexico. The soldiers, as well as the
6 7people, are tired of war and want peace." Villa's
^^"Continuation of the Conference on Mexican Affairs," 
August 11, 1915/15754-1/2.
66a Communication, made severally and independently, 
to all prominent civil and military authorities in Mexico, 
from the Secretary of State and the diplomatic repre­
sentatives at Washington of Brazil, Chile, Argentina, 
Bolivia, Uraguay, and Guatemala, August 11 (sent August 
13), 1915, Foreign R e lations. 1915 . 735-36.
^ C a r o t h e r s  to State Department, August 15, 16, 1915/ 
15763, 15800.
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personal reply was sent to the Pan-American conferees
through his agent in Washington. As might be expected,
Villa responded favorably. Still referring to himself
as a Conventionist, Zapata also agreed to the conference.
At the same time, virtually all the leading Villistas
6 8and Zapatistas accepted the invitation.
Carranza responded in typical fashion. He began by 
denouncing the Pan-American conferees even before he re­
ceived their message. He made it clear that he would no
sooner endure interference from other Latin American
69
nations than he would from the United States. Waiting
one day past the requested ten-day deadline, on August 24, 
the First Chief, implying that the Latin American diplo­
mats had been pressured into agreeing to the note, sent 
word to Silliman that he would not reply until he re­
ceived some guarantee that they acted in an official 
capacity in affixing their signatures. By September 3, 
all six diplomats had sent official statements through 
Silliman that they had, indeed, acted in an official 
capacity, and with full knowledge of their g o v e r n m e n t s . ^
^®Llorente to State Department (conveying Villa's 
reply), August 19, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 5 . 737-38; 
Parker to State Department (conveying Zapata's reply), 
August 29, 1915, ibid. . 739-40 ; List of replies to Pan- 
American diplomat's message of August 11, 1915, i b i d . . 
753-54.
69Arredondo to State Department, August 10, 1915, 
ibid. , 734-35.
70silliman to State Department, August 24, 26, 1915/ 
15898, 15935; Lansing to Pan American diplomats, September 
1, 1915/16251a; State Department to Silliman, September 
3, 1915/15898.
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Still Carranza procrastinated.
It soon became apparent (as it usually did) that the 
First Chief's obstinacy was prompted by more important 
reasons than merely that of antagonizing the United States. 
His forces having taken Aguascalientes, Zacatecas, and San 
Luis Potosi in July, Carranza sent Obregrfn attacking 
further northward in late August. By September 10, 
Saltillo, Durango, and Villa's greatest prize, Torreon, 
had fallen to the Constitutionalist armies. Once again,
71Villa's hegemony was restricted to the State of Chihuahua. 
What the First Chief planned was to present the Pan- 
American diplomats with the fait accompli of his 
supremacy.
Wilson and Lansing, meanwhile, were secretly working 
to prevent the Pan-American effort from becoming an 
embarrassing failure. They arranged for David Lawrence, 
who was currently on vacation, to join with the Chilean 
Ambassador, Eduardo Suarez Mujica, in conferring with 
Elisio Arredondo, Carranza's agent in Washington. Meeting 
with Arredondo at Ashbury Park, New Jersey, on August 15, 
Lawrence and Suarez Mujica revealed that the Pan-American 
nations had not ruled out the possibility of recognizing 
Carranza, but that they were not likely to do so unless 
his provisional government grew out of the proposed peace
^^Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 275-76, 287; Barragan 
Rodriguez, Historia . . . Constitucionalista, II, 393-96,
466-69.
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conference. The Constitutionalist agent suggested that 
Carranza might be inclined to accept their invitation if 
they first "cleared the air" and indicated what conditions 
would have to be met at the peace conference. Hinting 
that such a conference would reach conclusions not un­
favorable to the First Chief, Lawrence told Arredondo that, 
for now, all the conferees wanted was for Carranza to 
accept the peace conference "in principle." The American 
journalist left Ashbury Park with the impression that
Arredondo would urge the First Chief to accept this 
7 2p ro position.
The events that followed the Ashbury Park meeting 
were shrouded in secrecy. Encouraged by Arredondo's 
response, Lansing and Wilson decided to make a secret 
unilateral appeal directly to the First Chief. At their 
suggestion, Lawrence contrived to have the Associated 
Press send him to Vera Cruz to interview Carranza con­
cerning the Pan-American proposal. As far as the public 
or the Latin American diplomats knew, he was just another
journalist. Once in Vera Cruz, Lawrence reported directly
7 3to Lansing under the code name "Laguirre." Wilson's and
72Lawrence to Lansing, August 15, 1915/15866-1/2.
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Lansing to Lawrence, August 17, 1915/15867-1/2; 
Canada (for Laguirre) to State Department, CONFIDENTIAL,
For the Secretary only, August 29, 1915/16014-1/2;
Lawrence to Wilson, September 11, 1915/16189-1/2; David 
Lawrence, The True Story of Woodrow Wilson (New York:
George H. Doran Co., 1924), 104-105. The nature of 
Lawrence's sojourn must be pieced together from fragments.
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Lansing's bent for secrecy in this case indicates that 
they had about made up their minds to recognize Carranza, 
but that they preferred to do it as painlessly as possible 
and without making it appear that they were imposing their 
will upon the Latin American diplomats.
Only twenty-six years old, Lawrence substituted brass 
for experience in his conversations with the First Chief. 
Meeting Carranza for the first time on August 29, Lawrence 
presented himself as having no official character. This 
way, he revealed, he could be of service to both sides.
He explained that the United States preferred to recognize 
a provisional government which grew out of a peace 
conference, because granting recognition to only one 
faction would leave the others resentful and only encourage 
continued fighting. Carranza replied that within three 
weeks he would completely dominate the country. The re­
maining rebels would be so few and weak that their 
resentment would cause no dire consequences. He rejected
Lansing, in the above cited letter to Lawrence, did not 
specifically mention a secret mission, but he did include 
the following: "I do not wish to interrupt your
vacation, but I do think that you might be of very great 
service if you are here Thursday or Friday, as you 
suggest." In his own reminiscences, Lawrence states that 
he went to Vera Cruz as the joint representative of the 
President and the Associated Press, but mentions nothing 
about secrecy. Without mentioning Lawrence's real name, 
Canada reported that "Laguirre" had information for the 
Secretary. In his letter to the President, dated 
September 11, Lawrence referred to his "conversations at 
Vera Cruz."
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the idea of accepting a peace conference "in principle,"
whether it ever met or not, because it would imply
acceptance of foreign involvement in Mexico's internal
affairs. Lawrence then suggested that the First Chief
himself initiate a peace conference. After the meeting,
the American journalist reported to Lansing that
Carranza seemed impressed by this suggestion but would
74not state specifically if he would act upon it.
Perhaps revealing Wilson's ultimate intentions, 
Lawrence outlined for the First Chief a method by which 
he could probably obtain recognition. He suggested that 
Carranza reply to the Latin American conferees in terms 
that would give no offense and that he should agree to 
some form of peace conference, self-initiated or other­
wise. If no satisfactory agreement came from that 
conference, the most powerful faction would likely be 
recognized, provided it gave promise of living up to 
international obligations. This proposal definitely 
interested Carranza. Like a tiger stalking its prey, he 
replied that if Lawrence was invested with official 
character, and offered such a proposition, he would be 
willing to phrase his reply to the Latin American diplomats 
as Lawrence has suggested. Retreating, the American said
that this was not possible, because his government was 
74
Canada (for Laguirre) to State Department, 
CONFIDENTIAL, For the Secretary only, August 29, 1915/ 
16014-1/2.
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acting in conjunction with other governments and
President Wilson could not alone decide the issue. The
First Chief was still interested. Wanting at least
semi-official assurance, he urged that Silliman be
instructed from Washington to say that Lawrence "spoke
7 5
in the name of the Secretary of State."
When Wilson read Lawrence's despatch, he wrote to
Lansing: "It does not seem to me that our friend has got
anywhere in particular in his representations to the
stiff-necked First Chief or made any impressions on him
that is likely, if confirmed, to lead to cooperation on
his part with the United States. . . ." Wary of giving
Carranza the impression that the United States would
make a uniliateral agreement with him, the President
instructed the Secretary to "send word to Silliman that
our friend does come fresh from conversations with you
and is in a position to know what the real sentiments and
purposes of the Government of the United States are. Any
official recognition of him would be a mistake. . . ."
On August 31, Lansing sent the substance of'the
7 6President's suggestion to Silliman.
In Vera Cruz, Lawrence was making some investigations 
of his own. Drawing information from what he called
75t. . .Ib i d .
^ W i l s o n  to Lansing, August 31, 1915/16015-1/2; State
Department to Silliman, August 31, 1915/ibid.
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"authoritiative and well-informed persons," he reported 
what was already well-known in Washington— that the Ad­
ministration's representation in Vera Cruz was ineffective. 
"Our influence is virtually zero," he indignantly informed 
the Secretary of State. "We do not even get our protests 
and messages before Carranza." The First Chief, he added, 
took advantage of Silliman's friendship, while Consul 
Canada was absolutely ignored because he was considered an 
enemy of the revolution. He proposed that a new repre­
sentative, one who would be more firm in his relations 
with Carranza, be sent to Vera Cruz. This new repre­
sentative should again recommend a peace conference; but
if Carranza refused to confer, the United States should
, . 77recognize him anyway.
Wilson would have none of Lawrence's suggestions.
"I do not think any part of this good advice," he wrote
to the Secretary of State. "The usual thing has happened:
a man is sent down to explain our exact position and
purpose and within a day or two sends a comprehensive
plan of his own. . . I think it best to make no reply at
7 8all to this. . . ." Lansing was similarly dissatisfied.
Having committed himself to Pan-American cooperation, he 
could no accept the journalist's advice regarding
^ C a n a d a  (for Laguirre) to State Department, CONFI­
DENTIAL, For the Secretary only, August 30, 1915/16016-1/2.
7 8
Wilson to Lansing, August 31, 1915/16017-1/2.
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recognition. As far as the Administration’s representation 
in Vera Cruz was concerned, he admitted that neither 
Silliman nor Canada alone was adequate. They had opposite 
points of view and were extremely biased. But if their re­
ports were juxtaposed, he informed the President, they 
struck a neat balance and gave the Department a "reasonably 
correct idea of the situation." No one was likely to be
successful in dealing with the First Chief. Lansing sug-
79gested, therefore, that neither be replaced.
Lawrence met with Carranza again on September 1. The 
quasi-agent could not change the First Chief's attitude 
toward the peace conference. After the meeting, Lawrence 
reported that he felt certain he had convinced Carranza 
that Wilson and Lansing were not personally prejudiced 
against him and that, from then on, the First Chief would 
be "better disposed" toward the United States. Carranza 
convinced Lawrence that he was only trying to prevent the 
revolution from being deprived of its triumph. He also 
pointed out that the spirit of nationalism was so imbued 
in his people that, even if he did not uphold it, others 
would. After this second meeting, Lawrence left Vera 
Cruz a wiser man for having matched wits with Carranza. 
Wilson suggested as much to Lansing after reading the 
79 Lansing to Wilson, August 30, 1915, National 
Archives, Record Group 59, Personal and Confidential 
Letters from Secretary of State Lansing to President Wilson, 
1915-1918/875; Lansing to Wilson, August 31, 1915/16016- 
1 / 2 .
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journalist's last cable. "I have the feeling that our 
friend is finding out what we already know," the President 
wrote, "an yet it may be that he has been serviceable in
removing some erroneous impressions from Carranza's
• . .,80 m i n d .
Upon his return to the United States, Lawrence again
conferred with Arredondo. The Carrancista agent told the
American that the First Chief had recently indicated a
willingness to discuss "international questions" with
"several governments" but would not come to the peace
81
conference proposed by the Pna-American diplomats.
Lawrence had other inconsequential meetings with Carranza's
agent in late September, but neither Lansing nor Wilson
8 2gave any indication of taking notice of his advices.
With these meetings, Lawrence ended a rather unsuccessful
stint as the President's special agent. He remained an
ardent champion of Wilson and, in 1924, published his
sympathetic recollections of the great man in a book
8 3entitled The True Story of Woodrow W i l s o n .
^ C a n a d a  (for Laguirre) to State Department, CONFI­
DENTIAL, For the Secretary only, September 1, 1915/ 
16187-1/2; Wilson to Lansing, September 7, 1915/16188-1/2.
^ L a w r e n c e  to Wilson, September 11, 1915/16189-1/2.
82Lawrence to Lansing, Sep t e m b e r  27, 29, 30, October
1, 1915/16345-1/2, 16346-1/2, 16347-1/2, 16438-1/2.
8 3Lawrence became one of the giants of American 
journalism. One of the first Washington correspondents 
to write a syndicated column, in 1933 he became president 
and editor of the news magazine, U.S.. N e w s . An
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Not until his forces had captured Torreon did 
Carranza deign reply to the Pan-American note. The Ad­
ministration already knew how he would respond. No one 
was surprised, therefore, when he notified Silliman on 
September 10 that he refused the mediation offer, because 
it would be an encroachment upon Mexican sovereignty 
and set a precedent for future interference. Since all 
his subordinates, instead of replying themselves, had 
deferred to Carranza, he also pointed to the impressive 
unity of the Constitutionalists. He revealed explicity 
what Arredondo had implied to Lawrence. Because the 
Constitutionalists were unified and virtually dominant 
in Mexico, Carranza suggested that the would-be mediators
join him at one of the towns on the Texas-Mexico border
84to discuss diplomatic recognition of his regime.
Wilson and Lansing were not distressed by the reply. 
In conveying the text of the message to the President, 
Lansing noted: "The position taken by Carranza is not
influential critic of the Roosevelt and Truman Adminis­
trations, he was founder and editor of World R e p o r t , which 
began publication in 1946. Two years later he amalgamated 
the two journals with the publication of U..S. News and 
World Report. Current Bio g r a p h y , 1943 , 428-30; Who 1s Who 
in America, 1968-1969 , Vol. XXXV, 12 8 6 .
84 Silliman to State Department (conveying Reply of 
General Carranza to the Pan-American note), September 10, 
1915, Foreign Relations, 1915 , 746-48 ; List of Replies to 
the Pan American diplomat's message of August 11, 1915, 
ibid. , 7 53.
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8 5
unreasonable. . . . "  Having previously discussed the
matter with the Secretary, on September 13, Wilson
directed Lansing to call another meeting of the Pan-
American diplomats "to discuss the advisability of
recognizing him [Carranza] as the d_e facto head of the
Republic; having it clearly understood that we think the
8 6
acceptance of the Revolution absolutely necessary."
Not only was Wilson willing to accept the revolution on 
Carranza's terms, but he was now willing to accept 
Carranza.
Conditions in Chihuahua accentuated the wisdom of
Wilson's decision. In addition to the military defeats,
wholesale defections to the Carrancistas depleted Villa's 
8 7
ranks. As his empire crumbled, Villa became suspicious
of everyone. The more depraved of Villa's followers,
Carothers reported, had convinced their chief that the
"better element" was guilty of treachery in cooperating
with the United States. Among those suspected were Diaz
Lombardo and Angeles. Carothers himself was advised that,
8 8
for his own safety, he should stay out of Mexico. As
8 5
Lansing to Wilson, September 12, 1915, Lansing 
P a p e r s , II, 550-51.
8 6
Wilson to Lansing, September 13, 1915, ibid. , 552.
8 7
Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 287.
8 8Carothers to State Department, September 1, 8 , 1915/
15997, 16083. The War Department offered Angeles asylum in
the United States. See War Department to Commanding
General, Southern Department, September 8 , 1915/16090.
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conditions grew more and more menacing, the State De­
partment sent wires to all its consuls in northern Mexico, 
directing them to urge all Americans and other foreigners
to leave Mexico. The consuls, if they felt they were in
89
danger, were also urged to leave.
In September, Villa made a last-ditch effort to hold 
onto his American support. He sent a commission of six, 
headed by General Roque Gonzalez Garza (formerly Presi­
dent of the Convention) to Washington to confer with the 
Pan-American diplomats. The mood of Gonzalez Garza, as 
he passed through El Paso, was not likely to win 
allies. He spoke to Carothers in threatening tones.
He hinted that if the Villistas did not get what they 
wanted in Washington, they would commence hostilities 
against the United States. At about the same time, 
Carothers learned that Villa was massing his armies.
The American agent feared an attack on El Paso. General
Pershing, the commander at Fort Bliss, echoed Carothers*
90fears in a despatch to his superiors.
Carothers was right about Villa massing his troops, 
but not for an attack on the United States. He planned 
to reclaim the Sonoran border towns of Naco and Agua
89
State Department to certain American Consuls, 
September 11, 1915, Foreign Re l a t i o n s , 1915 , 837.
90 Carothers to State Department, September 17, 1915/
16219; Pershing to Bliss, September 24, 1915, Pershing
Papers, Box 37 2.
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Prieta, which General Plutarco Calles had occupied and
fortified in July in violation of the Naco Agreement of
the previous January. In preparing for this campaign,
Villa came to Juarez. On October' 9, Carothers met with
his old friend for the first time in over a month. Villa
expressed confidence that Carranza would not be recognized;
but if he was, the ex-bandit pledged that he "would fight
until killed." In the course of their conversation,
Carothers bluntly asked Villa if the rumors were true
that it would be unsafe for him to rejoin the Villista
camp. Villa replied: "No matter where I am or what
happens, or what you may hear to the contrary, I will
always be glad to see you." Villa, however, ended the
interview on a warning note. He told Carothers that he
felt quite certain that, as soon as he attacked Calles at
Agua Prieta, officials in Washington were going to protest
his violation of the Naco agreement. The protest will be
ignored, he said, "only God Almighty will stop me from
91attacking Agua Prieta." This was Carothers' last meet­
ing with Villa.
In Washington, Wilson and Lansing started the final 
acts of their charade. At a September 18 meeting, Lansing 
tried to maneuver the six Latin American diplomats into
91
Carothers to State Department, October 8, 9, 1915/
16427 , 16441; E_1 Paso Morning Times , October 11, 1915.
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agreeing to recognize Carranza. They resented the badger­
ing by the United States. Consequently, they would agree 
only to study the matter further and be prepared to re­
port at the next meeting, scheduled for October 9, what 
recommendations they would make to their own governments. 
Lansing, meanwhile, was to confer further with repre­
sentatives of the Carranza and Villa factions and be
9 2prepared to make his final recommendations. The Presi­
dent and Secretary of State were disappointed that the 
conferees had not agreed to immediate recognition, but 
they had committed themselves to Pan-American action and 
were willing to see it through.
While they waited, anti-Carranza sentiment in the 
United States intensified as United States Army and Texas 
Ranger units clashed with Mexican bands along the border 
in the Lower Rio Grande Valley. Most of the Mexicans who 
raided American soil were bandits, but American witnesses 
claimed that often the raiders joined with Constitution­
alist army units after crossing the Rio Grande to the 
93
Mexican side. Under orders from Washington, Silliman
92
Stenographic Report of the Conference on Mexican 
Affairs, September 18, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915 , 754- 
62; Text of the Agreement of the Conference of Diplomatic 
Representatives, Lansing P a p e r s , II, 554.
93
New York T i m e s , September 4, 1915, p. 1; ibid. , 
September 7, 1915, p. 12; ibid., September 8 , 1915, p. 14; 
ibid. , September 18, 1915, p. 5; ibid. , September 29, 1915, 
p. 6 ; ib i d . , October 6 , 1915, p. 11; Allen Gerlach, 
"Conditions Along the Border-1915: The Plan of San Diego,"
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protested; but Foreign Minister Jesus Acufia, while express­
ing regrets over the incidents, denied that the bandits 
came from the revolutionary army. In Washington,
Arredondo irrately charged that the American press was 
inventing falsehoods to embarrass Carranza and that the
Texas Rangers, who were notorious for baiting Mexicans,
94were largely responsible for the border troubles.
Even while negotiating with the Carrancistas over the
border troubles, Silliman suddenly departed for Washington
on about September 30, evidently at the request of the
First Chief. Arriving in Washington on October 7,
Silliman presented a strong case in favor of Carranza.
The New York Times reported that the agent brought data to
prove that the Constitutionalists were completely
dedicated to the First Chief and that they would be able
95to establish a stable government. Lansing, of course,
had already made up his mind to push for the recongition 
of Carranza at the next Pan-American conference. Since he 
had been charged by the conferees to present them with
New Mexico Historical R e v i e w , XLIII (July, 1968) , 199-205. 
Gerlach suggests that the border troubles may have been 
fomented by the G e r m a n s , but that Washington did not 
suspect it at the time.
^ S t a t e  Department to Silliman, August 28, 1915/15956; 
Silliman to State Department, September 1, 1915/16000; 
Arredondo to State Department, September 6 , 21, 1915/
16041, 16252.
95 Mexican H e r a l d , October 1, 1915; New York T i m e s ,
October 8, 1915, p. 4.
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additional information on both the Carranza and Villa 
factions, Silliman's appeal, having been given full 
publicity in the newspapers, gave the Secretary of State 
additional bargaining material.
On October 9, Lansing presented his case to the Pan- 
American conferees. The weight of his arguments con­
vinced the Latin American diplomats that the Constitution­
alist regime deserved dje facto recognition. After the 
conference, Lansing told reporters that the conferees 
had unanimously agreed to recommend to their governments 
that Carranza be recognized as head of the d_e facto govern­
ment of Mexico. On October 18, the Latin American diplo­
mats again met with Lansing and, since their respective
governments accepted their recommendations, they agreed
9 6to take the final step on the following day.
The announcement of recognition found Carranza at 
Monterey, in the midst of a triumphal tour of the north­
eastern states. He received the news with quiet dignity 
from John W. Belt in a simple ceremony at the Hotel 
Salvador. With no show of emotion, Carranza expressed 
gratitude and pledged his government to assume full 
protection of the lives and interests of foreigners.
9 7Outside in the streets, there was riotous jubilation.
9 6
New York T i m e s , October 10, 1915, p. 1; ibid. , 
October 19, 1915, p. 1.
97
Belt to State Department, October 19, 1915,
Foreign Relations. 1915 . 773.
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The same day that recognition was extended to Carranza, 
the Administration went the full measure by cutting off 
all support to Villa. Wilson clamped an embargo on
9 8munitions to Mexico, exempting the djs facto government.
Lansing ordered the American inspectors withdrawn from the
Juarez meatpacking house, which meant that Villa's beef
99could no longer meet required standards.
Wilson's recognition of Carranza marked the end of a 
two-year struggle between two great leaders equally 
convinced of his own self-righteousness. In the end, it 
was Carranza who won. Under his steady hand, Mexico 
maintained her sovereignty and worked out her revo­
lutionary solution, which culminated in the Constitution 
of 1917. Ironically, it was the ideas of the Zapatistas 
and the V i llistas, as expressed at the Convention of 
Aguascalientes,that emerged in the Constitution. Although 
their ideas became the "warp and woof of the real revo­
lution," Carranza's triumph made their realization possi-
m  100 b l e .
With the recongition of Carranza, the State De­
partment was still represented in Mexico by two special
agents, Carothers and Silliman, and Hall, who acted as if
98
A Proclamation by the President of the United 
States, October 19, 1915, ibid., 772-73.
99
State Department to Department of Agriculture, 
October 19, 1915, NA 312.114P19/61.
■^^Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 292-93.
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he were a special agent. Hall returned to Mexico City in 
early April, 1915, where he was finally given the De­
partment's letter of January 19, directing him to cease 
posing as a special agent. He was angered because the 
note claimed that he had "never had any connection what­
ever" with the State Department. He asked for funds so 
that he might come to Washington to vindicate himself.
Before Bryan and Cardoso de Oliveira could decide just 
how much money he would need to pay his passage, Hall 
again disappeared into M o r e l o s .
Between April and August, 1915, Hall moved back 
and forth between Mexico City and Cuernavaca. Apparently 
unable to face the fact that Bryan had disowned him, he 
continued to send his lengthy letters praising the 
Zapatistas and damning the other revolutionaries. His 
plans for an agricultural colony matured. On May 5, he 
issued a "carta Circular" (circular letter), signed by 
himself and Ignacio Di^az Soto y Gama, describing his 
proposed agrarian utopia. After the Zapatistas left 
Mexico City for good in August, Hall's letters to Washington
became more infrequent.'*'^^
101-Hall to State Department, April 4, 13, 1915/20609- 
1/2; Oliveira to State Department, and State Department to 
Oliveira, April 14, 1915/14847; O liveira (for Hall) to 
State Depar tment, and State Department to Oliveira (for 
Hall), April 19, 1915/14884.
102Hall to State Department, April 4, 13, 23, May 9,
23, June 4, 7, 8 , December 11, 12, 1915/20609-1/2; Hall 
to Department of Agriculture, April 7, 1915/i b i d .
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As Carranza pressed his military campaign into 
Morelos in early 1916, Zapata was forced to abandon 
Cuernavaca, and Hall was left to fend for himself. After 
an arduous journey by foot and horseback through the 
wilds of southern Mexico (which he claimed began on March 
15), he appeared in Vera Cruz on August 26, 1916. Again, 
he appealed for funds so that he might come to Washington. 
Lansing drew upon a fund used to aid destitute Americans 
abroad and allowed Hall passage, not to Washington but to 
his home in Utah. In February, 1917, Hall made one more 
request of the State Department— that a claim be lodged 
against the de facto government of Mexico for
103compensation for the loss of his Cuernavaca hotel.
H a l l ’s expectations for the ultimate dominance of 
the Zapatistas never materialized, but his letters pro­
vided Washington with a fairly accurate and sympathetic 
picture of Zapata's revolutionary program. Since the 
good Morman never functioned as an official agent, the 
Administration ignored his advices. Important passages 
in his letters were not underlined or bracketed by State 
Department officials or the President, as were such 
passages in the reports of the official agents. Had they 
paid closer attention to his letters, they would have been 
better informed of the most radical ideas of the Mexican
103
Hall to State Department, August 26, 1916,
September 11, 1916, February 14, 1917/20609-1/2.
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Revolution. Instead, the Administration discounted 
Zapata, because he did not rival either Carranza or 
Villa militarily. Nor did Wilson associate with Zapata 
the revolutionary ideas he came to accept.
As soon as Wilson recognized Carranza, Carothers 
was directed to cease his representations to Villa. Ob­
viously worried about Villa's possible response to the 
recognition, Lansing directed the agent to maintain his 
contacts on the border so the Department might be 
apprised of Villa's activities. Carothers dismantled the
equipment in his railroad car and did not thereafter
104return to Mexico. In late October he reported that
reliable informants in El Paso hinted that Villa might 
cross the border before reaching Agua Prieta and attack 
from the American side. Hastening to Douglas, Arizona, 
across from Agua Prieta, Carothers met an American news­
paperman who had just come from an interview with Villa.
The reporter claimed to have given an enraged Villa his
105first news of the recognition of Carranza.
In the dead of night, on November 2, Villa launched 
a massed cavalry attack on Agua Prieta from the Mexican
104 State Department to Carothers, October 19, 1915,
NA 1 1 1 . 70C22/16a; Carothers to State Department, October 
20, 1915, i b i d ./16.
^ ^ C a r o t h e r s  to State Department, October 21 , 24, 25,
27, 29, 1915/16541, 16580, 16588, 16606, 16627; Carothers 
to State Department, October 31, 1915, Foreign Relations, 
1915 , 775.
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side of the border. He was again soundly defeated, as 
powerful searchlights were used to illuminate the battle­
field. Rumor spread through the ranks of his retreating 
army that the searchlights had been located on the Ameri­
can side of the border. Added to this rumor was the fact 
that the State and War Departments had allowed the 
Carrancistas to send reinforcements to Agua Prieta via 
American railroad from Laredo, Texas. Villa had reason 
to nurse a monumental grudge against the United States. 
Carothers felt that after the defeat at Agua Prieta,
Villa was a bitter and vengeful an enemy as the United
10 6States had in the world.
Carothers now saw Villa as nothing more than a
menace. "He is absolutely irresponsible . . . ," the
agent reported, "and is capable of any extreme. No
promises nor assurances of good intentions can be relied 
10 7upon." Carothers joined Cobb in recommending that all
border ports be closed to Villa's commercial agents. 
Access to supplies would only sustain his opportunities 
to commit atrocities and resist the de facto government.^
106ciarence C. Clendenen, Blood on the B o r d e r : The
United States and the Mexican Irregulars (Toronto and 
London: The MacMillan Co., Collier-MacMillan, Ltd.,
1969), 186-88; Testimony of Carothers, Investigation of 
Mexican A f fairs, 1780.
^Carothers to State Department, November 8 , 1915/
16739.
•*-^Carothers to State Department, October 27, 
November 8 , 1915/16627, 16739; Cobb to State Department,
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Although Carothers made no more representations to 
Villa, he remained in Douglas to keep track of his former 
friend's whereabouts. He was there when General Obregon 
arrived on November 6 , to organize the pursuit of Villa. 
Although Obregon greeted Carothers cordially, he told 
American Army officers and representatives of the press 
that he resented the agent's presence. He charged that 
Carothers was an active paid agent of Villa and that he 
was persona non grata in Mexico. American military 
officials, uneasy after weeks of threatening conditions 
on the border, wanted nothing to hinder peaceful 
relations with Obregon. They joined Obregon in request­
ing that Carothers be relieved of his duties in Douglas. 
Realizing that his presence would only aggravate matters, 
the special agent returned to El Paso of his own
i ■«. • 109v o l i t i o n .
Although the State Department answered Obregon's 
charges against Carothers by claiming that he was no 
longer attached to Villa but had reverted to his former 
status as consular agent, officials in Washington realized 
that Constitutionalist hostility would prevent Carothers
November 2, 8 , 1915/16674, 16735.
109 Carothers to State Department, November 6 , 1915/ 
16733; Carothers to State Deparmtent, November 10 (two), 
1915, NA 1 1 1 .70C22/23 , 24 ; Col. H. J. Slocum to General 
Funston, November 9, 1915, Scott Papers, Box 20; New 
York T i m e s , November 7, 1915, II, p. 4; i b i d . . November 
12, 1915, p. 10; IS1 Democrata (Mexico City), November 
12, 1915.
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from ever again effectively representing the United States
in Mexico. Consequently, on December 4, Lansing,
evidently assuming that Carothers could take advantage of
one of the business opportunities previously offered to
him, notified the special agent that his services would
be terminated on December 31. It appeared that Carothers,
110like Villa, had served out his usefulness.
Justifiably distressed, Carothers reported that 
Constitutionalist hostility prevented him from even 
returning to his home in Tor reon and that business 
opportunities were not likely to come his way. These 
regrettable circumstances, he complained, resulted from 
his service to the Department. He requested, therefore, 
that he be retained in a different capacity. Coming to 
his ex-colleague's rescue, Canova called Carothers to 
Washington for conferences. Canova and Lansing, now 
fearing that Germany might be fomenting the border 
troubles, decided that Carothers, with all his contacts, 
was the man to make a continuing investigation of the 
border activities. Carothers was retained in this 
capacity until he resigned in 1918 to accept a business
'*''*'^ State Department, December 4, 1915, NA 111.
70C22/28a; New York T i m e s , November 8, 1915, p. 9.
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opportunity in the United States.
Carothers never again made representations to Pancho
Villa, but he kept track of the movements of Villa's 
112band. In fact, he reported to Washington on March 8 ,
1916, that Villa was directly south of Columbus, New 
Mexico, just a few miles from the border. He also warned 
Colonel H. J. Slocum, who commanded the American 
contingent at Columbus. Replying that his intelligence 
reports located Villa elsewhere, Slocum refused to 
accept the special agent's advice. Carothers bought a 
ticket on the next train to C o l u m b u s ; Villa arrived there 
first. At 4:00 a.m., March 9, Villa crossed the border 
into Columbus, killing seven Americans and burning several 
buildings. Arriving at 2:00 p.m., Carothers searched 
through two portfolios of documents found on the scene
111 Carothers to State Department, December 13, 1915, 
NA 1 1 1 .70C22/30; Canova to Carothers, December 24, 1915, 
ibid./28; State Department to Carothers, December 31, 
1915, ib i d ./28a. Too numerous to cite individually, 
documents in the State Department's 812.00 and 111.70C22 
files describe Carothers' movements and activities until 
his retirement in 1918.
112
Officials of Carranza's government continued to 
suspect an official relationship between Carothers and 
Villa. Consequently, the American's movements along the 
border were monitored. See Secretario de Relaciones 
Exteriores a Luis Cabrera, September 26, 1916, A G R E , L-E- 
729R, Leg. 8 ; Eduardo Bravo, ConsulMex, El Paso, a 
Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, December 17, 1916, 
ib i d . , L-E-800, Leg. 15; Sixto Spada a C. J. J. Pesquiera 
ConsulMex, Los Angeles, December 22, 1916, ib i d . , L-E- 
803; Pesquiera a Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, 
January 5, 1917, i b i d .
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113and quickly confirmed that Villa had made the attack.
The demand in the United States for intervention now be­
came too strong for even Wilson to resist. The result
was General John J. Pers h i n g ’s famous Punitive Expedition,
114which attempted to bring Villa to justice.
While troops and supplies were being massed in El
Paso for the Punitive Expedition, Carothers wrote to his
friend, General Scott, that "it looks like hell will be
popping soon, and I am in thorough accord with what is
being done." The documents found at Columbus, he
revealed, indicated that Villa had an "obsession to kill
Americans." He was inspiring his men by claiming "that
they could conquer the United States." Villista prisoners
that Carothers interrogated claimed tha^t their chief
suffered from "deliro de grandesa" (delusions of grandeur).
Carothers diagnosed Villa's malady similarly. "This is
a different man than we knew," he wrote to Scott. "All
the brutality of his nature has come to the front, and
115
he should be killed like a dog." Thus, even Carothers
113carothers to State Department, March 8 , 10, 1916/ 
17637, 17401; Carothers to Scott, March 5, 1916, Scott 
Papers, Box 22; Cobb to State Department, March 9, 1916, 
Foreign Relat i o n s , 1916 , 480; Testimony of Carothers, 
Investigation of Mexican A f f a i r s , 1781.
H ^ A r t h u r  S. Link, W i l s o n : Confus ions and Crises,
1915- 1916 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964),
205-209.
•*-^Carothers to Scott, March 13, 1916, Scott Papers,
Box 22.
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made the full cycle. Having helped to elevate Villa to a
position of prominence and political power, Carothers,
like his superiors, turned his back on the former ward of
the United States.
Silliman rejoined Carranza in early November, 1915.
He journeyed to Eagle Pass, Texas, in the company of John
Lind, who came to the border at the invitation of the
First Chief to receive personal thanks for his efforts in
1X6behalf of the Constitutionalists. Silliman was gi/en
a h e r o ’s welcome at Piedras Negras by Carranza and his
staff, much as if he had truly influenced the decision in
favor of recognition. The special agent's immediate
task was to ask the First Chief to do something about the
border troubles in the Lower Rio Grande Valley. Carranza
assured Silliman, as he already had Belt, that he had
ordered his officers to make every effort to prevent
bandits from crossing the border. Fatefully, Carranza
also suggested that the United States and Mexico enter
into an agreement that would give the nations mutual rights
117to cross the border in hot pursuit of bandits.
Silliman accompanied Carranza for the remainder of 
116W. P. Blocker, American Vice-Consul, Piedras 
Negras, to State Department, October 30, 1915/16650; San 
Antonio Express, November 5, 1915; New York S u n , November 
5, 1915.
^■^Silliman to State Department, November 3, 1915/ 
16686; Belt to State Department, November 2 (two), 1915/ 
16660, 16676.
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his tour through the northern states of Mexico, during 
which time the First Chief received the adulation he 
deserved but seldom received. Silliman continued making 
representations to the officials of the d_e facto govern­
ment. For the most part, the responses were more
118favorable than in the past. Silliman was with
Carranza in February, 1916, when he declared Quer^taro 
the provisional capital of Mexico and announced the call­
ing of a revolutionary convention to draft a new consti-
119tution for the Republic. On March 9, after V i l l a ’s
raid on Columbus, New Mexico, the agent was told to
inform the First Chief that President Wilson thought the
attack created "the most serious situation which has
confronted this government during the entire period of
Mexican unrest. . . ." Silliman was to urge Carranza to
immediately deploy as many troops as necessary to "pursue,
120
capture and exterminate" Villa and his band.
Distressed by the tone of the note from Washington, 
Carranza approached Silliman the following day and renewed 
118 Too numerous to cite individually, documents in 
the State Department’s 812.00 and 125.8276 files describe 
Silliman's tour with Carranza and his representations to 
the jie facto government.
119
Silliman to State Department, February 4 (two), 
1916/17217, 17227.
120
State Department to Silliman, March 9, 1916/
17382.
&
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his offer to allow authorities to pursue bandits across
the Mexican frontier, if the United States would grant
reciprocal rights to Mexico. Wilson and Lansing jumped
at the opportunity. Moving quickly, Lansing replied to
Silliman, on March 13, that the United States agreed to
the proposal and considered the arrangement to be
121
currently in effect. When Wilson did not request
specific permission for Pershing to cross the border, it
appeared momentarily that Carranza’s troops might block
the Punitive Expedition. On the eve of the expedition’s
scheduled entry into Mexico, Silliman eased tensions in
Washington when he reported from Queretaro that he had
spoken to both Obregon and Foreign Minister Cctndido
Aguilar and that they had approved and acquiesed to the
12 2sending of American troops to capture Villa.
The Punitive Expedition did provoke trouble between 
the United States and Carranza’s de. facto government, but 
Silliman played no part in the settlement. Acting under 
the assumption that Henry P. Fletcher would soon be 
confirmed by the Senate as Ambassador to Mexico, Lansing, 
in February, 1916, issued orders changing Silliman from 
121
Silliman to State Department, March 10, 1916, 
Foreign R e lations, 1 9 1 6 , 485; State Department to Silliman, 
March 13, 1916, ibid., 487-88.
122
Silliman to State Department, March 15, 1916,
ibid. , 491.
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his consular post at Saltillo to the more prestigious post
at Guadalajara. As it turned out, Fletcher was not
confirmed until March, 1917, because of antagonism between
the United States and Mexico that grew out of the
123
Punitive Expedition.
Silliman died at his post in Guadalajara on January 
124
17, 1919. Before moving to that city, he wrote an
emotion-charged letter to Lansing in June, 1916, reviewing 
his service near Carranza. Reminiscing on a particular 
conversation with the First Chief, Silliman recalled 
that he had said that "whatever good there was in the 
revolution could not be lost. It would remain a permanent 
benefit of the Mexican people . . .  If the revolution 
failed to establish an orderly government for Mexico," the 
agent had warned Carranza, "and if the task should fall, 
not by choice, but of neceysity, upon the United States, 
it would be solely because, after a fair trial, the men
125
of the revolution had proven themselves unequal to it."
In so speaking, Silliman probably summed up Woodrow 
Wilson's own thinking on the Mexican Revolution in the 
summer of 1916.
123gtate Department to all American Consuls in Mexico, 
March 18, 1916, NA 123.R61/158a; Register of the State De­
partment , 1917 , 137; New York T i m e s , February 23, 1916, p. 
2; Link, Confus ions and Crises, 290-91.
■*-^Register of the Department of State, 1922 (Wash­
ington: Government Printing Office, 1922), 179.
^ ^ S i l l i m a n  to Lansing, June 30, 1916, NA 125. 8276/6.
CONCLUSION
Because President Woodrow Wilson was the main 
architect of his foreign policy and exercised such an 
active and vocal role in its implementation, the roles 
played by his diplomats in the field have often been 
obscured. Such has been the case concerning the 
activities and influences of his executive agents who 
served in Mexico between May, 1913, and October, 1915. 
Although Wilsonian morality and missionary impulse pro­
vided a firm foundation for his Mexican policy, the 
executive agents, by their activities and advice, gave 
that policy substance and direction.
Wilson was particularly susceptible to the agent's 
advice when it was couched in moralistic terms. His 
intuitive feeling of revulsion toward Huerta and his 
regime, for example, was confirmed and intensified by the 
information received from agents William Bayard Hale and 
John Lind. They were New Freedom progressives, who viewed 
the Mexican situation through the prism of Anglo-American 
moral and political standards. They found Huerta's 
conduct totally reprehensible. Reporting in moralistic 
terms that touched Wilson's Puritan sensibilities, they
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helped convince the President that Huerta's ouster would 
result in great benefit for all the Mexican people.
After discovering what he thought to be a British oilman's 
conspiracy to sustain Huerta in power, Lind even persuaded 
his normally Anglophile president to court an Anglo- 
American confrontation over Mexican policy.
But Wilson could also be influenced by coldly 
realistic proposals from his agents. When Duval West, who 
found little in Mexico to praise, together with David 
Lawrence suggested as a realistic means of ending the 
civil war that the President recognize and support some 
government in Mexico, Wilson set in motion a policy that 
led to the recognition of Carranza.
More significantly, the agents influenced Wilson's 
attitude toward the Mexican Revolution. Paradoxically, 
Hale helped promote two different views. Because of his 
bungling behavior, Reginald Del Valle's anti-revolutionary 
views would not likely have influenced Wilson had they 
not been seconded by Hale. Together, the two agents 
temporarily convinced the President that the Consti­
tutionalists were unworthy of his support. Hale 
ultimately reversed his attitude. By the end of his 
service to the Administration, he revealed to Wilson that 
the rebels' program had merit. But more than Hale, it 
was Lind who became the early champion of the revo­
lutionaries. Motivated primarily by a burning desire to
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use them in eliminating Huerta, he at first feared their 
radicalism. After realizing that the Carrencista faction 
was composed of little more than middle-class reformers, 
he became their unabashed defender. In the process, he 
helped to educate Wilson to the fact that the revo­
lutionaries would ultimately create a constitutional 
regime that would better represent the Mexican people.
Other agents also contributed to a better understand­
ing of the revolutionaries. George Carothers, John 
Silliman, and Paul Fuller accepted the revolution on its 
own terms. All three understood Latin Americans and their 
brand of politics. They did not judge Mexicans by Anglo- 
American moral and political standards but only in terms 
of their apparent ability to aid their own people.
These three were the only ones who felt that the Mexicans 
could solve their own problems without constant American 
guidance.
Wilson did not listen to all advice concerning the 
revolutionaries. Perhaps because Lind suspected their 
radicalism, Wilson generally ignored the Zapat is ta s . Only 
briefly, while H. L. Hall was in Washington, were they 
given serious consideration. Because Hall was never 
accorded official status, his advice from Zapata's head­
quarters was largely ignored. Paradoxically, the revo­
lutionary leader of the South became the most enduring 
hero of the revolution.
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The interventionists also influenced the Adminis­
tration. Lind's constant pleas for American aid to the 
revolutionaries doubtless influenced Wilson's decisions to 
lift the arms embargo and land troops at Vera Cruz. Only 
after he met the Carrancista agents in the United States 
did Lind repudiate his interventionism.!?, When Leon J.
Canova first went to Mexico, he counseled that the Ad­
ministration must exercise a supervisory role over the 
revolutionaries in order to mitigate their extremist 
tendencies. His advice may well have contributed to the 
Administration's decision to promote Pancho Villa's 
ascendancy in Mexican politics.
Carothers was by far the most successful diplomat 
among the special agents. Because he was fluent in their 
language and colloquialisms and understood their nature, 
Carothers got along exceedingly well with the revo­
lutionaries. At first, he even maintained good relations 
with Carranza and succeeded in securing favorable 
judgments from the First Chief. Only after jealousy 
sprouted between Carranza and Villa and the State De­
partment directed him to concentrate on making repre­
sentations to Villa did Carothers' relations with the First 
Chief deteriorate. Carothers enjoyed remarkable success 
in is relations with Villa, especially in protecting 
foreign lives and property. Even when Villa had his 
back to the wall in the summer of 1915, Carothers, with
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the help of General Hugh L. Scott, was able to secure 
terms favorable to foreign property owners.
The records of the other diplomatic agents was more 
inconsistent. When he first arrived in Mexico, Lind 
gave promise of becoming an able shirt-sleeve diplomat; 
but ultimately these talents were overridden by his 
hatred for Huerta, making him callous, even hostile, 
toward all the Mexican officials with whom he dealt. 
Through no fault of his own, Hale got nowhere in 
attempting to influence Carranza along Anglo-American 
lines. Cool and calculating, Canova revealed a 
pragmatic ability to get along well with all Mexican 
factions. His diplomatic talents were never fully 
utilized and were ultimately forefeited when he was 
forced to interfere in the crude process of revolutionary 
justice. Silliman was never effective. His inability to 
express himself adequately in Spanish and his maudlin 
behavior in the First Chief's presence early marked him 
as a weakling. We can only conjecture at Lawrence's 
possible effectiveness. By the time he was brought into 
play, the die was cast, and his mission had virtually no 
influence on the course of relations with Carranza.
Wilson's executive agents also influenced the 
revolutionaries and the course of the revolution. Lind's 
prolonged stay in Mexico may well have hardened Huerta's 
will to remain in power. This in turn helped to insure
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that the usurper would be ousted by the revolutionaries. 
Thus, the final settlement, instead of being a half-way 
or compromise arrangement, helped to insure that Mexico's 
reform needs were satisfied. In influencing the Ad­
ministration in favor of the revolutionaries, Lind played 
an even more critical role. Because Wilson favored a 
revolutionary settlement, he would countenance no plan to 
end the strife in Mexico that would not leave the revo­
lutionaries in command.
Carothers influenced the situation in Mexico even more 
than did Lind. Within weeks of the outset of his mission, 
he was an outspoken champion of the Constitutionalists 
and sought to aid their cause. Since his attitudes were 
formed through associations with the Villistas, it was 
natural, when the split with Carranza came, that he should 
favor Villa. Indeed, his activities abetted the Villa- 
Carranza split. As Carranza charged, the very fact that 
Villa was accorded special representation from the United 
States encouraged his insubordination toward his chief.
Even if American meddling did help bring on a rupture in 
the revolutionary ranks, the long-run results were 
beneficial. Out of this dispute came the agreement to call 
a revolutionary convention. The tenor of the convention, 
when it met at Aguascalientes, exhibited to Carranza that 
his Plan of Guadalupe was inadequate to satisfy the wants 
and needs of the revolutionaries.
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Carothers' despatches, along with Canova's and 
Fuller's, were probably as influential as any other factor 
in Wilson's decision to promote Villa's ascendancy in 
Mexican politics. Until late summer, 1915, Carothers gave 
a uniformly favorable impression of Villa. It was 
through Carothers that Villa displayed his open show of 
friendship after the Vera Cruz incident. It was also 
through Carothers that Villa showed his willingness to be 
guided by the United States.
Under the tutelage of Carothers and General Scott, 
Villa showed promise of becoming the outstanding figure 
in the Mexican Revolution. That Carothers' presence 
provided a calming and steadying effect on Villa is 
exhibited by the fact that the Mexican general's 
depredations were always less numerous and severe when 
the American was by his side. Even the Villistas 
acknowledged that Carothers had more influence over their 
leader than they did themselves.
Carothers even acted as an unofficial minister of 
foreign affairs for Villa. He undertook (not always at 
the direction of the State Department) to represent Villa 
to other revolutionary factions. Seeking to conciliate 
the Villistas and Carrancistas, he involved himself in 
the negotiations leading to the Pact of Torreon and to 
the final agreement to call the Convention of 
Aguascalientes. Carothers promoted the abortive Villa-
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Obrego'n axis. He helped arrange the first meeting between 
Villa and Zapata. Along with Canova, he attended that 
conference and counseled the two revolutionary leaders on 
what behavior would make the best impression in the 
United States and throughout the world. Carothers* role 
as a diplomatic representative for Villa, however, 
reached its zenith when the American came to Washington 
in late summer, 1914, to plead the case of the Villistas 
to his own superiors.
To a lesser degree, Canova and Silliman also became 
involved in Mexican politics. Canova lent his support 
to promoting Villa's ascendancy. He also helped hold 
Villa in check when the Centaur of the North threatened to 
assassinate Obrego'n and scuttle any chance of a revo­
lutionary convention. While the convention met at 
Aguascalientes, he sought to eliminate Carranza by en­
couraging a conspiracy involving unscrupulous Americans 
and a rebel general, Lucio Blanco. Having established 
cordial relations with all the factions within the 
Conventionist camp, he was prepared to promote their 
interests, until he aided Eduardo Iturbide and lost their 
friendship. Silliman exercised no influence over the 
Carrancistas. His despatches seldom contained enough 
favorable comment to serve as pro-Carranza propaganda.
But twice he went to Washington in the First Chief's 
behalf, and the second time he provided evidence that may
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have helped the Administration present to the Pan 
American conference a plausible case for the recognition 
of Carranza.
The activities of Carothers and Silliman point up a 
failing in the State Department's use of special agents 
in Mexico. Carothers was chosen because on one occasion 
he was able to establish cordial relations with Villa, 
Silliman because he was an old friend of Carranza's. Hall, 
although he never served officially, was chosen for 
similar reasons. Such reasons for tendering appointments 
were not in themselves bad. But by countenancing the 
agents' activities in behalf of one or another revolutionary 
faction, the Department implicitly encouraged them to 
become too personally involved. As a result, each agent 
allowed his admiration for a particular factional leader 
to blind him to that leader's shortcomings. For example, 
it was months after Villa began to reveal that he lacked 
the emotional stability to be an adequate leader for an 
entire nation before Carothers acknowledged that short­
coming .
Another noticeable failing of the Department's 
system of representation was the lack of communication 
between the agents accredited to the different factions. 
Wilson's supreme desire was that the leaders of Mexico 
find some peaceful settlement which would embody the 
necessary reforms. Yet there was no attempt to coordinate
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the efforts of the agents toward that end. Without 
consulting one another, each made separate appeals to 
different factional leaders and, in reply to Washington, 
promoted the interests of one faction, often presenting 
a hostile attitude toward the others.
Although each of the agents, State Department and 
Presidential, exhibited a bias of some sort, all were 
diligent in pursuing their tasks. Charges of corruption 
touched four of them— Carothers, Silliman, Canova, and 
West. The charges of accepting bribes leveled by the 
Zap at is t as at Silliman, Canova and West were without 
foundation. The charges that Carothers accepted favors 
from Villa are difficult to ignore. They came from 
numerous and varied sources, including Agent Canova. 
Whatever the validity of the charges, Carothers seems to 
have benefited little in the long run. He lost virtually 
everything he owned in Mexico and, after August, 1915, 
was never even able to return to his home in Torreon.
Undoubtedly, the inconsistent meddling of Wilson 
and his executive agents in Mexican affairs left a 
legacy of animosity which took years to erase. But in 
the end, Wilson did respect the independence of Mexico. 
Mexico did not become a protectorate of the United 
States. Although he intervened twice with armed forces, 
both times the troops were withdrawn and the Mexicans
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were allowed to continue their revolution until they had 
reached their own settlement.
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